

MEDIAEVAL STUDIES

Volume XXVII

1965



PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES
TORONTO, CANADA

THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED
TO THE MEMORY OF
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Subscription \$14.00 a Year

Mediaeval Studies does not accept books for review

Reprinted in the Netherlands
ACADEMISCHE PERS N.V. — AMSTERDAM

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Gerald Bernard Phelan

1892 - 1965

THE Right Reverend Gerald B. Phelan was born in Halifax, Nova Scotia, on August 26, 1892 and died in Toronto, Ontario, on May 30, 1965. His death brought to an end a long career whose greater part was devoted to the Pontifical Institute in Toronto. His death also marked the end of the pioneering era of Thomistic studies on the North American continent that began before the First World War.

Gerald B. Phelan was educated in Halifax, at St. Patrick's School and High School, St. Mary's College, and Holy Heart Seminary. He received an S.T.B. degree from The Catholic University of America (1915), an M.A. from St. Francis Xavier University (1918), a Ph.D. from the University of Louvain (1924) and an Agrégé en Philosophie from the same institution (1925). He was ordained a priest on December 27, 1914 and made a Domestic Prelate (Halifax) on January 15, 1960. His honors were many. He was a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada and of The Canadian Academy of St. Thomas, as well as a member of the Société Philosophique de Louvain. In 1959-1960 he served as President of Section II, the Royal Society of Canada. He was an active member of many learned societies, including the Humanities Research Council of Canada and The American Catholic Philosophical Association, of which latter he was the President in 1931. A Mercier Medalist in 1925, an Aquinas Medalist in 1959, Father Phelan received an honorary LL.D. from Duquesne University (1938), the University of Toronto (1952), and St. Mary's University in Halifax (1958).

Though he remained a priest of the Diocese of Halifax to the end of his life, Father Phelan spent thirty-four of the last forty years in Toronto. He came to St. Michael's College in 1925 as a Professor of Psychology and for the next twenty years (1926-1946) served as a Professor of Philosophy in the College and in the School of Graduate Studies of the University of Toronto. In 1926 and 1927 he joined in a slowly developing plan, sponsored by the Congregation of St. Basil and St. Michael's College, to establish in Toronto an advanced institute of philosophical studies. The center of interest of the new school was to be medieval philosophy and especially the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. Although the pursuit of this idea was a cooperative effort involving many zealous colleagues, it is not inappropriate to single

out the names of four of them in the establishment of the new venture. These were the Reverend Henry Carr, at that time a General Councillor, and within a year destined to become Superior General of the Basilian Fathers, the Reverend Edmund J. McCorkell, then Superior of St. Michael's College, Father Phelan, and Professor Etienne Gilson, who visited Toronto for the first time while lecturing at Harvard University during the 1926-1927 school year. The result of their planning was the Institute of Mediaeval Studies, which was formally opened in September, 1929.

From 1929 to 1931 Father Phelan organized and directed the first library of the new Institute. From 1931 to 1936, under the Presidency of Father Carr, Father Phelan was Co-Director with Professor Gilson of the Institute, helping to develop and define its program of studies, its research, and its relations to the University of Toronto. In this connection special mention should be made of the close and personal friendship between Father Phelan and Professor George S. Brett, then Head of the Department of Philosophy and Dean of the School of Graduate Studies, University of Toronto. Father Phelan became President of the Institute in 1937 and held that office until 1946. In 1939, during his presidency, the Institute was honored with a pontifical charter by Pope Pius XII and became the only institution of its kind in the new world. In 1946, preferring to continue his work as a builder and an administrator, Father Phelan founded and directed The Mediaeval Institute at the University of Notre Dame, serving at the same time as Head of the Department of Philosophy. In failing health, he relinquished these positions at Notre Dame in 1952 and returned to Toronto as Professor of Philosophy in the Institute, the College and the University. Deteriorating health permitted him very little teaching after 1961, and for the last two years of his life he was in full retirement from his duties.

From a purely external point of view, the most extraordinary thing about Father Phelan was that neither his temperament nor his advanced training prepared him to engage so intensely in the work of the Institute. He was trained as a philosopher and psychologist, not as a medievalist or a historian, though he had a deep understanding of medieval philosophy. His dissertation, written under the direction of Professor Albert Michotte at Louvain, was entitled *Feeling Experience and Its Modalities*. Moreover, there is no doubt that to the end of his days Father Phelan was absorbed by purely speculative questions and especially by the metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas, and even more especially by the mysteries hidden in the Thomistic notion of *esse*. Few men had his metaphysical penetration and his grasp of the

principles of St. Thomas Aquinas. Yet circumstances seemed to divert the pure philosopher so that, soon after completing his graduate studies, he found himself immersed in the establishment and the development of a historically-minded research Institute. By training a psychologist, by interest and talent a gifted metaphysician, Father Phelan yet came to devote the greater part of his academic life to a school of medieval studies and to spend his time unstintingly in dealing with its needs and its purposes. He was, in turn, a willing builder, a tireless promoter, a brilliant teacher, a painstaking director of studies, an exacting president, and (last not least) an endlessly patient guide for perplexed graduate students, young and old. He had a passionate love for the Institute and he yielded to none in his loyalty to the message that the Church wished to teach in making it a Pontifical Institute. Any appreciation of Father Phelan's career must begin with this remarkable fact. The most contemporary of men, for whom, as he wrote in 1937, Jacques Maritain was *The Philosopher* of the twentieth century, was devoting himself at the same time to building and directing what was to be a school of historical studies.

In part, the paradox is a matter of circumstance. Like other pioneers, Father Phelan did what needed to be done, and did it selflessly. But this is only part of the truth. In what he did Father Phelan remained faithful to his original interests. The extraordinary fact about Father Phelan is that, deeply engaged as he increasingly became in the work of the Institute, he yet managed to achieve within himself the fulfillment of the most personal intellectual interests that had been awakened in him in his seminary days in Halifax. When Father Phelan was ordained a priest in 1915, he was in possession of the fundamental threads of his life—his dedication to his own priesthood, to the Church, to the Church's recommendation to follow the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas, and to the Thomistic metaphysics of being as act that he saw so vividly and taught so emphatically throughout his career. The most formative influence that Father Phelan experienced—apart from his vocation to the priesthood—was his introduction to metaphysics under the guidance of a young Eudist Father, le Père Marie D'Auvergne, who, as Father Phelan acknowledged in 1959, opened his mind to the crucial importance of the concept of being in the history of philosophy. Father Phelan was reading the *Quaestiones Disputatae* of St. Thomas as far back as 1910, and he was then listening to his young teacher explaining the role of *esse* in the theology of the Trinity and the Incarnation. One can imagine Father Phelan's absorbed delight in becoming acquainted with a work that was to remain a favorite and constant companion of his life, the

De Veritate of St. Thomas. Father Phelan began living in the rich world of the *De Veritate* when he was scarcely twenty, and he never left it. On the contrary, he built his whole life within it, and he brought his friends and students there as though it was his home. And indeed it was.

One would have had to know the man himself over a period of years to realize how deeply attached Father Phelan remained to the intellectual world of St. Thomas, how happy and free he felt within its atmosphere. It was within that world that he formed his career and made the great intellectual friendships of his life, especially those with his teachers in Louvain, with Jacques Maritain and with Etienne Gilson. It was within the same world of the *De Veritate* that Father Phelan entered the study of the history of philosophy. For him such a study was part of the unfolding of truth in history rather than a collection of assorted intellectual specimens. And though Father Phelan took up and used the tools of historical scholarship in his work at the Institute and in his writing, the ground on which he stood was the world of truth that he had learned from St. Thomas, and the stamp that he gave to the intellectual life of the Institute in its early days was a strongly metaphysical one.

We have only to read his lectures on St. Anselm and St. Augustine to realize that, enormously sensitive as he could be to what was personal and unique in these men and their teaching, Father Phelan saw them in relation to the teaching of St. Thomas—as though he preferred, like a great artist, to paint the whole world of Christian wisdom on one canvas and to make St. Augustine, St. Anselm and St. Thomas citizens of one and the same Christian universe even in the very variety of their colors. Perhaps the intense vision of the theologian influenced the eye of the philosopher in Father Phelan; but there is no doubt that, while fully allowing for the contingencies and the movement of history, he was absorbed by the drama of ideas in the minds of men and the history of philosophy was for him a dialogue among thinkers whom he could locate in one and the same world of truth.

Father Phelan served the Institute at a crucial moment in its history. As a teacher and president, he helped give to it an identity and a direction. He helped prepare the transition that the Institute went through in the late 30's when a returning staff of trained specialists made it, for the first time, the medieval center it has been ever since. If, by their breadth and scholarship, Professor Gilson's lectures on medieval philosophy opened the minds of students to the vitality of Christian thinkers from St. Augustine to Duns Scotus and after, Father

Phelan's lectures focussed their attention on the metaphysics of St. Thomas and gave to them an experience of that same existentialism which, in a different way and with a vaster synthesis in view, Gilson himself was building at the very same time. It was a remarkable experience for students to see two such men, temperamentally so different, not only cooperate in the work of the Institute but also complement one another in the convergence of their philosophical appreciation of the metaphysics of St. Thomas.

Father Phelan was not a voluminous writer, as the accompanying bibliography will show. His metaphysical papers were, at once, his best and most typical writing. He was most himself as a teacher, explaining patiently and meticulously how for St. Thomas *ens dicitur ab actu essendi*. He liked to say that for St. Thomas *esse* involved three different elements, namely, *subsistere*, *tendere*, and *requiescere*. He now knows the full meaning of the teaching he served so faithfully.

Anton C. PEGIS.

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies

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Quiddity and Real Distinction in St Thomas Aquinas

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I

NOT only in the tradition of school manuals stemming from the nineteenth century revival of scholasticism,¹ but also in weightier monographs and discussions,² has a separate argument for the distinction between essence and existence been taken from the simple inspection of a sensible thing's nature. What a stone or a tree is, according to the argument, does not show whether the stone or tree really exists. The definition, that is, the formula expressing the thing's quidditative content, does not include any indication of the thing's existence. On inspection, consequently, the distinction between a thing's essence and existence is apparent.

The text from St. Thomas quoted regularly in support of this position is the well-known passage from *De Ente et Essentia* :

Omnis autem essentia uel quidditas potest intelligi sine hoc quod aliquid intelligatur de esse suo; possum enim intelligere quid est homo uel fenix

¹ E.g., M. Liberatore, *Institutiones Philosophicae*, 1a ed. novae formae (Prati, 1881), I, 263; J. J. Urraburù, *Institutiones Philosophicae*, 2nd ed. (Paris & Rome, 1891), II, 712 (maintaining conceptual distinction, followed by rejection of real distinction on p. 728); D. Mercier, *Ontologie*, 3rd ed. (Louvain & Paris, 1902), 111-112 (no. 48); J. Gredt, *Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae*, 7th ed. (Freiburg i. Breisgau, 1937), II, 107-108 (no. 705, arg. II; cf. no. 708, p. 113, for text of St. Thomas).

² E.g., N. Del Prado, *De Veritate Fundamentali Philosophiae Christianae* (Fribourg, Switzerland, 1911), 55-58 (cf. 44-46); C. Fabro, *La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione*, 2nd ed. (Turin, 1950), 218-219; A. Forest, *La Structure Métaphysique du Concret selon Saint Thomas d'Aquin*, 2nd ed. (Paris 1956), 148; L. Sweeney, "Existence/Essence in Thomas Aquinas's Early Writings," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Ass'n*, XXXVII (1963), 105-109 (cf. 129-130). Forest, 148-149, notes: "Mais cet argument, on le voit, ne permet pas à la rigueur d'affirmer l'existence d'une distinction réelle; on ne dit pas du tout que l'essence soit une réalité, ni qu'elle compose à ce titre avec l'existence; de tels textes pourraient fort bien s'interpréter dans l'hypothèse d'une simple distinction de raison fondée."

et tamen ignorare an esse habeat in rerum natura. Ergo patet quod esse est aliud ab essentia uel quidditate.³

These lines state clearly enough that a distinction of being and essence emerges from the lack of any real being in a thing's essence considered just in itself. Could anything be more obvious than this conclusion, when left in the vague generality of some kind of distinction between thing and being? But the exact character of the argument, and the exact type of distinction it establishes, may not prove so easy to determine.

What, then, is the character of the argument? It has been given various names. It has been called, for instance, the "logical argument"⁴ for the real distinction between essence and existence. What force has the designation? If it suggests that the argument belongs to the realm in which the science of logic functions, the title of course gives a false impression. Logic is concerned with things as they exist in the human mind under the notions of individual, species, genus, subject, predicate, and the like— notions that are technically called second intentions.⁵ The present argument of St. Thomas, however, envisages objects of the first intention, such as the nature of a man or of a phoenix. It is not at all restricted to things as they are brought under the order of logic.

The bearing of the argument is, in fact, clear enough against its background in the text of *De Ente et Essentia*. A nature or essence, such as man, can be considered absolutely, that is, as just in itself. So taken, it is neither one nor many, neither existent in any mind nor existent in any individual in the real world. It abstracts from all being whatsoever.⁶ From the viewpoint of the absolute considera-

³ Le "*De Ente et Essentia*" de S. Thomas d'Aquin, ed. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, reprint (Paris, 1948), c. IV, p. 34.10-15. For list of other occurrences of the argument in St. Thomas, see Fabro, 218; Sweeney, 105-106.

⁴ Cf. "di natura logica"; "forma logica del arg."; "ratio logica". Fabro, p. 218.

⁵ "Et huiusmodi, scilicet ens rationis, est proprie subiectum logicae. Huiusmodi autem intentiones intelligibiles, entibus naturae equiparantur, eo quod omnia entia naturae sub consideratione rationis cadunt. Et ideo subiectum logicae ad omnia se extendit, de quibus ens naturae praedicatur." In *IV Metaph.*, lect. 4, Cathala no. 574. Cf. "cum sit de secundo intellectis," In *Boeth. de Trin.* VI, 1 (2), ad 3m; ed. B. Decker (Leiden, 1955), p. 210.14.

⁶ *De Ente*, c. III; pp. 24.1-26.9. Cf. "absoluta consideratio naturae senarii, prout abstrahit a quolibet esse," *Quodl.*, VIII, 1, ad 1m; "natura senarii, prout abstrahit a quolibet esse huiusmodi," *ibid.*, ad 3m. The background for this way of reasoning is the Avicennian doctrine that animality (or equinity, or humanity) just in itself is neither one nor many, nor existent either in sensible things or in the mind. For texts, see my study "Common Nature: A Point of Comparison Between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics," *Mediaeval*

tion, any being, being in the mind as well as being in reality, is lacking to the quiddity of every sensible thing. As presented to human cognition, of course, the essence always has to have some being, either being in a really existent individual or being in the subject that happens to be knowing it. Just in itself, that is, in what pertains to it solely from the viewpoint of its absolute consideration, it can never be a direct and immediate object of thought. It is always immediately known under some one of the existences to which it is open. It cannot be conceptualized in simple apprehension without simultaneous cognition of its existence, real or intentional as the case may be, through judgment. The existence that inevitably accompanies the essence that is known will therefore always be apprehended in conjunction with it. But the existence, no matter what kind, is not apprehended in the act of cognition by which the essence is grasped. It is apprehended through another operation of the mind, namely judgment.⁷ What is known through simple apprehension does not manifest any being whatsoever. Considered from that viewpoint, the essence is taken in its absolute consideration, or just in itself. From that viewpoint, it may be known without any indication whether or not it exists in the real world, and without any knowledge of its intentional existence other than the knowledge given by the accompanying act of judgment.

The quiddity that comes under scrutiny in the present argument, therefore, is not the quiddity just as it has existence in the mind, nor the quiddity just as it has real existence in sensible individuals, but the quiddity in its absolute consideration. In this consideration the nature is antecedent⁸ to the subject of logic and to the subjects

Studies, 19 (1957), 1-4. The conclusion that the essence so considered abstracts from all being whatsoever is, however, peculiarly characteristic of St. Thomas.

⁷ "Cum in re duo sint, quidditas rei, et esse ejus, his duobus respondet duplex operatio intellectus. Una quae dicitur a philosophis formatio, qua apprehendit quidditates rerum, . . . Alia autem comprehendit esse rei, . . ." *In I Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Solut.; ed. Mandonnet (Paris, 1929), I, 903. Cf. "Secunda vero operatio respicit ipsum esse rei, . . ." *In Boeth. de Trin.*, V, 3c; ed. Decker, p. 182.9-10. To be known, the thing has to exist at least in the mind: "...quidquid cognoscitur, aliquo modo oportet esse, ad minus in ipso cognoscente." *In I Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 4, Solut.; I, 905. The example of the eclipse, as used along with the phoenix by St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, Solut. (II, 87—text *infra*, n. 32), shows clearly enough that he has Aristotle (*APo.*, II 2,90a25-30; 8,93a23-b7) in mind in the distinction between the *an sit* and the quiddity. Yet in Aristotle the meaning was very different—with demonstrables the *an sit* had to be known before the *quid sit*.

⁸ "In his ergo illud quod est prius, semper est ratio posterioris; . . . et inde est quod hoc quod competit naturae secundum absolutam considerationem, est ratio quare competit

of metaphysics and of natural philosophy. Accordingly it is common to both the real and the logical realms, in the sense that it may be given either real existence in the world of nature or intentional existence as individual or species or genus in the mind.

The term "logical" in this connection, then, cannot be understood as locating the argument within the science of logic. If the term is to be used at all, it will have to function with the ancient Greek meaning of *logos* as a "notion" or "definition". It will have the sense of the Scholastic *ratio*, in signifying what the definition expresses. It will mean the argument from the definition of the thing. Consequently it will not be describing an argument from concepts, when concepts are understood as notions that exist only in the mind. On the other hand, though, it will not allow the argument to be restricted to a proof from a nature determined to real existence. A mythical phoenix as well as a real man may serve as an example for the starting point. Rather, the argument considers a nature in abstraction from real existence as well as from cognitional existence. It is examining the nature from the viewpoint of its absolute consideration, that is, as antecedent to the nature in real existence or in cognitional existence, and as common to both.

It has also been called the argument from the contingency of creatures.⁹ A creature's existence, because not contained within its essence, is thereby established as contingent. Since everything pertaining to the essence is a necessary characteristic of the thing, the distinction of the existence from the essence is from this angle immediately apparent. As contingent, the existence of the thing is obviously distinct from necessary traits. In this somewhat developed form, the argument has had a long history in Thomistic tradition.¹⁰

naturae alicui secundum esse quod habet in singulari, et non e converso. ...et ipsa natura absolute considerata et in singularibus est ratio intellectus humani, et quodammodo mensura ipsius." *Quodl.*, VIII, 1c.

⁹ Gredt, II, 107 (no. 705)—"ex contingentia creaturae."

¹⁰ See the way in which this form of the argument is equated with the "de intellectu essentiae" form by Capreolus: "...nulla rosa existente, haec est vera, essentia rosae non existit nec est, vel, essentia rosae est non existens. Ergo cum non esse vere praedicetur de essentia rosae, non est idem, in rosa, essentia rosae et ejus esse existentiae. Potest etiam ista ratio poni, sub aliis verbis, alia forma; scilicet: illud quod non est de intellectu essentiae, immo est tale quod essentia potest vere intelligi sub opposito illius, non est idem realiter cum ipsa essentia;..." *Defensiones Theologiae*, In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, la concl.; ed. Paban-Pègues (Turin, 1900), I, 309a. Cf. "...praedicata quiditativa conveniunt rei absque omni causa effectiva, existentia autem non convenit rei nisi per aliquod efficiens: ergo praedicata quiditativa et existentia rei distinguuntur realiter... Seclusa omni causali-

It may call, however, for one remark concerning the use of the term "contingent" in this respect. Strictly, in the terminology of St. Thomas, only material things are contingent beings. Angels and human souls are necessary beings, in the sense that their essences contain no principle tending to destruction, as matter tends in sensible things.¹¹ The term "accidental", therefore, seems more appropriate in the present context. It is used regularly by St. Thomas to characterize the union between essence and existence in creatures.¹²

Another designation given the proof is the *intellectus essentiae* argument.¹³ The title expresses the scope of the argument very neatly. "Intellectus" has here of course the sense of "understanding" or "notion". It signifies that one can understand what a thing is, without arriving at any knowledge of its existence. It means that the notion of the essence does not include any grasp of the thing's existence. Accordingly the notion of the thing's essence is a notion that runs out or exhausts itself completely without having brought within its scope any existence at all. "Notion" in this sense does not mean a concept that exists only in the mind. It signifies rather the quiddity or essence that is grasped in and by the concept. It is used in the way in which "man" may be said to be one notion, while "tree" and "stone" and "white" are other notions. In a word, it means the thing's quidditative content. The designation implies that the thing's entire quidditative content does not manifest any existence.

Under all these designations, therefore, the force of the argument

tate effectiva respectu rosae, quaero an ista sit vera, Rosa est substantia corporea; si sic habeo intentum, si non, ergo rosa absolute sumpta non est in praedicamento..." Cajetan, *In De Ente et Essentia*, q. XII; ed. M.-H. Laurent (Turin, 1934), 157 (no. 100). "Et tamen praedicata quidditativa conveniunt Petro semper et sub quacumque consideratione; nam convenientia humanae naturae cum Petro abstrahit a tempore, includit necessitatem absolutam, est convenientia per se, et implicat non posse de Petro praedicari talem naturam. *Esse* autem quod est actus existendi, competit Petro, non semper, non sub quacumque consideratione; ac nullam implicantiam involvit hoc quod Petrus non existat; etenim convenientia existentiae cum Petro pendet ab alio et excludit necessitatem inter praedicatum et subiectum: est, inquam, convenientia per aliud et accidentalis." Del Prado, *De Ver. Fund.*, 46.

¹¹ See *S T*, I, 104, 1, ad 1m; *De Pot.*, V, 3. Discussion of the question may be found in C. Fabro, "Intorno alla Nozione 'Tomista' di Contingenza," *Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica*, 30 (1938), 132-149; A. Maurer, "Henry of Harclay's Questions on Immortality," *Mediaeval Studies*, 19 (1957), 79-89.

¹² E.g., "esse quod est accidens essentiae," *In I Sent.*, d. 28, expos. textus; ed. Mandonnet, I, 684. See also texts *infra*, nn. 28 and 29.

¹³ Sweeney, *art. cit.*, 105. Cf. Capreolus text, *supra*, n. 10.

lies in the examination of the content of a sensible thing's essence taken just in itself or absolutely. Can the content of the essence, though, actually be examined with sufficient thoroughness to show that no existence is found within its embrace? Man's intellectual penetration into the sensible thing's essence does not go further than the generic grade of corporeity. The specific differentiae, as St. Thomas¹⁴ frequently has occasion to mention, remain impervious to human cognition. Is the generic penetration sufficient to show that the sensible thing's nature absolutely considered abstracts from all being, both from being in reality and from being in cognition?

The answer to this question should be found in the reasoning by which the *De Ente et Essentia*¹⁵ has shown why a nature just in itself abstracts from all being. The same nature is found existent both in real individuals and in the mind. If the nature as such included either way of existing, it would necessarily be restricted to that particular way of existing and therefore would not be able to exist in any other way. If human nature of itself were such that it required existence in the individual called Socrates, it could never be found outside the really existent Socrates. Its very essence would involve existence in Socrates, and could not remain itself without existing in Socrates. The only existence it could allow would be in that one individual man. It could never exist in any other individual or in any mind. On the other hand, if to exist in a mind were of the nature of humanity, humanity could not be humanity without thereby having existence that was cognitional. Humanity would be restricted to existence in the mind. In point of fact, however, human nature exists both in real individual instances and in the minds of those who think about it. In itself, accordingly, it abstracts from all the ways in which it may exist.

Such is the reasoning of St. Thomas. Does it show that a generic grasp of corporeal nature is sufficient to guarantee the application of the reasoning to all bodies, in spite of ignorance regarding their specific differentiae? A corporeal nature, insofar as it is a nature, obviously can exist either in a real stone or tree or horse, or in the minds of those who happen to be thinking about it. Of itself it is open to all these ways of existing. Whether it is found in a metal or in a liquid or in an animal or in a man, it is something that of itself is not determined to any particular act of existing. No specific

¹⁴ Passages listed in Roland-Gosselin, *op. cit.*, 40, n. 2.

¹⁵ Chapter III, 25.9-27.10. On the background, see *supra*, n. 6.

differentia can do away with that condition. If it did, it would do away with corporeal nature as such. As long as generic corporeal nature is present in a thing, it requires that the thing be undetermined of itself to any particular act of existing. The generic condition, because required by the generic essence, cannot be altered by any specific differentia. Even though the specific differentiae are impenetrable to human cognition, they remain specific differentiae of *bodies*, that is, of things whose nature as corporeal requires that they remain open to various acts of existing.

Ignorance of specific differentiae of bodies has accordingly no bearing on the conclusion that any body, by the very fact that it is a body, of itself lacks particular existential determination. Its generic nature as a body requires that it be open to multiple ways of existing. Generic knowledge of anything as a body, therefore, is sufficient to show that it can exist in the world of nature in individual instances if it is truly an essence, and that it can exist in many minds when it is known by them. Neither way of existing is found within its essence, regardless of what the specific differentia may be. Merely generic knowledge of a thing as a body, therefore, amply suffices to show that the quidditative content of anything corporeal does not include existence.

These considerations should be enough to place the general character of the argument beyond all doubt. Under whatever name the argument goes, its probative force lies in a sufficient scrutiny of a thing's nature to show that no existence is contained within it. *What* the thing is does not manifest any existence. A sensible thing's nature or quiddity, taken just in itself, is something that is open to existence but does not contain existence. The argument rests on an examination of *what* the thing is, namely of the essence as expressed by the definition. In the content of the quiddity no existence is found, and accordingly the quiddity appears as distinct from the existence it happens to have. But the quiddity taken in abstraction from existence is the nature in its absolute consideration. The argument, then, proceeds from the nature absolutely considered, from the nature as it is the formal ground or *ratio*¹⁶ of its occurrence in individuals or in the mind. The starting point is neither the nature as it is in the real order nor the nature as it exists in cognition, but the nature as it abstracts from both ways of existing. It may well be described, therefore, as the argument from the simple inspection of a sensible thing's quidditative content.

¹⁶ See *supra*, n. 8.

II

With the general character of the argument established, the question about the kind of distinction it demonstrates may be approached. Does it show a real distinction between the quidditative content and the existence? Or does it rather show that the mind is forming two concepts, one of the thing's essence and the other of the thing's existence? In the latter case the question could still be left open whether the same reality is known differently in each of the two concepts, in accord with different aspects really present in it, or whether two different realities correspond respectively to the two concepts, or whether in the one and the same reality what correspond respectively to the two concepts are really distinct independently of the mind's activity. But that could be a further question not touched upon by the argument, in the event that it establishes only a conceptual distinction.

That the argument does establish a conceptual distinction is, as already noted, quite obvious. The sensible thing's nature is conceived in abstraction from its existence. In that concept of it, no existence is present. It is conceived as open to existence, as able to have existence in the mind or in real individuals. The existence, accordingly, is represented in a separate concept. It is represented as something that the nature receives. There are clearly two concepts involved, one of the thing's essence and the other of the thing's existence. This conceptual distinction appears at once in the assertion that no creature exists through its own essence, but rather through the existence it receives from its efficient cause.

Does the argument show further that the essence and the existence are really distinct? Difficulties arise immediately when this question is asked. How can the essence in its absolute consideration be represented as having enough consistency to be joined to what is really other than itself? How can it be represented as a real unity just in itself, as a really distinct component able to enter into a union with what really is not itself? Of itself it has no unity, it is neither one nor many. Apart from its existence, moreover, it is really nothing. The old objection of Suarez rings out as strongly as ever: "How can an act be impressed upon that which is nothing?"¹⁷ The very

¹⁷ "Quo modo enim potest actus imprimi ei quod nihil est? Actus enim non imprimitur nisi potentiae receptivae: essentia autem sub ea consideratione non est in potentia receptiva, sed mere objectiva." Suarez, *Disp. Metaph.*, XXXI, 3, 5; ed. Vivès, XXVI, 234b. According

character of the argument, proceeding as it does from the essence in its absolute consideration, precludes the possibility of representing the essence as a reality distinct from the existence received. The quidditative content, taken just in itself in abstraction from existence, appears as exactly nothing when the attempt is made to represent it, on the simple inspection of the thing's essence, as really distinct from its existence. It is no longer a reality.

As found in the *De Ente et Essentia*, the same way of arguing shows the distinction between the individual and its specific nature. Of itself the nature is neither one nor many. It is open to many individuals and is restricted to no one of them in particular. Neither unity nor plurality belongs to it in its absolute consideration:

Vnde si queratur utrum ista natura sic considerata possit dici una uel plures neutrum concedendum est, quia utrumque extra intellectum humanitatis, et utrumque potest sibi accidere. Si enim pluralitas esset de intellectu eius, nunquam posset esse una cum tamen una sit secundum quod est in Socrate. Similiter si unitas esset de ratione eius, tunc esset una et eadem Socratis et Platonis et non posset in pluribus plurificari.¹⁸

The proof here undoubtedly follows the same lines as that for the distinction of the nature from its being. Just as existence in individuals and existence in the mind are not contained in the thing's quidditative content, so both unity and plurality are outside the notion of human nature—"extra intellectum humanitatis." The unity that individualizes the nature, just as the unity that universalizes the nature, cannot be found in the nature just in itself, taken in its absolute consideration.¹⁹ The reasoning is the same as for the distinction of the nature from its various existences. Yet here there can be no question of a real distinction between individual and specific nature for St. Thomas. For St. Thomas the nature absolutely considered is what is predicated of the individual in real identity: "Et hec natura sic considerata est que predicatur de indiuiduis omnibus" (*De Ente*, c. III; p. 26.10-11). In reality the one is the other, as Socrates is a man. The difference

to the doctrine of St. Thomas on the absolute consideration of essence, however, the essence that from all eternity was able to be created is the essence that receives the existential act. It leaves no room for distinction between "objective potency" and "receptive potency."

¹⁸ *De Ente*, c. III; p. 24.10-25.4. On the background, see *supra*, n. 6.

¹⁹ Cf. "de ratione uniuersalis est communitas et unitas, nature autem humane neutrum horum conuenit secundum absolutam suam considerationem" (*De Ente*, c. III; pp. 26.13-27.2); and "non inuenitur in indiuiduis natura humana secundum unitatem ut sit unum quid omnibus conueniens, quod ratio uniuersalis exigit" (p. 27.8-10).

between the individual and the specific nature lies only in what their respective concepts express: "Sic ergo patet quod essentia Socratis et essentia hominis non differunt nisi secundum signatum et non signatum" (*De Ente*, c. II; p. 11.9-10). In predication the nature coincides with the individual insofar as the nature is considered as a whole, not as a part:

Et ideo relinquitur quod ratio generis uel speciei conueniat essentie secundum quod significatur per modum totius, ut nomine hominis uel animalis, prout implicite et indistincte continet totum quod in indiuiduo est." (*De Ente*, III; p. 23.25-28).

The stand that the specific nature is one entity, and the individual differentia another entity, as in Duns Scotus,²⁰ does not allow the common nature to be predicated of the individuals. Any real distinction between nature and individual would prevent the real identity of whole with whole that is required for predication. For St. Thomas, accordingly, the reasoning that both unity and plurality are outside the nature and accidental to it establishes only a conceptual distinction between specific nature and individual difference.

The validity of the argument, therefore, is satisfied by a merely conceptual distinction. Can anything more be asked when the reasoning is applied to existence instead of to unity? There is, it is true, a sharp difference between the ways in which individual difference and existence are known by the human mind. The individual is known through reference to a phantasm.²¹ The nature is seen in designated matter, under definite dimensions of length, breadth, and thickness, and therefore as individualized in matter under those dimensions. The existence, on the other hand, is known originally through judgment, the activity technically known as the second operation of the intellect. This had been St. Thomas' doctrine as early as the time of the commentary on the first book of the *Sentences*,²² a time,

²⁰ Cf.: "...potest distingui, quantumcumque sit una res, in plures realitates formaliter distinctas, quarum haec formaliter non est illa, sed haec est formaliter entitas singularis et illa est entitas naturae formaliter." *Op. Ox.*, II, 3, 5 & 6, no. 15; ed. Quaracchi, II, 270 (no. 289). "Sed tale commune non est universale in actu, quia deficit ei illa indifferentia, secundum quam completive universale est universale, secundum quam scilicet ipsum idem aliqua identitate est praedicabile de quolibet indiuiduo, ita quod quodlibet sit ipsum" *Op. Ox.*, II, 3, 1, no. 9; Quar., II, 231 (no. 238).

²¹ "Cognoscit enim naturam speciei, sive quod quid est, directe extendendo seipsum, ipsum autem singulare per quandam reflexionem, inquantum redit super phantasmata, a quibus species intelligibiles abstrahuntur." St. Thomas, *In III De An.*, lect. 8, no. 713.

²² See text supra, n. 7.

either roughly the same or else slightly earlier than that of the *De Ente et Essentia*. What is pertinent to the argument, however, abstracts from these different ways of knowing. The probative force is that the quidditative content just in itself does not show either the individual determination given the essence in the phantasm, or the existential determination known through the act of judgment. Both determinations lie outside the nature taken in its absolute consideration. Both, accordingly, are accidental to it. A conceptual distinction suffices for the accidental connection in the one case, the case of individuation. As far as the argument itself is concerned, it should suffice in the other. If in point of fact it does not, the reason will have to be found elsewhere than in the inspection of the thing's quidditative content.

It might be urged that the nature, being material, necessarily requires individuation in designated matter.²³ Yet by the same token it also requires existence.²⁴ Of itself the essence is a potency to existence. It is meant for existence. But in neither case does the quidditative content do the determining. It does not determine the nature to the individuality in Socrates or in Plato, nor to existence in these individuals or in the mind. The present argument, accordingly, is that the nature considered in itself does not include determination to any particular individual, nor to any way of existing. Just as the absolute nature of a thing is expressed by a concept that fails to grasp the individuality, why may it not also be known by a concept that fails to grasp an existence really identical with it? As far as the present argument is concerned, no reason to the contrary appears.

It might also be objected that the nature is conceived as something predicable of the thing and therefore identical with it in reality. The existence, on the other hand, is conceived as had by the thing, not as something the thing is. Yet the nature may also be conceived precisively as the formal part of the thing;²⁵ as something that the thing has rather than something that the thing is. You may conceive humanity or human nature as something had by an individual, just as existence is conceived as had by him. That the concept represents

²³ "De ratione autem huius naturae est quod in aliquo individuo existat, quod non est absque materia corporali; sicut de ratione naturae lapidis est quod sit in hoc lapide, et de ratione naturae equi est quod sit in hoc equo, et sic de aliis." *S T*, I, 84, 7c.

²⁴ E.g., "cum nihil sit essentialius rei quam suum esse." *In I Sent.*, d. 8, expos. lae partis textus; I, 209 (text *infra*, n. 28). "...quamvis huius esse suo modo forma sit causa." *De Ente*, c. II; p. 10.7.

²⁵ See *De Ente*, c. II; pp. 12.5-19.13; 22.10-23.7.

existence in this way does not guarantee or even indicate, therefore, that the existence must be really distinct. If it is really distinct in point of fact, the reason will have to be sought in what is peculiar to existence itself, and not in the accidental connection established through inspection of the thing's quidditative content.

A difference recently suggested²⁶ between the two cases is that nature is related to individual as act to potency, but to existence as potency to act. It is of course true that in the one case the recipient is the individual who is represented as participating in the nature, and in the other case the nature is represented as the recipient that participates in existence. But why should nature represented as a recipient indicate a real distinction between itself and what it receives? A generic nature, for instance, may be represented as a determinable subject for the specific differentia.²⁷ This does not at all require a real distinction between the two. If there is a reason why existence when received into a subject has to remain really distinct from the subject, the reason will have to lie in the existence itself, and not in anything learned from the simple inspection of a sensible thing's essence.

As far as the argument from quidditative content goes, then, no reason emerges why the actuality attained through the judgment, namely the thing's existential act, should not be really the same as the quiddity. As far as this argument shows, it could be an aspect known through a different act of the intellect, yet an aspect of the same reality that is attained quidditatively through simple apprehension. The situation could be that the same reality is known in two different ways, and therefore through two concepts distinct from each other. Just in itself, consequently, the inspection of the thing's quidditative content shows only a conceptual distinction between the thing and its being.

Does St. Thomas himself specify the kind of distinction reached by the argument? In the *De Ente et Essentia* he makes no mention of the type of distinction it involves. But in the first book of his commentary on the *Sentences*, in explaining St. Hilary's statement "Esse non est accidens Deo," he faces the stand that neither is it an accident in creatures:

²⁶ Sweeney, *art. cit.*, 107. Cf. 130.

²⁷ "Ex hoc patet ratio quare genus et species et differentia se habeant proportionaliter ad materiam et formam et compositum in natura, quamvis non sint idem quam illa." St. Thomas, *De Ente*, c. II; p. 18.6-8. Cf. "Sed, si ponatur, sicut dictum est supra, quod in definitionibus sit unum sicut materia, aliud sicut forma; unum sicut potentia, aliud sicut actus: quaestio tam facilis est ad solvendum,..." In *VIII Metaph.*, lect. 5, no. 1758.

Videtur quod nec alicui creaturae, cum nihil sit essentialius rei quam suum esse. — Ad quod dicendum, quod accidens dicitur hic quod non est de intellectu alicujus, sicut rationale dicitur animali accidere; et ita cuilibet quidditati creatae accidit esse, quia non est de intellectu ipsius quidditatis; potest enim intelligi humanitas, et tamen dubitari, utrum homo habeat esse.²⁸

This is clearly the same argument from the thing's quidditative content. Being does not pertain to the notion of the quiddity—"non est de intellectu ipsius quidditatis." It is explained as accidental in the sense in which "rational" is accidental to "animal." There can be animal nature, for instance in a horse, without its being rational. "Rational" is not necessary, but only accidental, to "animal." What kind of a distinction does that accidental relation involve? Obviously it involves only a conceptual distinction, for in St. Thomas the specific differentiae are not really distinct from the genera. The accidental relation does not require a real distinction. A distinction through concepts is sufficient for keeping what is accidental in this sense from belonging to content of the quiddity. In the individual man, "animal" and the specific differentia "rational" are one and the same reality. That is all that the accidental character of existence, on the strength of the present argument alone, can establish.

From this text, then, the type of distinction St. Thomas has in mind in the reasoning emerges clearly enough. It is a distinction of the type found between the generic nature and the specific differentia. At least, the argument just in itself need not require any further kind of distinction. But is the argument meant to stand just by itself? Or is it merely a preliminary step in a longer argument that will prove the distinction of concepts to be based upon a real distinction in the thing? Those are further questions. But the argument, when taken just in itself, is geared to make manifest a distinction like that between

²⁸ *In I Sent.*, d. 8, expositio lae partis textus; I, 209. The fact that being does not belong to the notion of the quiddity is accordingly not the same as the fact that being is really distinct from the quiddity. The former kind of distinction is present with regard to "animal" and "rational," while the latter is not. The former fact is of course known antecedently to the demonstration that being is subsistent in its primary instance, while the latter fact is known in consequence upon that proof. The opposite stand, however, is asserted by J. Bobik: "Nonetheless, the fact of the composition of essence and existence in really existing creatures is known before that proof, though for another reason, and so known affords the middle term of that proof. It is the same fact that is known both before and after that proof, though the reason after is different from the reason before." "Some Disputable Points Apropos of St. Thomas and Metaphysics," *The New Scholasticism*, 37 (1963), 425. Cf. *infra* n. 32.

genus and differentia. The distinction is between two objects of different concepts, one of which is accidental to the other. Whether the conceptual distinction involves a further and real distinction, is not brought out by the argument and is not required by it when it is taken just in itself.

III

However, even for the conceptual distinction between the universal and the particular, real distinction between the thing's being and its quiddity is required by St. Thomas: "Ad hoc enim quod sit universale et particulare, exigitur aliqua diversitas realis, ut supra dictum est, quidditatis communicabilis, et esse quod proprium est" (*In 1 Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, a. 3, Solut.; I, 307). While remaining merely a conceptual distinction between universal and particular, it would not be possible unless real diversity were present in the thing between quiddity and being. The backward reference seems to bear on the following passage:

Illi autem quidditati non debetur esse nisi per hoc quod suscepta est in hoc vel in illo. Et ideo quidditas generis vel speciei non communicatur secundum unum esse omnibus, sed solum secundum unam rationem communem. Unde constat quod esse suum non est quidditas sua. In Deo autem esse suum est quidditas sua: aliter enim accideret quidditati, et ita esset acquisitum sibi ab alio, et non haberet esse per essentiam suam.²⁹

²⁹ *In 1 Sent.*, d. 8, q. 4, a. 2; I, 222. That the being of a creature has to be acquired from another, and ultimately from subsistent being, is demonstrated from the accidental character of being that is shown in its conceptual distinction from a thing's quiddity. The real distinction, accordingly, is fully compatible with the conceptual distinction. It is not correct to characterize the difference between them as "the opposition between knowing a distinction which is in the creature, after the demonstration of the existence of subsistent existence, and knowing one which is not a distinction in the creature but only a distinction between concepts, before that demonstration." Bobik, *art. cit.*, 425. The distinction in both cases is in the creature. The opposition lies between two ways of knowing the distinction. In the one case it is seen as a distinction between what is attained through simple apprehension and what is apprehended through judgment. These, though really distinct in the thing, are not as yet known to be really distinct. They are seen as two different perfections, as animality and rationality are distinct perfections, and are conceptualized as two different aspects in the thing—its essence and its existence. Whether or not they are really distinct in the thing, is not as yet known and remains an open question. Similarly the distinction between the essence of the soul and its powers is first known as conceptual, and only later proved to be real.

Even as conceptual, therefore, the distinction between quiddity and being describes "a condition in the really existing creature," namely that the creature does not exist in

In this passage the reasoning is that the quiddity is communicated as a common *ratio*, while its existence is not common. This is quite evidently the argument from the thing's quidditative content in a somewhat elaborated form. But its starting point, in the preceding context, was worded similarly to its format in the *De Ente et Essentia*. One can know what human nature is without knowing whether it exists: "humanitati enim ex hoc quod est humanitas, non debetur esse in actu; potest enim cogitari humanitas et tamen ignorari an aliquis homo sit."³⁰ Where being is accidental to the quiddity, the argument goes on, it is received from another. In God, however, being pertains to quiddity, because it is not received from anything else and therefore is not accidental.

This passage occurs in a work in which the existence of God had already been demonstrated with the being of creatures as the starting point: "Et ratio hujus est, quia esse creaturae est ab altero" (*In I Sent.*, d. 3, div. lae partis textus; I, 88). The identity of being and quiddity in God had likewise been established: "In Deo autem ipsum esse suum est sua quidditas" (d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, Solut.; I, 195). Working backwards, the above argument has shown that if God were not his being, his being would be accidental to his quiddity, and would therefore be acquired from something else, with the result that God would not be self-existent. The accidental character of a thing's being is a ground for showing that the being comes from something else. Whether really distinct from the quiddity or not, as far as this reasoning is concerned, the fact that the existence is accidental to the essence opens the way for the demonstration that the existence comes from an efficient cause.

In the *De Ente et Essentia* the distinction established through the inspection of the quidditative content is similarly used as part of a continuous demonstration. After showing that a quiddity identified with its being would not be open to differentiation or multiplication

virtue of its essence. This condition of the creature itself is mirrored in the concepts, is known through the concepts, but it is a condition in the thing that is known, and not "only in our concepts about the creature" (*ibid.*).

³⁰ *In I Sent.*, *ibid.* In this closely condensed text the unity of the whole demonstration can be seen at a glance—the inspection of the thing's quidditative content, the generic community of the quiddity but not of its being, the reception of being from something else because its being is accidental, and the identity of being and quiddity in the first cause of being. Fabro, *op. cit.*, 218-219, makes the reasoning from the generic community another form of the *ratio logica*, calling it "logico-metafisica," but allowing "diretta continuità fra l'aspetto logico e quello metafisico, come consta dal fatto che il primo argomento metafisico funge da 'minore' dell' argomento logico" (p. 219). The reasoning from extrinsic cause forms a second "argomento metafisico" for Fabro (p. 220).

(*De Ente*, c. IV; p. 34.15-30), and that being is not an accident consequent upon the quiddity, the demonstration goes on to show that being distinct from quiddity is always caused efficiently by something else, and ultimately by a cause that is being only (p. 35.3-19). The demonstration is not a dialectical process. It does not consist in an elaboration of concepts. Rather, it is thrown out of the order of formal causality into the order of efficient causality:

Non autem potest esse quod ipsum esse sit causatum ab ipsa forma uel quidditate rei, causatum dico sicut a causa efficiente, quia sic aliqua res esset causa sui ipsius et aliqua res seipsam in esse produceret, quod est impossibile (p. 35.6-10).

In sensible things, being is not a characteristic that follows upon quiddity nor does it coincide with quiddity. It can be accidental to quiddity, then, only by being prior to the quiddity. It cannot follow in the line of formal causality. It has to be caused efficiently. But the quiddity, because not yet existent, cannot exercise this efficient causality. It is exercised by something else, and ultimately by something whose nature is to be.

The reasoning here is emphatically not a dialectic of concepts. It is concerned rather with the actuality in the thing that is known originally not through a concept but through judgment. It is not concerned with existence as later conceptualized, but with the existence that is actually exercised by a sensible thing. It is seeing that this existence, because accidental and prior to the thing itself, depends upon something else in the peculiar way in which being is dependent, that is, through what is called efficient causality. It is no longer a question of what features appear in a quiddity, but the question of what produced the quiddity. It is the question "Who did it?" and not a question of what one's concepts of a nature make manifest.

But why does reception of being from an efficient cause entail real diversity? The argument has proven that the first efficient cause is being only. That means, its nature or quiddity is to be. Being, accordingly, has been established as a real nature. It can no longer be considered just a way of looking at things, a frame of reference, an empty concept, a concept without a real object. It is a real nature in itself. But if it is something real in itself, it is a nature that allows no differentiation or multiplication (*De Ente*, c. IV; p. 34.24-30). It could not, like the nature "animal," be differentiated into species, like "man" and "brute." Nor could it, like the specific nature "man," be multiplied in individuals like Socrates and Plato. If it were envisaged as entering into a nature as a quidditative note or characteristic, it

would like a juggernaut pulverize everything it encountered and absorb all else in that nature into its own undifferentiated unity.⁸¹ The reasoning of Parmenides, for whom being was regarded as a form, would have its full application.

If being is received as an act by some other nature, then, it has to remain in reality other than the nature receiving it. It cannot enter into real identity with the nature, as animal and man, when participated, come to be really identical with Socrates. It has to remain really other than the real individual it actuates. A sensible thing and its being, therefore, are really distinct from each other. That is the reason why the conceptual difference between universal and particular requires real diversity between the communicable quiddity and the being that actuates it. The reason lies not in anything seen by inspection of the quiddity itself, but in the nature of being that is established by the demonstration of the first efficient cause. The reason is that the being so established cannot, when participated, be really identical with any quidditative characteristics. Where it is participated as an act, it has to remain really other than the quiddity it makes be.

Correspondingly, the conceptual distinction shown by the accidental relation of existence to a sensible thing's quiddity cannot be maintained without the involving of a real distinction between the two. The conceptual distinction requires that the existence be received from another, and that the first cause be located in being as a real nature that allows no generic, specific, or individual differentiation. When participated, therefore, being can never have the status of a nature. It cannot function as a quidditative note with no other than a conceptual distinction from the rest of the quiddity. Where it is really present as an act of the quiddity it is accordingly really distinct from it.

IV

The argument from quidditative content, consequently, is but a stage in a larger demonstration. It is the initial step toward proving the existence of the first efficient cause, subsistent being. In the *De Ente et Essentia* this position of the argument is clearly discernible. It is scarcely less so in the briefer summaries in the *Commentary on the*

⁸¹ See *De Ente*, c. IV, p. 34.16-29. Cf. "Si enim esse est subsistens, nihil praeter ipsum esse ei adiungitur." C G, II, 52, Si enim.

Sentences.³² The argument opens the way to show that the being of sensible things is received from something else and ultimately from subsistent being, from being as a real nature. Not anything seen in the inspection of the quiddity, but the nature of being that is demonstrated by the argument from efficient causality, is what makes the real distinction imperative. The real distinction, accordingly, is not something that is seen on inspection, but something that is demonstrated as the conclusion of a long and complicated reasoning process. The real distinction between a thing and its being cannot be visualized. It cannot be intuited. It can only be reasoned to.

³² See *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, Solut.; I, 222 (text supra, n. 29). Cf.: "Cum enim in solo Deo esse suum sit sua quidditas, oportet quod in qualibet creatura, vel in corporali vel in spirituali, inveniatur quidditas vel natura sua, et esse, vel quo est, et quod est." a Deo, cujus essentia est suum esse; et ita componitur ex esse, vel quo est, et quod est." *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 5, a. 1, Solut.; I, 226-227. "Si vero non sit ipsum esse, oportet quod habeat esse acquisitum sibi ab alio, sicut est omnis quidditas creata... et ita in tali quidditate inveniatur potentia et actus, secundum quod ipsa quidditas est possibilis, et esse suum est actus ejus." Ibid., a. 2, Solut.; I, 229-230. "... ipsarum rerum naturae non sunt hoc ipsum esse quod habent: alias esse esset de intellectu cujuslibet quidditatis, quod falsum est, cum quidditas cujuslibet rei possit intelligi etiam non intelligendo de ea an sit. Ergo oportet quod ab aliquo esse habeant, et oportet devenire ad aliquid cujus natura sit ipsum suum esse; alias in infinitum procederetur, et hoc est quod dat esse omnibus..." *In II Sent.*, d. I, q. 1, a. 1, Solut.; II, 12. "Quaedam enim natura est de cujus intellectu non est suum esse, quod patet ex hoc quod intelligi potest esse cum hoc quod ignoretur an sit, sicut phaenice, vel eclipsim, vel aliquid hujusmodi. ... et quia omne quod non habet aliquid ex se, sed recipit illud ab alio, est possibile vel in potentia respectu ejus, ideo ipsa quidditas est sicut potentia, et suum esse acquisitum est sicut actus; et ita per consequens est ibi compositio ex actu et potentia..." *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, Solut.; II, 87-88. "Alia autem entia dicuntur per posterius, inquantum aliquod esse participant quod non est idem quod ipsa sunt, et haec procedunt usque ad ultima entium; ita quod quamcumque rationem essendi aliquid habeat, non sit sibi nisi a Deo, sed defectus essendi sit ei a seipso." *In II Sent.*, d. 37, q. 1, a. 2, Solut.; I, 946.

Sweeney (p. 105) acknowledges in such texts the "overlapping" character of the "four ways" he proposes to isolate. Disagreement with his interpretation does not all diminish appreciation of his valuable collection and arrangement of the texts. Bobik, *art. cit.*, p. 424, contends that after the demonstration of subsistent being "one has an additional reason" for the composition of essence and existence in creatures. But, as Forest pointed out (see text *supra*, n. 2), the composition of essence as a reality with its existence does not appear from the simple scrutiny of a thing's nature. That is why the distinction as shown here may not be called real. In the initial stage of the long argument, accordingly, one has a reason for showing that a thing's existence is accidental to and therefore distinct from the thing itself. Whether or not the distinction is real is still an open question. After being has been established as a real nature, one has the reason for showing that the distinction is real. This reason, consequently, is not just an "additional reason" for something that already has been proven.

The foregoing considerations make clear that the real distinction between essence and existence cannot be known prior to the demonstration of the existence of God. Being has to be established as a real nature before its real distinction from the quiddity it actuates can be proven. But to establish that being is a real nature is to demonstrate the existence of God. It is to prove that being is subsistent in its primary instance, that the nature of the primary instance is being and being only. Since as a nature being allows no differentiation, it cannot be found really identified with any other nature. Where it actuates other natures, then, it has to remain really distinct from them. The probative force of this demonstration, accordingly, presupposes the demonstration of God's existence.

In contexts where the existence of God has already been proven and is presupposed, in the sense of the sublime truth that God is his own being, there is, however, no reason why the argument from quidditative content should not be used to express the overall distinction between created things and their being.³³ With subsistent being already demonstrated, being is already established as a nature that cannot coalesce in reality with any other nature. One need only observe that a sensible thing's quiddity does not include its own being, and one knows thereby that it is distinct from an act with which it cannot have real quidditative identity. But that knowledge does not follow immediately from the inspection of the quiddity. It follows from the presupposed knowledge that being functions as nature in one instance only, and cannot really coalesce in any other nature.

V

But if in the *De Ente et Essentia* the argument from quidditative content was meant by St. Thomas to establish for the moment a merely conceptual distinction, why did he not make this point clear by express mention of it? Why did he not explain that the distinction emerged as real only after the existence of God had been proven in the further course of the long demonstration? Elsewhere St. Thomas can be very precise in contrasting a real distinction with a conceptual distinction. In regard to operative power, for instance, he was very clear and explicit at the time of writing the commentary on the first book of the *Sentences* in contrasting the real distinction of power and essence in

³³ See *Comp. Theol.*, I, 11; *S T*, I, 3, 5c, Tertio.

creatures with the merely conceptual distinction between them in God, and likewise in regard to being and essence.³⁴

The lifetime of St. Thomas was of course slightly antecedent to the years when the distinction of a creature from its being had become a recognized topic for Scholastic discussions. It was some two years after his death that lively discussions on the nature of the distinction began to arise, with Giles of Rome insisting that the real distinction had to be formulated as a distinction between two realities.³⁵ In the commentary on the first book of the *Sentences*, St. Thomas does allow this notion of a real distinction: "quaecumque distinguuntur realiter, unum eorum est alia res ab alio" (d. 9, q. 1, a. 1, Contra; I, 246). In the question of a thing and its existence, he is not concerned with a distinction between two things or two realities. There is only the one reality, a reality or thing that is made to be by an existential act that is other than itself. Without the existential act it is nothing. It is not even a thing. Existential act, on the other hand, can be a thing or a reality or a nature only in its primary instance, God. Outside God it cannot be a thing or reality or nature, but only the actualizing of some other nature. In any created unit there can only be the one reality, composed of quiddity and being. Any reality outside of God has to be composed of the two. Without the composition, there could not be any finite reality at all. Where a real distinction was understood as a distinction between two realities, even long before the writings of Giles of Rome, a reluctance to use the designation for the distinction between quiddity and being is quite understandable. Besides the use of "real" in *diversitas realis*, the term is used only a few times with other words to designate the distinction between the two.³⁶ Moreover, the distinction was also applicable to the being given a thing in the mind when it is known. The thing abstracts from this being as well as from real being, and has to receive it from the efficient causality of the knower and ultimately from the first cause of all being.³⁷ The

³⁴ "...inter essentiam et talem operationem cadit virtus media differens ad utroque, in creaturis etiam realiter, in Deo ratione tantum." *In I Sent.*, d. 7, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2m; I, 177. With regard to being, see d. 19, q. 2, a. 2, Solut.; I, 471.

³⁵ See *Aegidii Romani Theoremata de Esse et Essentia*, ed. E. Hocedez (Louvain, 1930), pp. (4)-(5); (13); (15)-(16).

³⁶ "...differt ab eo cuius est actus re quidem,..." St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 2, a. 2, Solut.; I, 471. "...compositum reali compositione." *De Ver.*, XXVII, 1, ad 8m. "...in compositis differunt realiter." *In Boeth. de Hebd.*, c. II; ed. Mandonnet, *Opusc.*, I, 175. *Diversitas realis* occurs at *In I Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, a. 3, Solut.; I, 307.

³⁷ "Unde sicut ex compositione formae ad subiectum vel ad materiam, relinquitur quoddam esse substantiale vel accidentale, ita etiam intellectus compositionem privationis

quiddity is no more its cognitional being than it is its real being. Yet here the designation "real distinction" would be quite out of place.

However, until the nature of the distinction became a focal point of controversy, was there any actual need for specifying the exact type? It was understood to be more than a verbal distinction. If a conceptual distinction were shown between the quiddity and the existence, it involved in the metaphysical reasoning of St. Thomas a further real distinction. All that was required, therefore, was to refer to the being as other than the thing, as accidental to the essence, and the sublime truth that God alone is his being guaranteed the rest. Where being had been established metaphysically as a real nature, and in consequence accepted as a real nature, the conceptual distinction could not be maintained without the real distinction. It leads to the real distinction, on the other hand, when it is made the starting point of the investigation in regard to the whole problem. If it did not lead demonstratively to the nature of being, established as a real nature in the primary efficient cause, it would not be able to maintain itself as even a conceptual distinction.⁸⁸ It would upon close investigation disappear into a merely verbal distinction. It would find that it had no original concept, attained through simple apprehension like those of man, animal, body, and so on, upon which it could ground a distinction from the thing's essence. "Being" would have no content over and above essence, and would be just another term to signify the same object. The useless and confusing reduplication would justify the stand that "we can banish the term 'being' from the vocabulary

cum subjecto per quoddam esse significat. Sed hoc esse non est nisi esse rationis, cum in re potius sit non esse, et secundum hoc quod in ratione esse habet, constat quod a Deo est." *In II Sent.*, d. 37, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3m; II, 947.

⁸⁸ On this problem in Suarez, see my article "The Number of Terms in the Suarezian Discussion on Essence and Being," *The Modern Schoolman*, 34 (1957), 147-192. J. Gómez Caffarena, "Sentido de la Composición de Ser y Esencia en Suarez," *Pensamiento*, 15 (1959), 137, n. 8, maintains nevertheless the possibility of a distinction of reason between actual essence and existence, "si por esencia actual se entiende el ente total existente y por existencia sólo aquello por lo que se le entiende estar actualizado, diferir del estado que tendría en cuanto potencial." The difficulty here, however, is that with the explicit Suarezian denial of a real distinction the notion of "actual essence" does not leave room in the thing for any perfection beyond that of the essence itself. In the existent essence, accordingly, the essence itself is the aspect by which it is understood to be actual, even though it has been produced by an efficient cause. There is no further aspect in the thing itself by which it would differ from the status of a potency to existence, once a real distinction has in Suarezian fashion been positively excluded. The tentative conceptual distinction between aspects in the thing vanishes upon closer scrutiny.

of philosophy.”³⁹ If conceptually distinct from essence, then, being is also really distinct from it in really existent things. The simple mention that a thing is not its own being, is other than its being, is distinguished from⁴⁰ its being, or differs from its being, is accordingly sufficient for characterizing the distinction against a background in which “being” is more than an empty term.

Without the provocation that arose from the later controversies, then, no reason would be present for specifying the nature of the distinction at the different stages of the argument in the *De Ente et Essentia*. Shown as other than essence by the inspection of quidditative content in the thing, being is established by demonstration as a real nature that is incapable of differentiation when it has quidditative status. That is enough to prove that when actuating anything else it remains really other than quiddity. But for his own purposes in the argument in the *De Ente et Essentia* St. Thomas had no interest in spelling out that conclusion.

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³⁹ Sidney Hook, *The Quest for Being* (New York, 1961), 147.

⁴⁰ As Sweeney, *art. cit.*, 103, n. 10, points out, St. Thomas does use this expression — “distinguitur actus essendi ab eo cui actus ille convenit.” *De Ver.*, I, 1, ad 3m in contr.

A Commentary on the Pseudo-Athanasian Creed by Gilbert of Poitiers

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IN his *Lament* (*Planctus*) on Gilbert's death (Sep. 4, 1154) the Dean of St. Peter's in Poitiers, Laurentius, writes: "in qua (lege) nimirum quantum profecerit, opera manuum eius in Apostolum et Prophetam et alia eius opuscula contestantur".¹ This is a reference to Gilbert's commentary on Psalms,² his commentary on St. Paul,³ and "his other opuscles". It is obvious that the last remark includes Gilbert's well-known commentary on Boethius, but it may very well comprise other "small works" which emanated from his pen and were probably published anonymously according to the custom of the time.

The commentary on the pseudo-Athanasian Creed, edited here for the first time, is listed by Stegmüller⁴ and found in manuscript 815, ff. 145-149, of the Stiftsbibliothek Klosterneuburg in Austria. In drawing attention to this commentary which is preceded in the manuscript by Gilbert's commentary on Psalms, P. Classen remarks: Die Erklärung trägt ausgesprochen porretanische Lehren vor; ob sie mit Recht dem Schulhaupt zugeschrieben wird, mögen Spezialisten entscheiden.⁵

There is no denying that the basic trinitarian and christological doctrines of our commentary point to Gilbert of Poitiers as the author. However, these doctrines are generally not proposed as the author's own but rather as those of a certain group of scholars. It is, for instance, well established that one of the controversial issues discussed at the trial of Rheims in 1148 was Gilbert's claim that to avoid Sabellianism a distinction of some kind must be admitted between Person and nature in God.⁶ Our commentator speaks of this doctrine

¹ *Recueil des hist.* 14 (Paris, 1877) 390.

² F. Stegmüller, *Rep. bibl. med. aevi* 2 (Madrid, 1940) 345, n. 2511.

³ *Ibidem*, n. 2515.

⁴ *Ibidem*, n. 2532.

⁵ "Zur Gesch. der Frühscholastik in Österreich und Bayern", *Mitt. des Inst. f. österr. Geschichtsforschung* 67 (1959) 264.

⁶ Cf. N. M. Haring, "The Porretans and the Greek Fathers", *MedSt* 24 (1962) 189 ff.

as follows (n. 32): Alii aliter sentientes, inter personam et naturam, et inter personas et personales proprietates, et inter personales proprietates et essentiam diuidunt.

Owing to this rather impersonal approach, the mere presence of certain doctrines held by Gilbert does not yet allow us to conclude that he is the author of the commentary. Another difficulty arises from considerations of style. Compared to the often long and involved sentences in Gilbert's commentary on Boethius, our *expositio* is written in a clear and simple style. If, however, Gilbert is the author, this difference of style may be interpreted in the sense that the commentary on the *Quicumque* is one of Gilbert's earlier literary efforts.

Although, as we have noted, certain basic doctrines are proposed by our author as those of an anonymous group, many details permit us to accept the accuracy of the title: *Expositio magistri Gisleberti*. One outstanding Porretan, Master John Beleth, writes that many scholars of his time considered Anastasius the author of the *Quicumque*.⁷ Our commentator actually attributes it to Anastasius rather than Athanasius and adds that he was a bishop "in the region of Aquileja" (n. 5). In his commentary on Boethius, on the other hand, Gilbert names Athanasius three times as the author of a statement taken from the *Quicumque*.⁸ Hence it would seem that at a later period Gilbert adopted the more common view that the author's name was Athanasius.

He did not change his view concerning the definition of faith attributed in our commentary (n. 7) to St. Augustine: Fides est perceptio ueritatis alicuius rei cum assensione. In his commentary on Boethius Gilbert writes: Fides... est ueritatis cuiuslibet rei cum assensione perceptio.⁹

The trinitarian ternary *paternitas-filiatio-conexio* (*concordia, amor*) proposed and discussed by our author (n. 15) is characteristic of Gilbert's teaching.¹⁰ At Reims Gilbert caused a great commotion when he justified his stress on the distinction of the three divine Persons by saying: Quia omnis persona est per se una.¹¹ To this correspond such

⁷ *Summa de div. off.* 40; PL 202, 50A.

⁸ Gilbert, *Expos. in Boethii librum Contra Eutychem et Nestorium* 7, 8-13; ed. N. Haring, *Arch. d'hist. doct. et litt. du moyen âge* 21 (1954) 329-331.

⁹ Gilbert, *Expos. in Boethii librum De Trinitate* I, 1, 1; ed. N. Haring, *Texts and Studies* 1 (Toronto 1955) 41.

¹⁰ Gilbert, *De Trin.* II, 2, 35; ed. Haring 97. The ternary is proposed as *generatio-nativitas-conexio* in his *De Trin.* I, 10, 22; p. 83. Our commentator also uses the term *natiuitas* (n. 20).

¹¹ Otto of Freising, *Gesta Frid.* I, 52; MGH SS 20, 380.

statements by Gilbert as: *Omnis enim persona recte intelligitur per se una*.¹² Our commentator holds (n. 15) that the *paternitas* is the *personalis proprietas* by virtue of which the Father is distinguished from both Son and Holy Spirit. Then he goes on to say: *Inde est persona i.e. per se unus et distinctus predicto modo habendi*.

The term *personalis proprietas*, soon a common term among theologians, seems to have been coined by Gilbert who may also be the author of the word *filiatio*. Perhaps less pronounced in Gilbert's than in our commentary is the view that each personal *proprietas* is a special *modus habendi* (n. 15). Our commentator also speaks of them as *relationes* (n. 88).

Typical of Gilbert's terminology is our author's use of such words as *naturalia* (nn. 14; 27; 55; 56), *concretio* (nn. 42; 47), *collatio* (nn. 42; 47; 50; 51), *extrinsecus affixa* (nn. 45; 46), *interuallares mensure* (45), and others.

Our commentator reasons that, as there are three Persons in God, it is legitimate to conclude: *Ergo tria* (n. 22). In his commentary on Boethius¹³ Gilbert speaks of *unitates que adsunt paternitati et filiationi et conexioni quibus sunt tria...* This view was severely criticized at the trial in 1148 as recorded by Geoffrey of Auxerre.¹⁴ Our commentator quotes St. Augustine in support of this conclusion (n. 22).

We are told by our commentator that among those who fused the divine Persons by not distinguishing properly between them there were the heresiarch Noetus, Arius, Sabellius, Praxeas, Hermogenes, and Priscillianus (n. 24). The list presented in Gilbert's commentary on Boethius reads: Arius, Ethius, Eunomius, Noetus, Sabellius, Praxeas, Hermogenes, and Priscillianus.¹⁵ According to our commentary (n. 26) Arius taught: *Solum Patrem esse Deum*. In his commentary on Boethius Gilbert tells us that Arius said: *Solus Pater est Deus*.¹⁶ In both commentaries the doctrine of the semi-Arians is described in a manner reflecting Gilbert's concept of *conformitas*.¹⁷

A strange confusion occurs in the attribution to Vigilantius of the rule: *Diuersorum numero subsistentium diuerse sunt subsistentie* (n. 27). This rule is described as a *naturalium regula* wrongly transferred

¹² Gilbert, *De Trin.* I, prol. 6; ed. Haring 36. See also *De Trin.* I, 10, 16 (p. 96) and especially *Contra Eut.* 3, 3; ed. Haring 281.

¹³ Gilbert, *De Trin.* II, 2, 35; ed. Haring 97.

¹⁴ *Libellus contra capitula Gilberti* 26 and 40; PL 185, 604A; 609 A.

¹⁵ Gilbert, *De Trin.* I, prol. 5; ed. Haring 35.

¹⁶ Gilbert, *De Trin.* I, prol. 5; p. 35.

¹⁷ Gilbert, *De Trin.* II, 1, 16; ed. Haring 92; *Quicumque* n. 26.

by Vigilantius to the Blessed Trinity (n. 27). Commenting on Boethius, Gilbert accuses Arius and the Sabellians of the same error. The principle is stated as follows: Est enim proprium naturalium quod sicut numero diuersorum proprietates diuerse sunt ita quoque subsistentie numero sunt diuerse.¹⁸ In this context it may be noted that the author of the commentary on Boethius's *De Trinitate* published under the name of Bede attributes to Vigilantius the same error: transferens naturalium rationes ad Deum.¹⁹ Both our commentator (n. 27) and pseudo-Bede²⁰ agree that St. Augustine changed his name to Dormitantius.

In support of his doctrine our commentator cites two *auctoritates*: Theodoret and a council of Braga. The text attributed to Theodoret, *Contra Sabellium* (n. 33), was quoted by Gilbert at the trial of Rheims as we learn from Bishop Otto of Freising.²¹ The excerpt is offered to show that according to Theodoret a distinction must be upheld between person and nature in God. The conciliar canon (n. 34) is cited to refute such statements as "The divinity is the Trinity". Gilbert's reference to Priscillianus in his commentary on Boethius²² may very well be based on canons issued by this council. A scribe seems to have thought that *Priscilliani* were a heretical group such as the *Gnostici*.

Our commentator does not approve of the proposition: "God is the divinity" (n. 37). But to his mind such "exuberant" statements are pardonable in view of the fact that Davus is described as "wickedness itself" and that we read it said of a human being: "You are wisdom through and through" (n. 37). Both illustrations must have been offered by Gilbert at the trial of Rheims, for Geoffrey of Auxerre was familiar with both of them.²³ The second illustration is also found in Gilbert's commentary on Boethius.²⁴ Robert of Melun who attended Gilbert's trial also knows both illustrations.²⁵ Equally familiar with both was Everard of Ypres.²⁶

Of basic importance for the proper analysis of Gilbert's teaching is

¹⁸ Gilbert, *De Trin.* I, prol. 4; ed. Haring 35.

¹⁹ *In Titulo*; PL 95, 394A.

²⁰ PL 95, 394D.

²¹ *Gesta Frid.* I, 56; p. 383.

²² *De Trin.* I, prol. 5; p. 35.

²³ *Libellus* 6; PL 185, 597D. *Ep. ad Albinum* 2; PL 185, 588C.

²⁴ *De Trin.* I, 3, 5; ed. Haring 51.

²⁵ *Sent.* I, 5, 4; ed. R. M. Martin and R. M. Gallet, *Spic. s. Lov., Etudes et doc.* 25 (Louvain 1952) 243.

²⁶ *Dialogus Ratii et Everardi*; ed. N. Haring, in: *MedSt* 15 (1953) 270.

the theory that every noun (and adjective) expresses an *id quod* called the substance of a (concrete) noun and an *id quo* called the quality of the same noun.²⁷ This distinction accounts for the interpretation given by our commentator to a text attributed to Jerome (n. 40).

Gilbert's followers, especially Adhemar of Saint-Ruf, Valence, made great efforts to prove that patristic writers applied to the divine essence not only such terms as *forma* but also *qualitas*, *genus* and *proprietas*. Our commentator touches on this terminology in n. 42. He tells us that human words are really insufficient in speaking of things divine: Non enim habemus verba cognata nec satis digna ad loquendum de Deo (n. 53). Commenting on the *De Hebdomadibus* Gilbert writes: Non habemus illi cognatos quibus de ipso loquamur sermones.²⁸ Concerning reason and faith our commentator declares: In theologicis uero fides preuenit rationem (n. 55). Commenting on Boethius Gilbert agrees: In theologicis... fides preuenit rationem.²⁹

The distinction between *localis* and *locatus* found in our commentary (n. 59) is made and explained by Gilbert on several occasions. The designation of the divine eternity as *mora* (n. 60) is also Gilbert's own choice of terminology.³⁰ How subtle theological discussions could become is revealed in the question whether it is proper to speak of three *eternal* Persons (n. 62). There were two schools of thought. Gilbert belonged to the first group whose members held that, apart from the eternity of the divine essence, each Person was "accompanied" by its own eternity.³¹ An unmistakable echo of this teaching is seen in the charge according to which Gilbert spoke of *tria eterna*.³² The commentator's claim that eternity is a *comes* of each Person (n. 63) has a parallel in Gilbert's doctrine that *unitas* is likewise the *comes* of each Person and that only for this reason can we truly speak of one, two, and three Persons in God.³³

In this context the commentator of the *Quicumque* reminds us that we are somewhat exuberant in speaking of two natures in Christ (n. 64). We learn from Gilbert's commentary on Boethius that strictly speaking the word "nature" is not applicable to God.³⁴ Nevertheless he frequently

²⁷ Cf. N. Haring, "Sprachlogische und philosophische Voraussetzungen zum Verständnis der Christologie Gilberts von Poitiers", *Scholastik* 32 (1957) 373-398.

²⁸ *De Hebdomadibus* 12; ed. Haring, *Traditio* 9 (1953) 192.

²⁹ *De Trin.* II, 1, 9; ed. Haring 90.

³⁰ For instance, *De Trin.* I, 1, 12; p. 45. *De Hebd.* 5; p. 187. *De Trin.* I, 8, 8-12; pp. 74 f.

³¹ Gilbert, *Contra Eut.* 3, 31; ed. Haring 293.

³² Geoffrey, *Libellus* 66; PL 185, 617A.

³³ *De Trin.* II, 2, 33-35; ed. Haring 96 f.

³⁴ *Contra Eut.* 4, 42; ed. Haring 309.

speaks of two natures in Christ. Our commentator justifies this usage *ratione consortii* (n. 65), an explanation or justification often proposed by Gilbert³⁵ one of whose illustrations is also given by our author (n. 65: *miles pictus*). It may come as a surprise that our commentator declares that the sun was already created before there was a sun (n. 75). But Gilbert expresses the same opinion regarding the existence of the Antichrist.³⁶

We have already mentioned that our commentator speaks of *relationes* (n. 88) within the Trinity. He also states that there are certain *relationes* attached (*addicte*) to the essence, relations such as being the Creator or the cause of all things. Gilbert deals with them in his commentary on Boethius where he calls them *extrinsecus affixa predicamenta*.³⁷ More specific names for these relations are *auctoritas* and *principalitas*, the abstract terms (*id quo*) for the concrete (*id quod*) terms *auctor* and *principium*.³⁸ Both abstract terms are used by our commentator in this technical sense (n. 92). On one occasion (n. 77) he declares: *Audacter respondeo...* which may remind the reader of Gilbert's reply at Rheims as reported by Otto of Freising: *Audacter confiteor...*³⁹

The christology of our author stresses that the Son rather than the divine substance became flesh (n. 104). We are told that such is the teaching of those who "distinguish between Person and nature" (n. 104). At Rheims Gilbert was accused of this particular christological view.⁴⁰ It was, no doubt, Gilbert's teaching.⁴¹

Unfortunately our text seems to be corrupt where the author speaks of the hypostatic Union as taught by one group (n. 108). But he clearly states and disagrees with the doctrine: *Aliquis homo est assumptus* (n. 112). After long and often angry discussions this opinion was debated in the presence of Pope Alexander III at the council of Tours in 1163. John of Cornwall could not decide which of the opposing factions won the argument: *Utra uero pars disputantium in pugna uerborum preualuerit, nescio*.⁴² Our commentary may be the earliest witness to this christological disagreement.

³⁵ See for instance, *De Trin.* I, 1, 11 (p. 44); I, 7, 2 (p. 71); I, 8, 4 (p. 72); I, 8, 8 (p. 73); I, 8, 9 (p. 74) *et passim*.

³⁶ *Contra Eut.* 4, 7; p. 298.

³⁷ *Contra Eut.* 8, 9; p. 340.

³⁸ *De Trin.* II, 1, 22; p. 93. *Contra Eut.* 3, 34; p. 295.

³⁹ *Gesta Frid.* I, 52; MGH SS 20, 379.

⁴⁰ Geoffrey, *Libellus* 67; PL 185, 617B.

⁴¹ *Contra Eut.* 9, 12; ed. Haring 345: *non natura sed persona suscepit naturam*. Cf. *C. Eut.* 4, 56; p. 313.

⁴² *Eulogium ad Alex. papam tertium*; ed. N. Haring, *MedSt* 13 (1951) 257.

Later on, John of Cornwall writes that "as many people say" *Magister Gilebertus Porretanus* held the second of the three then current theories concerning the hypostatic Union. He confesses, however, that he had not seen anything written on the subject by Gilbert and declares that his followers disagreed among themselves regarding the real meaning of his doctrine.⁴³ John wrote shortly before the Lateran council of 1179. At that time, Peter of Poitiers, a member of Gilbert's school, makes the clarification: (Christus) *secundum quod homo est aliquid i.e. alicuius modi vel alicuius naturae*.⁴⁴ Our commentator uses the same term saying: *Non ut anima et corpus aliam personam faciant sed ut personam... faciant aliud... i.e. alius modi* (n. 111). In this sense he states later: *res huiusmodi non quid sed quale incepit esse Deus* (n. 117). He means that the Son assumed not a human substance (*quid*) or person but a human nature.

In dealing with the teaching of Eutyches, Gilbert writes that Christ's human nature was not *absumpta* but *assumpta*.⁴⁵ In our commentary Eutyches is accused of teaching *ut absumeretur in ea coniunctione humanitas* (n. 124). The commentator's description of birth as *decisio* and *decessio* (n. 118) is also found in Gilbert.⁴⁶

Many more points of contact could be indicated. However, the cumulative evidence of the comparisons made is so strong that it constitutes a fully sufficient reason for accepting Gilbert of Poitiers as the direct author of our commentary or rather *expositio*, a term also used by Gilbert in reference to his commentary on Boethius. Supposing that Gilbert wrote this work at an earlier date than his commentary on Boethius, one may be inclined to wonder where he composed it. He once makes the remark: *Sicque in urbe loquimur...* (n. 66). Speaking of "exuberant" speech he notes: *Qua loquendi consuetudine, scilicet ratione consortii, multum utimur in urbe...* (n. 65). This may be a reference to Paris.

Only one manuscript of our commentary is known to exist. The text is written in two columns. The number of lines varies from 40 to 49. Concerning its date and provenance P. Classen suggests: *Nach dem wohl am Ausgang des 12. oder am Anfang des 13. Jahrhunderts entstandenen Schriftbild kann man zweifeln, ob der Codex in Österreich entstanden ist*.⁴⁷

⁴³ *Eulogium* 3; p. 263.

⁴⁴ *Sent.* IV, 10; PL 211, 1176C.

⁴⁵ *Contra Eut.* 7, 10; p. 330.

⁴⁶ *De Trin.* I, prol. 4; p. 35: *fit tamen decisione discessio...*

⁴⁷ "Zur Gesch. der Frühscholastik", p. 264.

In 1957 I received the following description in a letter written on January 16, 1957, by the eminent librarian and archivist Dr. Berthold Cernik⁴⁸ who died on May 20, 1962:

Die Auslegung Gilberts bezüglich des 'Quicumque uult...' habe ich in keiner anderen Bibliothek feststellen können. Unser Manuskript 815 stammt zur Gänze aus dem Ende des XII. Jahrhunderts, ist von einer Hand geschrieben und wie aus dem Pergament des MS. hervorgeht in Italien geschrieben. Es ist sehr schön ausgestattet und weist auf fol. 1 eine schöne Miniatur auf, offenkundig das Bild des Verfassers, ein Bischof mit Ornat und Inful und Stab und oberhalb seines Hauptes das Christusmonogramm. Nach dem dreimaligen Besitzervermerk in dem Kodex 'Liber sancte Marie in Newnburga claustrali' war die Handschrift bereits im XV. Jahrhundert (Mitte) im Stift Klosterneuburg und hat dann bald nachher einen sehr schönen Holzdeckel einband, der mit Leder überzogen ist und mit schönen Blindpressungen und Beschlügen ausgestattet ist, erhalten.

Hoffentlich habe ich Ihnen mit meinen Zeilen einen kleinen Dienst erwiesen. Selbstverständlich bin ich zu weiteren gewünschten Auskünften stets bereit.

INCIPIT EXPOSITIO MAGISTRI GISLEBERTI IN

QUICUMQUE UULT

1 QUICUMQUE UULT SALUUS ESSE etc. Ad heresim compescendam et fidem catholicam defendendam sinodales conuentus celebrari papa Silvester¹ instituit in quibus de fide conferretur et communi consensu ecclesie quid de fide sciendum esset dictaretur ut sic, heresiarcharum contumacia reprobata, ecclesia que tunc recens et nouella placatio erat in unitate fidei fundaretur.

2 Propter hoc itaque Nicena Sinodus et alie multe celebrata est que consensu *ccctorum* et xviii patrum² symbolum quod dicitur "Credo in unum Deum" etc. edidit.³ In quo de fide agitur et contra Grecos profecto Spiritum sanctum tam a Filio quam a Patre procedere ostenditur. Sic namque ibi legitur: "Qui a Patre Filioque procedit".

⁴⁸ The publication of this description has been authorized by the present librarian and archivist, DDr. Floridus Röhrig, Can. Reg., in a letter dated January 22, 1965.

¹ *Liber Pontificalis*; ed. L. Duchesne I (Paris, 1886) 171. Cf. *Decr. pseudo-isidorianae*; ed. P. Hinschius (Leipzig, 1863) 449; Ivo of Chartres, *Decr.* V, 26; PL 161, 330C.

² The number 318 dates back to St. Athanasius, *Ep. ad Afros* 2; PG 26, 1031B.

³ The reference is to the so-called Niceo-Constantinopolitan Creed containing the *filioque*.

3 Cum autem Greci legerent in Euangelio Iohannis *Spiritum ueritatis qui a Patre procedit*⁴ et nusquam legerent Spiritum sanctum a Filio procedere, sic a Patre quod non a Filio Spiritum sanctum procedere credebant. Hoc autem symbolum non est contrarium illi quod Apostoli, uolentes circumquaque predicare, ne diuersi diuersa predicarent instituerunt. Sed ibi breuiter fides, hic expositius narratur.

4 Symbolum dicitur collatio.⁵ Uel symbolum, ut beatus AUGUSTINUS⁶ dicit in libro *Contra quinque hostia hereseos*, consilium dicitur. Quod de illo ineffabili Dei consilio intelligendum est de quo Propheta dicit: *Quis agnouit consilium Domini aut quis eius consiliarius fuit?* Scilicet Filius eius. Unde et Filius dicitur consiliarius Deus.

5 De illo simbolo quod collatio dicitur hic agitur. In fide enim multa conferuntur ex quibus tamquam partibus fides integratur. Deinde ANASTASIUS in partibus Aquileie episcopus aliud symbolum in quo omnes fere articuli fidei exponuntur contra omnes fere hereticos edidit scilicet QUICUMQUE UULT. Quod Deo uolente exponere nitimur.

6 QUICUMQUE UULT etc. Cum multa sint saluti necessaria, fides pre omnibus necessaria est. Nichil enim sacramenta in aliquo adulto efficiunt nisi quod significant efficere ab eo credantur.⁷ Ad sciendum quid appelletur FIDES CATHOLICA huius nominis quod est fides diuisione utendum est. Fides enim sicut intellectus equiuoce dicitur.

7 Sicut enim intellectus dicitur motus mentis et res intellecta — unde *intellectus bonus omnibus facientibus eum* — ita fides dicitur motus mentis: illa scilicet uehemens opinio qua uehementer opinando ad percipiendum mens mouetur. Hii autem motus plures sunt. Quot enim sunt credentes tot⁸ sunt numero fides. Que tamen in specie unum sunt. Unde AUGUSTINUS: Fides⁹ est una specie, plures autem numero. Quod autem plures sunt numero ex eo quod dicitur Petro in Euangelio *modice fidei* et Cananee *magna est fides tua* AUGUSTINUS affirmat. Hic autem motus ab AUGUSTINO¹⁰ sic diffinitur: Fides est perceptio ueritatis alicuius rei cum assensione.

⁴ John 15:26.

⁵ Cf. Rufinus, *In symb. App.* 2; PL 21, 337B.

⁶ Pseudo-Augustine, *Adv. quinque haereses seu contra quinque hostium genera* 3, 4; PL 42, 1103: Alio loco Filium Dei symbolon appellat i.e. consilium vel consiliarium.

⁷ Gilbert's sacramentology was also scrutinized at Rheims. See Otto of Freising, *Gesta Frid.* I, 54; p. 379 (31) and John of Salisbury, *Hist. Pont.* 10; ed. R. L. Poole (Oxford, 1927) 23.

⁸ tot enim sunt credentes (*del.*) numero fides MS.

⁹ Augustine, *De Trin.* XIII, 2, 5; PL 42, 1017.

¹⁰ See the Porretan commentary on Romans; MS Boulogne-sur-mer, Bibl. mun. 24, f. 143: Augustinus enim proprietatem generis attendens sic eam describit: Fides est perceptio ueritatis cum assensione. Gilbert, *De Trin.* I, 1, 1; ed. Haring 41. Augustine, *De Praed. sanctorum* 2, 5; PL 44, 963: ipsum credere nihil aliud est quam cum assensione cogitare.

8 Item dicitur fides res credita. Unde *una fides, unum baptisma*.¹¹ Hec autem fides i.e. res credita est FIDES CATHOLICA que ex multis articulis quasi porcionibus integratur. Articuli¹² uero sunt isti: Personarum Trinitas, essentie unitas, Incarnatio, baptismus, passio, resurrectio, ascensio, Spiritus sancti missio, secundus aduentus et multa alia circumstantia.

9 CATHOLICAM. Catholica i.e. communis uel uniuersalis, nam catholon commune uel uniuersale dicitur. Hec fides ex predictis articulis constans merito dicitur catholica i.e. uniuersalis quia ab uniuersis qui sunt tam de triumphanti quam militanti ecclesia creditur. Triumphans enim ecclesia fidem habet tantam scilicet quod quantumlibet minimus inter triumphantes maiorem habet etiam diurnus puer quam quilibet maximus inter militantes. Unde commendato Iohanne a Christo dicente: *Inter natos mulierum non surrexit maior* etc. subiungitur: *Qui minor est in regno celorum maior est eo*.¹³

10 Militans quoque ecclesia eandem habet: quidam per compensationis habitum ut *boues* i.e. prelati *agrum* i.e. ecclesiam *arantes*. Alii uero per consensum ut *asine* i.e. simplices.¹⁴ Hii enim etsi omnes fidei articulos non comprehendant tamen quia prelati comprehendentibus consentiunt et eorum fidei contraria non sentiunt fidem per consensum habere dicuntur. De quibus legitur in Iob: *Asine pascebantur iuxta boues*.¹⁵

11 Prelatos igitur in fide instructos esse oportet ut habeant in quo subditi eis consentiant ne, dum utrique ceci fuerint, subditi prelati ruentibus super eos ruinam faciant.

12 TENEAT. Non dixit habeat sed TENEAT i.e. sic assensum prebeat ut cum oportuerit confiteatur nec etiam propter mortem diffiteatur.

13 QUAM NISI QUISQUE INTEGRAM INUIOLATAMQUE etc. Fidem INTEGRAM habere est omnibus articulis ex quibus ipsa integratur assentire. Sed quia posset aliquis omnes articulos fidei habere et in aliquo uel in aliquibus eorum aliquid erroneum sentire quod esset fidem uiolatam habere addit INUIOLATAMQUE i.e. sine aliquo in articulis errore SERUAUERIT i.e. quod credit opere monstauerit.

14 FIDES AUTEM CATHOLICA HEC EST UT UNUM DEUM etc. Hoc est: hic est unus fidei catholice articulus i.e. personarum Trinitas et essentie unitas. Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt tres persone et ita diuersi. Sed nota quod diuersitas personarum non est ex diuersis substantialibus nec ex parcium adunatione nec ex diuersorum accidentium informatione. Hec tantum sunt in naturalibus.

¹¹ Eph. 4:5.

¹² See the commentary on Romans; MS Paris, Arsenal 534, f. 196v: Articuli fidei sunt natiuitas Christi, mors, resurrectio, in celum ascension, Spiritus sancti missio, generalis omnium resurrectio.

¹³ Mt 11:11.

¹⁴ Cf. *Summa sent.* I, 3; PL 176, 47A.

¹⁵ Job 1:14.

15 Unde cum in Deo non sint substancialia, immo unica est eius essentia, nec partes nec accidentia —nichil enim Deo est accidens — predictam inter personas diuersitatem nulla istorum operantur sed tantum modus habendi. Quia namque Pater est habens Filium, Filius uero non est habens Filium, hoc modo habendi i.e. paternitate, [f. 145v] que Patris scilicet est personalis proprietas, distinguitur a Filio et a Spiritu sancto. Inde est persona i.e. per se unus¹⁶ et distinctus predicto modo habendi.

16 Similiter Filius quia est habens Patrem, Pater uero non est habens Patrem, hoc modo habendi i.e. filiatione, que est eius personalis proprietas, a Patre et a Spiritu sancto distinctus, est persona i.e. per se unus.

17 Eodem modo Spiritus sanctus distinguitur a Patre et a Filio. Est enim Patris et Filii conexio uel concordia uel amor.¹⁷ Quod non est Pater nec Filius. Sic igitur a Patre et a Filio distinctus est persona i.e. per se unus. Ecce quod diuersi modi habendi qui sunt eorum personales proprietates diuersitatem personarum operantur.

18 Spiritum sanctum diximus Patris et Filii esse conexionem. Quod hoc sit, scimus. Sed qualiter hoc sit, nescimus. Credimus, non discutimus. Ut enim dicit GREGORIUS: "Sacramenta sunt ueneranda non discutienda".¹⁸ De Deo enim non solum secundum diuinitatem sed secundum humanitatem multa ineffabilia sunt: ut quod clauso utero exiuit, quod superposito lapide surrexit, quod clausis ianuis intrauit.

19 Nec solum de Creatore sed etiam de creaturis ineffabilia multa sunt: ut de anima quomodo scilicet qualitatibus informetur. Nec etiam cuiuslibet creature quaecumque sunt proprietates philosophicis rationibus ostendi possunt.

20 Quomodo autem Spiritus sanctus a Patre et a Filio procedat et eos conectat et etiam quomodo Filius a Patre procedat natiuitate, in futuro quando Filius tradiderit regnum Deo et Patri merito fidei intelligemus. Quod intelligere erit summum gaudium. Cum enim anima de cognitione secretorum nature gaudeat, multo magis de supercelestium cognitione gauisura est.

21 Spiritus sanctus, ut dictum est, non solum Patrem conectit Filio sed etiam rationalem creaturam Deo Trinitati. In Spiritu sancto enim uiget ecclesia. Et per Spiritum sanctum creature creaturis conectuntur in mundana fabrica et etiam partes partibus ut in lapide.

¹⁶ Gilbert, *De Trin.* I, prol. 6; ed. Haring 36: Omnis enim persona recte intelligitur per se una. Cf. *De Trin.* I, 10, 16; p. 82. Abelard, *Expos. fidei in sym. Athanasii*; PL 178, 631A: Persona quippe quasi per se una dicitur. *Gesta Frid.* I, 52; MGH SS 20, 380 (3).

¹⁷ Gilbert, *De Trin.* II, 2, 35; ed. Haring 96. According to the *Hist. Pontificalis* 8; p. 19, St. Bernard spoke at Rheims of *paternitas-filiatio-processio*.

¹⁸ Cf. Ambrose, *De Fide ad Grat.* I, 10, 65; PL 16, 566A: Scrutari non licet superna mysteria... non licet discutere. Abelard, *Theol. 'Summi Boni'* II; ed. H. Ostlender, in *Beiträge* 35 (1939) 35.

22 Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, ut dictum est, sunt tres persone. Inde bene sequitur: ergo tria. Ergo aliquot tria sunt unum. Unde AUGUSTINUS: "Unum tria et tria unum".¹⁹ Sicut enim hoc corpus est album, durum, quadratum, et hoc album, hoc durum, hoc quadratum est hoc corpus ita diuina essentia secundum quosdam est Pater, est Filius, est Spiritus sanctus: et Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt diuina essentia.

23 Nota quod hec similitudo non est in toto rationis sed in parte. Sicut enim uerum est "Hoc corpus non est hec tria" non ita uerum est "Diuina essentia non est tria".²⁰ Nota quod si(cut) Socrates stans differt a se sedente ita diuina essentia secundum quod Pater est differt a se ipsa, secundum quod Filius est et secundum quod Spiritus sanctus est. Sed caue ne inducta similitudo te fallat. Est igitur fidei catholice unus articulus ut UNUM DEUM tres personas esse et tres personas unum Deum credamus et creditum ueneremur.

24 NEQUE CONFUNDENTES PERSONAS etc. In hoc uersu agitur contra eos qui non diuidentes inter personas eas confundeabant. De quibus fuit Noethus eresiarcha, Arrius et Sabellius, Praxeas, Ermogenes, Priscillianus.²¹ Hii enim omnes sicut unum Deum sic unam personam esse Deum credebant dicentes etiam quidam eorum quod eadem persona est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus et hec eadem quando uult est Pater, quando uult est Filius, quando uult est Spiritus sanctus.²²

25 Nota quod, cum quorundam sententia sit quod idem est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, in hoc differunt a predictis ereticis quia, cum illi hoc intelligerent de eadem persona, isti intelligerent hoc de essentia.²³

26 NEQUE SUBSTANTIAM SEPARANTES. Hic agitur contra eos qui unitatem essentie non credentes eam diuidunt. De quibus fuit Arrius qui, solum Patrem esse Deum dicens,²⁴ Filium non esse Deum natura sed adoptione credebat: et Semi-Arriani qui Filium Deum esse sicut et Patrem credebant sed non ab una numero diuinitate sed alia conformi.²⁵

27 De his item fuit Uigilantius qui hanc regulam²⁶ naturalium "Diuersorum numero subsistentium diuerse numero sunt subsistentie" theologicis accommodans ex pluralitate personarum pluralitatem in diuinitate asserebat. Inde sic ut tres

¹⁹ *De Doctr. christ.* I, 5, 5; PL 34, 21: Et tria haec unum omnia propter... Robert of Melun, *Sent.* I, 3, 14; ed. Martin-Gallet 242: Illud Augustini... hec tria unum sunt et unum hec tria. Cf. Geoffrey of Auxerre, *Libellus* 26 and 40; PL 185, 604A; 609A.

²⁰ See Robert of Melun, *Sent.* I, 5, 44; p. 255: Non enim idem est hec tria esse unum et unum esse hec tria.

²¹ Gilbert, *De Trin.* I, prol. 5; ed. Haring 35.

²² Cf. E. K. Rand, *Johannes Scottus* (Munich, 1906) 39. Augustine, *In Joh. Tr.* 37, 6; PL 35, 1672. Abelard, *Exp. fidei*; PL 178, 629C.

²³ Cf. Geoffrey, *Libellus* 65; PL 185, 617A: Quod... nec unum aliquid sint tres personae...

²⁴ Gilbert, *De Trin.* I, prol. 5; ed. Haring 35.

²⁵ *Ibid.* II, 1, 16; p. 92.

²⁶ *Ibid.* I, prol. 4; p. 35. Otto of Freising, *Gesta Frid.* I, 53; p. 381.

personas tres deos esse dicebat.²⁷ Cuius paralogisticam complexionem AMBROSIUS²⁸ non bene intelligens respondit: "Deus non saluauit mundum in dialectica". Tandem AUGUSTINUS paralogismum intelligens in quo fraus esset et fallatia aperuit. Principium enim naturalium theologicis accommodans paralogismum faciebat et ei impropere dicit: "Amodo non uocaberis Uigilantius sed Dormitantius".²⁹

28 ALIA EST ENIM PERSONA PATRIS etc. Quasi: Non debemus confundere personas. ALIA EST ENIM PERSONA PATRIS i.e. alia persona est Pater. Et sic intellige per intransitionem cetera que secuntur. SED PATRIS ET FILII ET SPIRITUS SANCTI UNA EST etc. Quasi: Non est separanda substantia trium. Non enim plures sunt eorum substantie.

29 SED UNA EST DIUNITAS PATRIS ET FILII ET SPIRITUS SANCTI. Persone quidem distinguende sunt. Sed earum est eadem numero substantia que hic diuersis nominibus appellatur scilicet DIUNITAS, GLORIA, MAIESTAS. Sed multiuoce.

30 Dicunt tamen quidam quod MAIESTAS non est DIUNITAS immo ratio theologica ut MAIESTAS quasi maior status dicatur. Qui sic sentiunt, inter personas et essentiam et inter personas et personales proprietates et inter essentiam et personales proprietates non diuidunt sed tantum inter personas. Hii dicunt quod DIUNITAS est Pater et paternitas et econuerso; et DIUNITAS est Filius et filiatio et econuerso; et DIUNITAS est Spiritus sanctus et conexio et econuerso.³⁰

31 Quibus sic opponitur: Pater est DIUNITAS et DIUNITAS est filiatio. Ergo Pater est filiatio. Quod per sillogismum probant non sequi sic: Pater est essentia sed essentia est Filius. Ergo Pater est Filius.

32 Alii aliter sentientes, inter personam et naturam et inter personas et personales proprietates et inter personales proprietates et essentiam [146r] diuidunt, tam auctoritatibus tam rationibus sententiam suam confirmantes.

33 Quod persona et natura idem non sint, auctoritate beati THEODORITI *Contra Sabellium* confirmant que est: "Qui naturam et personam esse idem intelligit, aut in confusione(m) Sabellii aut in diuisionem Arrii incidit".³¹ Item dicunt de

²⁷ Pseudo-Bede, *In Titulo*; PL 95, 394A: Hinc emersit Vigilantiana haeresis. Vigilantius enim, transferens naturalium rationes ad Deum, tres deos asserebat.

²⁸ *De Fide ad Grat.* I, 3, 42; PL 16, 559B: Sed non in dialectica complacuit Deo saluum facere populum suum. *In Titulo*; PL 95, 394B: Hinc fertur beatus Ambrosius, mirae simplicitatis vir, respondisse quod Deus non saluat mundum in dialectica.

²⁹ *In Titulo*; PL 95, 394D.

³⁰ Cf. John of Salisbury, *Hist. Pont.* 8; ed. Poole, 19: Quoniam Deus simplex est et quicquid in Deo est Deus est, proprietates personarum sunt ipse personae et quod Pater est paternitas... Robert of Melun, *Sent.* I, 4, 23; p. 147: Nam proprietates sunt ipse persone.

³¹ *Acta conc. oec.* II, 5, 152 or PG 83, 1170AB. The quotation is offered by Otto of Freising, *Gesta Frid.* I, 56 (MGH SS 20, 383), Hugh of Honau, *De Homousion*, (MS Cambridge, Univ. Lib. I, iv, 27; f. 54v) *Summa porretana*; (MS Vat. Ross. 212, f. 100v), Adhemar

nullo posse dici ueraciter quod sit Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus quin illud sit heresis Noethi siue "nullo" accipiaturs masculinum uel neutrum.

34 Quod ex Bracarensis³² Concilii decreto confirmant quod est: "Si quis extra sanctam Trinitatem nescio que mala diuinitatis nomina introduxerit dicens quod diuinitas sit Trinitas ut Gnostici et Priscilliani dixerunt, anathema sit".

35 Isti diuinam essenciam tantum, non aliquam personam, appellant substantiam ut scilicet quod in Trinitate dicitur substantia sit personarum essencia. Sed nota quod quamuis diuinitas, ut ait AUGUSTINUS, iure dicatur substantia et essentia, dignius dicitur essencia quam substantia.³³ Quod enim proprie dicitur substantia, accidentibus substat. Unde cum eius nulla sint accidentia, minus digne dicitur substantia quam essentia.

36 Nota eos inter personam et naturam sic diuidere ut inter ea nec sit omnimoda diuersitas nec omnimoda identitas. Cum enim nec substantialiter differant nec numero, non sunt prorsus diuersa. Et cum non quicquid uerum est de essentia uerum sit de persona uel de personis et econuerso, non omnino eadem sunt. Quia si aliqua sint prorsus idem, quicquid est uerum de uno, uerum est de alio sicut (quicquid) uerum est de Marco, uerum est de Tullio, et quicquid est uerum de sole, et de Phebo et econuerso. Sed cum essentia sit communis trium et hoc uerum sit de ea, non potest esse uerum de persona: et quedam similiter de persona que non sunt uera de essentia.

Item nota quod persona et natura sic sunt diuersa quod non plura nec

of Saint-Ruf, *Tract. de Trin.* IV, 87 (MS Vat. Lat. 561, f. 265v). Peter Lombard ignored this text, though he was quite familiar with the issue: Quidam perversi sensus homines in tantam prosilierunt insaniam ut dicerent non idem esse naturam Dei et personam... Propter haec et huiusmodi inter naturam et personam dividunt. *Sent.* I, 34, 1; ed. Quaracchi (1916) 212.

³² Hence it would be wrong to say: Diuinitas est Trinitas. The reading of this canon is uncertain. It reads in Mansi 9 (Florence, 1763) 774D: Si quis extra sanctam Trinitatem alia nescio quae diuinitatis nomina introducit dicens quod in ipsa diuinitate sit Trinitas Trinitatis sicut Gnostici et Priscillianus dixerunt, anathema sit. Mansi notes the variant: (quod) ipsa diuinitas sicut sit Trinitas (sicut Gnostici...). The text adopted by Mansi agrees with the *Hispana* (PL 84, 563C). From this Spanish collection the canons of the council of Braga (563) were incorporated into the *Decretales pseudo-isidorianae*; ed. P. Hinschius (Leipzig, 1863) 421 or PL 130, 567A. Hinschius notes, however, that two MSS (Chartres, Angers) have the reading: ipsa diuinitas sit Trinitas. Our commentary agrees with this reading. The first canon of this council is quoted by Adhemar, *Tract. de Trin.* III, 38 (f. 243) and Hugh of Honau, *De Homousion* (f. 46). The canons were also found in the Spanish *Epitome* according to F. Maassen, *Gesch. der Quellen und der Lit. des can. Rechts* (Graz, 1870) 655. At the end of Gilbert's commentary on Psalms in MS Paris, B.N. Lat. 439, f. 193 (s. XII) the following fragment is found: Si quis extra sanctam Trinitatem mala nescio que nomina diuinitatis intulerit quod ipsa diuinitas sit ut nostici et priscillianiste dixerunt anathema sit. Numeratur Trinitas in substantiis atque personalibus proprietatibus perfectis atque semotim subsistentibus et numero diuisibilibus. (Sophronius, *Ep. ad Serg.*; PG 87, 3155C).

³³ *De Trin.* VII, 5, 10; PL 42, 942.

aliquot. Non enim quecumque sunt diuersa, sunt plura uel aliquot: sicut ens et non-ens et Socrates et albedo Socratis.

37 Hanc propositionem "Deus est diuinitas" hoc modo concedunt: non ut persona sit natura sed ut Deus diuinitatem solam et solus habere ostendatur. Sic enim in ethicis per emphrasim uel emphasim loqui solemus cum aliquid alicui inesse habundantius quam cetera que insunt et habundantius quam aliis quibus similiter inest inesse significamus: ut "Dauus est scelus" et "Tu tantus quantus es, sapientia es".³⁴

38 Hanc autem "Diuinitas est Deus" concedunt hoc modo: i.e. illi qui sunt diuinitas uel ille sunt Deus uel est Deus. Illud AUGUSTINI³⁵ quod est "Unum tria et tria unum" sic exponunt: "Unum tria" i.e. illi qui sunt unum sunt tria. Cum enim "tria sunt unum" sit particularis affirmatiua et "unum est tria" sit eius simplex conuersa, in utraque agitur de eodem, scilicet de tribus. Particularis enim affirmatiua tam conuertenda quam eius simplex conuersa idem subiectum habet de quo fit sermo: ut "quiddam homo est animal, quiddam animal est homo".

39 Item inter personas et personales proprietates diuidunt ut aliud sit Pater quam paternitas et aliud Filius quam filiatio et aliud Spiritus sanctus quam conexio. Pater enim persona est. Paternitas uero modus habendi ad Filium qua differt a Filio et a Spiritu sancto. Filius est persona. Filiatio uero modus habendi ad Patrem qua differt a Patre et a Spiritu sancto. Spiritus sanctus est persona. Conexio uero est modus habendi ad eos quos conectit. Et sic est personalis proprietas qua differt ab illis personis hec persona.

40 Illud autem IERONIMI³⁶ ubi dicitur: "Proprietates nominum sunt persone" quod contra eos facere uidetur sic exponunt: "Proprietates nominum sunt persone" i.e. illa sunt persone que hec nomina Pater, Filius, Spiritus sanctus significant pro substantia, non illa que significant pro qualitate, scilicet paternitas, filiatio, conexio. Illud enim quod nomen significat pro substantia proprietas nominis est quandoquidem nomen habeat significare substantiam³⁷ ex inuentione, qualitatem uero ex accidenti. Unde DONATUS: Qualitas accedit nomini.³⁸

41 Item inter personales proprietates et essentiam diuidunt. Personales enim proprietates, cum sint modi habendi quibus differunt persone, essentia non sunt.³⁹

³⁴ Gilbert, *De Trin.* I, 3, 5; ed. Haring 51: Terence, *Adel.* 394. Robert of Melun, *Sent.* I, 5, 40; p. 243: Terence, *Adel.* 394 and *Andr.* 317. See also Geoffrey, *Libellus* 6 and *Ep. ad Albinum* 2; PL 185, 597D; 588C. Everard of Ypres, *Dialogus*; ed. Haring 270.

³⁵ Cf. *De Trin.* X, 11, 18; PL 42, 983. *De Anima* II, 3, 5; PL 44, 497.

³⁶ Pelagius, *Libellus fidei* 6; PL 48, 489C (PL 45, 1717).

³⁷ Priscian, *Instit.* II, 4, 18; ed. H. Keil (Leipzig, 1855) 55: Proprium est nominis substantiam et qualitatem significare. Everard, *Dialogus*; p. 253.

³⁸ Cf. Donatus, *Ars grammatica*; ed. H. Keil (Leipzig, 1864) 355.

³⁹ Everard, *Ep. ad Urbanum III* I, 8; ed. Haring, in: *MedSt* 17 (1955) 164: Et ita paternitas non est diuina essentia.

42 Nota quod diuinitas ab auctoribus appellatur Forma. Unde BOETIUS: "Forma boni liuore carens".⁴⁰ Et Apostolus: *Qui cum in Forma Dei esset* etc.⁴¹ Hec a BOETIO dicitur: Forma sine subiecto.⁴² Cum enim diuinitas sola et sine concretionem sit in Deo, est in eo non ut in subiecto. Subiectum namque in collatione accidentium dicitur. Item dicitur qualitas.⁴³ Et Deus dicitur esse Deus genere⁴⁴ i.e. proprietate.⁴⁵

43 Istis sic opponitur: Solus Deus est eternus. Sed diuinitas est eterna et non est Deus. Ergo solus Deus non est eternus. Sic fallitur per simile: Solus Socrates est in hac domo. Sed pes Socratis est in hac domo et non est Socrates. Ergo solus Socrates non est in hac domo. Solus Socrates hodie incepit esse. Sed albedo Socratis non est Socrates et incepit hodie esse. Ergo solus Socrates non incepit (hodie) esse.

44 "Solus" enim adiunctum alicui nec eius partes nec eius naturas excludit. Item: Diuinitas est in Deo. Paternitas est in eodem. Ergo sola diuinitas non est in eo. Ergo Deus non est simplex. Quod non sequitur. Paternitas enim non est in Deo sed est ad Deum uel Dei. Est enim paternitas personalis proprietas et relatio ab eterno.

45 Nota quod ea que non sunt insitiue nature ut relationes et alia extrinsecus affixa⁴⁶ non sunt in subiecto ut inherencia subiecto. Insitiue nature sunt ut ea que sunt in predicamento substantie et que sunt in predicamento qualitatis et quedam quantitates ut interuallares mensure⁴⁷ et etiam locus [146v] quantitatis. Hec dicuntur insitiua quia sic sunt in subiecto insita ut sine uariatione subiecti accedere vel recedere non possint.

46 Extrinsecus affixa sunt cetera que restant in predicamentis. Et dicuntur extrinsecus affixa quia eorum accessu uel recessu subiectum non uariatur: ut quia Socrates incipit esse pater uel desinit esse pater non ideo uariatur. Unde hec a BOETIO circumstantie, circumferentie, status appellantur.⁴⁸

47 Nota quod, cum aliquid dicatur simplex in collatione ut hypothetica propositio dicitur simplex et spiritus dicatur simplex i.e. sine partibus, Deus dicitur simplex i.e. sine concretionem. Qua simplicitate nichil preter Deum simplex est. Anima hominis autem etsi sit simplex i.e. sine partibus, non tamen dicitur uel

⁴⁰ *De Cons. phil.* III, 9, 6; CSEL 67, 63.

⁴¹ *Phil.* 2:6.

⁴² *De Trin.* 2; ed. Stewart-Rand (Cambridge, Mass., 1953) 10.

⁴³ Vigilius, *Contra Arianos* II; PL 62, 169A. Pseudo-Jerome (= Pascasius), *Ep.* 9, 12; PL 30, 135B. Hilary, *De Syn.* 36; PL 10, 508B: naturae qualitate.

⁴⁴ Cf. Hilary, *De Trin.* IV, 40; VI, 11; PL 10, 125C; 165C.

⁴⁵ Cf. Hilary, *De Trin.* IV, 33; IX, 61; XI, 1; XII, 8; PL 10, 120C; 330B; 400A; 438A. See Adhemar, *Tract. de Trin.* II, 8; f. 217.

⁴⁶ Gilbert, *De Trin.* I, 10, 23; ed. Haring 83: extrinsecus affixa praedicamenta. *De Trin.* I, 6, 8; p. 67: Accidentia ... extrinsecus affixa ... Cf. Geoffrey, *Libellus* 44; PL 185, 610B.

⁴⁷ Cf. *De Hebd.* 6; ed. Haring 189. *Contra Eut.* 6, 6; 6, 10; pp. 322 f.

⁴⁸ Cf. *De Trin.* 4; ed. Stewart-Rand, 22.

est simplex i.e. sine concretionem.⁴⁹ In ea namque plura concreta sunt ut potentie ex quibus, ut dicit BOETIUS, substantia anime iungitur: et multa accidentaliter ut letitia, tristitia, gramatica. In Deo uero non est nisi sola diuinitas. Unde in eo non est concretio i.e. plurium inherencium coniunctio.

48 Item opponitur illud ISIDORI: "Ideo Deus simplex est quia aliud ab ipso in eo non est".⁵⁰ Diuinitas est in Deo et non est Deus nec eius pars. Ergo est aliud ab eo. Non sequitur. Illud ISIDORI namque sic exponendum est: "Aliud ab ipso non est" hoc est omnino aliud. Sic expositum est.

49 Item: Quicquid est aut est Creator aut creatura.⁵¹ Sed diuinitas est, et non est Creator. Ergo est creatura. Quod idiotum⁵² est dicere. Hec enim disiunctio fit inter Deum tantum et inter illa creata que sunt substantie subiecte. Unde ab ea excluditur quaecumque forma. Quare et diuinitas. Uel aliter: cum dicitur "Quicquid est aut est Creator aut creatura", non excluditur immo includitur quod est Creatoris aut quod est creature.

50 QUALIS PATER TALIS FILIUS TALIS SPIRITUS SANCTUS. Cum Pater non sit qualis nec Filius qualis nec Spiritus sanctus qualis sed tantum sint quid, non uidetur esse recta hec collatio qua sic conferuntur Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus. Quamuis enim Pater sit iustus, pius, fortis, bonus et similiter Filius et Spiritus sanctus, non ideo sunt aliquid quale, immo quid, quia eos hoc esse est eos Deum esse: et eos Deum esse est eos esse quid. Sed quoniam diuinitas modo qualitatis significatur unde etiam est quod a IERONIMO⁵³ appellatur qualitas ut cum dico Deus est bonus, iustus et huiusmodi, iccirco talis fit collatio cum dico: QUALIS PATER TALIS FILIUS etc.

51 Item si diuinitas esset qualitas quoniam non sunt plura immo unum numero, in quo conferuntur non uidetur esse bona hec collatio. Collatio enim hoc exigit ut diuersa sint numero que conferuntur et diuersa sint numero in quibus conferuntur, eiusdem tamen speciei uel generis: ut qualis est margarita talis est cignus. Margarita enim et cignus diuersa sunt numero. Et eorum albedines, in quibus sunt conferribilia, diuerse sunt numero, eiusdem tamen speciei quoniam utraque est albedo.

52 Inde est quod corpus Socratis et Socrates in colore, spiritus Socratis et Socrates in gramatica non conferuntur ut dicatur: Talis est Socrates quale est corpus eius: talis est Socrates qualis est spiritus eius. Non enim sunt plures numero color Socratis et corporis eius sed unus numero. Unde non plura colorata sed unum coloratum sunt Socrates et corpus eius: sicut nec sunt plura⁵⁴

⁴⁹ Gilbert, *De Trin.* II, 1, 18; p. 92: Anima enim simplex est, multis tamen subsistentiis aliquid est.

⁵⁰ Cf. Isidore, *Etym.* VII, 1, 26 (ed. Lindsay); Lombard, *Sent.* I, 8, 8; p. 65; Robert of Melun, *Sent.* I, 5, 1, p. 181.

⁵¹ Augustine, *De Trin.* I, 6, 9; PL 42, 825. Geoffrey, *Libellus* 19; PL 185, 601A.

⁵² This rather rare adjective means *illiteratus*, *imperitus*.

⁵³ Pseudo-Jerome, *Ep.* 9, 12; PL 30, 135B.

⁵⁴ uel (plu)res *suprascriptum MS.*

numero gramatica Socratis et spiritus eius sed una numero. Unde non sunt plura gramatica sed unum numero gramaticum. Similiter cum non sint plures diuinitates sed una numero non uidetur recte conferri ut dicatur secundum eam: QUALIS PATER etc.

53 Sed nota uerba esse humana et sensum theologicum et hac non ueri nominis collatione animum ad intelligendum essentie identitatem utcumque promoueri. Non enim habemus uerba rebus cognata nec satis digna ad loquendum de Deo.⁵⁵ Inde est quod sicut eum comprehendere non possumus sic nec effari possimus.

54 Unde PLATO: "Summum Opificem uniuersitatisque Conditoem tam difficile est inuenire quam inuentum digne profari".⁵⁶ Unde AUGUSTINUS in libro *De Videndo Deo*: "Quid est Deus? Maius quod intelligere possis, immo maius quam intelligere possis".⁵⁷ Et HYLLARIUS: "Sermo nature succumbit et rem, ut est, uerba non explicant".⁵⁸

55 "Sermo nature succumbit". Hoc intelligitur dupliciter: "Nature" i.e. diuinitati que est natura super omnem naturam. Uel: "Sermo nature" i.e. sermo naturalis ille scilicet quo de naturalibus disseritur. Unde "sermo nature" dicitur. Ille, inquam, "succumbit" i.e. subest rebus diuinis. In theologicis enim intellectus et sermones subsunt rebus. In naturalibus uero res subsunt sermonibus et intellectibus.

56 Inde est quod in naturalibus ratio preuenit fidem. Ibi enim ratio facit fidem rei dubie. In theologicis uero fides preuenit rationem.⁵⁹ Unde AUGUSTINUS: "Crede ut intelligas".⁶⁰ Hic enim rei prius dubie fides asserit rationem.

57 Quod quedam sint de Deo inenarrabilia Ysaia innuit dicens: *Generationem eius quis enarrabit?*⁶¹ Quasi: Nullus. Id est: impossibile est. Sicut enim dicit IERONIMUS⁶² super hunc locum: Hoc nomen "quis" quandoque notat impossibilitatem ut hic; quandoque difficultatem ut *quis potest eum audire?*;⁶³ quandoque raritatem ut *quis putas est fidelis seruus?*⁶⁴ Quasi: Rarus.

58 INCREATUS PATER, INCREATUS FILIUS, INCREATUS SPIRITUS SANCTUS. IMMENSUS PATER, IMMENSUS FILIUS, IMMENSUS SPIRITUS SANCTUS etc. PATER est IMMEN-

⁵⁵ Cf. Boethius, *De Cons. phil.* III, 12 pr.; ed. Stewart-Rand, 292: ...cum, Platone sanciente, didiceris cognatos de quibus loquuntur rebus oportere esse sermones.

⁵⁶ *Timaus* (Calc. interpr.) 28C; ed. J. H. Waszink, in: *Corp. Plat. Medi Aevi: Plato Lat.* 4 (Leyden, 1962) 21. Abelard, *Theologia 'Summi Boni'* III; PL 178, 1224C.

⁵⁷ *Ep.* 147 (*De videndo Deo*) 18, 45; PL 33, 617.

⁵⁸ *De Trin.* II, 7; PL 10, 56B: Naturae sermo succumbit et rem, ut est, uerba non explicant.

⁵⁹ Gilbert, *De Trin.* II, 1, 9; p. 90.

⁶⁰ *In Joh. Tr.* 29, 6; PL 35, 1630. *Sermo* 43, 6, 7; PL 38, 257.

⁶¹ *Is.* 53:8.

⁶² *In Eccle.* 3; PL 23, 1059C. Robert of Melun, *Sent.* I, 14, 16; p. 132.

⁶³ *John* 6:61.

⁶⁴ *Mt.* 24:45.

sus hoc est tempore infinitus cuius scilicet superne vite terminus secundum tempus inueniri non potest. Hoc enim, ut dicit BOETIUS, est esse infinitum tempore.⁶⁵

59 Uel IMMENSUS dicitur Deus quia est in his que sunt ab ipso ubique creata et extra. Ergo est localis uel locatus?⁶⁶ Quod non sequitur. Deum autem extra creata esse est ipsum uitam [147] in se uiuentem esse i.e. ipsum sic esse sicut erat antequam aliqua creata essent: uel sicut esset etsi aliqua creata non essent.

60 ETERNUS PATER, ETERNUS FILIUS, ETERNUS SPIRITUS SANCTUS. Eternitas, ut quidam dicunt, est mora, comes essentie, non essentia. Alii dicunt quod eternitas est diuinitas.⁶⁷ Et hoc uidetur uelle AUGUSTINUS⁶⁸ in libro *De Trinitate*. Diuinitas enim dicitur multiuoce⁶⁹ bonitas, iusticia, fortitudo et secundum quosdam eternitas.

61 ORIGENES⁷⁰ *Super Ieremiam* his nominibus dicit essentiam multiuoce predicari et eam, quamuis sit una numero, propter diuersos effectus quos habet in rebus multis nominibus appellari: ut quia est puniens et remunerans iustus dicitur; quia tenet nos ne cadamus, et filium a patre et nocrum a socro et uirum ab uxore diuidit fortis dicitur.

62 ET TAMEN NON TRES ETERNI SED UNUS ETERNUS SICUT NON TRES INCREATI NEC TRES IMMENSI etc. Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt unus aeternus Deus, NON TRES ETERNI dei. Nota quod sicut legitur "Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt tres diuine persone et tres co-omnipotentes" ita potest dici quod sunt tres eterne persone.

63 Sed secundum illos qui dicunt plures esse eternitates, unam scilicet que est comes usie, alias uero que sunt comites personarum, proprie dictum est tres eterne persone.⁷¹ Secundum alios uero qui non diuidunt inter eternitatem et essentiam improprie dictum est tres eterne persone sicut et tres diuine et tres omnipotentes persone.

64 Et nota hoc dici per quandam excessum et ratione consortii sicut dicuntur due nature esse in Christo: non quod utraque sit natura sed altera tantum i.e. humanitas. Diuinitas namque, quandoquidem non incepit esse, natura non esse sed ratione consortii natura dicitur.⁷²

⁶⁵ Cf. *De Divisione*; PL 64, 889A.

⁶⁶ *De Trin.* I, 8, 10; ed. Haring, 74.

⁶⁷ Thierry of Chartres, *Tract. in Genesim* 31; ed. N. Haring, in: *Arch. d'hist. doct. et litt. du moyen-âge* 22 (1955) 195: Aeternum nihil est aliud quam diuinitas. Clarembald, *Tractatulus* 25; *ibidem* 208: Aeternitas quae Deus est.

⁶⁸ *De Trin.* V, 10, 11; PL 42, 918. *Sermo* 2, 10; PL 37, 1311: Aeternitas uero ipsa Dei substantia est.

⁶⁹ predicari *add. et del. MS.*

⁷⁰ *In Jer.* 10, 12; hom. 5; PL 25, 627AB.

⁷¹ Gilbert, *Contra Eut.* 3, 31; p. 293.

⁷² Cf. *Contra Eut.* I, 50; p. 274.

65 Qua loquendi consuetudine, scilicet ratione consortii, multum utimur in urbe ut scilicet miles pictus propter arma et monachus niger propter uestem dicatur.⁷³ Hoc excessu utuntur sancti ut, cum non sit nisi unum eternum, unum diuinum, unum simplex, dicant tria eterna, tria diuina, tria simplicia.

66 SIMILITER OMNIPOTENS PATER, OMNIPOTENS FILIUS, OMNIPOTENS SPIRITUS SANCTUS. Ut dicit AUGUSTINUS: "Omnipotens dicitur Deus quia quicquid uult potest".⁷⁴ Sed cum angeli eadem ratione omnipotentes dici possint — quicquid enim uolunt, et possunt — scias hoc non esse dictum ad omnipotentis diffinitionem, immo ad quandam annotationem. Ad annotandum uero aliquem esse omnipotentem satis est ostendere illum posse quicquid uelit. Sicque in urbe loquimur ut quem potentem implere, quicquid uult, uidemus omnipotentem appellemus.

67 Attende qua ratione Deus dicatur omnipotens. Non enim dicitur Deus omnipotens ut omnia impossibilia possit. Quedam enim impossibilia potest: ut impossibilia nature sicut de truco facere uitulum et de saxo dare fontem. Sunt uero alia impossibilia que ipse non potest: ut facere quod, quando aliquid est homo, et ipsum sit non-animal; et facere quod, quando aliquid est album, et ipsum sit non-coloratum; quia hoc esset idem hominem et non-hominem facere; et idem album et non-album facere. Quod esset contra se ipsum facere.

Nota quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus eque possunt in omnibus ex creatricis potentie et saluatricis gratie operibus i.e. in creando et remunerando.

68 ITEM DEUS PATER, DEUS FILIUS, DEUS SPIRITUS SANCTUS. ET TAMEN NON TRES DII sicut Uigilantiis dicebat SED UNUS EST DEUS. ITA DOMINUS PATER, DOMINUS FILIUS, DOMINUS SPIRITUS SANCTUS. ET TAMEN etc.

Quidam dicunt quod dominium non est essentia⁷⁵ in Deo sed relatio quedam. Quare Deum Dominum esse dicunt non eum ideo aliquid esse sed ad aliquid esse. Quod esse dominum non sit esse Deum uolunt habere ex AUGUSTINO dicente in libro *De Trinitate* quod dominus incepit esse in tempore. Non enim fuit dominus donec esset seruus.⁷⁶

Alii dicunt quod esse dominum est esse Deum et ab eterno esse dominum uirtute et potentia dominandi etsi in tempore actu ceperit dominari.

69 QUIA SICUT SINGILLATIM UNAMQUAMQUE PERSONAM etc. Quasi: Uere dico quod est unus Deus et non tres dii, unus Dominus et non tres domini quia SICUT COMPELLIMUR CHRISTIANA UERITATE hoc est catholica fide que dicitur ueritas quoniam de uerissimis est i.e. de eternis CONFITERI unamquamque personam SINGILLATIM⁷⁷ i.e. per se et solitarie acceptam esse DEUM AUT DOMINUM ita PROHIBEMUR CATHOLICA RELIGIONE hoc est fide CATHOLICA que dicitur religio

⁷³ Cf. *Contra Eut.* 4, 7; p. 298.

⁷⁴ *Enchir.* 96, 24; PL 40, 276: Vocatur omnipotens... quoniam quicquid uult potest. Abelard, *In symb. App.*; PL 178, 622A; *Theologia 'Scholarium'* I, 8; PL 178, 989C.

⁷⁵ non est essentia *add. MS.*

⁷⁶ Augustine, *De Trin.* V, 16, 17; PL 42, 922.

⁷⁷ sigillatim *MS.*

quia est potius in christiana religione. Ipsa enim est, ut dicit IERONIMUS, sine qua omnis uirtus in uicio est.⁷⁸ Uel dicitur religio i.e. ius quo ad recte uiuendum ligamur.⁷⁹ Hac, inquam, fide PROHIBEMUR DICERE TRES DEOS AUT DOMINOS.

70 Nota ubi dictum est DEUM AUT DOMINUM illud AUT accipi subdisiunctum discretium uel subdisiunctum copulatum. Disiunctive enim coniunctiones, quando subdisiunctive ponuntur, uel subdisiunctive discretive uel subdisiunctive copulatiue sunt. Subdisiunctive discretive sunt quando utrumque potest conuenire eidem. Sed sic alterum ab altero discernitur et eligitur ut, altero relicto, alterum assumatur sicut hic DEUM AUT DOMINUM. Quasi: cum utrumque possis dicere, dic quodlibet siue DEUM siue DOMINUM.

Discretive copulatiue sunt quando utrumque sic conuenit alicui quod utrumque redditur eidem. Quod potes hic attendere ut dicas DEUM AUT DOMINUM i.e. DEUM et DOMINUM.

71 PATER A Nullo est factus etc. Contra eos qui personas confundunt⁸⁰ et contra eos qui substantiam separant superius egit. Hic contra alios hereticos agit. Fuerunt enim diverse hereses et diversi heresiarche qui quamuis diuersa errorum capita habeant tamen in eodem fine conueniunt quia circa Deum uersantur uel circa uanitatem. Ipsi enim sunt uulpes Sansonis caudas alligatas habentes.⁸¹

72 Attende quod omnes modi incipiendi esse, scilicet factura, creatura, genitura, hic a Patre remouentur. Quibus ab eo remotis, eternus esse probatur.

73 Dicendum est ergo quid sit creari, quid gigni, quid fieri. Aliquid creari est ipsum de nulla preiacente materia incipere esse. [147v] Qua ratione sola primordialis materia et spiritus creati sunt. Unde Moyses: *In principio creauit Deus celum et terram*⁸² hoc est inuisibilem materiam quam appellauit celum, terram, aquas, non quia ipsa esset hoc uel illud uel tertium sed quia hoc et illud et tertium ex ipsa facienda erant: uel propter simplices, qui minus idonei sunt ad percipienda inuisibilia, nominibus uisibilem eam appellauit.

74 Uel eam celum, terram, aquas appellauit ut eam nec esse celum nec terram nec esse aquas significaret sicut Christus petra, fons, uitululus, aries appellatur ut nec esse hoc uel illud uel tertium uel quartum ostendatur.

In hac materia, primo die creata, omnia corpora sunt creata corpora. In ceteris uero diebus de hac materia ut de preiacenti fecit ut, que fuerant in chaos corpora, fierent talia per⁸³ formarum impressiones i.e. animalia uel talia, i.e. arbores. Et sic de ceteris.

75 Facere enim est de preiacenti materia operari.⁸⁴ Et sic omnia creauit ante-

⁷⁸ Cf. Jerome, *In Eccle.*; PL 23, 1121A.

⁷⁹ Cf. Jerome, *In Amos* III, 9, 6; PL 25, 1090A: Religio a religando.

⁸⁰ confidunt MS.

⁸¹ *Judges* 15:4.

⁸² *Gen.* 1:1.

⁸³ (talía per) per talía MS.

⁸⁴ Cf. Abelard, *Exp. in Hexameron*, PL 178, 734B.

quam faceret. Est igitur sol creatus antequam esset sol. Quod quamuis aliquibus absurdum uidetur non tamen minus est uerum. Omnis enim fere scientia circumstantes abusiones habet et maxime diuina pagina.

76 Nota quod hec materia est corpus non tamen aliquod corpus. Ergo nullum corpus? Non sequitur. Sicut etsi Deus non sit aliquis Deus, et sol etsi non sit aliquis sol, non tamen est nullus Deus nec nullus sol. Hoc nomen enim "aliquis" cum sit partitium et de multis uel uniuersis unum excerptat, circa unica et solitaria excerptium non est. Unde non est bonum dicere: Aliquis Deus est, Aliquis sol est, Aliqua luna est. De re numero una et singulari non est excerptio facienda.

77 Si uero quis instet dicens: Aliquis Deus est, Nullus Deus est, iste sunt contrarie, ergo necesse est alteram esse ueram et alteram esse falsam, audacter respondeo⁸⁵ huiusmodi propositiones circa unica et solitaria nichil contradicere nec etiam debere circa ea fieri.

78 Item nota creare et facere sub auctoribus quandoque accipi sic distincte sicut expositum est, quandoque indistincte ut in Iohanne *Omnia per ipsum facta sunt*.⁸⁶ Sic ergo attendas quid sit proprie creare et facere: PATER non est CREATUS quia de non-esse per aliquid primum genus non incepit esse NEC FACTUS quia non est de preiacenti materia aliquid factus NEC GENITUS quia ex aliqua causa operante et mouente, ut esset, non est. Est enim gigni⁸⁷ aliquid per causam efficientem, mouentem scilicet et operantem ut sit aliquid esse.

79 PATER A Nullo EST quia nullum pre se habet. Ipse enim est principium, non de principio. FILIUS A PATRE SOLO EST. A PATRE SOLO i.e. A PATRE qui est solus, falsum est. A PATRE SOLO i.e. solum a Patre sic uerum est ut nomen pro aduerbio ponatur.

80 Distinguenda tamen est propositio que est: FILIUS A PATRE solum EST. FILIUS A PATRE solum EST i.e. nullus alius nisi Filius est a Patre falsum est quia Spiritus sanctus.⁸⁸ FILIUS A PATRE solum EST hoc est Filius a nullo alio est nisi a Patre uerum est.

81 Attende quamuis Filius sit homo ex Uirgine, hic tamen simpliciter dicitur solum esse a Patre. Illa enim que de Filio Dei secundum diuinitatem dicuntur, simpliciter et sine omni determinatione de eo affirmantur. Illa uero que secundum humanitatem de eodem dicuntur uera sunt. Quidam sine determinatione non concedunt.

82 Unde non concederent "Filius Dei mortuus est" nisi cum hac determinatione "secundum quod homo", uolentes hoc habere ex Apostolo dicente de Filio Dei *Qui factus est ei ex semine David* et addidit *secundum carnem*.⁸⁹ Idem

⁸⁵ Cf. Otto of Freising, *Gesta Frid.* I, 52; p. 379: Audacter confiteor...

⁸⁶ *John* 1:3.

⁸⁷ ginni *MS*.

⁸⁸ *supple*: etiam est a Patre.

⁸⁹ *Rom.* 1:3.

rursus Apostolus de eodem in *Epistola ad Hebreos* dixit *Fidelis ei qui fecit eum*⁹⁰ non addens aliquam determinationem. Unde quidam sunt⁹¹ de eo secundum humanitatem cum determinatione et sine determinatione, subintellecta tamen, enuntiare possumus.

Filius NON est FACTUS NEC CREATUS. Sic intellige NON FACTUS NEC CREATUS de Filio sicut expositum est de Patre.

83 SED GENITUS. Nota Filium gigni⁹² a Patre non ut a causa operante et mouente ut ipse sit sed ab eo quadam gigni⁹³ ineffabili generatione et ab eodem⁹⁴ procedere. Unde in Iohanne *Ego a Patre processi*.⁹⁵

84 Sed attende quod cum Filius a Patre procedat et Spiritus sanctus a Patre et a Filio, processio Filii a Patre "natiuitas" et Spiritus sancti ab utroque "conexio" appellatur.⁹⁶ Et sic hoc nomen "processio" natiuitatem et connexionem fortassis equiuoce significat. Hanc autem utramque processionem ab inuicem diuersam et fortassis multa ratione diuersam attende.

85 SPIRITUS SANCTUS A PATRE ET FILIO NON FACTUS NEC CREATUS NEC GENITUS. Sicut a Patre et a Filio remouetur factura et creatura sic a Spiritu sancto. Item sicut a Patre remouetur genitura sic a Spiritu sancto. Pater enim non est genitus. NEC SPIRITUS SANCTUS est GENITUS.

86 Nota quod quamuis Spiritus sanctus sit non-genitus sic et Pater. Non tamen dicitur ingenuus sicut Pater. Non enim sequitur: si non est genitus ergo est ingenuus: sicut non sequitur: lapis non est iustus ergo est iniustus. Non enim de quocumque est uera negatio et uera est priuatio. Cum Filius sit genitus, Spiritum sanctum genitum non dicimus ne duos filios, ut ait AUGUSTINUS, affirmare uideamur.⁹⁷

87 Item cum Pater sit ingenuus, Spiritum sanctum ingenuum non dicimus ne, ut idem ait, duos Patres dicere culpemur.⁹⁸ Cum Pater et Filius habeant se ad inuicem ut relatiua, conueniens est ut, de quo predicatur genitus, de suo relato i.e. de Patre predicetur sua priuatio i.e. ingenuus quia si de Spiritu sancto predicaretur ingenuus uideretur quod Filius, quia genitus est, referretur ad ipsum. Sicque nec est genitus nec est ingenuus.

88 UNUS ERGO PATER etc. Nota quod quedam relationes distinguende sunt personarum ut paternitas qua [148] Pater habet se ad Filium et filiatio qua

⁹⁰ *Heb.* 3:2.

⁹¹ *Instead of* quidam sunt *read* quedam sunt *que*.

⁹² *ginni MS.*

⁹³ *ginni MS.*

⁹⁴ *eodem corr. ex. eadem MS.*

⁹⁵ *John* 8:42: *Ego ex Deo processi.*

⁹⁶ Gilbert, *De Trin.* I, 10, 22; ed. Haring, 83.

⁹⁷ *Ad Orosium*, qu. 2; PL 40, 734. *Sent.* I, 13, 4; ed. Quaracchi, 88.

⁹⁸ *Ibidem.*

Filius ad Patrem et conexio qua Spiritus sanctus ad utrumque. Quedam sunt que communes sunt personarum et predicantur de personis coniunctim sed singulari nomine. Sunt enim addicte essentie ut Creator, Dominus, Principium, Auctor et etiam Pater.⁹⁹ Ideoque Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus dicuntur unus Pater i.e. una causa rerum efficiens.¹

89 Sed diligenter attendendum est quando hoc nomen Pater significat relationem que est persone et quando eam que est personarum. Habent² enim talia uerba et fraudem paratam et fidei conscientiam.³ Similiter et principium predicat relationem de tribus que est comes essentie.

90 Sed nota quod Pater quadrupliciter est principium. Est enim principium Filii et Spiritus sancti et ratione creandi et ratione remunerandi. Filius tripliciter quia ratione emittendi Spiritum sanctum: et ratione creandi et ratione remunerandi. Spiritus sanctus dupliciter quia ratione creandi et ratione remunerandi. Similiter potes assignare de auctoritate.

91 Sed attende quod, cum Spiritus sanctus dicatur auctor et principium tantummodo ratione creandi et remunerandi, incepit esse auctor in tempore: manens tamen natura auctor et principium ab eterno.

92 Quod AUGUSTINUS dicit in libro *De Trinitate*: "Quecumque predicantur de Deo secundum substantiam, sub singulari numero predicantur⁴ de eodem",⁵ sic expone: "secundum substantiam" i.e. que sunt eius substantia ut magnus, iustus, potens et huiusmodi que omnia in Deo sunt sinonima i.e. multiuoca. Uel: "secundum substantiam" i.e. que eius substantiam comitantur ut auctoritas, principalitas et huiusmodi. Sicut enim non est nisi unus Deus sic non est nisi unus auctor et unum principium.

93 Sed quod idem AUGUSTINUS dicit: "Persona predicatur secundum substantiam" uidetur esse contrarium.⁶ Persona enim sub plurali numero de tribus predicatur. Quidam sic exponunt: "Persona predicatur secundum substantiam" hoc est: persona significat substantiam. Dicunt enim quod hoc nomen persona significat equiuoce essentiam et distinctum ut secundum unam significationem singulariter predicetur de tribus, secundum uero alteram pluraliter.

94 Quod persona essentiam significet confirmant ex eodem AUGUSTINO dicente:

⁹⁹ Gilbert, *De Trin.* I, 10, 33 (p. 85); II, 2, 35 (p. 96).

¹ Cf. Augustine, *De Trin.* V, 11, 12, PL 42, 918: non sic potest dici Trinitas pater nisi forte translate ad creaturam propter adoptionem filiorum. *Sent.* I, 26, 5, p. 167.

² habet MS.

³ Hilary, *De Syn.* 67, PL 10, 525A: Habet enim hoc verbum (homousion) in se et fidei conscientiam et fraudem paratam.

⁴ predicatur MS.

⁵ Augustine, *De Trin.* V, 8, 9, PL 42, 917: Quidquid de singulis ad se ipsos dicitur, non pluraliter in summa sed singulariter accipiat.

⁶ *De Trin.* VII, 6, 11, PL 42, 943.

"Idem est Deo esse personam quod esse Deum."⁷ Quod preter usum Catholice ecclesie est. Ideoque quamuis fortasse sit uerum, tacendum est.

95 Aliter alii exponunt: "Persona predicatur secundum substantiam" i.e. sicut essentia non predicatur relatiue sic nec persona. Et illud ita: "Idem est Deo esse personam quod Deum esse" i.e. eodem modo predicatur de Deo persona sicut et ea que significant essentiam.

96 UNUS SPIRITUS SANCTUS. Nota quod cum hoc nomen SPIRITUS et hoc nomen SANCTUS predicent essentiam et ita uerum est de unaquaque personarum quoniam est spiritus sanctus, hec complexa oratio SPIRITUS SANCTUS ponitur in designatione illius persone que procedit ab utroque. Unde si quis dicat: Pater est spiritus sanctus, Filius est spiritus sanctus, multiplices sunt. Habent enim fraudem paratam et fidei conscientiam.⁸ Ideoque diuidende sunt.

97 ET IN HAC TRINITATE NICHIL PRIUS AUT POSTERIUS etc. Hoc est: nulla personarum est prior uel posterior sicut nec tempore sic nec ordine. Quod enim quelibet personarum tertia appellatur non est ordinaliter intelligendum ut scilicet dicatur tertia i.e. post primam et secundam, sed tertia i.e. de tribus una.

98 NICHIL MAIUS AUT MINUS. Hoc est: nulla earum est maioris potestatis uel minoris.

99 COETERNE SIBI SUNT ET COEQUALES. Quod dicit COETERNE respicit ad illud NICHIL PRIUS AUT POSTERIUS. Quod dicit COEQUALES respicit ad illud NICHIL MAIUS UEL MINUS.

100 ITA UT PER OMNIA etc. DE TRINITATE SENTIAT. Sentire equiuocum est. Sentire i.e. aliquo sensu experiri. Sentire i.e. intelligere. SENTIAT i.e. intelligat uel intelligenti adquiescat. Et sic erit bos in ecclesia uel asina pascens iuxta bouem.⁹

101 SED NECESSARIUM EST A(D) E(TERNAM) S(ALUTEM). Hucusque in credente fidem informauit ad diuinitatem. Et articulos fidei posuit quibus Deum intelligimus. Nunc qualiter homo diuinitus assumptus sit intelligendus fide rursus instruit. Quasi: non solum predicti articuli sunt ad salutem necessarii sed etiam illi qui ad humanitatem spectant. In quibus plus meretur homo. De quibus dicendum est. Et primum de Incarnatione.

102 In hoc articulo sicut in supra dictis diuersi diuersa sentiunt. Illi enim qui asserunt quod eadem substantia est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus dicunt quod illa eadem substantia secundum quod est Filius non secundum quod est Pater uel Spiritus sanctus incarnata est.

⁷ *Ibidem*: Et quemadmodum hoc illi est esse quod Deum esse... ita hoc est illi esse quod personam esse.

⁸ Hilary, *De Syn.* 67, PL 10, 525A.

⁹ Cf. *Job* 1:14. *Sent.* III, 25, 2; p. 667.

103 Dicunt enim quod quamuis eadem substantia sit Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, non tamen quicquid uerum est de hoc uel de illo uerum est de tercio et econuerso: sicut quamuis idem sit in Deo misericordia et iusticia, uoluntas et potentia, non quicquid uerum est de misericordia et de iusticia et econuerso nec quicquid uerum est de uoluntate et de potentia et econuerso.

104 Illi uero qui diuidunt inter personas et naturam dicunt Filium incarnari, non aliquam substantiam que sit Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus. Quare Filius est incarnatus et non Pater nec Spiritus sanctus. Ad quod multas rationes assignant diuini auctores. Quia si Pater esset incarnatus, Pater esset Uirginis Filius. Et sic eadem persona esset Pater et Filius. Si Spiritus sanctus esset incarnatus, Spiritus sanctus esset Filius hominis. Et ita duo filii essent in Trinitate.

105 Decuit igitur Filium Dei incarnari ut, qui Filius Dei erat in diuinitate, idem esset Filius Uirginis in humanitate. Uel quia diabolus contra sapientiam fecerat oportebat ut per iusticiam ab illa persona uinceretur cui sapientia attribuitur i.e. a Filio Dei.

106 Sed attende Deum in faciendo aliquid uel non faciendo non sequi rationes que ab auctoribus assignantur sed de sola sua uoluntate est que unica causa omnium est¹⁰ quod sic faciat uel non faciat. Unde si queratur quare Deus sic fecit, uere et sufficienter respondetur: Quia uoluit.

107 Ipse enim est "quem nichil externe pepulerunt fingere cause".¹¹ Quare ergo huiusmodi rationes auctores assignant? Non scilicet ut Deum quod facit uel non facit his de causis facere credant sed ut Deum iuste et rationabiliter facere quicquid facit, etiam si has causas sequeretur, ostendant et persuadeant.

108 In Incarnatione Filius Dei animam et corpus assumpsit. Dicunt quidam quod substantia¹² subsistentium facta est coniunctio et naturarum unio ut scilicet persone nichil sit coniunctum nec unitum sed que sibi sunt coniuncta ut corpus et animam [148v] non persone sed in persona coniuncta esse dicunt. Similiter non humanitatem unitam diuinitati in persona dicunt.

109 Non enim dicunt quod aliquid sit iunctum ex his tribus scilicet persona que est Filius Dei, corpore, anima: sed corpus et animam esse coniuncta in persona secundum illud AUGUSTINI scilicet "dominicus homo fit ex tribus substantiis"¹³ sic exponentes: "ex tribus substantiis" i.e. ex tribus predicabilibus scilicet diuinitate et genere corporis et genere anime: non ex tribus subicibilibus i.e. Filio Dei, corpore et anima.

¹⁰ Cf. Gilbert, *Contra Eut.* 6, 10, ed. Haring 323: ex suae voluntatis unica causa...

¹¹ Boethius, *De Cons. phil.* III, m. 9, 4, ed. Stewart-Rand 262.

¹² read: substantiarum.

¹³ Cf. Augustine, *De Trin.* XIII, 17, 22, PL 42, 1031: ...ex tribus: Deo, anima et carne. In his *Retractationes* I, 18, 11 CSEL 36, 94, St. Augustine disapproves of and retracts his own use of the term *homo dominicus*.

110 Alii dicunt dominicum hominem constare ex persona et ex anima et corpore: non quod ex istis tribus integretur sed tantum ex duobus: et personam unitam esse anime et corpori, et animam et corpus unita¹⁴ esse persone et personam humanitati et humanitatem persone concedunt.

111 Non ut anima et corpus aliam personam faciant sed ut personam que est Filius Dei faciant aliud uel, si uelis dicere, aliam i.e. alius modi quia hominem. Quia corpus et anima in simul coniuncta sunt persona et Filius Dei qui est persona assumpsit ea, uisum fuit Nestorio Christum ex duabus personis scilicet eterna et temporali constare.

Qui multas auctoritates male interpretans errorem suum uouebat ut hanc: Christum assumpsit hominem. Et illud Psalmi: *Beatus quem elegisti et assumpsisti*.¹⁵

112 Quidam iam dixerunt quod aliquis homo est assumptus. Sed non est aliquis homo qui non sit filius hominis. Et Filius Dei assumpsit aliquem hominem. Ergo Filius filium. Ergo persona personam. Et sic contra eos uel illas disputabatur.

113 Queritur cum corpus et anima secundum quosdam sint unita persone utrum persona sit aucta an non. Ad quod dicimus quod nullo genere auctmenti aucta est. Cum enim nullam partem prius haberet, quamuis postea partes habuerit, numero parcium aucta non est nec extensione spatiosae quantitatis. Posset quidem¹⁶ dicere aliquis quoniam numero proprietatum aucta est. Cum enim prius esset tantum Deus, postea factus est homo. Sed quoniam suspectum esset sic dicere, Filium Dei propter Incarnationem minime auctum esse dicimus.

114 EST ERGO FIDES RECTA i.e. rectus articulus fidei — quicumque enim articulorum fidei potest dici fides — UT CREDAMUS ET cum necesse fuerit tum ad instructionem tum ad corroborationem ecclesie CONFITEAMUR. Nulli enim sufficit credere nisi, cum oportuerit, confiteatur. Sicut nec Petro qui, quamuis crederet Christum esse Deum quia cum oportuit non est confessus, negando et peierando grauiter peccauit.

115 DEI FILIUS DEUS ET HOMO EST. DEI FILIUS est assumens ET EST HOMO. Sed non homo assumptus. Assumens enim non est assumptum. Nec assumptum assumens. Cum esset Deus et tandem homo, aliud erat et aliud incepit esse. Unde AUGUSTINUS *Super Iohannem*: "Aliud est Uerbum et aliud est homo".¹⁷

116 Quod sic intellige: Aliud est personam illam esse Deum et aliud est esse hominem. Illa eterna persona incepit esse aliquid temporale et aliquid uisibile secundum (quod) homo. Hoc quidam minime concedunt, cum "aliquid" concedunt tum sine "aliquid". Putant enim quod si concedant de Filio Dei "incepit

¹⁴ unitate MS.

¹⁵ Ps. 64:5.

¹⁶ quid MS.

¹⁷ In Joh. Tr. 69, 3, PL 35, 1817.

aliquod uisibile" cogantur concedere: Ergo incepit esse. Quod inde non prouenit. Sicut nec: Socrates incepit hodie esse aliquod album, sequitur: Ergo incepit esse.

117 Dicimus quod Deus incepit (esse) homo et homo Deus. Unde AUGUSTINUS: "Ex quo Dei Filius incepit esse homo, homo cepit esse unicus Filius Dei"¹⁸ i.e. res huiusmodi non quid sed quale incepit esse Deus. Simile est si dicas: Ex quo corpus cepit esse album, album cepit esse corpus i.e. albedinis et corporalitatis cepit esse coniunctio.

118 DEUS EST EX SUBSTANTIA PATRIS. Hoc est: ex Patre, qui est substantia, eadem cum ipso substantia ET HOMO EST EX SUBSTANTIA MATRIS per decisionem integritatis et per decessionem singularitatis.¹⁹ Sicque hec prepositio que est ex bis posita non consignificat eandem circumstantiam.

119 PERFECTUS DEUS. Hic contra Arrium. PERFECTUS HOMO. Hic contra Manicheum qui dicebat Christum non esse hominem in ueritate substantie sed in sola fantasia. Sicut in arte prestigii uidetur nummus: non est nummus uerus sed fantasticus hoc est in apparentia.

120 MINOR PATRE SECUNDUM HUMA(NITATEM). Secundum etiam diuinitatem dicitur Filius minor Patre. Dicit enim HYLARIUS: Sic Pater est maior Filio quod Filius non est minor eo.²⁰ Non enim est minor eo potentia uel aliquo sed quia Pater est auctor de non-auctore, Filius uero auctor de Patre auctore. In hoc consistit ratio dicendi ut Filius MINOR PATRE SECUNDUM diuinitatem dicatur.

121 QUI LICET DEUS SIT ET HOMO, NON DUO TAMEN i.e. non duo Christi nec due persone SED est UNUS numero CHRISTUS. Attende quod cum hic dicitur: Christus non est duo, duo masculinum negatur, non neutrum. Est enim duo si neutraliter accipiat duo. Est namque Deus et homo.

122 Ne mireris si dicam quia est duo. Ab AUGUSTINO enim dicitur quia est utrumque. Ex quo potest intelligi: Ergo est duo. In quadam omelia sic dicit AUGUSTINUS: "Forma Dei formam hominis accepit ut utrumque sit Deus, utrumque sit homo: utrumque Deus propter suscipientem Deum, utrumque homo propter susceptum hominem".²¹

123 Quod dicitur "susceptum hominem" sic expone: hoc est susceptam humanitatem. Uel sicut IERONIMUS exponit *Super Marcum*: "Suscepit hominem i.e. animam et corpus".²² Et infra in eadem omelia: Non est alia Uerbi, alia hominis persona sed utrumque Christus una persona.²³ Ex his auctoritatibus in quibus legitur quoniam Christus est utrumque probatur quoniam ipse est duo.

¹⁸ *De Praed. sanct.* 15, 30, PL 44, 982.

¹⁹ Gilbert, *De Trin.* I, prol. 4, p. 35.

²⁰ *De Trin.* IX, 56, PL 10, 327A.

²¹ *De Trin.* I, 7, 14, PL 42, 829.

²² Cf. Jerome, *In Marc.* XI, 10, ed. G. Morin, *Anecd. Mareds.* III, 2 (Maredsous, 1897) 356. Cf. PL 30, 313D.

²³ Augustine, *In Joh. Tr.* 69, 3, PL 35, 1817.

124 UNUS AUTEM NON CONUERSIONE DIUNITATIS etc. Hic dampnatur Euticiana heresis. Eutices coniunctionem humanitatis et diunitatis per commixtionem factam esse dicebat et humanitatem sic diunitati coniunctam ut absumeretur²⁴ in ea coniunctione humanitas et in diunitatem uerteretur: sicut si parum aque multo uino commisceatur, aqua non remanet genere aqua sed fit genere uinum.²⁵

125 Contra hanc heresim agit ANASTASIUS²⁶ hic dicens nec diunitatem esse conuersam in humanitatem nec humanitatem in diunitatem sic: UNUS AUTEM NON CONUERSIONE DIUNITATIS IN CARNEM i.e. in humanitatem uel ipse existens in carne i.e. in humanitate est unus non conuersione diunitatis in eam sicut AMBROSIIUS dicit in libro *De Trinitate*: "Unus est non uertibilitate nature sed unione persone".²⁷

126 SED ASSUMPTIONE HUMANITATIS²⁸ IN DEUM. Quod est: humanitas est assumpta i.e. glorificata et exaltata in Deum i.e. in diuine glorie fulgorem et incorruptibilitatem [149] et in immortalitatem.

127 UNUS OMNINO NON CONFUSIONE SUBSTANTIE. In Christo enim sicut non est facta naturarum commixtio sic nec earum confusio.²⁹ Non enim in coniunctione humanitatis et diunitatis sic factum est sicut in confusione albi et nigri. Quia si album in nigro confunditur, nec album nec nigrum est.³⁰ Deus uero non sic est factus homo ut nec Deus nec homo sit. Immo sic est factus homo ut et Deus et homo sit. Et sic in his duobus uersibus tam commixtio naturarum quam confusio remouetur.

128 NAM SICUT ANIMA RATIONALIS etc. Inducta naturali similitudine, comprobatur quod Christus Deus est et homo est: SICUT UNUS HOMO ET ANIMA RATIONALIS est ET CORPUS EST. Nota quod iste due note UNUS HOMO in subiectiua parte ponuntur; iste uero ANIMA RATIONALIS, CORPUS in praedicatiua. Similiter UNUS CHRISTUS in subiectiua, DEUS ET HOMO in praedicatiua.

129 Uide ne te fallat inducta similitudo.³¹ Si enim attendas eam in plenitudine rationis, heretica est si scilicet attendas Christum constare ex Deo et homine sicut unus homo ex anima rationali et corpore constat. Si enim attendas eam in parte rationis, ut non faciat tibi nisi tantum ad hoc probandum propter quod inducta est, certe catholica est.

130 QUI PASSUS EST etc. Hic maximam partem articulorum fidei colligit dicens PRO SALUTE NOSTRA. Causam quare passus est, aperte ostendit.

²⁴ Gilbert, *Contra Eut.* 7, 10, p. 330.

²⁵ Gilbert, *Contra Eut.* 7, 18, p. 332.

²⁶ See Gilbert, *Contra Eut.* 7, 8, p. 329.

²⁷ Cf. Hugh of Saint-Victor, *De Sac.* II, 1, 4, PL 176, 381A ("Ambrosius"). Lombard, *Sent.* III, 7 3; p. 589.

²⁸ humana MS.

²⁹ Cf. Gilbert *De Trin.* I, 3, 16; p. 54.

³⁰ Gilbert, *Contra Eut.* 4, 11, p. 299: cum album et nigrum miscentur, neque componentia neque compositum albi et nigri retinent qualitates sed alterutrius speciei afficiuntur colore.

³¹ Cf. *Sent. diuinitatis*, tr. 4; ed. G. Geyer, *Beiträge* 7 (1909) 67* and 70*.

131 DESCENDIT AD INFEROS. Hoc propter animam de Christo uerum est. Legitur enim quod anima armata diuinitate ad inferos descendit. De inferno non satis aperte locuntur auctores. Dicunt enim quidam quod infernus est sub terra: uolentes hoc habere ex Iohanne dicente in *Apocalipsi* sua.³² Alii dicunt infernum esse in aere caliginoso ubi et anime impiorum et demones in presenti puniuntur et in futuro eternis penis detrudendi: uolentes hoc habere de Epistola Iude dicentis: Carcere caliginis huius retrusus seruatur in iudicio puniendus.³³ Item uolunt hoc habere de *Epistola* Pauli *ad Ephesios* in qua Paulus uocat diabolum principem aeris huius.³⁴ Inde in scripturis sepe appellantur demones aues celi.

132 Quicquid de inferno uerum est, hoc pro certo scio quoniam anime sanctorum affligente pena non urgebuntur sed sola uisione Dei carebunt. Et ita in tenebris lectulum suum strauerunt.³⁵ Per "lectulum" eorum quies notatur. Per hoc quod dicit "in tenebris" ipsos carere uisione Dei ostendit.

133 In descensu illo infernum momordit. Unde: *Morsus tuus ero, inferne*.³⁶ Quia sicut in mordendo solet fieri, partem tulit secum i.e. predestinatos, partem reliquit i.e. reprobatos. In descensu portas inferni confregisse dicitur quia suos inde eripiens hoc tunc fecit ut nullus saluandus deinceps ad inferna descenderet.

134 TERCIA DIE RESURREXIT A MORTUIS. Qui secundum animam descendit, secundum carnem resurrexit. Unde et in quadam *omelia*: Quemadmodum caro mortua est, Christus mortuus, et caro sepulta est Christus sepultus sic cum caro est uiuificata Christus ad uitam rediit.³⁷

135 Unde AUGUSTINUS in sermone *De Resurrectione* dicit: Postquam enim Christus exaltatus est i.e. a Iudeis in cruce suspensus et ut mox spiritum reddidit unica sue diuinitati, anima ad infernorum profunda descendit.³⁸ Et facta preda in inferno uiuus exiit de sepulchro. Ipse se sua potentia suscitauit et iterum immaculata carne uestiuit et ad uitam rediit.

136 ASCENDIT AD CELOS secundum quod homo. SEDET AD DEXTERAM. SEDET i.e. quiescit. Et regnat AD DEXTERAM in eadem potentia Patri equalis. IUDICARE U(IUOS) ET M(ORTUOS) i.e. pios et impios. Uel UIUOS i.e. eos qui tunc uiui inueniuntur sed statim moriuntur ibidem resurgentes. Uel MORTUOS i.e. iam dudum MORTUOS. AD CUIUS ADUENTUM etc.

137 DE PROPRIIS FACTIS i.e. de his que proprio actu persone gesserunt et de his que per consensum sua fecerunt. Hunc autem consensum tam in bono quam in malo intellige. REDDITURI SUNT RATIONEM. Reddere rationem appellat hic habere premium uel penam pro qualitate meriti.

³² *Apoc.* 5:13.

³³ Cf. *Jude* 6.

³⁴ Cf. *Eph.* 2:2.

³⁵ Cf. *Job* 17:12.

³⁶ *Osee* 13:14.

³⁷ See Augustine, *Sermo* 213, 3, 3, PL 38, 1062.

³⁸ Cf. Augustine, *Sermo* 362, 13, 13, PL 39, 1619.

138 IBUNT IN UITAM ETERNAM i.e. eternum gaudium habebunt quod est Deum cognoscere. IN IGNEM ETERNUM i.e. gehennalem. Alius erit ignis qui ardebit usque ad inferni nouissima i.e. ignis purgatorius. Alius est ignis *qui paratus est diabolo et membris eius*.³⁹

139 Ille ignis qui ardebit super faciem terre, imperfectos purgabit, perfectos non ledet. Sed erunt in eo tamquam tres pueri in camino ignis. Reprobi multum in eo grauiter cremati ad gehennalem transibunt. Quotquot enim resurgent, per illum ignem transitori sunt.

140 Queritur de illo igne gehennali utrum habeat fulgorem an non. Hoc ab auctoribus non diffinitur. Sed ex hoc fulgorem habere conuincitur quia dum impii erunt in gehenna ipsos uidere sanctos auctoritas testatur. Quod non contingeret si nichil fulgoris ibi esset.

141 HEC EST FIDES CATHOLICA. Repetit quod in principio dixerat ut sinceram fidem confirmet QUAM NISI QUISQUE FIDELITER corde scilicet ad iustitiam ET FIRMITER mente ad salutem CREDIDERIT, SALUUS ESSE NON POTERIT. Hec est salus et uita eterna: credere in Deum Patrem et unicum Filium eius quem misit saluare mundum. Amen.

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³⁹ Mt. 25:41.

Classification of the Sciences in Medieval Thought*

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IN modern usage the word 'science' has connotations and implications notably different from those of medieval usage. The English word 'science' is derived from the Latin verb *scire*, to know, by way of the French substantive, *science*. The Latin root, it would seem, came from an early Greek form of the verb *κείζω* (the radical form *κειω* for *σκεω*) meaning to split, to cleave. In early Latin usage the verb simply meant to discern, or to penetrate to the bottom in the sense of cutting a situation to its very roots. Thus in Latin the term *scientia* was used to designate a discerning, penetrating, intellectual grasp of a situation or of a given subject. Technically it was employed of knowledge that explained the situation fully and accurately through all or any of its true causes. This causal knowledge was considered possible in speculative research and in practical affairs, in theological analysis and in philosophical investigations. Generally scientific knowledge was contrasted with the arts and technical skills, on the one hand, and with mere probability on the other. In other words, in medieval usage the term 'science' was given to every field of intellectual endeavor in which true causal explanations could be discovered.

The medieval views of scientific knowledge and the classification of the sciences reached full development in the thirteenth century. Three distinct sources must be noted in order to clarify the thirteenth century discussions concerning the sciences. First, there was the Greco-Roman heritage of a liberal arts education, which always remained the foundation of learning in the Middle Ages; second, the profound influence of Manlius Boethius, who before his tragic death bequeathed to the Middle Ages a schema and a few gems of Greek philosophy; third, the twelfth and thirteenth century translations from the Greek and Arabic which helped to make this schema intelligible to the Latins.

* This study is part of a research project made possible, in part, by the generosity of the American Council of Learned Societies, through a grant-in-aid that provided necessary sources and assistance.

When Rome came under the influence of Greek culture she implicitly surrendered to a higher civilization. Rome under the Republic tried to assimilate and oftentimes to imitate the best ancient Greece had to offer. Roman education under the Empire was modeled on the Greek system, but with important differences. Philosophy and medicine, for example, never really became part of a Latin education; these specialized studies could be pursued in Greek. The basic education in the arts, however, was modeled on the Greek liberal tradition and even before the reign of Augustus boys of the Roman aristocracy learned the liberal arts in both Latin and Greek.¹

The earliest Latin classification and exposition of the liberal arts seems to have been incorporated in the now lost work of Terence Varro (116-27 B.C.) entitled *Disciplinarum libri IX*. Varro's compendium of disciplinary or encyclical studies embraced successively: 1. grammar, fragments of which are extant,² 2. dialectics, 3. rhetoric, 4. geometry, 5. arithmetic, 6. astrology, 7. music, 8. medicine, 9. architecture. Medicine and architecture were understandably dropped from later discussions of the liberal arts, and there remained the well known classification later to be designated as the *trivium* and *quadrivium*. Varro personally had a high reputation as a teacher of grammar, dialectics and rhetoric in the schools of Italy, but his four books on the *quadrivium*, it would seem, were little more than insignificant summaries of Greek sources.³ Varro's classification of the seven liberal arts became the foundation of later Roman manuals and summaries of the *artes*. Cicero, Varro's contemporary, listed geometry, letters, physical sciences, moral and political philosophy among the *artes liberales* preparing one for the supreme art of oratory,⁴ but this was never the actual practice or theory of Roman education. In the Roman theory of education the seven liberal arts were a preparation for one of the specialized branches of learning: philosophy, medicine or law.

¹ On the study and use of Latin and Greek in the Roman world see H. I. Marrou, *History of Education in Antiquity* (N. Y., 1956) 255-64, and A. Gwynn, *Roman Education from Cicero to Quintillian* (Oxford, 1926).

² H. Funaioli, *Grammatica et Romana Fragmenta* (Leipzig, 1907) I, 205-6.

³ R. M. Martin, "Arts libéraux (Sept)," in *Dict. d'hist. et de géog. ecclés.* IV, 830; see the collection of studies edited by Josef Koch, *Artes Liberales von der antiken Bildung zur Wissenschaft des Mittelalters* (Studien u. Texte, V), Leiden 1959; on the Greek origin of the quadrivium see P. Merlan, *From Platonism to Neo-platonism* (The Hague, 1953) pp. 78-85.

⁴ Cicero, *De oratore*, I, 72-3; III, 27.

After obtaining an elementary training from a tutor or school master the Roman youth was sent to the nearest grammar school, conducted by a *grammaticus*; normally the boy would have different masters for Latin and Greek grammar. The primary duty of the *grammaticus* was, of course, to teach grammar and literature, but it seems that he also taught the rudiments of arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy.⁵ From the grammar school the youth might proceed to higher studies, which consisted in attending the school of a *rhetoricus*, from whom he learned not only composition and declamation, but also dialectics, or logic.⁶ Thus in practice the Roman schools assigned grammar and a rudimentary *quadrivium* to the secondary school master, the grammarian, while it reserved rhetoric and dialectics for the more advanced teacher, the rhetor. This distribution of the arts course through grammar school and the school of rhetoric is reflected in the *Institutio oratoria libri XII* of Quintillian (c. 35-95 A.D.), which, although primarily a discussion of rhetoric and dialectics, indicates the subjects assumed to have been taught in the grammar school. It is clear that in practice the entire curriculum of both schools embraced the seven *artes liberales*; these arts were the indispensable foundation for any respectable specialization. While the Romans never regarded philosophy or medicine as special subjects to be acquired in Latin, they did consider the study of Roman law to be strictly a Latin specialization to be studied by Latins and Greeks only after completing a liberal education in the arts.⁷

Thus the general plan of Roman education reflected its Greek prototype, just as the general plan of all medieval education revealed its Roman inheritance. Clement of Alexandria, writing around the year 200, was thoroughly traditional in his outlook when he insisted that after the elementary training a youth should study all the liberal or *ἐγκύκλια* disciplines as a foundation for the higher study of philosophy, and not grow old in the exclusive study of music, geometry, grammar or rhetoric, as so many do.⁸ For, Clement observes, the liberal arts are a preparation for philosophy, just as philosophy itself is a preparation for true Christian wisdom. For St. Augustine the seven liberal arts embrace grammar, dialectics, rhetoric, music, geometry,

⁵ See R.-M. Martin, *op. cit.*, col. 830-1.

⁶ *Ibid.*, col. 831.

⁷ See H. I. Marrou, *op. cit.*, 289-91.

⁸ Clem. Alex., *Strom.*, I, 5 (PG 8, 721 B); see also *Strom.*, I, 7.

astronomy and philosophy,⁹ but he too considered the arts a preparation for Christian doctrine and an aid to its interpretation.¹⁰ The Fathers of the Church found no difficulty in adapting Greek and Roman culture to the needs of Christianity. Even after the barbarians put an end to the Roman Empire and its numerous educational institutions scattered throughout the West, the basic conception of the seven liberal arts as the indispensable foundation for philosophy (and beyond philosophy for theology, medicine and law) remained in the Christian schools of the Middle Ages.

A. *The Early Middle Ages*

The Latin Middle Ages inherited not only the general plan of education, but important text-books as well. Cicero served as an invaluable source for the philosophical ideas of antiquity; his *latinity* was a model, though rarely imitated, and his *De inventione* was taken as a text-book of rhetoric in the Middle Ages. Aelius Donatus, a rhetor of Rome around the middle of the fourth century and tutor of St. Jerome, wrote a highly popular, though unoriginal, text-book known as the *Ars grammatica*. In the Middle Ages the elementary part of this treatise dealing with the parts of speech was known as the *Ars minor*; the more detailed consideration of grammar distributed into three books was known as the *Ars maior*. Early in 387 St. Augustine started to write an encyclopedia of the seven liberal arts, his *Disciplinarum libri*,¹¹ but only the grammar, six books on music and a beginning of "the other five disciplines, namely concerning dialectics, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic and philosophy" seem to have been written by him. The popular and curious *Satyricon*, or *De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii et de septem Artibus liberalibus libri novem* by Martianus Capella (early fifth century) was of no doctrinal value, but it was instrumental in establishing the accepted enumeration of the seven liberal arts in the Middle Ages, namely grammar, dialectics, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astrology and music. Around the year 500 A.D. Priscian, about whom practically nothing is known, composed his very influ-

⁹ Aug., *De ordine*, II, 12-16 (PL 32, 1011-1016); *Retract.*, I, 6.

¹⁰ Aug., *De doctr. Chr.*, II, 27-39.

¹¹ Aug., *Retract.*, I, 6. This is the reading printed in the Vienna edition (CSEL 36, 28); one might have expected 'astronomica' in place of 'arithmetica' (line 6) to give a closer parallel to *De ordine*, II, 15.

ential *Institutiones grammaticae* in eighteen books. During the Middle Ages the first sixteen books were taught as *Priscianus maior*; the last two books were commonly called *Priscianus minor*, or *De constructionibus*. The Latin Middle Ages did indeed inherit many other important works from Roman authors, and not the least were the translations and commentaries on Plato's *Timaerus*, but none were more influential on the medieval conception of the sciences than the bequest of Manlius Severinus Boethius.

i. *Boethius and the Division of the Sciences*

Boethius (c. 475-524) was a man of extraordinary learning and versatility, well acquainted with the best of ancient Latin and Greek thought.¹² He has justly been called "the last Roman and the first scholastic",¹³ because he preserved the ideal of the classical Roman tradition when the Roman world was crumbling and he established the foundation of Latin scholasticism both in theology and in philosophy. He was, as P. Mandonnet observed, "le véritable introducteur d'Aristote en Occident".¹⁴ His translations of almost the whole of Aristotle's *Organon* established the foundation of the scholastic method, and offered the only direct contact with Aristotle's thought before the twelfth century. Philosophically Boethius was a convinced Platonist, as were many others of his day, but he was fully aware of the importance of Aristotelian logic. While a Roman consul, Boethius undertook the impossible task of translating, interpreting and harmonizing all the works of Aristotle and the *Dialogues* of Plato.¹⁵ Boethius, however, was unjustly put to death by Theodoric, a former friend and patron, before this dream could be realized.

¹² See R. Bonnaud, "L'Education Scientifique de Boèce," *Speculum*, IV (1929), 198-206.

¹³ M. Grabmann, *Gesch. d. schol. Methode*, I, 148-177.

¹⁴ P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant* (Louvain, 1911) I, p. 7.

¹⁵ "...ego omne Aristotelis opus, quodcumque in manus venerit, in Romanum stilum vertens eorum omnium commenta Latina oratione perscribam, ut si quid ex logicae artis subtilitate, ex moralis gravitate peritae, ex naturalis acumine veritatis ab Aristotle conscriptum sit, id omne ordinatum transferam atque etiam quodam lumine commentationis inlustrum omnesque Platonis dialogos vertendo vel etiam commentando in latinam redigam formam. His peractis non equidem contempserim Aristotelis Platonisque sententias in unam quodammodo revocare concordiam eosque non ut plerique dissentire in omnibus, sed in plerisque et his in philosophia maximis consentire demonstrarem." *Comm in lib. Arist ΠΕΡΙ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ*, ed. 2a, II, c. 3 (Leipzig, 1880) 79-80.

Besides his translations of Aristotle's logical works Boethius supplied text-books for the other liberal arts, thus enabling students of the next six hundred years to acquire a liberal education. Earlier Romans had provided sufficient text-books for grammar and rhetoric; Boethius added abundant works for logic, and elementary adaptations from the Greek for music, arithmetic and geometry. Theodoric also mentions translations of Ptolemy's *Astronomy* and Archimedes' *Mechanics* as coming from his pen,¹⁶ but nothing is known of these translations or summaries today.

It was particularly through the short theological treatises that Boethius laid the foundation for the scholastic method of the early Middle Ages. He showed the utility of grammar and logic in the discussion of difficult theological doctrines and the importance of definition and division in harmonizing apparently contradictory authorities. The method of arriving at a satisfactory solution through a tangle of apparently 'sic et non' views was greatly developed during the twelfth century. This always remained the foundation of the scholastic method, but it was not until the *Posterior Analytics* of Aristotle was fully understood in the thirteenth century that theology could be developed as a scientific discipline. But to understand the Aristotelian scientific method presented in the *Posterior Analytics* the schoolmen needed to see its application in physics, metaphysics and ethics. These works of Aristotle, however, were not known to medieval scholars before the middle of the twelfth century, at the earliest. Nevertheless, through Boethius and other authors the early Middle Ages knew that these parts of philosophy did exist. The early schoolmen, however, since they did not have the actual works of antiquity, could do little more than repeat what Boethius had said.

In his first commentary on Porphyry, an early work (c. 509),¹⁷ Boethius discussed the nature of philosophy as the love and study of wisdom. Following Ammonius' commentary on the same work, Boethius divides philosophy into two species, theoretical and practical, that is, speculative and active. "There are, however, as many parts of speculative philosophy as there are things which can suitably be considered speculatively." For Boethius as for Ammonius before him, there are three kinds of things which fulfill this requirement, hence there are three kinds of speculative philosophy: "est enim una theore-

¹⁶ Letter of King Theodoric to Boethius in Cassiodorus, *Lib. Var.*, I, ep. 45, PL 69, 539.

¹⁷ S. Brant, *Boethii In Isagogen Porphyrii Commenta*, CSEL 48, xxvii.

tica pars de intellectibilibus, alia de intelligibilibus, alia de naturalibus."¹⁸ Boethius claimed that he coined the word *intellectibilia* to express the Greek νοητά, that is, the object νόησις, or intuition. This corresponds to Plato's supreme wisdom of dialectics, which contemplates eternal forms. The lowest type of speculative philosophy is natural science, "which explains the natures and properties of bodies." Intermediate between the highest and lowest species of speculative philosophy lies the consideration of *intelligibilia*, a term already coined by Marius Victorinus. Although Boethius gives no name to this branch of philosophy, it seems to be the study of celestial movers.¹⁹ Ammonius had listed mathematics in this position and Boethius himself later replaced this intermediate science with mathematics, thus returning to the classical tripartite classification of speculative philosophy.

Boethius likewise divided practical philosophy into three branches: the study of personal morality, political morality and domestic morality. Later these practical sciences are re-ordered and simply called ethics, domestics and politics. The position of logic, or rational discipline is also discussed briefly: some consider logic to be a part of philosophy, others do not, thus showing that there is reasonableness in both positions. In his second commentary on Porphyry Boethius judiciously remarks of logic that it is "not a part of philosophy, but rather an instrument" of philosophy.²⁰

In his mature treatise *De Trinitate* (c. 520) Boethius gave the Middle Ages the standard tripartite classification of speculative philosophy.²¹ The first part of speculative science is called *naturalis*, or physics; it considers forms which are not abstract or separable, i.e. *ἀνυπεξαρτοσί,*

¹⁸ Boethius, *In Isagogen Porphyrii Comm.*, ed. prima, lib. I, c. 3, CSEL 48, 8. Ammonius not only places mathematics in the middle position between natural science and divine science in the hierarchy of speculative disciplines, but he insisted that mathematics is divided into no more and no less than four parts: geometry, astronomy, music and arithmetic. *Explanatio in Quinque Voces Porphyrii*, prol.

¹⁹ E. Gilson, *History of Christian Phil.* (N. Y., 1955) 97, suggests that the name 'psychology' could be given to this intermediate science, since it is the science that deals with souls. But Boethius, it would seem, is here describing the blessed condition of intellectual substances when they understand the 'first intellectible', an understanding which could be mathematics. Hence, G. Fraile, *Historia de la Filosofia*, I (Madrid, 1956) 785, prefers to identify this unnamed science with 'mathematics' as described in *De arithmetica* and *De musica*.

²⁰ Lib. I, c. 3, ed. cit., p. 142.

²¹ The pioneer efforts of Joseph Mariétan, *Problème de la Classification des Sciences d'Aristote à s. Thomas* (Thesis, Paris, 1901), to trace the influence of this division needs to be supplemented by further research.

because this science is concerned with forms which cannot exist or be considered apart from matter and motion. The second part of speculative science is called *mathematica*; it considers forms which are actually "inabstracta" as though they were without matter and motion. Since mathematical forms are really the forms of bodies, they can never exist "separate" from matter. The third part is *theologica*, which considers forms which are actually abstract and separable from matter and motion, "for the divine substance is without either matter or motion." To each of these parts of speculative philosophy there is an appropriate method which ought to be used. The method of natural science is the process of reasoning scientifically (*rationabiliter*); the method of mathematics is disciplinary (*disciplinaliter*), and that of theology is intuitive or intellectual (*intellectualiter*) in the sense that theology must not be diverted by imagination, but must contemplate that form which is pure *esse* and not a mere image.

The terminology used by Boethius to designate the methodological procedures of the various parts of philosophy is indeed strange, and it was variously interpreted by medieval commentators. The method of theology, viz. *intellectualiter*, undoubtedly refers to noetic intuition or direct contemplation as explained by Boethius in his first commentary on Porphyry. This was the type of knowledge Plato had reserved for the supreme wisdom of dialectics. *Disciplinaliter* as the method of mathematics means nothing more than "mathematical" procedure, which for Plato was hypothetical in the sense that mathematics must assume certain axioms without investigating their ontological foundation. Plato identified the method of mathematics with reasoning and science *επιστήμη* as distinct from intuition and wisdom. But Aristotle had insisted on the scientific status of physics, which studies universal and necessary natures existing individually in sensible matter. Hence by *rationabiliter* Boethius undoubtedly intended to signify the scientific, or demonstrative procedure which Aristotle had extended to natural science.

The Boethian division and designation of the philosophical sciences is clearly a fusion of Platonic and Aristotelian views. The division between speculative and practical, the scientific status of physics and the rejection of sensible forms subsisting apart from matter are all Aristotelian. The tripartite hierarchy of forms suitable for speculative consideration, the position and division of mathematics are purely Platonic and Pythagorean. Describing the mathematical disciplines, to which he gives the name *quadrivium*, Boethius insists that these constitute the "four lane road to wisdom" that is, to theology, and whoever spurns this road to wisdom will never know how to

philosophize.²² "Constat igitur quisquis haec praetermiserit, omnem philosophiae perdidisse doctrinam." Among the quadrivial disciplines there are determined grades of priority and posteriority. In the order of nature number and the science of number, arithmetic, are prior in the sense that without number there can be nothing subsequent, while when the subsequent figures, etc. are removed, number remains. Subsequent to number and the science of arithmetic is harmony, or music. Then comes figures and the science of geometry; and finally the study of geometrical solids in motion, the science of astronomy. Astronomy, therefore, is the most physical of the mathematical sciences and the closest to natural science.


It is difficult to determine how Boethius conceived the study of nature and where he would place it in the curriculum of studies. Clearly the ascending hierarchy of the mathematical sciences, astronomy, geometry, music and arithmetic, were meant to lead to the supreme wisdom designated simply as theology. It is also clear that for Boethius the study of nature inevitably leads to the mathematical sciences, but it is not clear whether or not a student was expected to study nature before studying the mathematical sciences of the *quadrivium*. This problem never arose in the early Middle Ages simply because the early schoolmen had at hand text-books for the liberal arts, while they had nothing of the "three philosophies": physics, metaphysics and ethics.

ii. *The Arts and the Three Philosophies*

The *Institutiones* of M. Aurelius Cassiodorus, a junior contemporary of Boethius, was written as a manual of divine and secular literature for the monks of Vivarium about the year 544-5. The first book is a compendium of Sacred Scripture, exegesis, hagiography and religious discipline; the second book is a summary of the seven liberal arts: grammar, rhetoric, dialectic, arithmetic, music, geometry and astronomy. This second book, which became exceedingly popular in later centuries, is drawn largely from Boethius, Cicero, Donatus, Quintillian, Varro and St. Augustine. At the beginning of his summary of dialectics (lib. II, c. 3) Cassiodorus discussed the definition and

²² "Quibus quatuor partibus si careat inquisitor, verum invenire non possit, ac sine hac quidem speculatione veritatis nulli recte sapiendum est. . . . Quod haec qui spernit, id est, has semitas sapientiae, ei denuntio non recte philosophandum." Boethius, *De arithmetica*, I, 1. PL 63, 1081 C.

division of philosophy, a procedure which was frequently followed throughout the Middle Ages. The schematic classification of philosophy given by Cassiodorus is simply that of Boethius, but in one popular recension, probably of the eighth century, this classification is attributed to Aristotle:²³




Natural philosophy discusses the nature of each thing which is produced naturally; doctrinal philosophy is the science which considers abstract quantity, i.e. quantity which has been mentally separated from matter or from the other accidents; philosophy is called 'divine' when it considers the ineffable nature of God or when it discusses spiritual creatures. Cassiodorus briefly defined each of the doctrinal, or mathematical sciences as well as the practical. The rest of the second book is devoted to the seven liberal arts. In the early Middle Ages the second book of Cassiodorus' work seems to have been copied separately and expanded by scholars desiring a fuller compendium of the arts.

The encyclopedic *Etymologiae*, libri XX of St. Isidore of Seville was composed early in the seventh century and enjoyed great popularity as a reference work throughout the Middle Ages. A summary of the seven liberal arts was given in the first three books: I, grammar; II, rhetoric and dialectics; III, arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy. Following Cassiodorus and Boethius, Isidore discusses the definition and division of philosophy at the beginning of his compendium of dialectics (lib. II, c. 3), but he gives two divisions of philosophy.²⁴ The first is the familiar Stoic classification, which St. Augustine

²³ This is recension III, signified by Δ in the edition of R. A. B. Mynors (Oxford, 1937) 110.

²⁴ Isidore, *Etymologicarum Libri XX*, ed. W. M. Lindsay (Oxford, 1957) lib. II, xxiv.

attributed to Plato, namely the division of philosophy into physics, ethics and logic. According to Isidore, Plato divided physics, or natural philosophy into arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy. The division of logic into dialectics and rhetoric is also attributed to Plato, while the division of ethics according to the four cardinal virtues is said to have originated with Socrates, who first established moral science. St. Isidore's version of this classification can be represented briefly as follows:



For Isidore the whole of theological teaching can also be adapted to this classification, for it discusses nature (Genesis and Ecclesiastes), ethics (Proverbs and other books) as well as logic (Canticle of Canticles and the Gospels). The second division of philosophy given by Isidore is taken directly from Cassiodorus without alteration.²⁵

St. Augustine, Boethius, Cassiodorus and St. Isidore served as the principal sources for all later discussion of the seven liberal arts and the tripartite division of philosophy. As the early Middle Ages were unaware of the numerous Greek works on natural science, metaphysics

²⁵ "Alii definierunt Philosophiae rationem in duabus consistere partibus, quarum prima inspectiva est, secunda actualis. Inspectiva dividitur in tribus modis, id est prima in naturalem; secunda in doctrinalem; tertia in divinam. Doctrinalis dividitur in quattuor, id est, prima in Arithmeticam, secunda Musicam, tertia Geometriam, quarta Astronomiam. Actualis dividitur in tribus, id est, prima in moralem, secunda dispensativam, tertia civilem." *Ibid.*

and ethics, repetition of the Boethian and Stoic classification of the sciences had little significance and no practical value for teachers of the arts. Misunderstanding of the original divisions and confusions of the issues involved were the inevitable result of not having the Aristotelian Corpus. This confusion can be seen in writers from the ninth through the twelfth century. Alcuin of York selected the Stoic division from Isidore as the point of departure for his *De dialectica*,²⁶ presumably because it included the mention of dialectics, while the Boethian division did not. Rabanus Maurus likewise took the Stoic division, but he included under physics seven arts: arithmetic, astronomy, astrology, mechanics, medicine, geometry and music.²⁷ Scotus Erigena combined the Boethian and Stoic classification when he divided philosophy into (i) *activa* or ethics; (ii) physics, or natural science, subdivided into the quadrivial arts; (iii) theology, which discusses God; (iv) logic, or rational philosophy, which shows the rules by which the other "parts of wisdom" are to proceed.²⁸

In the twelfth century a more thorough synthesis of the two ancient classifications was presented in the various *Didascalía*, or general introductions to the *artes*. These summary treatises follow the general pattern of the traditional *Disciplinarum libri*, discussing the nature and classification of learning, and briefly explaining the nature of each art. The best known of these is the *Didascalion* of Hugh of St. Victor (1096-1141). In this remarkable treatise seven mechanical arts are introduced as parts of philosophy in order to balance the seven liberal arts; all seven liberal arts, including grammar, find a place in this classification; and it is a successful combination of the Boethian and Stoic divisions of science. "Philosophy is divided into theoretical, practical, mechanical and logical; these four branches embrace all scientific knowledge."²⁹ Except for the mechanical arts, the basic division of scientific knowledge is that of the Stoics.³⁰ In this case 'physics' is taken to be equivalent to 'theoretical' and coextensive with Boethius' tripartite classification of speculative philosophy:


²⁶ Alcuin, *Didascalía*, Opusc. IV (*De dialectica*), cap. 1. PL 101, 952.

²⁷ Rabanus Maurus, *De universo*, lib. V, c. 1. PL 111, 413-4.

²⁸ Scotus Erigena, *De div. nat.*, lib. III, 29. PL 122, 705; see also col. 778-9.

²⁹ Hugh of St. Victor, *Didascalion*, lib. II, c. 1, ed. C. H. Buttmer (Washington, 1939) 24.

³⁰ "Physica aliquando large accipitur aequipollens theoreticae, secundum quam acceptionem philosophiam in tres partes dividunt, i.e. *physicam*, *ethicam*, *logicam*, in qua divisione mechanica non continetur, sed restringitur philosophia circa *physicam*, *ethicam*, *logicam*." Lib. II, c. 16, *ed. cit.*, p. 35.



Hugh of St. Victor's classification of scientific knowledge was taken over by Clarenbaud of Arras around the middle of the twelfth century,³¹ and it enjoyed continuous circulation from the time it was written.³² But in practice it did not affect the actual teaching of arts at Chartres, Paris or elsewhere. Gilbert of la Porrée,³³ Thierry of Chartres³⁴ and others could continue to include theology, physics and ethics in the classification of scientific knowledge, but without the works of Aristotle such branches could not but remain meaningless. In actual practice the schools of the twelfth century, that is, monastic schools, cathedral schools and some court schools, taught only the seven liberal arts. By

³¹ *Der Kommentar des Clarenbaldus von Arras zu Boethius De Trinitate*, ed. W. Jansen (Breslau, 1926), 26*27*.

³² R. W. Hunt, "The introduction to the *Artes*," in *Studia Mediaevalia in honorem R. J. Martin* (Bruges, 1948) 99.

³³ Gilbert de la Porrée, *Commentaria in lib. de Trin.*, c. 2. PL 64, 1265.

³⁴ Thierry of Chartres, *Glossa super lib. Boeth. de Trin.*, c. 2, 24-28, ed. N. Haring, *AHDLMA*, XXIII (1956), 285-7.

the term 'philosophy' or 'science' was understood the seven liberal arts already known to them. In the prologue to the *Heptateucon* Thierry of Chartres (fl. 1124-1149) points out that there are two instruments (*organa*) of philosophy, the spirit and its expression. The spirit is illuminated by the *quadrivium*, its expression, congruous, reasonable and ornate, are provided by the *trivium*.³⁵ William of Conches (c. 1080-c. 1154) expresses the same attitude when he proposes the order of studying the arts.³⁶ One should first acquire the various parts of eloquence, first grammar, then dialectics, and after this rhetoric. Being instructed and well-armed in the *trivium*, one ought then to approach the study of philosophy ("ad studium philosophiae debemus accedere"). Here the order of study is first the *quadrivium*, proceeding from arithmetic to music, to geometry and finally to astronomy; only after this can one approach the study of the *divina pagina*.

Concerning the early medieval classifications of the sciences three points ought to be noted before discussing the new views of the thirteenth century. First, the distinction between grammar on the one hand and the combination of dialectics and rhetoric on the other hand in all the classifications before Hugh of St. Victor may help to illuminate the antagonism between 'grammarians' and 'dialecticians' during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Peter Abelard, the dialectician *par excellence*, felt justified in dismissing grammar from the realm of philosophical disciplines; for him dialectics and arithmetic are the principal disciplines of philosophy.³⁷ Second, it might be noted that the identification of 'physics' with the *quadrivium* was not at all inconsistent with the general Platonism of the early Middle Ages. This identification may have been strengthened by familiarity with the two Latin versions of Plato's *Timaeus*. It is also possible that this traditional identification of physics and the *quadrivium* exerted some influence on the thought of the thirteenth and early fourteenth century. Third, it is clear that the early masters of arts did not teach anything which

³⁵ A French translation of this passage is given in H. Clerval, *Les Ecoles de Chartres au Moyen Age* (Chartres, 1895) 221.

³⁶ "Ordo vero discendi talis est ut, quia per eloquentiam omnis sit doctrina, prius instruatur in eloquentia. Cuius sunt tres partes, recte scribere et recte pronuntiare scripta, quod confert *grammatica*; probare quod probandum est, quod docet *dialectica*; ornare verba et sententias, quod tradit *rhetorica*. Initiandi ergo summus in grammatica, deinde in dialectica, postea in rhetorica; quibus instructi et ut armis muniti, ad studium *philosophiae* debemus accedere. Cuius hic ordo est, ut prius in *quadrivio*, id est in ipsa prius *arithmetica*, secundus in *musica*, tertius in *geometria*, quartus in *astronomia*. Deinde in divina pagina." William of Conches, *De phil. mundi*, lib. IV, c. 41. PL 172, 100.

³⁷ Abelard, *Introd. ad theol.*, lib. II, c. 2. PL 178, 1040 sqq.

might be called 'ethics' or 'natural theology' (metaphysics); these "parts of philosophy" were studied in Sacred Doctrine which was taught by a Bishop or master of sacred theology. Hence the emphasis on logic and physics in the arts faculty of the later Middle Ages, and the apparent neglect of metaphysics and ethics ought not to be considered novel or in itself clear proof of decadence in scholastic thought. The mainstays of the faculty of arts at Oxford in the early fourteenth century were in fact logic and physics.

When the 'new' Aristotle was finally admitted to the curriculum of studies in the first half of the thirteenth century, 'philosophy' was added to the existing curriculum of the liberal arts. The *trivium* and *quadrivium* remained the basic curriculum, at least in theory, preparatory for the study of philosophy. Arabian philosophers had considered logic and mathematics to be propedeutic disciplines required for the study of philosophy.³⁸ The medieval faculty of arts already taught these 'propedeutic' disciplines. Thus all that needed to be added were the Aristotelian *libri naturales*, metaphysics and moral philosophy. In the Oxford statutes these new sciences introduced into the curriculum of arts are commonly referred to as "the three philosophies".

B. The Thirteenth Century

With the introduction of the "new" Aristotle into the West there came new treatises concerning the classification of the sciences, shedding light on the Aristotelian books and not infrequently casting a Platonic shadow over their interpretation. Alfarabi's *De scientiis*³⁹ and *De ortu scientiarum*⁴⁰ were translated by Dominic Gundissalinus from the Arabic around 1150 at Toledo. Dominic's own *De divisione scientiarum* is a lengthy and detailed analysis of the individual sciences compiled from Arabic and earlier Latin sources.⁴¹ In the thirteenth century Gerard of Cremona produced a new version of Alfarabi's *De scientiis* around 1230

³⁸ For example Alfarabi, *De scientiis*; Averroes, *Phys.*, prooem.; II *Phys.*, comm. 35; VI *Metaph.*, comm. 1; on this point and the classification of the sciences see L. Gauthier, *Ibn Rochd (Averroës)* (Paris, 1948) 47-51.

³⁹ The most recent edition of this translation is that of M. A. Alonso, *Domingo Gundisalvo, De Scientiis* (Madrid, 1954); Gerard of Cremona's translation was edited by A. Palencia, *Alfarabi, Catalogo de las Ciencias* (Madrid, 1932).

⁴⁰ Edited by C. Bäumker, *Alfarabi, Über den Ursprung der Wissenschaften*, BGPTMA, XIX, 3 (Münster, 1916).

⁴¹ See the edition and detailed study by L. Baur, *Dominicus Gundissalinus, De divisione philosophiae*, BGPMA, IV, 2-3 (Münster, 1903).

and Michael Scot is said to have composed a treatise, *Divisio philosophiae*, about the same time based on Gundissalinus.⁴² There are clear indications that these treatises from the Arabic or dependent on Arabic sources influenced later medieval interpretations of the Boethian classification of the sciences.

For Alfarabi († 950) the study of the various sciences ought to follow the natural order in which they originated. Substance, in his view, is the basic reality and it was first of all divided into many; this gave rise to the science of arithmetic. Each substance was then given a particular figure and disposition of parts; this gave rise to geometry. But since substance is naturally moved with different velocities, fast, slow or regular, there arose the science of comparative velocities in celestial motions, namely the science of astronomy. From these velocities there followed various sounds (*accidit ei sonus*), and the science which studies tonal proportionalities is called music. But since these substances sometimes alter in quality, change, act and are acted upon, there arose the study of their natures, *quae est scientia de actione et passione*.⁴³ In the course of studying these natures four primary qualities were discovered, hot, cold, humid and dry; from these four natural qualities and the four mathematical disciplines there arose the science of terrestrial physics.⁴⁴ Alfarabi lists eight branches of terrestrial physics: practical astronomy (*de iudiciis*), medicine, natural necromancy, iconography (*de imaginibus*), agriculture, navigation, alchemy and perspective (*de speculis*). The natural sciences are the most extensive of the sciences and they should be cultivated only after the mathematical disciplines have been acquired; practical astronomy and medicine in particular should not be studied until one is well-versed in the disciplinary branches. Finally one is ready to study the nature of the higher substance (*massa substantiae superioris*), the study of which will lead to a knowledge of God. By 'higher substance' Alfarabi here means the eternal, celestial sphere which is moved by the power and wisdom of God.⁴⁵ Almost as an after-thought Alfarabi adds that before one begins

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 364-7; fragments of this work have been collected from Vincent of Beauvais by Baur, 398-400. For the probable date of Michael Scot's treatise see C. Haskins, *Studies*, 279.

⁴³ Alfarabi, *De ortu scientiarum*, cap. 1, 5, *ed. cit.*, 20.

⁴⁴ "Et ex his quatuor radicibus cum primis quatuor, quae sunt quatuor scientiae disciplinales, emersit scientia quae cadit sub circulo lunae." *Ibid.*, lines 20-22.

⁴⁵ "Nolo autem intelligere substantiam superiorem nisi sphaeram circumvolubilem et mobilem motu naturali deservientem constitutioni huius mundi secundum potentiam dei et sapientiam et voluntatem eius." *Ibid.*, p. 21, lines 7-10.

mathematics, he should learn languages, grammar, logic and poetry as a first step toward learning. In the *De scientiis* Alfarabi presents a more detailed schema of the sciences, other branches of learning are included, logic and natural science are divided according to the Aristotelian books, but the fundamental order of the sciences is retained.

The *De divisione philosophiae* of Dominic Gundissalinus was composed some time after his translation of Alfarabi's two treatises, perhaps shortly after 1150. L. Baur in his detailed analysis of the work has admirably shown that it is "a cleverly fabricated collection of materials from Arabic (Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Avicenna, An-Nairizi, Al-Gazel and other unknown authors) and Latin (Boethius, Isidore, Bede) sources."⁴⁶ Baur, however, maintained that the treatise as a whole is "based on an entirely Aristotelian foundation."⁴⁷ To the extent that Gundissalinus recognized the tripartite classification of both speculative and practical knowledge, and to the extent that he mentioned all the currently accepted Aristotelian books, the treatise might be said to have an "Aristotelian foundation." However, Gundissalinus' conception of this classification and his interpretation of the various sciences are far from Aristotelian.

Gundissalinus recognizes, as did all his predecessors, that grammar is a mere instrument of philosophy and that it should be studied first. Poetry, then rhetoric should follow in the curriculum, even though these arts are taken as parts of 'logic' in the wide sense.⁴⁸ These should be followed by the full course in logic, including the study of demonstration, dialectics in the sense of probable argumentation, and fallacies. After these preparatory studies one is ready to study the three parts of philosophy: physics, mathematics and theology (metaphysics). But first one should study physics, because forms existing in matter and in motion are better known to us. Gundissalinus takes from Alfarabi the eight special parts of physics and the enumeration of the Aristotelian *libri naturales*. Gundissalinus, however, adds that physics utilizes the "dialectical syllogism", which argues from true and probable principles; this interpretation is given to Boethius' *rationabiliter*.⁴⁹ He also adds

⁴⁶ L. Baur, *op. cit.*, 314; see the detailed study of the text, 164-314.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 314.

⁴⁸ The classification of poetry and rhetoric under logic or dialectics in the wide sense is derived from Alfarabi's *De scientiis*, cap. 2, ed. Alonso, pp. 72, 78-9; ed. Palencia, pp. 137, 142.

⁴⁹ "Instrumentum autem huius artis est sillogismus dialecticus, qui constat ex veris et probabilibus. Unde Boecius: in naturalibus rationabiliter versari oportet." *De div. phil.*, ed. Baur, p. 27 lines 9-11.

that physics should be studied after logic, because logic teaches the art of composing the dialectical syllogism, which is used in physics.⁵⁰ The mathematical sciences ought to be studied after this, because after the study of forms in matter should come the study of forms abstracted from matter in order to prepare the mind for those pure forms existing separate from matter.⁵¹ Following Avicenna, Gundissalinus identifies the mathematical sciences with the abstractive knowledge proper to the intellect, and adds that this is acquired by the "demonstrative syllogism". Mathematics, however, is a wide term embracing seven particular arts: arithmetic, music, geometry, optics, astrology, statics (*de ponderibus*) and engineering (*de ingeniis*). Gundissalinus recognized, as did all the Arabian philosophers, a theoretical and a practical aspect to these mathematical sciences. Among the theoretical disciplines priority, both ontological and pedagogical, is given to arithmetic, for number is prior to all other considerations.⁵² After arithmetic comes music, which is the science of number related to harmony.⁵³ But since magnitude necessarily follows upon multitude, sciences of continuous quantity should next be studied.⁵⁴ The order of study envisaged by Gundissalinus follows a descending order of concreteness: geometry, optics, astronomy (*astrologia*), statics and engineering. The last science to be studied in the curriculum is the highest of all, the divine science called theology or metaphysics. This supreme wisdom is concerned with realities which are "separate from matter and motion" both in fact and in our understanding of them, namely being, separate substances and God. This science also employs the "demonstrative syllogism"⁵⁵ and its principal function is "to prove the principles of all the other sciences."⁵⁶ In order to acquire this science astronomy is indispensable, and this presupposes arithmetic and geometry; "but music, the other particular disciplines of mathematics, as well as ethics and political science are useful, although not necessary for the acquisition of wisdom."⁵⁷

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, lines 18-21.

⁵¹ "Post naturalem autem legenda est quia, qui per naturalem scienciam formam simul cum materia iam considerat, profecto quantum ad profectum sciencie pertinet dignum est, ut formam sine materia considerare discat, quatenus assuefactus in hiis ad speculandas formas, que nullius materie sunt, proficiendo perveniat." *Ibid.*, p. 35 lines 3-8.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 94.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 92 line 12.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 39 lines 10-14.

Clearly Gundissalinus conceived the Boethian classification of the speculative sciences as a carefully ordered hierarchy of realities descending from God through mathematical being to various sensible expressions. The acquisition of philosophy follows the reverse order: ascending from physics, about which we can have only probable knowledge, through mathematics to supreme wisdom. Far from being fundamentally Aristotelian, this conception is clearly neo-Platonic in foundation. It is the well-known doctrine of emanation adapted to the Boethian classification of the sciences.

The use of Arabian sources to explain the new Aristotelian books can be seen throughout the thirteenth century, particularly at Oxford.

i. Oxford Platonism

Apart from possible early influences from the school of Chartres, the one who most influenced Oxford Platonism in the thirteenth century was the secular master, Robert Grosseteste (c. 1168-1253), first teacher of the Oxford Franciscans and first chancellor of the University. Grosseteste's "metaphysics of light" has been sufficiently discussed by L. Baur,⁵⁸ P. Duhem,⁵⁹ C. K. McKeon⁶⁰ and A. C. Crombie⁶¹ so as not to need further elaboration here. Briefly, Grosseteste conceived all creatures, material and spiritual, to be composed of common matter and the first form of 'light'. This universal hylemorphic composition of creatures has been traced to the Jewish philosopher Ibn Gebirol, but Grosseteste clearly believed this to be the doctrine of the Stagirite as can be seen from his gloss, or marginal notes on the first book of the *Physics*.⁶² The first general form of light which actuates the common matter of both material and immaterial substances is itself an indivisible point of light. The form, however, of material substances, diffuses itself in an infinite number of ways into three directions, thus generating the first *forma corporeitatis*.⁶³ Subsequent self-multiplication of this luminous form, which accounts for dimensionality, begets the variety of

⁵⁸ *Die Philosophie des Robert Grosseteste*, BGPMA, XVIII, 4-6 (Münster, 1917) esp. 76-93.

⁵⁹ *Le Système du Monde*, V, 356-74.

⁶⁰ *A Study of the 'Summa philosophiae' of the Pseudo-Grosseteste* (N. Y., 1948) 156-66.

⁶¹ *Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science* (Oxford, 1953) 128-34.

⁶² MS Oxford, Bodley, Digby 220, fol. 84r-88r. See the passages and discussion by R. C. Dales, "Robert Grosseteste's *Commentarius in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis*," *Medievalia et Humanistica*, XI (1957), 15-21.

⁶³ Grosseteste, *De luce*, ed. L. Baur, *De philosophischen Werke*, BGPMA, IX, (Münster, 1912) 51-9.

material things in the universe. But the rays of light which are produced in every such self-multiplication follow determined laws of mathematical proportionality, and are derived from God, the *lux prima*.⁶⁴ Hence for Grosseteste the key to understanding physical nature lies in geometrical optics.⁶⁵ But geometrical optics itself, for Grosseteste, is only a concrete sample of that higher mathematical proportionality which could explain the generation of immaterial light rays from the first light.

In his remarkable commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*, which was probably written before 1210,⁶⁶ Grosseteste gave much consideration to the application of mathematics to physical phenomena, particularly in those sciences "subalternated" to geometry, namely optics and astronomy. Exemplifying Aristotle's discussion of optics (I, text. 42), Grosseteste compares a simple geometric proof of the equality of two triangles (Theorem I of Euclid's *Catoptrica*) and a dependent optical conclusion that 'every two angles, of which the ray incident with the mirror makes one and the reflected ray the other, are two equal radiant angles'.⁶⁷ The syllogism of the higher science is properly geometrical, demonstrating *propter quid* the equality of the two geometrical triangles. The syllogism, however, of the lower science unites the subject and predicate of optics by means of a middle term taken from geometry. This syllogism of the lower science, Grosseteste observes, is different from that of the higher science and is properly called *quia*, "for the cause of the equality of the two angles made on a mirror... is not the middle term taken from geometry, but is the nature of the radiant energy generating itself according to rectilinear progress."⁶⁸ This is explained later in the commentary. Paraphrasing Aristotle's distinction of *quia* and *propter quid* knowledge according to different sciences (I, c. 12, text. 67), Grosseteste concludes that in subalternated sciences, the superior science (*subalternans*) provides the reason (*propter quid*) for that

⁶⁴ Grosseteste, *Commentaria in lib. Post. Arist.*, lib. I, c. 7 (ed. Venetiis, 1552) fol. 8rb-va; *De luce*, loc. cit.; *De veritate*, ed. Baur, 137.

⁶⁵ See A. C. Crombie, *Robert Grosseteste*, ed. cit., 131; L. Baur, *Die Philosophie des Robert Grosseteste*, BGPMA, XVIII, 4-6 (Münster, 1917) 93-109.

⁶⁶ D. A. Callus, "The Oxford Career of Robert Grosseteste," *Oxoniensia*, X (1945), 45, and "Robert Grosseteste as Scholar," in *Robert Grosseteste* (Oxford, 1955) 12, 251.

⁶⁷ Grosseteste, *Comm. in lib. Post. Arist.*, lib. I, c. 8, ed. cit., fol. 9rb.

⁶⁸ "Causa namque equalitatis duorum angulorum... non est medium sumptum ex geometria, sed eius causa est natura radiositatis sese generantis..." *Comm. in Post.*, I, 8, ed. cit., fol. 9va. A. C. Crombie translates *namque* as 'yet' (*op. cit.*, 95); this alters considerably the sense of the passage (cf. *ibid.*, 96).

predicate of which the inferior science (*subalternata*) provides the fact (*quia*). "But it must be noted that a lower science always has an added condition through which the subject and predicates of the higher science are appropriated to itself, and they are in the conclusion of the subalternated science like two natures, namely the nature which it received from the higher and the additional nature proper to itself; and so the higher science says nothing about the causes of this additional nature; sometimes the lower science indicates its causes [*quia*] and sometimes not. The higher science, however, does declare the causes of that nature which the lower science took from the higher."⁶⁹

The distinction perceived by Grosseteste in the composite nature of the subject of all such subalternate sciences as astronomy, optics, harmonics and the like, was acknowledged by all later schoolmen. But not all the schoolmen agreed with Grosseteste's conclusion. For Grosseteste, explanations derived from the nature of the subject of subordinated sciences, that is, those derived from that part of the subject which is proper to it, cannot be explanations *propter quid*. Not even his theory of the nature of light provided him with a *propter quid* explanation in optics. This ability is accorded only to mathematics. Grosseteste, however, went further and extended the importance of mathematics to the whole of natural philosophy. "It is impossible," he says, "to know natural philosophy without considering the geometry of lines, angles and figures."⁷⁰ "All causes of natural effects have to be expressed by means of lines, angles and figures, for otherwise it is impossible to have *propter quid* knowledge concerning them."⁷¹ In *De natura locorum* Grosseteste shows how the principles of geometry can be used to explain not only the general aspects of nature, but also all particular natural effects.⁷² Explanations offered by natural philosophy, Grosseteste had declared in his commentary on the *Posterior*

⁶⁹ Commenting on Aristotle's statement that in subalternate sciences the higher science knows *propter quid* and the lower science knows *quia* (text. 67: 'Hic enim ipsum quia, sensibilibus est; propter quid autem, mathematicorum') Grosseteste observes: "Sciendum autem quod scientia inferior semper addit conditionem per quam appropriat sibi subiectum et passiones superioris scientiae, et sunt in conclusione scientiae subalternatae sicut naturae duae, natura scilicet quam accipit a superiori, et natura propria quam superaddit proprii; itaque superaddicti causas non dicit scientia superior, et quandoque dicit eas causas scientia inferior et quandoque non. Illius vero quod accipit scientia inferior a superiori, causas dicit scientia superior." *Comm. in lib. Post.*, I, 12, fol. 15vb. Also *Glossa in lib. Phys.*, II. MS Oxford, Digby 220, fol. 88v, cited in part by R. C. Dales, *loc. cit.*, 19-20.

⁷⁰ *De lineis, angulis et figuris*, ed. L. Baur, 59-60.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 60.

⁷² See *De natura locorum*, ed. L. Baur, 65-6.

Analytics, are "probable rather than strictly scientific... Only in mathematics is there science and demonstration in the most proper sense."⁷³ Here one may detect the Platonic influence of Alfarabi.

The influence of Arabic neo-Platonism can be seen in greater detail in the *De ortu scientiarum* of Robert Kilwardby. This is a monumental treatise on the nature, division and relation of the speculative and practical sciences, composed not earlier than 1246-7, probably about 1250, while Kilwardby was a Dominican student of theology at Oxford.⁷⁴

Kilwardby's important treatise contains 67 chapters.⁷⁵ After a brief discussion of the nature and division of scientific knowledge in general (chap. 1-4), he discusses the speculative sciences (chap. 5-33): natural science, the four mathematical sciences and metaphysics. Under the practical sciences he considers the three moral sciences, the seven mechanical arts and the three *sciencie sermocinales*, namely grammar, logic and rhetoric. In chapter 25 Kilwardby raises four questions, the responses to which clearly show his view of the classification and study of the sciences. First he asks how can abstracted knowledge be true? Second, why is the term 'abstraction' applied especially to the mathematical sciences? Third, what is the difference and the order of abstraction in the three speculative sciences? Fourth, what is the difference and the order of abstraction in the four mathematical sciences?

Answering the first question, Kilwardby says that the veracity of abstractions is based on the priority and posteriority of different forms in nature. What is prior in nature can be conceived by the intellect without that which is posterior. There is no error in such conceptions, for when the intellect conceives the prior without the latter, it does not affirm that the prior actually exists in nature without that latter addition.⁷⁶ In nature one finds this priority of forms between substance

⁷³ "Versatur in his rationabiliter magis et probabiliter quam scientificè... In solis enim mathematicis est scientia et demonstratio maxime et principaliter dicta." *Comm. in lib. Post.*, I, 11, fol. 13ra.

⁷⁴ D. A. Callus, "The 'Tabulae super Originalia Patrum' of Robert Kilwardby, O.P.," *Studia Mediaevalia* in honorem R. J. Martin, O.P. (Bruges, 1948) 247-9.

⁷⁵ I am indebted to Father Bernard Delany, O.P., for allowing me to use his text of Kilwardby's *De ortu scientiarum*, prepared from four MSS and submitted for the degree of B. Litt. at the University. Certain obvious corrections have been made, however, without noting the variants, and references given below are to Merton College MS 261, fol. 19r-66r.

⁷⁶ "Quod enim est prius per naturam potest ab intellectu concipi per se sine posteriori. Quando ergo illud prius ab intellectu concipitur cum suis proprietatibus preter posterius

and accident, number and magnitude, quantity and sensible qualities; it is also found between every form *absolute considerata* and any form here and now existing in *materia signata*.⁷⁷

In his answer to the second question Kilwardby admits that mathematics is more abstract than natural science, and that metaphysics is more abstract than mathematics.⁷⁸ However, it is mathematics 'which most deserves the designation of being abstract, "because everything which the mathematician considers is *per abstractionem*."' Almost all the objects considered in mathematics are concretely realized in sensible reality. Kilwardby insisted on the word 'almost', because regardless of what philosophers may think, one can legitimately speak of the 'number' of angels, although this is not the concern of the mathematician.⁷⁹ Since, on the other hand, metaphysics discusses not only material substances in as much as they are substances, but also substances which are really separated from matter, metaphysics is said to be *de separatis* rather than *de abstractis*.⁸⁰

In his reply to the third question Kilwardby presents a clear and direct picture of three ascending "grades of abstraction". The first and lowest grade of abstraction is from concrete matter (*a sensibili signato*), and this belongs to the physicist. The second and higher grade abstracts from qualitative motion and changeable matter, and this belongs to the mathematician. Kilwardby excludes qualitative motion in this

et eius proprietates, non est in hoc conceptu nec in hac consideratione falsitas, quia intellectus non dicit quod illud prius est in re per se sine omni posteriori ei concreto..." *Ibid.*, cap. 25 ad 1. *MS cit.*, fol. 31rb.

⁷⁷ "Eodem modo se habent ad inuicem substantia et accidens, similiter numerus et magnitudo, ut patet, et quantitas ad qualitates actiuas et passiuas, et omnino forma absolute considerata preter materiam signatam ad formam in materia signata hic et nunc, que forte eadem est per essenciam solo esse differens." *Ibid.*, fol. 31va.

⁷⁸ Also cap. 24 ad 1, fol. 29rb.

⁷⁹ Cap. 25, fol. 32ra; also cap. 24 ad 1, fol. 29rb.

⁸⁰ "Ad secundum dicendum quod uerum est quod physica et omnis sciencia abstrahit, et metaphisica plus quam mathematica. Et tamen mathematica pocius dicitur esse de abstractis quam physica, quia maioris abstractionis est quam illa, sicut dicit Aristoteles in 2^o *Physicorum* quod minus abstrahunt physica mathematica. Item pociusquam metaphisica: quia omnia que mathematica considerat per abstractionem considerat, quia aut omnino omnia aut fere sunt concreta cum rebus phisicis. Et dixi fere propter numerum qui in spiritibus separatis est, quicquid super hoc sentirent philosophi. Uerumptamen de numeris illorum non est cura arimetrico secundum quod talis est. Set metaphisica non solum considerat substanciam que est in rebus phisicis abstrahendo ipsam ut in se consideret secundum quod substantia est, set substancias omnino separatas a motu et a materia secundum esse; et quia illa est potissima pars metaphisice que huiusmodi substancias considerat, ideo magis dicitur esse de separatis quam de abstractis." Cap. 25 ad 2, fol. 31va-b.

grade of abstraction, but retains change of place in order to account for astronomy and the other mathematical sciences which deal with locomotion. The third and last grade abstracts from all accidents and considers substance in all its purity, and this belongs to the metaphysician.⁸¹ Thus abstraction is a process of removing mentally the succession of natural forms which Kilwardby believed necessary for the constitution of every creature. To clarify his position Kilwardby further notes that whatever there is of substance in the metaphysician's consideration is also in mathematics and physics, and whatever quantity there is in the mathematician's consideration is also in physics.⁸²

According to Kilwardby natural science considers *materia transmutabilis* and motion, and for this a knowledge of all four causes is necessary. Mathematics considers quantity which is "antecedent to natural forms" and qualities, and for this consideration efficient and final cause are not needed.⁸³ Finally metaphysics considers the unity and plurality of pure substance. Therefore Kilwardby said that it also belongs to the metaphysician to explain the cause of plurality in mathematics.⁸⁴ It was because of Kilwardby's inability to distinguish between the meaning of 'number' in mathematics and its meaning in metaphysics, that he found difficulty in expressing the difference between mathematics and metaphysics.⁸⁵ To the extent that all sciences use number and proportionality, they are subordinated to arithmetic, which is *quasi mater aliarum [scientiarum]*.⁸⁶ But it is the task of metaphysics to explain the source of multiplicity in mathematical being, for when mathematical being is divested of quantity there is nothing left

⁸¹ "Ad tercium dicendum quod omnis sciencia abstrahit, et maxime speculatiua. Et primus et minimus gradus abstractionis est a sensibili signato, et iste competit phisico. Secundus et ulterior gradus est omnino a motu alteratiuo et materia transmutabili, non tamen omnino a motu et omnino a materia, et iste competit mathematico. Tercius et ultimus est omnino ab accidente, ut consideretur substantia in sua puritate, et iste competit metaphisico. Tertio, tolle dimensiones quantitatuas et restat nuda substantia, et hec est ultima abstractio et pertinet ad metaphisicum." Cap. 25 ad 3, fol. 31vb; see also cap. 24 ad 1, fol. 29ra.

⁸² *Ibid.*, fol. 31vb-32ra; also cap. 24 ad 1.

⁸³ Cap. 14 ad 2, fol. 24v.

⁸⁴ "Tolle igitur has differencias que pertinent ad naturalem et dimitte eas ei, et superest corpus scil. substantia corporea, que quia substantia est composita unitatem habet, que multiplicata numerum facit; et hoc uidetur per hoc quod unitas et numerus uniuoce sunt in spiritibus, et ideo unicam causam habent utrimque." Cap. 24 ad 1, fol. 29rb; also cap. 14 ad 2, fol. 24vb.

⁸⁵ This is apparent throughout chapters 29 to 31, fol. 33vb-38ra.

⁸⁶ Cap. 22, fol. 28vb; see whole of cap. 22.

but substance in undisguised plurality. Through consideration of this plurality the metaphysician perceives God, "substantia eterna que est causa omnis substancie et accidentis in triplice genere cause."⁸⁷

In his response to the fourth question Kilwardby summarized his view of the four mathematical sciences. The lowest of all the mathematical sciences is astronomy, for it considers celestial motion through the principles of geometry. Hence astronomy is prior to and more abstract than natural science.⁸⁸ Since discrete quantity is simpler and prior to extension, all the sciences which deal with number are prior to geometry. Among these the lowest is the science of harmony, by which Kilwardby did not mean the audible harmony of music, but the pure harmony of numerical proportion.⁸⁹ The highest and most abstract of all the mathematical sciences is arithmetic, or algebra, *quia ipsa ut sic, nulla aliarum indiget*.⁹⁰

Thus for Kilwardby the three stages of abstraction together with the subdivision of mathematical abstraction correspond to real forms which are prior and posterior in nature. Clearly Kilwardby never held the pure Platonic doctrine of universal natures, figures and numbers existing apart from material things or apart from the mind of God. However, the reality of these forms in created substances and the reality of the divine exemplars are fundamental to Kilwardby's whole philosophical doctrine. The acceptance of universal hylemorphism and divine exemplarism was by no means confined to Kilwardby, but he did express perhaps more clearly than others the classification of the speculative sciences according to three ascending 'grades of abstraction'. Underlying his discussion of the speculative sciences is the conviction that the science of numerical proportions is the key to understanding all the other sciences, even metaphysics, because numerical proportions are, as it were, the intrinsic principle of created multiplicity. This typically neo-Platonic conviction was undoubtedly due rather to the influence of Arabic sources than to any predilection for mathematics on the part of Kilwardby. A true predilection for mathematics, however, is conspicuous in the writings of Roger Bacon, a junior contemporary of Kilwardby.

⁸⁷ Cap. 26, fol. 32rb-va.

⁸⁸ Cap. 16 ad. 1, fol. 25v.

⁸⁹ "Deinde armonica adhuc naturaliter precedere uidetur geometriam, quia numerus armonicus de quo considerat prior uidetur esse magnitudine, et est secundum ueritatem." Cap. 24 ad 4, fol. 32ra. In chapter 18 Kilwardby divides music or harmony into "mundannam, humanam et instrumentalem." fol. 27rb.

⁹⁰ Cap. 19, fol. 27va.

Roger Bacon (d. 1292), it would seem, became a master in arts at Paris by about 1237 and continued to lecture there until about 1247.⁹¹ We do not know under whom Bacon studied at Paris, but it is probable that he had Kilwardby for a master, at least at some period of his studies. Bacon tells us that he heard many masters and that he taught arts at Paris for many years: "audivi diligenter plures, et legi plus quam alius."⁹² Unfortunately many of his writings and lecture notes from this period have not been identified, among them his commentary on the *Metaphysics*.⁹³ The three well-known *Opera* were all written after 1265, by which date Bacon was already a dissatisfied Franciscan Friar living in Oxford. Hence we do not know in detail what Bacon taught concerning the classification of the sciences. However, his repeated insistence that "without mathematics no science can be had"⁹⁴ clearly shows that for Bacon the principles of natural science are to be found in mathematics.

Bacon, like Kilwardby, conceived the three speculative sciences (natural science, mathematics and metaphysics) as corresponding to a real hierarchy of forms in nature. But unlike Kilwardby, he did not emphasize the supreme role of metaphysics in human knowledge. Rather, he followed Grosseteste in according mathematics the power of opening all doors. This view is clearly implied in the *Opus Maius* where Bacon states, "Without mathematics neither what is antecedent nor consequent to it can be known."⁹⁵ The natural sciences are antecedent to mathematics in the hierarchy of knowledge, and metaphysics is consequent. Clarifying the function of the mathematical sciences, Bacon continues, "They perfect and regulate that which precedes, and dispose and prepare the way for that which succeeds." Mathematics perfects natural sciences by giving a true explanation of natural phenomena, and regulates them by determining the utility and validity of experimentation in each branch of natural science. Because mathematics alone could perfect and regulate the natural

⁹¹ A. B. Emden, *Biog. Reg.*, I, p. 88a.

⁹² *Compendium studii phil.*, c. 8, ed. Brewer, 468.

⁹³ In the *Communio mathematica* Roger Bacon frequently refers to his own commentary on the *Metaphysics*, e.g. "et hoc manifesti in *Metaphysica mea*"... "hec in metaphysicis ostendi certitudinaliter"... "declaravi quidem in *Metaphysica*, quod mathematica dictiur dupliciter." (*Op. Hac. ined.*, XVI, p. 2) This work, as far as I know, has not yet been identified. Cf. Roger Bacon, *Commemoration Essays*, ed. A. G. Little (Oxford, 1914) 377, 406-7, and P. Glorieux, *Répertoire*, II, 56-76.

⁹⁴ *Opus tertium*, ed. Brewer, 35, 64, 57 and in many other passages.

⁹⁵ *Opus maius*, IV, 1, ed. Bridges, I, 97.

sciences, Roger Bacon was convinced that "it is impossible to know the things of this world (*huius mundi*), unless one knows mathematics."⁹⁶ In confirmation of this view, Bacon, like Grosseteste and Kilwardby before him, could point to the role of mathematics in astronomy and optics.⁹⁷

Perhaps the most detailed and erudite elaboration of the "metaphysics of light" in the various sciences is to be found in the anonymous *Summa philosophiae*, which before the studies of L. Baur was generally ascribed to Grosseteste. The treatise was undoubtedly written, probably around 1263 or 1264, by an Englishman who was strongly adverse to the innovations which had been produced by Albertus Magnus on the Continent. The undeniable influence of Roger Bacon upon this treatise led P. Duhem to believe that the author of the *Summa philosophiae* was a disciple of Bacon.⁹⁸ Whoever the author may have been, he elaborately explains the procession of translucent light from its primordial source through the hierarchy of forms generated by self-multiplication down to the specific composition of natures in the visible world. Problems of astronomy, psychology, biology and alchemy are discussed with the aid of elementary geometry and some principles of optics. Although the author was little concerned with preserving the distinction of sciences, either philosophical or theological, the approach to all these problems is patently neo-Platonic, pseudo-mathematical and at times mystical.

The depreciation of purely natural science, the appeal to mathematics for an explanation of natural phenomena and the approach to metaphysics through mathematics—all of which express one aspect of the Platonic view of scientific knowledge—was by no means confined to Oxford or to masters associated with Oxford. Nor were these authors consciously Platonic in the sense that they rejected the Aristotelian books recently introduced into the university curriculum of Arts. It is well known that the new Aristotelian books were eagerly expounded

⁹⁶ *Opus maius*, IV, 2, ed. Bridges, I, 109.

⁹⁷ Concerning the influence of Grosseteste on Bacon's theory of science see L. Baur, "Der Einfluss des Robert Grosseteste auf die wissenschaftliche Richtung des Roger Bacon," in *Roger Bacon*, ed. A. G. Little, 33-54; P. Duhem, *Le Système*, III, 411-413; A. C. Crombie, *Robert Grosseteste*, 139-162.

⁹⁸ Duhem, *Le Système*, III, 461 seqq.; this suggestion was made earlier by Baur, 137*. However, it is doubtful whether one who was never a master in theology could be called "in theologia perfectissimus", even if one were to grant that Bacon had been "vitaque et religione sanctissimus." Tr. XV, cap. 31, ed. Baur, p. 589 lines 15-16.

at Oxford,⁹⁹ Paris¹ and Toulouse² in the first half of the thirteenth century, and that by the middle of the century the "three philosophies" were a recognized part of the curriculum in arts. However, it would be a mistake to think that these early masters understood fully the Aristotelian texts they expounded in the schools. Unconsciously and inevitably these masters expounded the text in the light of the traditional, living Platonism, derived from St. Augustine and confirmed by twelfth-century translations of Arabian philosophers. Historians who presume that all masters who expounded the text of Aristotle were necessarily Aristotelian fail to consider the obscurity of Aristotle's text and the normal laws of human psychology. Each commentary on Aristotle must be considered on its own merits and in the light of its sources. Perhaps it would not be extravagant to say that at least a whole generation of masters and the aid of Averroes were required to bring out the Aristotelianism of the Aristotelian Books.

ii. *A New Aristotelianism at Paris*

The real innovation in Western philosophical thought came from the pen of Albertus Magnus,³ who, although he was himself a theologian, introduced an Aristotelianism which appeared strange to many of his contemporaries. The theological implications of Albert's Aristotelianism became disturbingly clear in the writings of his disciple, St. Thomas Aquinas. These disturbing elements together with the exaggerated Aristotelianism of Siger of Brabant and his followers eventually evoked episcopal censure at Paris and Oxford, as is well known to all. This aspect of the new Aristotelianism, however, is of no concern to us here. We are interested only in their view of scientific knowledge in the classification of the sciences.

In the new Aristotelianism of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas what place did mathematics occupy in the classification of the sciences?

⁹⁹ See D. A. Callus, "Introduction of Aristotelian Learning to Oxford," *Proc. Brit. Acad.* XXIX (1943), 229 sqq.

¹ See M. Grabmann, *I divieti ecclesiastici di Aristotele sotto Innocenzo III e Gregorio IX*, *Miscel. Hist. Pont.*, V (Rome, 1941).

² *Chart. Univ. P.*, I, 131 n. 72.

³ This interpretation of Albert's position in medieval thought was originally proposed in my "Albertus Magnus and the Oxford Platonists," *Proc. Am. Cath. Phil. Assoc.*, XXXIII (1958), 124-39, and in *The Development of Physical Theory in the Middle Ages*, Newman Phil. of Sc. Series, 4 (London, 1959).

What kind of assistance could mathematics give to the solution of physical problems? What kind of scientific 'explanation' did they think mathematics could offer for natural phenomena? The view of Albertus Magnus and Aquinas can be said to be essentially that of Aristotle, but greatly refined and more precise, particularly with regard to the *scientiae mediae*. Scientific knowledge had developed considerably since the days of Aristotle: Euclid had systematized geometry, Archimedes had discovered important laws in hydrostatics, Ptolemy had devised a highly satisfactory system of astronomy, and had contributed greatly to the development of optics among the Arabs. These developments encouraged and apparently confirmed the Platonic view of scientific knowledge in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The new Aristotelianism of Albert and Aquinas, however, took issue with the Platonic view of mathematics as affording the only scientific explanation of natural phenomena.

At the very beginning of his paraphrase of the *Metaphysics*, probably composed between 1265-1270, Albertus Magnus directed his attack on "the error of Plato, who said that natural things are founded on mathematical, and mathematical being founded on divine, just as the third cause is dependent on the second, and the second on the first; and so [Plato] said that the principles of natural being are mathematical, which is completely false."⁴ The basis of this error, Albert explains, is that Plato had seen a certain ascending order from natural bodies to mathematical, to divine being, but he had misunderstood the explanation of this order. Perceiving that all changeable beings are continuous, and that all continuous beings are simple, Plato had thought that the principles of natural science are mathematical, and that the principles of mathematical are metaphysical, or divine. "And this is the error which we have rejected in the Books of the *Physics*, and which we shall again reject in the following Books of this science [of metaphysics]."⁵ Actually in his commentary on the *Physics* Albert rejected this Platonic error only in passing, discussing it infrequently and very briefly. But in the *Metaphysics* it is a central theme running throughout the whole of his paraphrase. Albert, it would seem, had in mind not only the historical Plato, but also the *amici Platonis*, who were Albert's own contemporaries.

⁴ "Cavendus est autem hic error Platonis, qui dixit naturalia fundari in mathematicis, et mathematica in divinis, sicut causa tertia fundatur in secunda, et secunda in prima, et ideo dixit esse principia naturalium mathematica, quod omnino falsum est." *Lib. I Metaph.*, tr. I, c. 1, ed. Borgnet, VI, p. 2b.

⁵ "Et hoc est error quem in libris *physicis* reprobavimus, et iterum in consequentibus huius scientiae reprobavimus eundem." *Ibid.*

As Albert understands the information given by Aristotle (*Metaph.* A, 6), Plato postulated immutable ideas of natural species separated from the everchanging reflections seen in the world of sense. These exemplars were to account for the stability of natural species, which belong to the study of natural philosophy.⁶ But antecedent to the subsistent ideas are their formal generative principles, namely abstract figure and its generative number (*numerus principians entia*).⁷ Just as antecedent to every physical body there is abstract tri-dimensionality, so antecedent to every figure there is an abstract generative number. These subsisting figures and numbers are the proper subject of geometry and arithmetic respectively.⁸ The principle of all number, however, is unity, which is the eternally subsistent God from Whom all being flows; hence for Plato this separated unity, namely God, is the proper subject of metaphysics, the divine science.⁹ Thus for Plato and the Platonists there are three ascending grades of separated being, and there are three corresponding grades of scientific knowledge. And just as the lower grade of being depends upon the higher for its very existence, so the lower grade of scientific knowledge depends upon the higher for its very intelligibility.

The *error Platonis*, as seen by Albertus Magnus, is not a simple error; it is a complex view of scientific knowledge and of reality. Every element of that complex view, however, is vigorously rejected by Albertus Magnus. In fact, in his commentary on the *Metaphysics* Albert is more vehement in his repeated rejection of the *error Platonis* than he is in his explicit rejection of the Averroist doctrine of one intellect for all mankind.

The view of Albertus Magnus concerning scientific knowledge, a view which was thoroughly Aristotelian, may be stated briefly under the following five points:

1) The proper principles of natural science are not mathematical, "for dimensions are not principles of bodies according to any *esse*, rather they are consequent upon the fact that they are concrete physical bodies having proper principles like matter and form, and that the form giving existence is in this matter."¹⁰ Physical dimensions are

⁶ *Lib. I Metaph.*, tr. V, c. 5-15; *Lib. VII Metaph.*, tr. II, c. 1-9.

⁷ *Lib. I Metaph.*, tr. IV, c. 2, *ed. cit.*, p. 63b; see also *Lib. I*, tr. V, c. 10, pp. 102b-103a; *Lib. III*, tr. II, c. 11, pp. 162a-164b; *Lib. VII*, tr. III, c. 10, pp. 463a-464b.

⁸ *Lib. I. Metaph.*, tr. I, c. 1, p. 3b.

⁹ *Ibid.*, tr. I, c. 2, pp. 4b-5b.

¹⁰ "Dimensiones enim non sunt principia corporum secundum esse aliquod sed potius consequentia esse eius quod est corpus, et sua principia secundum esse ratum quod habet

consequent upon the natural constitution of bodies; abstract, or mathematical dimensions are consequent upon a mental abstraction. "That a natural body should be constituted by the dimensions of quantity, and that mathematical measures should be the principles of physics are both absurd for all who know anything about the astuteness of the Peripatetics."¹¹ For Albertus Magnus natural science, including its numerous branches, is an autonomous science having its own principles of research, its own *principia propria illuminantia*.¹²

2) The object of the mathematical sciences is not an antecedent form, but "abstracted measures and number."¹³ Not only is physical quantity subsequent to physical natures, but mathematical quantity is further subsequent to physical quantity and requires the mental act of 'abstracting' one special aspect of bodies, while disregarding the natural constitution of bodies, their change, proper activities and causes. Figures and numbers, therefore, can be studied mathematically only inasmuch as they are "abstracted from sensible matter and motion," as Boethius had declared.

3) The subject of *scientiae mediae*, such as optics and mechanics, has a twofold condition: one mathematical, the other physical.¹⁴ To the extent that the lower science is subalternated to mathematics, the higher science of mathematics can give *propter quid* explanations of strictly quantitative properties. But there are other properties which are caused by the particular physical subject considered, and for these the lower science itself can give the proper explanation. "Si autem passiones aliquae sunt, quae causantur ab hoc vel illo secundum quod hoc vel illud, in illis non dicit propter quid scientia superior, sed inferior."¹⁵ Albert thus accepts Grosseteste's distinction of the two aspects in such sciences, but he insists that the physical properties of

sicut forma et materia et illius materiae subiectae inesse quod dat forma." *Lib. I Metaph.*, tr. I, c. 1, pp. 2b-3a.

¹¹ "et secundum hoc corpus naturale constitueretur dimensionibus quantitatum, et mathematica secundum esse accepta erunt principia physicorum, quae ambo sunt absurda apud omnes qui aliquid noverunt de peritia Peripateticorum." *Ibid.*, tr. IV, c. 8, p. 75a. "Mathematica ergo principia naturalis corporis esse non possunt; et quia multa talia in *prima philosophia* a nobis contra Stoicos dicta sunt, haec quantum ad dictam opinionem dicta sufficiant." *Lib. I de causis et processu universitatis*, tr. I, c. 4, ed. Borgnet, X, p. 369a.

¹² *Lib. I Post. Anal.*, tr. V, c. 6, ed. Borgnet, II, p. 140a-b; *Lib. I Phys.*, tr. I, c. 5, ed. Borgnet, III, pp. 10b-11b.

¹³ *Lib. XII Metaph.*, tr. I, c. 3, ed. cit., pp. 696b-697a.

¹⁴ *Lib. I. Post. Anal.*, tr. III, c. 7, ed. cit., p. 85b.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 85b-86a.

the subject can be explained by the subalternated science. "It is not under this aspect, if one considers it carefully, that perspective is subalternate to geometry; moreover a science is supposed to consider the properties of its own subject."¹⁶

4) The subject of metaphysics is not God. "In accordance with all the Peripatetics speaking the truth," Albert says, "being is the subject insofar as it is being, and not insofar as it is this kind of being."¹⁷ This common notion of being as such is reached once the mind realizes that there exists something which is not physical.¹⁸ Following Aristotle, Albert insists that if there were no immaterial substance existing in reality, natural science would necessarily be the supreme wisdom.¹⁹ The proper subject of metaphysics, however, is not this separated, immaterial substance, nor is it God, for then there would be nothing to look for in metaphysics. *Deus autem et divina separata quaeruntur in ista scientia.*²⁰

5) Metaphysics is the last science to be studied, and hence it presupposes all the other sciences and arts. The particular sciences and arts, however, are in no way rendered superfluous by metaphysics. The transcendental and universal truths of metaphysics cannot explain things in their *propria natura*; this explanation can be had only in the particular sciences and arts, which are never rendered superfluous.²¹

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 86a.

¹⁷ *Lib. I. Metaph.*, tr. I, c. 2, pp. 4b-5b. "Ideo cum omnibus Peripateticis vera dicentibus dicendum videtur, quod ens est subiectum inquantum ens est, et ea quae sequuntur ens inquantum est ens (et non inquantum hoc ens) sunt passionibus eius, sicut est causa tantum substantiva et accidens, separatum et non separatum, potentia et actus, et huiusmodi." *Ibid.*, p. 5b.

¹⁸ *Lib. IV Metaph.*, tr. I, c. 3, pp. 206a-207a; tr. I, c. 6, pp. 211b-212a.

¹⁹ "Si enim non est aliqua substantia diversa existens a physicis... tunc oporteret quod physica esset scientia prima et universalis." *Lib. VI Metaph.*, tr. I, c. 3, p. 387a-b.

²⁰ *Lib. I Metaph.*, tr. I, c. 2, p. 5b. See also *Lib. I Phys.*, tr. III, c. 18, *ed. cit.*, p. 91b, where Albert defends this doctrine of Avicenna against the objection of Averroes: "nescio quare reprehendit Averroes, cum ipsum sit necessarium quod dicit Avicenna. Scimus enim quoniam ens est subiectum primae philosophiae, et divisiones et passionibus entis esse, quae in prima philosophia tractantur, scil. per se et per accidens, et per potentiam et actum, et unum et multa, et separatum et non separatum. Et cum separatum sit differentia et passio entis, non potest esse subiectum. Et cum dicitur quod metaphysicus est de separatis, non intelligitur hoc modo de separatis sicut intelligentiae sunt separatae, sed intelligitur de his quae separata sunt per diffinitionem et esse."

²¹ "Nec aliae scientiae superfluum eo quod causae omnium et principia stabiliuntur in ista, quia primo a transcendentibus scitis, non propter hoc scitur scientia vel ars particularis... Et ideo ad sciendas res in propria natura, summe requiruntur scientiae particulares." *Lib. I Metaph.*, tr. I, c. 2, p. 6a-b.

Albert considered the natural order of learning to be 1. logic, 2. mathematics, 3. natural science, 4. moral philosophy (a practical science), and finally 5. metaphysics.²² Thus for Albertus Magnus each science and art is autonomous in its own sphere of inquiry, and natural science has no need of mathematics in order to solve its own problems.

From this summary it is clear that although Albertus Magnus utilized the traditional tripartite classification of the speculative sciences,²³ his own understanding of the division was vastly different from that of Alfarabi, Gundissalinus, Grosseteste, Kilwardby, Bacon and pseudo-Grosseteste. For Albert the traditional division preserved by Boethius does not represent an ascending hierarchy of forms; nor does it represent an ascending hierarchy of scientific knowledge. Albert clearly conceives the mathematical sciences to be speculatively inferior to natural science and a preparation for the science of nature, physics. For him applied mathematics (*scientiae mediae*) can be useful in the study of physical reality, but not a substitute for it. Finally, Albert insists on the autonomy of natural science, which needs neither mathematics nor metaphysics in order to solve its problems. Natural science may indeed lead the mind to a higher and more sublime study, once the existence of some immaterial substance is recognized, but in the investigation of physical problems the natural sciences have no need of metaphysics.

A study of the writings of Albertus Magnus on Aristotle shows that they are not mere paraphrases of the Stagirite, or even mere encyclopedias of medieval science. Albert in fact rewrote almost the whole of philosophy, following the order of Aristotle and other authorities, adding new sciences and correcting wherever he thought necessary.²⁴ Throughout his philosophical writings Albert strove to render the true doctrine of the Peripatetics "intelligible to the Latins." Thus Roger Bacon could complain that many people thought, although mistakenly,

²² See *Lib. VI Ethic.*, tr. II, c. 25, ed. Borgnet, VII, pp. 442-4; *Lib. I Metaph.*, tr. I, c. 1, pp. 2-4a. Robert Kilwardby also considered this to be the natural order of learning, except that he, following Alfarabi (*De scientiis*, c. 5), places moral philosophy after metaphysics (*De ortu scientiarum*, cc. 63-4, Merton College MS 261, fol. 62rb-64vb); Roger Bacon also places moral philosophy after metaphysics in the order of learning (*Communium naturalium*, ed. R. Steele, *Op. hac. ined.*, II, pp. 1-3; *Moralis philosophia*, P. I, proem., ed. Delorme-Massa (Zürich, 1953) 4-7.

²³ See for example, *Lib. I Phys.*, tr. I, c. 1; *Lib. I Metaph.*, tr. I, c. 1; *Lib. VI Metaph.*, tr. I, c. 2. In the *Philosophia pauperum* or *Summa naturalium*, attributed to Albertus Magnus by some historians, philosophy is divided into logic, ethics and physics (ed. Borgnet, V, 445).

²⁴ *Lib. I Phys.*, tr. I, c. 1, pp. 1b-2a.

that "philosophia iam data sit Latinis, et completa, et composita in lingua Latina."²⁵ The rewritten Aristotelianism of Albertus Magnus was the point of departure for the theological synthesis of Thomas Aquinas, who produced critical analyses of the Aristotelian text only when the right to use Aristotle was challenged by the Averroist threat to Christian orthodoxy.

In an early work, *In Boethium de Trinitate*, which was written between 1252 and 1259, Thomas Aquinas revealed his opposition to classifying the speculative sciences according to ascending degrees of abstraction. L. B. Geiger's study of the first and second versions shows that Aquinas deliberately restricted the term 'abstractio' to the consideration of things not separated in fact, but only in thought.²⁶ For Aquinas the natural sciences 'abstract' only in the sense that they are directly concerned with the universal nature and not with singulars as such. This *abstractio totius*, however, is the condition of all intellectual knowledge. Of the three traditional speculative sciences only mathematics properly 'abstracts' by considering only a part of reality, idealized extension and number; this consideration is called *abstractio formae*, because it disregards the 'material' part of existing bodies. But since number and extension are not conceived as pure accidents in mathematics, but rather after the manner of things, that which is imagined to be a line, point, circle or any given number is said to have *materia intelligibilis*, a condition for all mathematical thought. Metaphysics, unlike the other sciences, presupposes that there exists in reality at least one substance which is not physical, not material, but 'separated' from matter. Although this separated substance is not the subject of metaphysics for Aquinas, the science of metaphysics rests on the proven judgement that such a separated being exists in reality.²⁷ Unlike mathematics, the science of metaphysics leaves nothing out of consideration; it considers all things, even individual things, matter and motion, *secundum communem rationem entis*, that is, according to that which is common to material and immaterial substances.²⁸

²⁵ Bacon, *Opus tertium*, c. 9, ed. Brewer, p. 30.

²⁶ L.-B. Geiger "Abstraction et séparation d'après s. Thomas," *Revue des Sciences Phil. et Théol.*, XXXI (1947), 3-40. Words and phrases in the autograph which were changed or deleted by Aquinas have been published by B. Decker in the appendix to his edition, *Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate* (Leiden, 1955).

²⁷ *Expos. Boeth. de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3; see also *In I Metaph.*, lect. 12 (ed. Cathala), n. 181; *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 5, n. 593; *In VI Metaph.*, lect. 1, n. 1170.

²⁸ *Expos. Boeth. De Trin.*, q. 5, a. 4 ad 6; also *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 11, n. 1526; *In XII Metaph.*, lect. 2, n. 2427.

The view of Thomas Aquinas, therefore, is essentially that of Albertus Magnus. Mathematics for Aquinas does not present a deeper explanation of natural phenomena, nor does it offer to natural science the true principles of scientific demonstration. On the contrary, mathematics looks to natural science for its justification. Mathematical principles for Aquinas can be applied to motion and time as well as to physical dimensions, but such an application in the mixed sciences (*scientiae mediae*) touches only the quantitative aspects of physical phenomena, and not the sensible, or natural aspects.²⁹ In his analysis of *scientiae mediae* Aquinas went further than Albert or any of his predecessors. After discussing subalternation of the sciences and Aristotle's use of the terms *quia* and *propter quid* with regard to science, Aquinas notes that both terms when used of sciences are to be included in the previous explanation of *demonstratio quia*, "scilicet quando fit demonstratio per causam remotam."³⁰ Thus in sciences subalternated to geometry "the geometer explains *propter quid* in those sciences according to the formal cause,"³¹ but this quantitative formality is a remote cause as far as the natural phenomenon is concerned. In other words, the mathematical principles used in astronomy, optics and mechanics can indeed demonstrate the quantitative characteristics measured, but they can only describe, and not demonstrate *propter quid*, the production of natural effects. Since every science is determined by the type of probative principles employed, the formal structure of these *scientiae mediae* is more mathematical than physical.³² Some scientific truths, for example, the sphericity of the earth, can be demonstrated by both astronomy and physics, if the attribute to be demonstrated is a physical quantity. The principles employed in the two demonstrations are different. But since astronomy, like all the mathematical sciences, abstracts from natural matter, motion, efficient and final causes, it cannot demonstrate *propter quid*, or *why* any of these effects occur in nature. From this it follows that

²⁹ *Expos. Boeth. de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3 ad 5-8; *In II Phys.*, lect. 3 (ed. Leon.) nn. 8-9.

³⁰ "Sciendum autem est quod illa differentia *quia* et *propter quid*, quae est secundum diversas scientias, continetur sub altero praedictorum modorum, scilicet quando fit demonstratio per causam remotam." *In I Post. Anal.*, lect. 25 (ed. Leon.) n. 6. Cardinal Thomas de Vio Cajetan went to great lengths to determine the exact meaning of this sentence in his own *Commentaria in libros Posteriorum Analyticorum*, lib. I, cap. 13, *Quomodo in diversis* (ed. Venetiis, 1599) pp. 131a-133a.

³¹ "Unde patet quod geometra dicit *propter quid* in istis scientiis secundum causam formalem." *Ibid.*, n. 4 fin.

³² *Expos. Boeth. De Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3 ad 6; see also *In II Phys.*, lect. 3, nn. 6-9; *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 35, a. 8; II-II, q. 9 a. 2 ad 3.

the aim and method of such *scientiae mediae* are essentially different from the aim and method of natural science. Nevertheless Aquinas conceived all the mathematical sciences as preparatory for the more valuable science of nature.

The ideal order of learning indicated by Aquinas is identical to that of Albertus Magnus.³³ First boys should be instructed in logic, because logic gives the common method of all the sciences. Second, they are to be instructed in the mathematic sciences, which neither demand experience, nor transcend the imagination. Third, they should study the natural sciences, which although not exceeding sense and imagination, require experience. Fourth, they should be instructed in the moral sciences, which require experience and a mind not perturbed by emotions. Finally, they may study divine things, which transcend the imagination and require a sturdy intellect. Of course, in the medieval faculty of arts this ideal order of learning was never followed; it would have been impractical, no doubt, to impose such an order on youths.

In the view of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas each science is granted autonomy within its own field of inquiry; particular sciences are not absorbed into more universal sciences, such as metaphysics; and all the mathematical sciences are considered subordinate to natural philosophy, which is the point of departure for metaphysics. This view may be considered authentically Aristotelian. According to the other view which was predominant in the thirteenth century the classification of the sciences corresponds to the hierarchy of forms in nature: natural science is subalternated to the four mathematical sciences, and mathematics is subalternated to metaphysics. Each science is resolved into a higher and more universal science, and mathematics is the key which unlocks both nature and metaphysics. This view, although contaminated with the doctrine of universal hylemorphism, may be considered representatively Platonic.

The writings of the fourteenth century which have been preserved reveal very little concern about the classification of the sciences or the polemic of the thirteenth century. Nevertheless, the writings of

³³ "Erit ergo congruus ordo addiscendi, ut *primo* quidem pueri logicalibus instruantur, quia logica docet modum totius philosophiae. *Secundo* autem instruendi sunt in mathematicis quae nec experientia indigent, nec imaginationem transcendunt. *Tertio* autem in naturalibus, quae etsi non excedunt sensum et imaginationem, requirunt tamen experientiam. Quarto in moralibus, quae requirunt experientiam et animum a passionibus liberum, ut in primo habitum est. *Quinto* autem in sapientibus et divinis, quae transcendunt imaginationem et requirunt validum intellectum." In *VI Ethic.*, lect. 7, n. 1211; also *In librum de causis*, prooem., ed. H. D. Saffrey, p. 2.

Avicenna, Averroes, Grosseteste, Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas were well known in the fourteenth century; they were accepted together with earlier authors as *auctoritates* in the schools and they comprised the scientific 'tradition' upon which later masters could build. Each generation, however, must learn for itself truths discovered with great labor by earlier generations. The *auctoritates* recognized in the schools were those authors who could guide students in the acquisition of those truths. But students were expected to become masters who were not only equipped with ancient learning, but also capable of raising new problems in new fields of inquiry.

Scientific learning at Oxford in the early fourteenth century was concerned with new problems in the field of logic and physics, a physics which was to become kinematics and dynamics, and eventually a new science of classical mechanics.

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The Development of Middle English Romance

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THE purpose of this article is to offer a tentative outline of the growth and development of Middle English romance from 1240 to 1400. The initial date for the discussion is not difficult to arrive at, for it is simply the date, on palaeographical evidence, of the Cambridge MS fragment Gg.4.27, containing *King Horn* and *Floris and Blancheflur*, the earliest extant Middle English romances.¹ The final date is arbitrary, and some of the romances to be discussed may possibly be from the early years of the fifteenth century. However, a distinction may be drawn between fourteenth and fifteenth century romance which is not arbitrary and which justifies the choice of 1400 as a terminal date.

The corpus of Middle English romance, from the period of its great flourishing between 1280 and 1380, gives the strongest impression of homogeneity, a homogeneity which makes quite possible a general analysis of the 'type' such as Dorothy Everett gave in her fine essay.² This homogeneity is most evident in the observance of a wide range of formal and literary conventions, what we might call the 'grammar' of romance. The same plot-patterns, the same situations, the same phrases, recur insistently from romance to romance, providing much of their popular strength. The reason for this close stereotyping, however, is to be found in the social context of Middle English romance, which is overwhelmingly popular and non-courtly. True courtly romance had no real vogue in English, since the audience which could appreciate it, at the time when it was fashionable, was French-speaking. The only exceptions are the alliterative romances and the late adaptations of the genre by Chaucer. The audience of the Middle English romances is primarily a lower or lower-middle-class audience, a class of social aspirants who wish to be entertained with what they

¹ The MS is described briefly in *King Horn*, ed. Hall (Oxford, 1901), p. x. See also K. Brunner, "Middle English Metrical Romances and their Audience", in *Studies in Medieval Literature in Honor of Professor A. C. Baugh*, ed. MacEdward Leach (Philadelphia, 1961), 219-226, especially 220-222.

² "A Characterization of the English Medieval Romances", in *Essays on Middle English Literature*, ed. Patricia Kean (Oxford, 1955), 1-22.

consider to be the same fare, but in English, as their social betters. It is a new class, an emergent bourgeoisie, whose tastes were assessed with professional expertise by the compilers of the Auchinleck MS.³ By the end of the fourteenth century, this class, though it has not disappeared, has changed, and popular romance, which may be seen as the primary extant literary manifestation of the newly enfranchised vernacular, is no longer to its taste. This veneer of sophistication is partly Chaucer's doing, and is acquired more slowly in the north than in the south, so that as the century progresses we notice a northward shift in the provenance of romance.

Fifteenth century romance is thus significantly different from fourteenth century romance. There is, for one thing, a marked decrease in output, and the few verse-romances that are produced, such as *Generydes*, the *Squyr of Lowe Degre*, and *Partonope*, are evidently directed at a more sophisticated bourgeois audience, an audience more aware of social tone and capable of responding, on however simple a level, to the Chaucerian stylistic.⁴ The ultimate resort of this enhanced sophistication is of course the prose romance of Malory and Caxton. But side by side with *Generydes* and *Partonope* there are other romances like *The Grene Knyght* and *The Turke and Gowin*, often crude debasements of earlier romances, which represent the regression of romance into oral tradition. This oral tradition we may take to have existed before the flourishing of romance and to have co-existed with it, the last crude residue when popular tradition had done its worst with courtly romance. It would be the property of the lowest classes of society and by its very nature would not be written down and therefore would not be extant. Accidents of survival, likelier to occur later than earlier, have preserved the debased fifteenth century Gawain-romances for us, two of them unique in the Percy Folio, and thus enabled us to glimpse a substratum of literature usually hidden.

Fourteenth century romances continued to be copied in the fifteenth century—some, indeed, are extant only in fifteenth century manuscripts

³ Nat. Lib. Scot., Adv. 19.2.1. For a plausible account of the commercial provenance of this MS, see L. H. Loomis, "The Auchinleck Manuscript and a Possible London Bookshop of 1330-1340", *PMLA*, 57 (1942), 595-627. The MS is fully described by E. Kölbing in *Englische Studien*, 7 (1884), 177-191. See also Brunner, *op. cit.*, 219-220.

⁴ In *Partonope* (ed. A. T. Bødtker, *EETS*, ES, 109, 1912) there is explicit reminiscence of Chaucer, especially of the *Knight's Tale*. Compare 11128-11145 and *KnT*, I, 2600-2618, 2636-2637. See B. J. Whiting, "A Fifteenth-Century English Chaucerian", *Mediaeval Studies*, 7 (1945), 40-54; also R. M. Smith, in *MLN*, 51 (1936), 320-322, and J. Parr, in *MLN*, 60 (1945), 486-487.

—but the adaptations are usually free enough to reveal the same two tendencies. The tendency to increased sophistication is illustrated by the fifteenth century rewriting of *The Seege of Troye* in Harley MS 525. This redactor omits minstrel material such as direct address to the audience and oral punctuation, and adds characteristically 'literary' material such as an expanded account of the building of the New Troy, a learned digression on Neptanabus, and a rhetorical amplification of the grief of Priam and Polyxena over Hector's death.⁵ He also corrects gross errors in the text: he knows, for instance, that the three goddesses involved in the Idan beauty competition were Venus, Juno and Minerva, and not Saturn, Mercury and Jupiter, as the earlier version has it. The opposite tendency, what I have called the regression into oral tradition, is illustrated by a number of fifteenth century copies of fourteenth century romances, such as the text of *Sir Orfeo* in Harley MS 3810.

If 1240-1400 are accepted as working limits for this discussion, there is no need to make a point of excluding prose romance, which is a purely fifteenth century phenomenon in England, for reasons that have been suggested. Alliterative romance presents a slightly more difficult problem, especially as there is an important group of later northern non-alliterative romances which draw towards the alliterative tradition in sophistication of technique and social outlook. Even a strict formal distinction breaks down on a romance like the fragmentary *Song of Roland*, which is really an alliterative poem in rhymed couplets, though both alliteration and rhyme are loose and irregular. Stylistically, its affinities are with the alliterative tradition, the influence of which is clear in conventional contexts such as battle-descriptions.⁶ However, alliterative romance has in general a strong enough formal and social identity to warrant exclusion from this study. It is not easy to talk of *Sir Orfeo* and *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* in the same breath.

It would remain only to admit that the corpus of romance established by this process of elimination has no inviolate identity.⁷ Some roman-

⁵ See lines 306, 674, 1522.

⁶ E.g. 336-339. See also 53, 202-205, 214-218, 237-238, 279, 305-309. The poem, which is edited by Herrtage for the *EETS* (*ES*, 35, 1880), is not included in the subsequent discussion.

⁷ It comprises fifty pieces, though a different technique of computation might vary this convenient number slightly. They are listed here, with reference to the best available edition, in the order in which they are to be treated.

I. 1. *Havelok the Dane*, ed. W. W. Skeat, 2nd ed. rev. K. Sisam (Oxford, 1915).

ces are centrally typical of the form, while others are romances because they are more like romances than they are like anything else. At one point romance blurs off into history, and it would be hard, for instance, to decide, without some arbitrary line-drawing, what exactly

2. *Guy of Warwick*, ed. J. Zupitza, *EETS*, ES, 42, 49, 59 (1883, 1887, 1891). Includes the stanzaic continuation and *Reimbrun*.
3. *Beves of Hamtoun*, ed. E. Kölbing, *EETS*, ES, 46, 48, 65 (1885, 1886, 1894).
4. *Richard Cœur de Lion*, ed. K. Brunner, *Wiener Beiträge zur Englischen Philologie*, Bd. 42 (Vienna, 1913).
5. *Arthur and Merlin*, ed. E. Kölbing, *Altenglische Bibliothek*, Bd. 4 (Leipzig, 1890). Includes the later *Merlin*.
6. *Kyng Alisaunder*, ed. G. V. Smithers, *EETS*, OS, 227, 237 (1952, 1957).
- II. 1. *Floris and Blancheflur*, ed. A. B. Taylor (Oxford, 1927).
2. *Ywain and Gawain*, ed. A. B. Friedman and N. T. Harrington, *EETS*, 254 (1964).
3. *Lai le Freine*, ed. Margaret Wattie, *Smith College Studies in Modern Languages*, Vol. 10, no. 3 (1929).
4. *Sir Landeval*. See IX. 3.
5. *Sir Orfeo*, ed. A. J. Bliss (Oxford, 1954).
6. *Sir Degare*, ed. G. Schleich, *Englische Textbibliothek*, Bd. 19 (Heidelberg, 1929).
- III. 1. *Otuel*, ed. S. J. Herrtage, *EETS*, ES, 39 (1882). Includes *Roland and Vernagu*.
2. *The Seege of Troye*, ed. Mary E. Barnicle, *EETS*, OS, 172 (1927).
3. *Arthur*, ed. F. J. Furnivall, *EETS*, OS, 2 (1864).
4. *Titus and Vespasian*, ed. R. Fischer, in *Archiv für das Studium der neueren Sprachen und Literaturen*, 111 (1903), 285-298, and 112 (1904), 24-45.
5. *Ipomydon*. See X. 1.
- IV. *Laud Troy-Book*, ed. J. E. Wülfing, *EETS*, OS, 121, 122 (1902-1903).
- V. 1. *King Horn*, ed. J. R. Lumby, *EETS*, OS, 14 (1866; re-ed. G. H. McKnight, 1901); ed. J. Hall (Oxford, 1901). The latter includes *Horn Childe*.
2. *Sir Tristrem*, ed. G. P. McNeill, *Scottish Text Society* (1886).
- VI. 1. and 2. Stanzaic *Guy and Reinbrun*. See I. 2.
3. *Horn Childe*. See V. 1.
4. *Amis and Amiloun*, ed. MacE. Leach, *EETS*, OS, 203 (1937).
- VII. 1. *The King of Tars*, ed. F. Krause, *Englische Studien*, 11 (1888), 1-62.
2. *Le Bone Florence of Rome*, ed. W. Vietor and A. Knobbe (Marburg, 1899).
3. *Roland and Vernagu*. See III. 1.
4. *Sir Amadas*, (i) ed. H. Weber, in *Metrical Romances of the 13th, 14th and 15th Centuries* (Edinburgh, 1810), iii, 243-275; (ii). See XI. 4.
5. *Sir Cleges*, ed. A. Treichel, *Englische Studien*, 22 (1896), 345-389.
6. *Sir Gowther*, ed. K. Breul (Oppeln, 1886).
- VIII. 1, 2. *Octavian, Octovian*, ed. G. Sarrazin, *Altenglische Bibliothek*, Bd. 3 (Heilbronn, 1885).
3. *Athelston*, ed. A. McI. Trounce, *EETS*, OS, 224 (1951).
4. *Sir Isumbras*, ed. G. Schleich, *Palaestra*, 15 (Berlin, 1901).
5. *Sir Eglamour*, ed. G. Schleich, *Palaestra*, 53 (Berlin, 1906).
6. *Torrent of Portyngale*, ed. E. Adam, *EETS*, ES, 51 (1887).
7. *Sir Tryamour*, ed. Anna J. E. Schmidt (Utrecht, 1937).
- IX. 1. *Emare*, ed. Edith Rickert, *EETS*, ES, 99 (1908).
2. *The Erl of Tolous*, ed. G. Lüdtke (Berlin, 1881).

the wretched *Arthur* is. This little piece occurs unique in the middle of a Latin chronicle of the kings of Britain, rather like the spurts of patriotic alliteration in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, as if the author felt that verse alone could match his mood of exaltation. *Arthur* is anything but exalted, however, and even its claim to be verse is tenuous. If it were less grotesquely inept one might feel more certain about its literary status. At another point romance merges into epic, and although *The Seege of Troye* is certainly romance, and Lydgate's *Troy-Book* just as certainly epic, the *Laud Troy-Book* is somewhere between the two. At yet another point, didactic romance, pious legend and saint's life become difficult to distinguish, and formal criteria alone determine the inclusion of poems like *Sir Amadas* and *Sir Cleges* as romances.

With this inevitable blurring admitted, the homogeneity of the popular romance tradition still remains as a strong impression, though it has its diachronic as well as its synchronic aspect. In other words, it is possible to discern within the homogeneity of the tradition certain variations, certain patterns of growth and decline, certain interlockings of form and theme, which enable us to trace, as it were, a historical morphology of romance. The task is a complex one, involving as it does the assembling and reconciliation of evidence as to date, dialect, manuscript provenance,⁸ metrical form, exact class of audience,

3. *Sir Launfal*, ed. A. J. Bliss, *Nelson's Medieval and Renaissance Library* (1960). Includes *Landeval*.

X. 1. *Ipomadon*, ed. E. Kölbing (Breslau, 1889). Includes *Ipomydon*.

2, 3. *The Sege of Melayne* and *Rowlande and Ottuell*, ed. S. J. Herrtage, *EETS, ES*, 35 (1880).

XI. 1. *Libeaus Desconus*, ed. M. Kaluza, *Altenglische Bibliothek*, Bd. 5 (Leipzig, 1890).

2. *Sir Degrevaunt*, ed. L. F. Casson, *EETS, OS*, 221 (1949).

3. *Sir Perceval of Gales*, ed. J. Campion and F. Holthausen, *Alt- und Mittelenglische Texte*, Bd. 5 (Heidelberg, 1913).

4. *The Avowyng of King Arther, Sir Gawan, Sir Kaye and Sir Bawdewyn of Bretan*, ed. J. Robson, *Three Early English Metrical Romances* (Camden Society, 1842). Includes *Amadas*.

XII. 1. *Sir Ferumbas*, ed. S. J. Herrtage, *EETS, ES*, 34 (1879).

2. *The Sowdone of Babylone*, ed. E. Hausknecht, *EETS, ES*, 38 (1881).

XIII. *Le Morte Arthur*, ed. J. D. Bruce, *EETS, ES*, 88 (1903).

Sixteen of the above romances are edited, twelve of them complete, with the minimum of apparatus, by W. H. French and C. B. Hale in *Middle English Metrical Romances* (New York, 1930). The twelve are *Havelok*, *Floris*, *Orfeo*, *Degare*, *Horn*, *Cleges*, *Athelston*, *Emare*, the *Erl of Tolous*, *Launfal*, *Perceval*, and the *Avowyng*.

⁸ Much remains to be done in this particular field, especially now that Brunner (in the article cited, and another in *Anglia*, 76 (1958), 64-73) has opened it up. The main problem is one of fragmentation, for the 50 romances are found in 55 MSS and 25 exist in unique

type of source, type of story and range of art, and is made still more complex by the ambiguous or disputed nature of much of this evidence;⁹ but it is a task which needs doing because of the inadequacy of the traditional classification according to the 'Matters' (of Britain, France, Greece and Rome, and England).¹⁰ This classification, where it is not obviously useless, as it is in dismissing twenty-three of the fifty romances under discussion as 'miscellaneous', can be actually misleading where it lumps together quite dissimilar romances because of some superficial coincidence of plot-material. Stories are the property of everyone, but a formal tradition is the property only of its practitioners, and it is through its formal and stylistic aspects—in combination with the others—that the history of romance can be most objectively analysed.

The first broad division in the tradition is between the nineteen romances in four-stress couplet and the twenty-five in tail-rhyme. The remaining six are closely associated with the latter, either through partial anticipation of the full development of the form (*King Horn*, *Sir Tristrem*) or through subsequent variation upon it (*Octovian*, the *Sowdone of Babylone*, *Ferumbras*, *Le Morte Arthur*). This division is obvious enough, but it is a very real one, for it corresponds to a more fundamental division between 'epic romance' and 'lyric romance', the former more prosaic, realistic, historical and martial, the latter more emotive, more concerned with love, faith, constancy and the marvellous. In French, these different types also exist, but come in a series of waves, with much overlapping, as society gradually evolved the need for them: first the *chanson de geste*, romance a degree removed from epic, then the *roman d'aventure*, and finally its more refined, sentimental and ethereal derivative, the Breton *lai*. There are no such waves of development in English, but rather a more complex simultaneous layering, since by the time English was capable of absorbing the form, its full course had been run in the source-literature. Nor should the

texts. But there are certain key MSS, such as the Auchinleck (which contains 15 of the romances, 6 in unique texts), Caligula A. ii, Egerton 2862 and Cambridge Ff.2.38.

⁹ Two useful handbooks, in addition to Wells's *Manual*, which help sift this evidence, are A. H. Billings, *A Guide to the Middle English Metrical Romances* (New York, 1901), and L. A. Hibbard, *Medieval Romance in England* (Oxford, 1924).

¹⁰ This classification is used in virtually all the standard textbooks and bibliographies. Professor George Kane, in his chapter on "The Middle English Metrical Romances" in *Middle English Literature* (London, 1951), ignores the 'Matters', but the technique of classification he does use, one of aesthetic merit, is avowedly subjective and unhistorical.

analogy of French be pressed too hard, since English romance, for all its great debt to French,¹¹ is more than merely derivative. A small group of non-epic romances in couplet (*Sir Orfeo*, &c.) are all early and may be regarded as the result of the powerful influence of French metrical form before the tail-rhyme tradition, with its mixed ancestry, had become fully established.

The first growth of couplet-romance is initiated by *Havelok* about 1280 and centres on *Guy of Warwick*, *Beves of Hamtoun*, *Richard Cœur de Lion*, *Kyng Alisaunder* and *Arthour and Merlin*, all five represented in part or whole¹² in the Auchinleck manuscript (c. 1330), and the last three forming a strongly marked south-eastern group. Typically, these are vigorously professional adaptations of French poems of the *chanson de geste* type, blunting the first keen edge of unsophisticated appetite with battles and heroic adventures strung in loosely climactic sequence over many thousands of lines. The first four have English heroes, and there are traces of patriotic feeling in Guy's fight against the Danish champion Colbrand and the outburst of anti-French prejudice in *Richard*,¹³ but it would be the greatest mistake to regard them as any sort of national epic or significant outgrowth of germinally historic native tradition. Much has been made of the Matter of England, and certainly there is evidence for the growth of a considerable body of popular heroic legend in medieval England, some of it going back to the days of the Viking invasions (Horn, *Havelok*), or earlier (Wade, *Weland*), some to the days of resistance against the Norman conquerors (*Hereward*). A whole cycle of outlaw and exile stories gave expression to re-emerging English spirit.¹⁴ But this body of native heroic legend

¹¹ Of the 50 romances listed above, all but 12 would have a direct French source, extant or putative.

¹² This phrase hints at a problem which this study, for the most part, will have to by-pass, the complexity of textual tradition in romance. It is not merely a matter of corrupt texts or incomplete texts but of related versions of a particular romance so different that it is questionable, for instance, whether we can talk about an English romance of *Beves* or whether there are not as many romances of *Beves* as there are texts (Kölbing's attempt to offer a critical text produces some extraordinary footnotes). Often the problem has to be explicitly recognised, as with *Guy*, where the texts need individual reference.

¹³ Caius *Guy*, 10579; *Richard*, 3849. The English versions of *Guy* add passages in which 'England' is used as a focus of national sentiment—Guy is fighting 'for England', 'to make England free' (Auchinleck, st. 248), and Athelstan declares that he has 'saved all England' (st. 271). *Beves*, on the other hand, is outrageously unpatriotic, ending as it does with Beves slaughtering 32,000 London citizens and the Thames running red with blood (4529-4532).

¹⁴ See R. M. Wilson, *The Lost Literature of Medieval England* (London, 1952), 16-19, 123-130; H. G. Leach, *Angevin Britain and Scandinavia* (Cambridge, Mass., 1921), 324-355;

exists by hypothesis—usually from references or versions in French or Latin, paradoxically enough—and not in fact. Even the romances of *Havelok* and *Horn*, though their adaptations of the material owe something to memories of native versions of the stories, come to us strained through the medium of French romance.¹⁵ It is possible to believe that such stories as these had wide currency in popular oral tradition, and at the same time admit that when such stories came to be written down, they would be written down as translations from available sources and not records of oral tradition. It would be easier for the hack to work from a source, and there would be prestige in it too. References to Athelstan and Anlaf in romances like *Guy* are evidence not of primitive historicity, but of the astuteness of the fabricators of these romances in scattering such names about so as to give the illusion of historicity.

The *Havelok*-story probably contains a germ of historical truth from Anglo-Viking tradition, but the English romance is a free reworking, about 1280, of some variant of the French poem (it is difficult to explain inconsistencies of narrative in the English except by derivation from the French), with contamination from local Lincolnshire tradition. *Havelok* is unique among English romances in its systematic realisation of the story in terms of humble everyday life. The midnight scene in Grim's cottage, the details of boat-building, fishing and trading, *Havelok's* work as a kitchen-boy,¹⁶ all of them added or expanded from the French, are part of the very texture of common life. *Havelok's* qualities—his instinct for survival, opportunism, modesty, industry, lack of sentiment, practical good sense, love of children—are the virtues of common people. The fighting is savagely in earnest, the narrator's participation in the story full and intense, and behind the poem rises a respect for order and the rule of law which is deliberately emphasised in the opening description of Athelwold's ideal reign, in the juxtaposition of the two parallel episodes of the regent's betrayal of his trust, as if to drive home the

J. de Lange, *The Relation and Development of English and Icelandic Outlaw-Traditions* (Haarlem, 1935); C. E. Wright, *The Cultivation of Saga in Anglo-Saxon England* (Edinburgh, 1939), 31.

¹⁵ For full discussion of sources, see Hibbard, *op. cit.*, 83-92, 103-112; H. le Sourd Creek, "The Author of *Havelok the Dane*", *Englische Studien*, 48 (1915), 193-222; H. Heyman, *Studies on the Havelok-Tale* (Upsala, 1903); W. H. Schofield, "The Story of King Horn and Rimenhild", *PMLA*, 18 (1903), 1-84; W. H. French, *Essays on King Horn* (Oxford, 1939), 117-145.

¹⁶ Lines 565-648, 699-720, 749-784, 909-958.

enormity of the double outrage to justice, and in the scrupulously detailed punishment of the traitors at the end.¹⁷ The manner of the poem is rough, but the handling of the story bears witness at every point to deliberate purpose, and *Havelok* has a claim, if any English romance has, to be regarded as the genuine expression of popular consciousness.

Guy of Warwick, by contrast, is hack-work, a flat recital of battles which increase only in length. Closely translated from the French, with some adaptations to suit less sophisticated taste, it is of great importance as a prototype of epic romance (and of lyric romance, as we shall see). In it the conventional techniques of narrative and description, especially battle description, long established in French romance, are naturalised and, with some modifications, converted to the English tradition. The story was well chosen to appeal to the new audience, both for its scrupulously detailed air of historical veracity and also for its theme, of the steward's son who achieves knighthood, marries his lord's daughter, and twice acts as the saviour of England, a theme which is the epitome of all those bourgeois narratives in which the hero breaks into a higher or more enviable social milieu through the exercise of innate merit. The story also has a strong pietistic undertow, which a non-aristocratic audience would have found very satisfying. Halfway through, soon after his marriage to Felice, Guy has a moment of spiritual illumination in which he sees the futility of mere knight-errantry, and so becomes an ascetic pilgrim-knight. The change makes precious little difference to the matter of the romance, except that Guy now fights in disguise (to display self-abnegation), but it makes a strong appeal to conventional piety, as does the sentimental ending. The shift to tail-rhyme stanza at the halfway point in the Auchinleck version, whether the work of a different continuator or not,¹⁸ seems to be the result of deliberate policy which, recognising the affective nature of the new material—the wedding, Guy's moment of illumination, Felice's sorrow at his departure—adopts the more suitably lyrical and 'poetic' tail-rhyme stanza. The opening of the stanzaic *Guy* is certainly the best part of the poem, a repository and perhaps a primary source of classical tail-rhyme writing. A similar sort of professional adeptness, maybe that of the 'editor' of the Auchinleck manuscript, is displayed in the disentangling of the story of Guy's son Reinbrun from

¹⁷ Lines 27-105, 286-337, 408-544, 2488-2511, 2808-2849.

¹⁸ R. W. Ackerman, in his essay on "The English Rimed and Prose Romances", in *Arthurian Literature in the Middle Ages*, ed. R. S. Loomis (Oxford, 1959), suggests that the commercial shop-hacks wrote in couplet and minstrels in tail-rhyme (p. 482).

the last half of *Guy* so as to make of it a separate romance, though it is poor stuff when it comes.

Where *Guy* strains at uplift, *Beves of Hamtoun* makes every possible concession to popular taste. The story is a heady brew of outrageous incident, concocted *ad hoc* from many diverse sources, and culminating in a single-handed pitched battle against the massed citizenry in the streets of London. This and several other sensational episodes are the work of the English adaptor,¹⁹ as is the outright vulgarisation of *Beves*, who, stripped of crusading chivalry, becomes a saga or folk-hero, admired for his physical strength, bravado and low cunning. The whole fantastic pot-pourri is carried off with irresistible panache and a marked sense of the comic.²⁰ It is vivid, gross and ridiculous by turns, but never dull.²¹

Richard Cœur de Lion is most remarkable for the streak of crude physical brutality which it displays, as in the lion-heart episode and Richard's cannibalistic orgies at Acre.²² These episodes, like the account of Richard's magical birth and early adventures in Germany, were added in an expanded second English version of the story,²³ and show the expertise of the romancer in recognising and satisfying new thirsts for stimulation which found heroic adventure in itself inadequate. Perhaps he helped create this taste, for it is characteristic of the purveyor of popular entertainment to run before his audience, to underestimate their capacity for the expected and to overestimate their need for new twists and gimmicks, perhaps because of his own wider acquaintance with the stock material. The technical skill of the author, the vigour and authenticity of the battle-scenes, do not, however, disguise the shapelessness of the narrative and laborious circumstancing of each incident, the real drama of history being rejected in favour of the sham of interminable Saracen-baiting.

¹⁹ The Christmas-day fight against the Saracens (585-738) and the dragon-fight (2597-2910) are both new, and the Miles-Josiane episode (3117 ff.), in which *Beves's* beloved strings up an unwelcome bridegroom on the curtain-rail of the marriage-bed (3220-3224), is richly expanded.

²⁰ Notably in the farcical scene of the attempted baptism of the giant Ascopard (e.g. 2594-2596).

²¹ It is interesting that the Auchinleck text of *Beves*, the oldest if not the best MS, begins in tail-rhyme stanza, switching to short couplet at 1.475. Perhaps a different hack took over, or perhaps the English adaptor recognised the unsuitability of the more 'poetic' measure to this vulgar thriller.

²² Lines 1090-1109, 3077-3124, 3194-3226, 3409-3520.

²³ Or there may have been two successive expansions of the original shorter version as it appears in the Auchinleck fragments. See Hibbard, 147-154; *Richard*, ed. Brunner, introd., 17-24. The French source is not extant.

If Kölbing is right, and *Arthour and Merlin* and *Kyng Alisaunder* are by the same Kentishman of the late thirteenth century as *Richard*,²⁴ then one would suspect that *Arthour* was written first. There is an assertiveness about the status of English in the very deliberate prologue—

Of Freynsch no Latin nil y telle more,
Ac on Inglisch ichil tel per fore;
Rigt is þat Inglische understonde
Pat was born in Inglond;
Freynsche use þis gentilman
Ac everich Inglische Inglische can—²⁵

which suggests that this was one of the first attempts to fasten on the new audience, while the handling of the French story is cramped and the verse lacks the confident hard professionalism of *Richard*. On the other hand, in its more frequent use of the seasons-headpiece as a prestige-conscious form of narrative punctuation, *Arthour* is closer to *Alisaunder*. This device, the use of which provides interesting confirmation of the growing sophistication of the new audience, is employed only once in *Richard*²⁶ and elsewhere very sporadically in isolated romances, and is, with dialectal identity, an important part of Kölbing's thesis. For the rest, *Arthour and Merlin* is very much the stock-in-trade of this first growth of romance, an interminable catalogue of Arthur's first battles against the barbarians, preceded by some account of the marvels surrounding Merlin's birth and early career.²⁷ *Kyng Alisaunder*, however, is something different, technically by far the most accomplished of all the English popular romances. The poet seems conscious of the grandeur of his theme,

Pis is nougth romaunce of skof (668),

and he elaborates the endless battles and fantastic marvels of the Alexander-legend with an abundance of detail, a richness of imagery

²⁴ This theory is advanced in the introduction to his edition of *Arthour and Merlin*, pp. lx-cv. It is accepted by G. V. Smithers in his introduction to *Kyng Alisaunder* (p. 41), along with the attribution of *The Seven Sages of Rome* to the same London (rather than Kentish) author.

²⁵ *Arthour and Merlin*, 19-24. Cf. *Richard*, 21-24.

²⁶ *Richard*, 3755. Cf. *Arthour*, 259, 1709, 3059, 4199, 5349, 6595, 7397, 7619, 8657; *Alisaunder*, 235, 457, 795, 911, 1239, 1573, &c.

²⁷ It is perhaps a mark of changed taste that the Lincoln's Inn *Merlin*, a hundred years later, has only the marvels and not the battles. This version is not a separate abridged recension of *Arthour* but a corrupt 2492-line text of the first 2162 of *Arthour*'s 9938 lines.

and a full exploitation of the techniques of rhetorical amplification developed in the *chansons de geste*.²⁸ For this, the direct French source provides the bare bones, but little more. The appeal to a more sophisticated audience is suggested also in the full preservation of the courtly atmosphere of *fine amour* in the Candace episode, and in the novel and brilliantly effective manipulation of the seasons-headpiece. There are twenty-seven examples of this device in *Alisaunder*, mostly of six lines, some of more, monorhymed, beginning as simple nature-descriptions but developing in complexity through the poem to accommodate sententiae and miniature evocations of courtly life. They are often finely rhetoricated, packed with metaphor, and function within the poem like illuminations in a manuscript, free-running arabesques of the literary imagination standing out by their perfect irrelevance in the narrative or by a subtly piquant contrast with it. This device alone would serve to set *Alisaunder* apart from the generality of English romance.

Meanwhile, simultaneously with this first growth of 'epic romance', there were some early ventures into French love-romance and the Breton *lai*. These poems, *Floris and Blauncheflur*, *Ywain and Gawain*, *Sir Orfeo*, the *Lai le Freine*, *Sir Landeval* and *Sir Degare*, are in short couplet, and cut across the broad formal distinction between 'epic' and 'lyric' romance drawn earlier, suggesting the predominance of French metrical form before the development of native tail-rhyme.²⁹ *Floris* is very early, about 1250, and the others are from the first quarter of the fourteenth century, *Ywain* being latest. All are from the London area except *Ywain*, written in the north, where tail-rhyme took longer to spread.³⁰ These romances are markedly more urbane and delicate than the last group, and were designed for a somewhat more sophisticated stratum of the audience, perhaps for women. They deal less in battle, more in love and the supernatural, and the narratives are shaped to a purpose. *Floris* is particularly successful in catching the idyllic sentiment of its French original, which the poet chose in

²⁸ For suggestive analysis of these features, and excellent treatment of the romance as a whole, see the introduction by G. V. Smithers to his edition, especially pp. 28-40.

²⁹ This epithet is not intended to pre-empt discussion of the origin of tail-rhyme but to suggest that tail-rhyme, whatever its formal origin, soon became a specifically 'English' form.

³⁰ It will be recognised, here and elsewhere, that these are necessarily broad statements, and that the evidence as to date and dialect is a good deal more ambiguous than these assertions make it sound. However, no evidence has been deliberately neglected or distorted, and the general context of time and place is fairly clear.

preference to another French version padded out with fighting. Though some ornamental descriptive matter is omitted and some of the lengthier love-scenes curtailed, this story of tender calf-love loses nothing in translation and gains in humour and irony. Even the Saracens are treated with mild good manners. *Ywain*, an abridgement of Chretien's *Ywain*, is less interested in sentiment, and not at all interested in Chretien's psychological speculations,³¹ though otherwise very faithful in outline to the French story. Nothing much of the special quality of Chretien's writing comes through, and in the absence of this dialectic of love the romance is bound to seem somewhat otiose, but it is far from being a travesty of its original and, like *Floris*, bears all the marks of carefully contrived professional adaptation for more popular consumption.³²

The other four in this group are Breton lays, *Lai le Freine* and *Landeval* both being based on extant French *lais*. The former is fragmentary, but seems close in style and technique to *Sir Orfeo*. The two poems occur side by side in the Auchinleck manuscript, share a common prologue, and were perhaps the work of the same translator.³³ *Sir Landeval* is an undistinguished translation of the *Lanval* attributed to Marie de France, fairly close except for the usual vulgarisation of story-material. Some late texts of this romance, known as *Sir Lambewell* and *Sir Lamwell*, are so corrupt that they have often been mistaken for separate recensions of the story.³⁴ *Sir Orfeo* is probably derived from a lost French original, and represents a weirdly convincing Celticization of the classical Orpheus-legend with the addition of a happy ending. It is one of the most interesting of all Middle English romances,³⁵ partly for the perpetual fascination of the myth itself and partly for a rare economy and neatness which underlie the apparent naivete of style and handling. *Sir Degare* is stylistically close to *Freine* and *Orfeo*,

³¹ For instance, Ywain's debate with himself about the possibility of his love (for the lady whose husband he has slain) being returned occupies 1428-1506 in the French text but only 893-902 in the English (the total proportions are 6818:4032). For further examples, see the *EETS* edition, xvi-xxxiv.

³² The *EETS* editors suggest "the sober, realistic audience of a provincial baron's hall" (p. xvii). This seems reasonable.

³³ See L. Foulet, "The Prologue of *Sir Orfeo*", *MLN*, 21 (1906), 46-50; G. Guillaume, "The Prologues of the *Lai le Freyne* and *Sir Orfeo*", *MLN*, 36 (1921), 458-464; *Orfeo*, ed. Bliss, introd., pp. xlv-xlvii.

³⁴ See *Launfal*, ed. Bliss, introd., 4-5.

³⁵ Recent signs of interest include J. Burke Severs, "The Antecedents of *Sir Orfeo*", in *Baugh Studies*, 187-207; D. M. Hill, "The Structure of *Sir Orfeo*", *Mediaeval Studies*, 23 (1961), 136-153.

with verbal imitation of the former, and may be an original English product designed to exploit the popularity of the form. The title, however, suggests a French original, a 'lai d'Egare', as the English text explains carefully (perhaps too carefully) at line 256. Whatever the case, *Sir Degare* is a remarkable comprehensive collection of typical *lai* motifs, and, though there are a few loose ends,³⁶ the patchwork is cunningly done and the whole thing is a not at all contemptible example of what the professional romancer could knock together when pressed.

The channelling of composing talent into tail-rhyme and the taste of an increasingly discriminating audience for something more than inventories of cloven heads and mutilated limbs leads to a sharp decline in short-couplet 'epic romance' after about 1320. The products of this second phase, the *Auchinleck Otuel*, the *Seege of Troye*, *Arthur*, *Titus and Vespasian* and *Ipomydon*, are uncompromisingly popular in tone, all crude abridgements of familiar pseudo-historical 'epic' material except for *Ipomydon*, a prosaic redaction for a popular audience of the important northern tail-rhyme *Ipomadon*. These poems are like a backwash from the first surge of romance-writing, third-rate fumbling in an enfeebled tradition when the new points of growth are elsewhere. Late in the century the rhetorically elaborate epic manner of *Kyng Alisaunder* is imitated in the *Laud Troy-Book*, but in a bookish, laborious, pedestrian manner which the author tries occasionally to invigorate with infusions of alliterative phraseology, for instance in the interesting secondary prologue, where for twenty lines he writes in a strongly alliterative manner, as if to whip up flagging interest.³⁷ The *Laud Troy-Book*, which appears to be of north-west-midland origin, would thus provide another late fourteenth century link between the older tradition of rhymed romance and the poetry of the alliterative revival.

There was something of a revival of short-couplet romance in the fifteenth century, in a series of smooth, fashionable romances such as *Partonope of Blois*, the *Squyr of Lowe Degre* and *Eger and Grime*, designed for

³⁶ See G. V. Smithers, "Story-Patterns in some Breton lays", *Medium Aevum*, 22 (1953), 61-92; also C. P. Faust, *Sir Degare: a Study of the Texts and Narrative Structure* (Oxford, 1936); C. H. Slover, "*Sir Degarre*: a Study in a Medieval Hack Writer's Methods", *Texas Studies in English*, 11 (1931), 6-23. W. C. Stokoe, "The Double Problem of *Sir Degare*", *PMLA*, 70 (1955), 518-534, argues that some of the apparent confusion is due to the existence, hitherto unrecognised, of two separate recensions of the story, both textually corrupt.

³⁷ Ll. 3243-3256. Compare the battle-description in 16675-16686.

middle-class consumption. Chaucerian influence, which is explicit in *Partonope* and which extends also to other romances in rhyme-royal, such as *Generydes* and the *Romans of Partenay*, is the main factor in this revival, which precedes the major fifteenth century development, the shift to prose.

Investigation of the tradition of 'lyric romance', to which we now turn, must begin with *King Horn*, a unique early (c. 1240) survival in which we see the first germination of the form. The story, with its exile-and-return motif, is of great antiquity, perhaps a legendary outgrowth from the era of the Viking conquests, though any historical authenticity has been obscured by romantic accretions. The geography and place-names, for instance, are unrecognisable, and *Suddene*, Horn's native land, has been plausibly identified as Sussex, Cornwall, the Isle of Man and Roxburgh as well as with the land of *Suðdene* in *Beowulf*. The English poem is related to the French *Horn et Rimenhild*, probably by indirect derivation, though with drastic abridgement and some contamination, as in *Havelok*, from native tradition. The French romance is an amalgam of *geste* and *courtoisie*, with courtly love-scenes, tournaments and a rich and luxurious social setting, but in *Horn* the story is reduced to its bare essentials and the social background is non-courtly, though there is no sign of any deliberate attempt to present the story in terms of lower-class values, as there is in *Havelok*. In fact, despite the ultimate Anglo-Viking origin of the story and the occurrence of both poems in MS Laud 108, *Horn* needs to be carefully dissociated from *Havelok* and indeed from the whole 'Matter of England' group of epic romances, less for its differences of matter, which are considerable (love, trial and constancy are here as important as fighting) than for its complete difference of manner. *Horn* is the first narrative outgrowth from song or lay, and may be presumed to bear the same relation to pre-existent sung lay as the extant *contes* of Marie de France to the Breton *lais* which they claim as their source.³⁸ *Horn* is close to song:

Alle beon he bliþe
 Ðat to my song lype;
 A sang ihc schal zou singe
 Of Murry þe kinge;³⁹

³⁸ See W. H. French, *Essays on King Horn*, 1-19.

³⁹ Ll. 1-4. Quotation of *Horn* is from the Cambridge text, with numbering from the convenient synchronised system used in the *EETS* edition.

and the manner of the telling is ballad-like, with concentration on the dramatic moment, abrupt transitions, internally dependent repetition, and a cryptic allusiveness of episodic reference. There is little attempt at 'literary' or rational articulation of the narrative:

Pe word bigan to springe
 Pe woord bigan to springe
 Of Rymenhilde weddinge.
 Horn was in þe watere,
 Ne migte he come no latere.
 He let his schup stonde,
 And zede to londe. (1093-8)

These narrative techniques demand the heightened alertness of response which one associates with song, and often a subtlety, especially in the two scenes where Horn returns disguised to rescue his princess from unwelcome suitors,⁴⁰ that makes nonsense of the idea that a popular audience must of necessity be a crude one. The verse itself has the same breathless character, a pared-down economy of phrase in which the conventional formulae lie in embryo:

He was brigt so þe glas,
 He was whit so þe flur,
 Rose red was his colur, (14-16)

and a curt parenthetical indirection pregnant with meaning:

Murie lif he wroȝte:
 Rymenhild hit dere boȝte. (1491-92)

The couplet of *Horn* is a unique non-alliterative derivative from the alliterative first-half-line, blended with the French trimeter to give a standard line of three stresses, though two and four occur in special contexts.⁴¹ This development of alliterative verse is already well advanced in *Lazamon's Brut*, and *Horn* thus stands midway between *Lazamon*, the debt to whom is explicit in a number of borrowed phrases,⁴² and the later couplet. Whether it was so or not (i.e. in terms of lost literature), *Horn* seems to us of crucial importance, for it embodies, partly by derivation from *Lazamon*, a conventional technique and conventional phraseology in unalloyed form, like crude ore, from

⁴⁰ Ll. 1185-1298, 1577-1618.

⁴¹ This analysis is not unanimously accepted. See J. Schipper, *A History of English Versification* (Oxford, 1910), 79-84; *Horn*, ed. Hall, xlv-1; W. H. French, *op. cit.*, 23-113; H. S. West, *The Versification of King Horn* (Baltimore, 1907).

⁴² See, for example, the notes in Hall's edition of *Horn* to ll. 11, 411, 913, 1366.

which later romances such as *Guy* or *Richard* drew extensively.⁴³ Where they modify the metre of the oldest text, the two later manuscripts of *Horn* (Laud 108 and Harley 2253) always move towards four-stress regularity, but the clipped, short-breathed lines of the Cambridge *Horn*, with their sparse, abrupt syntax and lack of articulation, are the perfect complement of the narrative's lyric quality and may be considered a deliberate choice.

Sir Tristrem is the second link in the chain. Written about fifty years later than *Horn*, it is, with its rapid transitions, allusive episodes and cryptic, staccato narration, another attempt to adapt lay-type conventions to the conduct of a longer narrative. Features such as the prologue, with its graceful comparison of past and present with summer and winter, and the hunting-scene (474), with its technical account of the breaking of the deer where Tristrem reveals his breeding, presuppose a less popular audience, and there is a more sophisticated attempt to find a metrical alternative, more lyrical, more musical, more 'poetic', to the plain, pedestrian four-stress couplet by now firmly established for more prosaic narrative. The result is a difficult eleven-line stanza, ³ababababc¹ac, based on a three-stress line of the *Horn*-type, with a 'bob' embryonically suggestive of tail-rhyme. Unhappily, the stanza proves unsuited to narrative, and the whole poem, though thoughtful and carefully adapted to its audience,⁴⁴ lacks the vigour of *Horn*. There is a traditional association with Thomas of Erceldoune, a Scots poet of the late thirteenth century, but the extant *Tristrem* is probably a south-midland adaptation of a lost work by Erceldoune.⁴⁵ He and *Tristrem* are both mentioned, though not specifically associated, in a passage in Robert Manning's *Chronicle*,⁴⁶ which is very interesting for its contrast of Manning's own simple style and simple English with the artificial verse-forms and 'strange Inglis' of poets like Erceldoune and poems like *Tristrem*. Manning says that his own writing is intended to be clear and readily understood:

I mad noght for no disours,
Ne for no seggers ne harpours.

But others, out of vanity, write in such complicated schemes of 'ryme couwee or strangere or enterlace', and in such 'quaynte Inglis',

⁴³ See Hall's notes *passim*.

⁴⁴ There is a sympathetic reappraisal of *Tristrem* by T. C. Rumble in *Comparative Literature*, 11 (1959), 221-228.

⁴⁵ A southern provenance for *Tristrem* (which would associate it conveniently with *Horn*) is argued by B. Vogel in *JEGP*, 40 (1941), 538-544.

⁴⁶ Lines 71-128 in the edition of F. J. Furnivall in the Rolls series (London, 1887).

that people can neither understand their poems nor recite them without errors. Whatever the *Tristrem* referred to, there is here clear confirmation of a distinction between the four-stress couplet (which Manning himself uses), with its 'ordinary' English and prosaic quality, and stanzas of the tail-rhyme ('couwee') type, with their musical associations, archaic and strongly alliterative phraseology, and definitely 'poetic' quality.

The developed tail-rhyme stanza, in which the formal problems of lyric romance are resolved and into which virtually the whole tradition is channelled from 1300 to 1400, is of twelve lines, typically ⁴aab³ccb³dddb³eeb³. Whatever its origin,⁴⁷ it can be seen stylistically as an attempt to combine the clear articulation of the four-stress couplet with the musical and poetic quality of the native-based three-stress line.⁴⁸ There are differences of technique within the tail-rhyme tradition, but the basic stanza is one of alternate movement and rest, the pressing forward of the narrative in the couplet contrasting with the pause in the tail-line for descriptive arabesque, emotive comment, exclamation or other conventional formula. Later poets, such as the author of *Athelston*, often set their material in quite subtle tension against this formal structure, running on from tail to couplet, for instance, or using the tail for *sotto voce* comment.⁴⁹ The musical or poetic satisfaction of the stanza is at once in the variety provided by the contrast between couplet and tail, and in the unity of the fourfold tail-rhyme. The ever-present danger of the form is that the tail-line, whilst fulfilling its musical function, will become a meaningless tag and eventually drop off like a mortified limb. The tail-rhyme romances maintain their identity further through the use of an extensive and elaborate conventional phraseology, often strongly allite-

⁴⁷ It is usually assumed to be derived, through Anglo-Norman, from ecclesiastical sequences and responses. See Schipper, *op. cit.*, 296; M. Dominica Legge, *Anglo-Norman Literature and its Background* (Oxford, 1963), 250; A. McI. Trownce, in *Medium Aevum*, 2 (1933), 34-42.

⁴⁸ There seems to be something of this distribution in the *Brut*, where Laȝamon characteristically uses traditional formal alliterative verse for 'poetic' passages such as battle-pieces and sea-journeys and longer rhymed half-lines for more prosaic narrative. In Anglo-Norman, Nicole Bozon seems to have considered the couplet most suitable for narrative, and tail-rhyme stanza for "anything vaguely lyrical" (Legge, *op. cit.*, 231).

⁴⁹ This is the term used by A. McI. Trownce, whose study of the tail-rhyme romances (*Medium Aevum*, 1 (1932, 87-108, 168-182; 2 (1933), 34-57, 189-193; 3 (1934), 30-50) is full of valuable material, though his attempt to force all the romances into a strictly east-midland tradition is unnecessary and has brought his work into disfavour. See A. R. Dunlap, "The Vocabulary of the Middle English Romances in Tail-rhyme Stanza", *Delaware Notes* (1941); also G. Taylor, "Notes on *Athelston*", *Leeds Studies in English*, 4 (1935), 47-57.

rative and particularly heavily concentrated in the tail-line, which can thus become the poetic core of the stanza. The tradition is centred in the east-midlands but shifts northwards towards the end of the century, closely pursued by Chaucer's ridicule.

The first quarter of the century sees the establishment of the classical tradition of stanza technique and conventional idiom in the stanzaic *Guy* and *Reinbrun*, already mentioned, in *Horn Childe* and *Amis and Amiloun* (all are in the Auchinleck). *Horn Childe* is an independent reworking of the Horn-story, less primitive and more courtly in setting than *King Horn*, and closer to the French, though the pressure behind the native tradition is still strong enough for the story to throw out historical roots in the opening account of the heroic death of Horn's father Hapeolf at the hands of Irish raiders. This is a semi-historical north-eastern accretion to the story which has not been filtered through the French, and its spirit is stern, northern, unchivalric and powerfully authentic. Hapeolf's rallying call to his men,

He bad þe harpour leven his lay:
'For ous bihoveþ anoþer play', (157-158)

and his death, surrounded like a boar by the Irish dogs who, frightened to approach, stone him till his legs are 'broken—

He kneled atte last— (222)

are among the most stirring passages in English romance. Much of this spirit is lost when Horn leaves for the south and his more familiar adventures begin, and the rest of the romance is rather commonplace. *Amis and Amiloun* is a thoroughly conventional adaptation from the French, a fine romance, beautifully shaped to the idealised illustration of friendship but never burdened by its didactic theme. The tail-rhyme form fixes the romance-convention absolutely, so that, with never a suggestion that the laws of romance are going to be violated, the poem can afford considerable elaboration of the genuinely affective parts of the story. In other words, though the events of the story are wildly improbable by realistic standards, the formal tradition is strong enough to inhibit any appeal to such standards, strong enough furthermore to allow a broadening and deepening of the area of human response, within the romance-convention, which makes of *Amis* a genuinely poetic experience. The handling of the narrative line is typical of tail-rhyme, flowering at times into a lyrically free expansiveness, as in the talk of Amis's excellence, or the spring-scene, or the battle,⁵⁰

⁵⁰ *Amis*, 439-468, 529-540, 1297-1320.

where we feel we are at the very poetic heart of romance. At the climax of the narrative the poet passes out of the conventional phraseology into a pregnantly simple style which lies beyond art,⁵¹ though only made possible by art, that is, by the establishment of a conventionally valid poetic context in which such a situation can be invested with deep narrative significance. *Amis* has some claim to be regarded as the typically best English romance.

English composers were not slow to exploit the didactic possibilities opened up by *Guy* and *Amis*, and a group of midland and north-midland tail-rhyme romances, the *King of Tars*, *Le Bone Florence*, *Roland and Vernagu*, *Sir Amadas*, *Sir Cleges* and *Sir Gowther*,⁵² tap the rich vein of popular piety with varying degrees of success. The first two, both early (c. 1320), effectively combine a strong religious colouring with much traditional romance-material and a close adherence to classical tail-rhyme techniques. These romances are the bridge to the saint's legend, and contain much typically hagiographic material, such as the elementary exposition of Christian doctrine by the princess of Tars to her husband the Sultan, prior to his conversion.⁵³ A similar passage of exposition occurs in the roughly contemporary *Roland and Vernagu*,⁵⁴ which is included in this group because the chief motive in extracting it from the Latin chronicle of the pseudo-Turpin seems to have been pietistic. However, it is difficult to talk of motives with such a wretched piece of work. The handling of tail-rhyme is so crude and so feeble as to suggest that the form was, at the time of writing, still inchoate. *Amadas* and *Cleges* are somewhat later, short moral exempla with a homely bourgeois tone. Both derive from native folkloristic motifs, and both have to do with money, poverty and debts, and the practical rewards of virtue. *Amadas* exists in two redactions, of which the later (in the Ireland MS) is the closer to popular romance.⁵⁵ The romance-setting of *Cleges*, however (at the court of king Uther), is the merest gesture, the real centre of the story being in its folksy wisdom. *Gowther* claims to be a Breton lay but it is really a sensationalised

⁵¹ E.g. 2281-2292, 2311-2316.

⁵² The last three, which are later, are significantly grouped in Nat. Lib. Scot., Adv. 19.3.1, along with *Sir Isumbras*, which has close didactic affiliations.

⁵³ Lines 836-870. This passage was altogether too much for the scribe of the Vernon MS, who omits it entirely.

⁵⁴ Lines 677-790. *Vernagu* proves more stubborn than the Sultan.

⁵⁵ Two stanzas are added at the end, for instance, to show *Amadas* recovering his original lands and rewarding his faithful steward, an archetypal romance-motif (ed. Robson, st. 71-72).

version of the popular legend of Robert le Diable, the repentant warlock. The tone of the prologue is earnestly religious, but the poem as a whole is an unscrupulous and highly professional exploitation of popular piety, credulity and love of sensation. The tail-rhyme affiliations of *Cleges* and *Gowther*, both late fourteenth century, are lame and sporadic.⁵⁶

Meanwhile, the central tradition is embodied from 1340 onwards in a series of romances with a marked unity of plot-material, *Octavian*, *Athelston*, *Sir Isumbras*, *Sir Eglamour*, *Torrent of Portyngale* and *Sir Triamour*, all stories of rejection or exile, trial, constancy and reward. *Octavian* is the earliest and basic exemplar, a brisk and lively narrative, full of piety and pathos, with a humble gift for the dramatic realisation of the story which, anticipated in *Amis*, is one of the most striking achievements of later tail-rhyme romance. This is shown especially in the scenes describing prince Florent's life as a Paris butcher's adopted son, where there is not only development of the obvious comic line (e.g. 889) but also an effective presentation in terms of narrative of the real difference between knightly and bourgeois manners. These domestic scenes have a pungent authenticity which would have appealed strongly to an audience of lower bourgeois, and which fulfils, in however humble a way, the demand for 'some sort of substantial contents' which W. P. Ker saw as the necessary corollary of the development of romance.⁵⁷ There is another version of the Octavian-story, in an unusual tail-type stanza, ⁴aaab²ab². It is independently derived from the same original French source and is usually called the 'southern' *Octavian*, though it might be more convenient to call it. *Octovian*. This version is throughout cruder and more popular in appeal, and develops the comedy of social situation with less concern for its narrative point than for its farcical possibilities.

The quality of dramatic realisation discernible in *Octavian* is fully developed in *Athelston*, a strict, sober tale shaped by its English author to a serious moral and religious purpose. It is a story of treachery, false accusation, ordeal by fire and the vindication of innocence, told with a strong sense of physical, historical and political reality. The relationships of Church and State, the conflict of king and archbishop, the interdict, as well as the ordeal by fire and the messenger's journey

⁵⁶ One short-couplet piece, *Robert of Cicyle* (c. 1360), is closely associated with this group of tail-rhyme romances in theme, though it is doubtful whether it can be considered a romance itself.

⁵⁷ *Epic and Romance* (2nd ed., Oxford, 1908), 354.

to Canterbury, are all described with powerful authenticity, and the tiny sub-plot of the messenger (whose name is also Athelston) is like a counterpointing of common imperfect reality against the figuration of reality in the main romance-plot. The annexation of new areas of experience to tail-rhyme in *Athelston* is matched by deliberate and highly effective innovation within the form.⁵⁸

The other four romances in this group are composites of stock incidents, of the type that the professional romancer could turn out *ad libitum*. *Isumbras*, the legend of the man tried by Fate, has a strong religious colouring, like *Athelston* and the *Amadas*-group, as well as elements of prosaic realism which link it with *Octavian*.⁵⁹ Like many tail-rhyme romances of the mature tradition, it relies heavily on the carrying power of the tradition, beginning confidently and vigorously, only to decline as the narrative slips limply from the composer's grasp. *Sir Eglamour* is a mechanical shuffling-together of stock incidents, whisked vigorously and poured out at a pace that aims to provide little time for reflection on what rubbish it all is. Sheer multiplication of stimuli is the writer's recipe for success, and the existence of four manuscripts and five sixteenth century prints would seem to suggest that he knew what he was about. *Torrent* is, if such a thing can be conceived, a composite derivative of *Eglamour*, with further multiplication of stock incidents: where *Eglamour* had two giant-fights, *Torrent* has no less than five.⁶⁰ *Sir Triamour* is marked as late by a good deal of variation and transposition of the traditional tail-rhyme phraseology. The praise which this romance has received may be due in part to its inclusion of a faithful dog among its chief actors, but it is on the whole a skilful rehash of conventional motifs with a quite intricate plot. There may not be much interest in what is going on, but at least there is always something going on.

The late fourteenth century saw a revival of interest in the Breton lay, as the *Franklin's Tale* bears witness, and three romances claim Breton origin, *Emare*, the *Erl of Tolous* and *Sir Launfal*. Though all three share a mild refinement of tone which makes the claim not entirely pointless, only *Launfal* is authentic, *Emare* being a slight, trivial,

⁵⁸ See Trounce's edition of the romance, 57-59, 95-96, 104, 122. Trounce's observations on the tail-rhyme style are sometimes over-refined, but he does at least give it a chance.

⁵⁹ E.g. the description of ironsmithing, 397-432. *Isumbras*'s first 'trial' is to have his farm-buildings burnt and his beasts slain, 73-96. Cf. *Degrevevaunt*.

⁶⁰ *Torrent* comes down to us in a single late 15th century MS in a state of advanced textual corruption, which may help explain its incoherence. Like *Triamour*, the original romance would date from the early 15th century.

tinselly handling of the Constance-story and therefore associated with the *Octavian*-group, while the *Erl of Tolous* shows the growing taste of an audience surfeited with marvels for the potentially real and unmarvellous human situation, and thus represents a further stage in the growth of romance to accommodate some sort of 'substantial contents'. In *Launfal*, freely expanded by Thomas Chestre, who names himself in line 1039, from the earlier *Landeval*, the elements of fantasy and reality are held in uneasy suspension. Where earlier translators of Breton lays accepted the supernatural and irrational without question, Chestre makes a systematic attempt to obscure them with prosaic circumstance and rational motivation. The careful explanation of Launfal's poverty in relation to his disapproval of Guenevere's promiscuity, his polite fiction of a dying father, invented to save hurting Arthur's feelings when he leaves court, the embarrassed evasiveness of the mayor of Caerleon when Launfal asks for hospitality, the quiet irony later when Launfal's luck changes, all these and many other new touches show Chestre aware of simple dramatic interplay of character.⁶¹ But much is lost that is more traditionally 'romance': Tryamowr receives less emphasis as a faery mistress than as a rich patroness who will help Launfal out of a tricky financial situation, while the Guenevere of romance is sadly smeared in the final episode. Chestre is something of a hack, and his handling of stanza and descriptive formulae is often uncomfortable, in the manner of a writer working towards the lag-end of a tradition. He is generally credited with two other romances, *Octovian* and *Libeaus Desconus*, in addition to *Launfal*, on the principle that when a shadowy figure emerges from the mist, it is a pity not to load him with as much responsibility as we can.⁶² Such attributions, within a tradition so close-knit, are not susceptible of proof, though this one is plausible. *Libeaus Desconus* would be somewhat earlier (c. 1350) than the other two, a popular abridgement of some version of *Le Bel Inconnu* (the English title effectively conceals the derivation) by Renaud de Beaujeu. It is a good example of the way in which passionate erotic romance in French is emasculated into innocent knockabout in English. Metrically,

⁶¹ *Launfal*, 44-48, 70-72, 73-84, 109-120, 400-415. The long tournament and giant-fight (433-636) are both added by Chestre to make Launfal more 'substantial'.

⁶² The poems were first associated by G. Sarrazin in his edition of *Octavian* (pp. xxv-xxxi). See Dorothy Everett, "The Relationship of Chestre's *Launfal* and *Lybeaus Desconus*", *Medium Aevum*, 7 (1938), 29-49; M. Mills, "The Composition and Style of the 'Southern' *Octavian*, *Sir Launfal* and *Libeaus Desconus*", *Medium Aevum*, 31 (1962), 88-109.

it provides a link between *King Horn* and the *Degreveaunt*-group, having a tail-rhyme stanza based on three instead of four stresses.

The northward shift of tail-rhyme romance, which we have explained in terms of change of taste in the metropolis, is focussed in *Ipomadon*, a close translation of the late twelfth-century Anglo-Norman *Ipomedon* of Hue de Rotelande. There is little concession to popular taste here, for *Ipomadon* is courtly, witty, smooth, enormously leisurely, and technically highly gifted, and it opens up the tradition for a much more sophisticated audience. The heavy alliteration is a mark of the developing northern tradition, as are the freer handling of syntax and stanza and extensive non-popular vocabulary. These are the characteristics too of *Sir Degreveaunt*, the first of a group of three late fourteenth century romances in sixteen-line stanza, ³aaab²cccb²dddb²eeeb², in which the triplet and tail lines are derived from alliterative first and second half-lines respectively.⁶³ In *Degreveaunt* can be seen the fullest and most successful attempt to place romance in a dramatically realised social setting, to merge the traditional knight of romance with the knight of reality, for Sir Degreveaunt is not only a knight of the Round Table and companion of Percival and Gawain but also a Yorkshire country landowner with his estates, gamekeepers, letters demanding compensation and prosaic responsibilities worlds away from romantic chivalry. The story of his love-affair with Melidor is realised in the same manner, with scrupulously detailed accounts of the feast she prepares for him and the room she entertains him in.⁶⁴ There is exaggeration, of course, but there is also knowledge: upper-class life as described here is no idealised fantasy. The other two poems in this group, *Sir Perceval of Gales* and the *Avowyng of King Arther*, share this quality of vivid dramatic realisation, but on a more popular level. Both are technically skilled, with full development of the stanza-linking hinted at in *Degreveaunt*. *Perceval* is an effective and very amusing exploitation of the theme of the ill-bred hero, the son of Round Table knight who is brought up in the woods by his mother in ignorance of chivalry and knighthood, and of the impact of his rough-hewn heroism on the court of Arthur. The appeal of the situation is simple and obvious, simultaneously to the audience's vanity

⁶³ See the discussion of metre in Casson's edition of *Degreveaunt*, xxxi-xli, where further references are given.

⁶⁴ Ll. 1389-1520. *Degreveaunt* also states with bourgeois bluntness the need for strict pre-marital chastity (1533-1536), though 'bundling' is permissible (1557-1560).

(in that they recognise the breaches of decorum) and to the latent spirit of anti-chivalric mockery, but the poem has wit and skill. The episodic *Avowynge* is from still farther north, perhaps a little after 1400, and provides a link with the stricter Scots alliterative tradition of the fifteenth century.

Two vigorous offshoots of the *Ipomadon* tradition are the *Sege of Melayne* and *Rowlande and Ottuell*, the only effective treatments in English of the Matter of France. The choice of such material at a date when England must have been at war with France demonstrates the insatiability of appetite for new stories, but the theme is made palatable by a twist of patriotic feeling in which the *douseperes* become 'oure Cristen men'. The *Sege* is a splendidly stirring fragment which takes fire from the moment of Bishop Turpin's first appearance and thereafter maintains a stern, martial ardour (e.g. 1507-1512) which *Rowlande* lacks only by comparison.⁶⁵ The contribution of tail-rhyme tradition to the effectiveness of these two romances is best assessed by comparing the latter with the crude couplet *Otuel*, based on an identical source.⁶⁶ Where *Rowlande*, for instance, strives to subordinate detail to an overall narrative pattern, *Otuel* snatches at any sensational incident in order to exaggerate it, and where *Rowlande* can surround any situation with a rich accumulation of traditional detail, *Otuel* can only reel off statement after crude statement.⁶⁷ The two English versions of the Fierabras-story, *Sir Ferumbras* and the *Sowdone of Babylone*, also serve to throw into relief the accumulated strength of the tail-rhyme tradition, since both are late non-northern deviations from the tradition, the former in ballad-quatrain 'ab³ab³' and (from line 3411) six-line tail-rhyme stanza,⁶⁸ the latter in quatrain 'abab'. *Ferumbras* is metrically crude and shows little knowledge of traditional techniques or phraseology, though it is a faithful enough translation to convey something

⁶⁵ The prologue to *Rowlande*, for instance, with its talk of adventures, of 'gamen and gle', should be compared with the imperious demand for attention to history and bygone chivalry, 'ryghte lele trouthe', at the beginning of the *Sege*. The two romances are still likely to be by the same author, and both occur unique in the same MS. It is worth remarking that all the Matter of France romances occur unique.

⁶⁶ Ultimately, the French *Otinél*. There is a third version of the story in the 15th-century *Otuel and Roland*, in the Fillingham MS, which also contains a third version of *Firumbras*. Both are edited by Mary I. O'Sullivan, *EETS*, OS, 198 (1935).

⁶⁷ Compare *Rowlande*, 614-624, with *Otuel*, 641-642; 466-468 with 461-463; 172-174 with 167-168.

⁶⁸ Both metrical forms are disguised in the *EETS* print, as well as the enormous length of this romance, which in standard numbering runs to nearly 12,000 lines.

of the vigour and graphic detail of the original *chanson de geste*. The *Sowdone* follows a familiar pattern of popular abridgement and adaptation, but shows uncertainty of touch in introducing some peculiar passages of meretricious ornamentation, which may be sops thrown out to changing taste in the late century.⁶⁹

Before its degeneration in the Gawain-romances of the fifteenth century, the sophisticated northern alliterative tail-rhyme tradition threw off one poem which embodies all that is best in lyric romance. Though *Le Morte Arthur* is written in a difficult eight-line stanza, 'abababab, and not in tail-rhyme, it is deeply indebted to the tradition for its conventional techniques and heavily alliterative phraseology. There is fine response to the story, a knowledge of courteous and proper behaviour, little or no vulgarisation, and an elegiac quality which even Malory found hard to improve on.⁷⁰

It remains only to admit that new evidence, and further evaluation of the more neglected romances, may affect the details of this historical morphology of Middle English romance. There are many blurs in it, and many assertions which lack of space alone has caused me to leave unqualified. But the main lines of the scheme, particularly the general formal distinctions, though only tentatively sketched out here, have at least some objective basis, and may serve as scaffolding for others to build on.

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⁶⁹ E.g. a spring-prologue, 41-48; a spring-transition on love and valour, 963-978 (hinted in *Fierabras*); and an apostrophe by the Sultan to 'Mars Armypotente', 939-962 (cf. *Knight's Tale*, 1, 1982). Such passages could be 'Chaucerian' interpolations.

⁷⁰ For a full recognition of Malory's debt to *Le Morte Arthur*, see E. Talbot Donaldson, "Malory and the Stanzaic *Le Morte Arthur*", *SP*, 47 (1950), 460-472.

Malory's Tragic Knights

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WHILE the code of chivalry had by the late fifteenth century ceased to have any real military or political importance in England and although knighthood itself had become a faintly archaic social institution, to the literary men of the age chivalry was not yet wholly a lost cause, the "fragrance of an irretrievable past."¹ The popular writers of the fifteenth century—Stephen Hawes, Stephen Scrope, Sir Gilbert Hay, and, of course, Malory and Caxton—wrote or translated great numbers of books and tracts and pamphlets concerning the archaic practises of knightly warfare and behavior, books which while they reflect more accurately the desires of the Tudor family to "romanticize its British origins"² than to teach a living tradition of conduct, nevertheless attest to the popularity of courtly literature even a hundred years after the death of Chaucer.

Thus although the preceding century had witnessed both the demise of chivalry as an active military code and the beginning of its transformation, or really its sublimation, into a political ideal,³ it had not quite let go of the tradition of the military knight-errant and his role in society. The author of *Piers Plowman*, despite the patent "liberalism" of his political beliefs, holds to an ideal of knighthood as the agency of the crown entrusted with the defence of the realm and the "comune":

... the kynde is of a knyzt oper for a kynge to be take,
And among here enemys in mortels bateles
To be called and overcome, þe comune to defende. (C, XVIII, 289-91)

In spite of the fact that the "military function of the knight" had long since begun to give way to "his civil duties as a governor,"⁴ the author of *Piers Plowman* still thinks of the knighthood, as I expect did nearly all the "comune," "in its military, chivalric sense, without political connotation."⁵

¹ Arthur B. Ferguson, *The Indian Summer of English Chivalry* (Durham, 1960), xiv.

² *Ibid.*, 6.

³ Cf. Ferguson, 104 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 107.

⁵ E. Talbot Donaldson, *The C-Text and Its Poet* (New Haven, 1949), 92.

Thus in spite of the historical changes in the character and function of the knight "from medieval knight into... Tudor governor,"⁶ the popular ideal, what we would call I expect the "image," of the knight did not essentially change. And in an age of violent and upsetting transition like the fifteenth century, a time when men were being forced by events quite beyond their control out of the feudal and Catholic way of life and into Renaissance and Reformation, the literary portrait of the age of chivalry must have seemed to aristocrats like Malory to embody the very stability in standards and values which England most needed. The humiliating defeats in France and the chaos of the Wars of the Roses at home thus in time became the cause both of the "chivalric revival" of the fifteenth century, with its self-conscious and slightly decadent rituals, jousts, and tournaments, and also of its re-emphasizing in works such as Caxton's translation of *The Boke of the Ordre of Chyvalry*, the glorious history of monarchs like Edward III and Henry V and hence the standards and ideals to which living knights should attain as inheritors of that great tradition:

Oh ye knights of England, where is the custom and usage of noble chivalry that was used in those days? What do ye now but go to the bagnios and play at dice? And some not well advised use not honest and good rule against all order of knighthood. Leave this, leave it and read the noble volumes of the Holy Grail, of Launcelot, of Galahad, of Tristram, of Perseforest, of Percival, of Gawain, and many more. And look in later days of the noble acts since the conquest, as in the days of King Richard, Cœur de Lyon, Edward the First and Third and his noble sons.... Read Froissart. And also behold that victorious and noble king, Harry the Fifth, and the captains under him....⁷

It is thus a mistake to view Malory's *Morte Darthur* as simply a sentimental excursion into a long-dead past. To a degree, it is this, of course, but it is much more. It is certainly also a didactic work, a plea to the English knights of the fifteenth century to learn a great lesson from the past, to see in the internal struggle for power in Arthur's court a meaningful parallel to their own civil conflicts and to avoid the pitfalls of history by re-asserting the simple, practical code of conduct implicit in the high ideals of legendary chivalry:

... never to do outeage nothir morthir, and allwayes to fle treson, and to gyff mercy unto hym that askith mercy, uppon payne of forfiture [of their]

⁶ Ferguson, 106.

⁷ *The Boke of the Ordre of Chyvalry*, ed. A. T. P. Byles (Early English Text Society, O. S. No. 168, 1926), 122-3.

worship and lordship of kynge Arthure for evirmore; and allwayes to do ladyes, damsels, and jantilwomen and wydowes [socour:] strenghe hem in hir ryghtes, and never to enforce them uppon payne of dethe.⁸

But the *Morte Darthur* is also, and perhaps most importantly, a great literary tragedy. Observed apart from its historical relation to its age and seen in its own light and that of its purely literary tradition, Malory's book reflects, below and running counter to its historical, didactic surface, a deeply tragic sense of the inevitable failure of chivalry to attain the perfect state. It is to a degree true, of course, that Malory would have preferred it otherwise and that Vinaver and Ferguson are right in asserting that Malory did at times make an effort to remove from the book those attributes of the chivalric code—courtly love, religious mysticism, the “gently cynical realism”⁹ of Sir Dinadan—of which he personally disapproved and which he did not wish included in the code of behavior that he envisioned as proper for his kind of knight, the Tory military agrarian of the fifteenth century. But despite his strict notions of knightly propriety and his provincial English prejudices, Malory was in the end powerless to change the essential elements of the legend with which he was dealing. From the beginning, the book is larger than the man and the artist stronger than the reformer. Malory's conscious desire, apparent on nearly every page of his book, to bring some sort of unity out of the chaotically framed legend and to arrange the loosely bound episodes of his sources into a coherent and pointed structure clearly transcends whatever simple didactic message he may have wished to preach, and where artistry and the desire for reform conflict, as they occasionally do in the book, it is clear that Malory prefers a consistent tragic book to an ill-formed moral one.

Let me make perfectly clear exactly where such a view differs with the more traditional views of chivalry in the *Morte Darthur*. As I understand it, the usual line taken by literary and cultural historians—Vinaver, Ferguson, and P. E. Tucker, for example—maintains that Malory strongly advocated a highly practical and ethical chivalry far removed from the mystic and courtly code of his sources, whose main purpose had been “to serve as an expression of the thoughts and

⁸ *The Works of Sir Thomas Malory*, ed. Eugene Vinaver, 3 vols. paged consecutively (Oxford, 1947), 120. All page references in the text and notes are to this edition. This didactic point of view towards Malory's work is thoroughly explored by Ferguson, *op. cit.*, 42 ff.

⁹ Ferguson, 47.

emotions inspired by courtly idealism, to translate in terms of actions and characters the subtle varieties of courtly sentiment and the highly sophisticated code of courtly behavior."¹⁰ It is generally argued that Malory systematically removed from his sources all praise of those elements such as courtly love or Cistercian mysticism or the cynicism of Dinadan that he thought debilitating to knighthood as he conceived of it and that he, in order to point a moral for his own time, placed full blame for the tragedy of the Round Table on a "conflict of two loyalties, both deeply rooted in the medieval conception of knightly service: on the one hand, the heroic loyalty of man to man...; on the other, the blind devotion of the knight-lover to his lady...."¹¹ Thus it is said that Malory suddenly became aware of Lancelot his hero's inherent sinfulness halfway through the book¹² and that while he "does not condone the sin of Lancelot," yet Lancelot remains for him the "best of 'earthly sinful' men and his hero—a tragic hero, but one in whom the good greatly outweighed the bad."¹³

While I have possibly blurred the edges of the ethical, didactical really, approach to Malory by presenting it as a composite of the views of several critics, I have I hope nevertheless struck its central note—the essential practicality of Malory's approach to chivalry; "it is the chivalry strictly of an agrarian and military caste, and interpreted as far as possible in terms of realism and common sense."¹⁴ Yet tempting as this view is—especially since it presents ready-made for me such a beautifully defined "stage" in the development of literary knighthood—it contains an apparently insuperable paradox: how could a writer who set out certainly to praise, and perhaps even to revive, a dying chivalry have concluded by so effectively damning it; the chivalric ideal, as interpreted by Lancelot, admittedly Malory's hero, is clearly shown to be not only itself peculiarly open to the attacks of immorality, corruption, fraud, and treason, but singularly ineffective in warding off the ravages of these attacks. Vinaver and, to a degree, Tucker resolve this difficulty by affirming, on slim evidence, that Malory's concept and understanding of the story evolved as he wrote it, that he discovered more and more discordant elements in his sources as he progressed and so developed a *sens* to fit this new *matière*. But

¹⁰ Vinaver in *Works*, lxxv.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, lxxxii.

¹² P. E. Tucker, "Chivalry in the *Morte*," *Essays on Malory*, ed. J. A. W. Bennett (Oxford, 1963), 64-103.

¹³ Ferguson, 54.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 46-47.

such a theory does not of course adequately explain either the dour prophecies of the early books or the clear evidence that Malory had acquired considerable knowledge of his sources before he began his own work.¹⁵

I submit, on the principle of Occam's Razor, that it is easier to abandon this self-contradictory "didactic" view of the *Morte Darthur* and to substitute for it a genuinely "tragic" view of a unified *Morte* than to attempt to reconcile the "didactic" interpretation with Malory's text. Nor is there any great danger in advancing such an insistently literary approach to the book of "losing sight of Malory himself and, more particularly, of the larger characteristics of his thinking."¹⁶ For on our answer to the "literary" question of whether or not Malory did indeed wish to unify his work depends, initially, our view of Malory's intention in writing the book and, ultimately, our judgment of whether he was a rather simple-minded social reformer or an exceedingly gifted writer whose essentially tragic view of life moved him to re-create in one sustained narrative the passage of a civilization from beginning to end, from its hopeful and innocent youth to its tragic decay and destruction.

I have said elsewhere that I believe that Malory attempted the latter of these courses, that his book everywhere reveals a single great theme—the rise, flowering, decay, and fall of a well-nigh perfect earthly civilization—and that in order to communicate this theme he drew from the tangled mazes of undirected incident that made up his immediate sources three clear narrative lines—the feud of the houses of Lot and Pellinore, the Grail quest, and the adultery of Lancelot and Guinevere—all of which involved the same characters and chronology and so became for Malory the means by which he could give unity and focus to the legend. It is thus of vital importance in any consideration of the *Morte Darthur* to consider the nature of these three strong narrative cables since they by controlling and giving focus to Malory's structural design also determine the tone of the work.

Taken separately, the three narratives are superficially unlike; a tale of a family blood-feud, a semi-mystical religious tract, and a romance of lovers' intrigue would not seem to be suited for inclusion in the same library, much less the same work. Yet despite these obvious differences in subject—and we should remember that it is these differences which account for the immense variety of incident and

¹⁵ Cf. R. H. Wilson, "Malory's Early Knowledge of Arthurian Romance," *University of Texas Studies in English*, XXX (1951), 1-23.

¹⁶ Ferguson, 42.

character in the *Morte Darthur*—Malory's three strains have at least two important characteristics, as well as characters, in common. First, each of the three deals with one of the essential aspects of chivalric knighthood—loyalty, piety, and love—qualities which mark the three decisive stages in the development of the historical knight: the feudal vassal, the crusading soldier, and the courtly lover. And this is a fact, I think, of the greatest importance to anyone studying the *Morte Darthur*. For I am convinced that Malory's decision to unify the structure of his book through a concentration on these particular narrative strains was based neither on the arrangement of his sources nor on chance, but on the discovery that each of these narrative lines expressed one vital aspect of his overall theme, each contributed its part to the definition of the chivalric life with which the book is centrally concerned. By means of Malory's structural revisions, we are permitted to see the face of the knight in each of his traditional historical and literary roles, as soldier, as Christian, and as lover.

But the second quality which these three plot lines share must be seen to qualify the first. Each of the three great movements of the book—the Lot-Pellinore feud, the Grail quest, and the Lancelot-Guinevere intrigue—begins in a happy dawn of naive innocence and hope, but ends in dissolution, decay, and tragedy. The quarrel between the families of King Lot and King Pellinore is in the beginning exactly that—a family quarrel—but in time comes to involve the whole court and to split the Round Table into a Gawain faction and a Lancelot faction. The Grail quest begins in rapture and vision, but in time, as the King foresees, debilitates the strength of the Round Table and destroys the unity of the kingdom. Our first view of Lancelot the lover is of a rather grave, idealistic young man sending as trophies to the Queen those knights he has overcome, completely unaware of the effect that his later attachment to Guinevere will have on the court.

The central theme to which these narrative lines point and which they emphasize is thus not simply the nature of chivalry, but more exactly the *tragic* nature of the Round Table civilization and hence of the courtly life. There would be little point, of course, in attempting to establish precisely what definitions of tragedy can be linked historically and externally to Malory and thus to the *Morte Darthur*. Almost certainly Malory thought of tragedy, if indeed he ever attempted a definition, only in the familiar medieval terms of the arbitrary wheel-spinning of Dame Fortune, whose dictates caused even the most deserving of heroes to be cast down by the sheer chance of events and through no fault of their own.

But the image and doctrine of Fortune's wheel was even among the

pagans who invented it at best a makeshift attempt to explain, or at least to describe, the irrational play of chance in the life of man, and although Boethius and the Fathers converted the pagan belief in chance to Christian use by assigning to Fortune the role of God's unwitting handmaiden, the doctrine continued to be more descriptive than explanatory and hence, because it did not adequately explain the human predicament, never really became, no matter how carefully argued, a satisfactory, or even a possible, basis for tragedy. Chaucer's Monk, for example, having carefully explained the theory of how all men are fated to fall from high to low estate "whan that Fortune list to flee," proceeds in his seventeen instances of the untrustworthy nature of the false felicity of earthly glory to describe what are actually seventeen examples of the way in which pride of place or of intellect, sheer foolhardy *hubris*, leads to a fall from station. Lucifer, the Monk tells us, fell "for his synne," Adam "for mysgoveraunce," Samson "for wommen," and so on through the list. The tragedy of Grettir in the *Grettirsaga*, though attributed by everyone in the book to his "luck," actually results from *hubris*, from his insistence on matching his unusual, though merely human strength with that of the ghost of Glam, who curses his presumption. And, to come forward a bit in time, despite Shakespeare's proclamation that Romeo and Juliet are "star-crossed lovers," their tragedy is more directly attributable to Romeo's cocky rashness than to the inevitable workings of Fate. In short, medieval tragedy, no matter how it was explained, actually demonstrated that false felicity led inevitably to spiritual blindness and that the resultant *hubris*, not the initial "luck," was in effect the cause of the hero's downfall.

Thus, despite the single appearance of the wheel of Fortune in the *Morte Darthur* (1233),¹⁷ the strongly articulated element of Fate in Book I, and Malory's own beliefs, whatever they may have been, about the nature of tragedy, we cannot dismiss the *Morte Darthur*, or any other tragedy for that matter, as simply a tragedy of Fate. I have attempted elsewhere, moreover, to define the tragedy of the fall of Arthur's court in somewhat Aristotelian terms, as a self-ordained tragedy precipitated by the *hamartiai* of the court— by Lancelot's instability, Arthur's dogged blindness, the queen's lechery, Gawain's unreasoning temper. Yet this analysis is perhaps also more descriptive than explanatory, and we are left feeling, as I think we feel after reading the *Poetics*, that while Aristotle has caught brilliantly the

¹⁷ Vinaver remarks (1606) on "how little he [Malory] made . . . of the Wheel of Fortune."

pattern and movements of the tragedies, there are yet depths to be plumbed, even though in the end the essence, the final cause, will elude us.

Thus, although the Aristotelian dicta can help to explain much of the *Morte Darthur*, there is still much about the book that they do not explain, principally its conclusion. For it is the point of Aristotelian tragedy that it ends in a kind of moral victory by means of which the base emotions of pity and fear, having been aroused by the initial action, are purged. Lear, stripped of kingship and power, reaches in his poverty and degradation a nobility of spirit far surpassing his former temporal majesty. *Œdipus*, once blinded by pride, comes to understand himself, his strength and vices alike, as he truly is, and having in *Œdipus at Colonnus* resisted all the temptations he had once been prey to, is assumed into the company of gods.

The *Morte Darthur* fails precisely here. The heroes fall, but they fall in ignorance, and the "dolorous death and departing" of the great court is accompanied by no upsurge of spirit and by no illumination of self. Guinevere takes the veil and Lancelot dies in orders, but these are the expedients of the times; and their final interview is filled only with regrets for the past, not with the vision of a new life :

And they departed; but there was never so harde an herted man but he wold have wepte to see the dolour that they made, for there was lamentacyon as they had been stungyn wyth sperys, and many tymes they swouned. And the ladyes bare the quene to hir chambre.

And syr Launcelot awok, and went and took his hors, and rode al that day and al nyght in a forest, wepyng (1253-54).

Gawain's dying letter to Lancelot is filled with remorse that he "suogthe [Lancelot's] dethe, and nat thorow [Lancelot's] deservynge, but [his] owne sekyng" (1231). Ector's great eulogy looks backward to the youthful triumphs of Lancelot and praises only those qualities — his prowess, his love of the queen, his chivalry — which destroyed him; we are never convinced that his last holy days brought him either peace or self-knowledge, only a "broken slepe" in which he saw himself "lyeing groveling on the tombe of kyng Arthur and quene Guenever, and there was no comferte that the Bysshop, nor syr Bors, nor none of his felowes coude make hym, it avaylled not" (1257). And Arthur, whose vision and energy and whose sins had framed the new chivalry, dies disillusioned and haunted by failure. "Comferte thyselff, ...and do as well as thou mayste, for in me ys no truste for to truste in" (1240), he says at the last to Bedivere, and though in Tennyson he goes on to prophesy a new and better world, in Malory he sees only the total destruction of his own order.

No one in the *Morte Darthur*, except Bors, really comes, like Ædipus and Lear, to know himself and therein lies a tragedy deeper than that defined by Aristotle. The folly of the court, predicated by Merlin and foreshadowed in Balin, persists to the end. Granted that the chivalric code by which the knights live is itself shot through with contradictions—that they must swear to respect and protect women in a society which regularly indulges in the practises of courtly love, that they go off to search for the Grail armed as if for battle, that they plot against a king to whom they yearly pledge fealty—they fail ever to rise above the code, to examine it and themselves in the light of its obvious failures and so they perish clutching to a way of life, to a system that they can no longer bend to meet events and that has failed to provide its promised ends. In modern philosophical terms the knights have placed “essences,” theoretical standards of behavior, before the facts of “existence.” The Grail quest, though thoroughly in the spirit of chivalry’s view of itself, was from its hasty inception an impossible presumption for everyone except the Grail knights; the intrigue of Lancelot and Guinevere, though conducted according to the rules of *fin amor*, could not continue unnoticed and without consequence; the brutal feud of the houses of Lot and Pellinore, though proceeding from the most respected motives, was certain to erupt eventually into civil war. As with Milton’s Eve, at whom every reader wants to scream, “Look, woman; can’t you see that’s a *snake*,” we see what the knights cannot, the folly of the code by which they live and their own folly in adhering to it. Only Bors, who rejects totally the standards of chivalric behavior, refusing to take up arms even to defend his brother, achieves self-knowledge and so becomes Lancelot’s most trusted, though ironically his most unheeded, advisor.

Thus is the end, the failure of the knights lies not so much in their code as in their failure, seen in their thoughts even after Salisbury, to examine themselves and the institutions by which they live and to transcend the destruction of Arthur’s kingdom. Unlike Ædipus, unlike even Hamlet who is trapped in the meshes of his perpetual self-examination, the knights go bitterly to their deaths, relentlessly whoring after strange gods.

One cannot finally say to what degree this tragic concept of knight-hood is Malory’s own and how much of it is simply inherent in the legend as he received it from his sources. That the tragic fall of the court is implicit in all forms of the story from Geoffrey of Monmouth onwards is of course obvious, though it is largely ignored in most of the early French romances. But though the last events are dutifully recorded in Malory’s sources for these last books, the English stanzaic

Le Morte Arthure and the Vulgate *Mort Artu*, they are never given the precise emphasis that Malory gives them, chiefly through the reactions of the great knights and ladies to the tragedy that confronts them. As Vinaver concludes, after an analysis of those passages in these final pages that have no source, "having transferred the tragedy of Arthurian knighthood to [an] essentially human plane, Malory could only make it convincing by emphasizing those emotions which, in his conception, had brought it about — the passionate feudal loyalty of man to man [seen in the Lot-Pellinore feud] and the self-denying devotion of the knight-lover to his lady [seen in the Lancelot-Guinevere intrigue]"¹⁸ to which I should add the devotion of the court to an unattainable religious ideal, the Grail quest. Thus Malory adds Gawain's letter, Arthur's final bitter statement that "truste" is gone, Ector's lament — those passages that define the "essentially human plane" on which he is working and so best illustrate the human blindness and tragedy, unrelieved by any sort of spiritual triumph, that mark the ending of the *Morte Darthur*.

I realize, of course, that I have emerged with, of all things, an "existential Malory," and it might be argued, quite convincingly I suppose, that I am reading a great deal into Malory by assigning to him a theory of tragedy he could not possibly have held. But I do not believe that I am therefore, human nature being what it is, misreading the *Morte Darthur*. For the book does end in despair and with the burial of the chivalric ideal. Malory, to return for a moment to the didactic view of the book, may very well be warning his contemporaries against the excesses of chivalry; he may even, as Caxton thought, be lamenting the tragedy of its fall; but he is not in the "hoole book" either defending it or attempting to revive it as a panacea for his own troubled times. In Malory, the knight perishes by his own hand, to be revived briefly, though only as a shadow, in Spenser's allegorical figures and finally to become in Sir Toby Belch and Sir Andrew Aguecheek the property of groundlings.

From Roland to Lancelot is a long journey indeed, but in spite of the many by-paths, the down-sloping road between them may be mapped with fair accuracy. As the knight, like the court he represents, becomes more sophisticated, he becomes more complex, more a creature of the fallen world of mixed good and evil. Roland is in a sense the Adam of knighthood; his primitive simplicity and innocence are the signs of and the protectors of a virtue uncomplicated by mixed motives and values. "Païen unt tort e chrestiens unt dreit" says the

¹⁸ *Works*, p. 1607.

author of *La Chanson de Roland*, and the reader is expected to approve that statement without either hesitation or reservation.

Lancelot stands at the opposite pole; every statement of his greatness must be hedged round with qualifications:

'Sir, I say you sothe,' seyde the damesell, 'for ye were thys day in the morne the best knyght of the worlde. But who sholde sey so now, he sholde be a lyer, for there ys now one bettir than ye be, and well hit ys preved by the adventure of the swerde whereto ye durst nat sette to your honde. And that ys the change of youre name and levyng. Wherefore I make unto you a remembraunce that ye shall nat wene frome hensforthe that ye be the best knyght of the worlde.' (863)

And even Sir Ector's funeral lament reveals by implication Lancelot's imperfections by calling him "the trewest lover of a synful man that ever loved woman" (1259).

At the risk of over-simplification, then, it makes considerable sense to say that in moving from Roland to Lancelot, we have moved from success to failure, from heroic comedy to tragedy, and that Chrétien, the Gawain poet, and Chaucer profess attitudes somewhere in between the two extremes. Yvain and Erec learn through suffering and so make their knighthood both meaningful and worthwhile; Gawain in the English romance himself recognizes the tragic dualism of knighthood, but cannot communicate it to the court; Chaucer's knights transform the very basis of knighthood by turning pride into humility and so adjust themselves to a new age and society.

But Malory's Lancelot can do none of these things and so his tragedy and that of the court becomes for the first time in literature tragic as well as inevitable:

My synne and my wyckedness hath brought me unto grete dishonoure! For whan I sought worldly adventures for worldely desyres I ever encheved them and had the bettir in every place, and never was I discomfite in no quarell, were hit ryght were hit wronge. And now I take uppon me the adventures to seke of holy thynges, now I se and undirstonde that myne olde synne hyndryth me and shamyth me, that I had no power to stirre nother speke whan the holy bloode appered before me. (896)

At the end of the Grail quest, Galahad bids Bors, who unlike Lancelot has renounced chivalry in order to achieve salvation, to "salew me unto my lorde sir Launcelot, my fadir, and as sone as ye se hym bydde hym remembir of this worlde unstable" (1035). It is the tragedy of Lancelot, and of the chivalry of the Round Table, that they are forever committed to "this worlde unstable."

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“Sir Isumbras” and the Legend of Saint Eustace

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WILLIAM OF NASSINGTON about 1350 prefaced his translation of the *Speculum vitae* with a condemnation of two popular romances. His work is for the sake of the soul, he says, and intends to make no

veyn carpyng
Of dethes of armes, ne of amours,
As doth menstral and jestours,
That maketh carpyng in many place
Of Octovyane and Ysambrace.¹

His words echo an earlier appeal in the *Cursor Mundi*, which states that those romances men ‘yearn to hear’—including *Octavian* and *Sir Isumbras*—have captured too well the ears of a foolish audience.² Such condemnation of secular works, in fact, occurs so frequently throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in vernacular religious works that it could almost be considered a commonplace.

That this commonplace in the fourteenth century should twice include the Middle English romance, *Sir Isumbras*, is ironical, since the work seems to have been based upon the life of Saint Eustace as represented by many religious documents, e.g., martyrologies, legendaries, and homiletic collections. The legend of Saint Eustace circulated in England at least from Aelfric’s time. His Anglo-Saxon translation, ca. 995, of a Latin *vita* is the earliest vernacular version of the legend extant in the West. Like most later vernacular versions Aelfric’s text shows much more popularization and narrative skill than the closest Latin analogues.³ I have found thirty manuscripts containing a life of

¹ John of Waldby, *Speculum vitae*, trans. William of Nassington. Nassington’s introduction is published from Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Hatton 18 by J. O. Halliwell, ed., *The Thornton Romances*. Camden Society 30 (London, 1844), xx.

² *Cursor Mundi*, ed. R. Morris. E. E. T. S., O. S. 57 (London, 1874), 9.

³ Aelfric of Winchester, *Metrical Lives of the Saints*, ed. W. Skeat. E. E. T. S., O. S. 114 (London, 1900), 191-218. The closest extant analogue is found in Paris, Bibl. Nat. MS lat. 5577 (ninth century, prose), ed. Jessie Murray with two related texts from London, British Museum MS Arundel 91 (Latin, twelfth century) and Paris, Bibl. Nat. MS fr. 2464 (thirteenth century) in *La Vie de Saint Eustace* (Paris, 1929). In his attempt to render the

Saint Eustace in English; they date from Aelfric's eleventh-century manuscript to a sixteenth-century collection which contains a very different life of Saint Eustace among items dealing largely with chivalry (London, Lambeth 306). Of these thirty Old and Middle English lives there are four distinct versions in verse and four in prose. Old French offers a comparable number of extant texts. Approximately thirty date from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries: eleven distinct versions are in verse and four in prose. All show considerable variety of treatment and many go a long way toward being a *roman* in the secular sense. *Le Roman de Placidus*, for example, begins with the usual invocation of a *jongleur* and continues in the appropriate meter and style.⁴ At least one English version of the legend opens with the same device.⁵ Thus, the legend of Saint Eustace was widely circulated and seems to have been acceptable to the Church even in its most popular redactions. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the same story transferred to secular literature received special ecclesiastical condemnation.

How close the relation is between the legend and the romance is the

Latin *vita* into terms and situations comprehensible to his Anglo-Saxon audience Aelfric changes it considerably. Eustace, for example, is described as an *ealdor-man* (the Latin is *magister militum*). Aelfric, moreover, emphasises the element of *fore-stihtung* or God's foreordination in the story, and it is obvious that his treatment of it comes close to the Anglo-Saxon concept of *wyrd*. Aelfric's descriptive passages are much more graphic than his sources: Eustace's good works are 'covered over with the shadows of heathen idol-worship' or Eustace compares himself to a once beautiful tree adorned with fruits but now reduced to a twig buffeted on all sides. For the latter passage B. N. MS lat. 5577 simply reads "*Heu mihi quondam pollentem ut arborem, modo vero nudatus sum*" (cf. also *AA. SS. Boll.*, Sept. VI, 128). Aelfric's treatment of the legend is particularly important for this study, since it illustrates the first step in the transition from *vita* to romance.

⁴ This late thirteenth-century legend has been edited by A. C. Ott, "Das altfranzösische Eustachiusleben der Pariser Handschrift Nat.-Bibl. fr. 1374," *Romanische Forschungen*, 32 (1913), 481-607. Cf. also London, British Museum MS Egerton 1066, an early thirteenth-century fragment in Anglo-Norman, which similarly shows technical influences from the *chansons de geste*: ed. P. Meyer, "Fragment d'une vie de S. Eustache," *Romania*, 36 (1907), 12-28.

⁵ Oxford, Bodleian Library, Digby 86 (S. C. 1687); the manuscript contains Anglo-Norman and Middle English religious pieces. The invocation to the life of Saint Eustace begins:

Alle that lovieth godes lore,
Olde and zonge, lasse and more,
Lestneth here stounde
Of a kniȝt of hethenesse,
Thar levede mucche in herthe blisse,
Of gold and penewes rounde.

Ed. Carl Horstmann, *Altenglische Legenden, Neue Folge* (Heilbronn, 1881), 211-219; the date is ca. 1290.

subject of this study. How the author of *Sir Isumbras* further utilized his matter to suit his *genre* illustrates well those affinities between hagiography and medieval romance—an association long recognized but seldom examined in detail.

The *vita* for Saint Eustace as published in the *Acta sanctorum* for September 20th will serve as the starting point of this study.⁶ That *vita* accords with the basic structure of most other versions in Latin, Greek, and the vernaculars, even though these may vary considerably in detail. The story is briefly as follows.

A Roman knight named Placidus is *magister militum* to the Emperor Trajan at the beginning of the second century A. D. He excels in works of justice and charity. For this reason the Lord takes pity on him and offers Placidus a chance for salvation and martyrdom. While out hunting with his men on a certain day Placidus sees an extraordinary stag and resolves to follow it. The animal lures him away to an isolated spot, then suddenly turns and looks down upon him from a Craig. Light streams from a cross between its horns, in the midst of which appears the figure of Christ. The stag speaks and explains to Placidus the rewards of Christianity. Shortly thereafter Placidus is baptized with his wife, Theopistis, and his two sons, Theopistus and Agapetus; he takes the name 'Eustace'. A second meeting with the stag reveals that Eustace is to suffer extreme deprivation in order to render him worthy of the heavenly kingdom. It now remains for him to choose between immediate or future tribulation. Eustace chooses immediate trial and prays for the strength to sustain it. Accordingly his tribulations commence at once. His slaves and livestock are lost through disease, his possessions by theft. In shame he is forced to flee with his family to Egypt. At the sea shore a shipmaster demands Theopistis in lieu of the fare Eustace cannot pay. Reluctantly Eustace leaves his wife and proceeds to Egypt with the children. As he carries one son across a stream, a lion seizes the child left on the bank. In an attempt to rescue him, Eustace loses the other to a wolf. His tribulations continue for fifteen years as he labors in the fields near Badissus. Meanwhile the boundaries of the Roman Empire are being invaded

⁶ *AA. SS. Boll.*, Sept. VI (Paris, 1867), 123-135. Similar *vitae* are published in Bonius Mombritius, *Sanctuarium seu vitae sanctorum* (Paris, 1910), I, 262-266, and F. Combefis, *Illustrium Christi martyrum lecti triumphii* (Paris, 1660), 1-44. Combefis' text is reproduced in Migne, PG 105, 373-418. A related version, important in the tradition of the Saint Eustace legend, is by Simeon Metaphrastes (ca. 960), ed. G. Van Hooff, *Analecta Bollandiana*, 3 (1884), 66-112. An influential Latin life nearly contemporary with *Sir Isumbras* is that in James of Voragine's *Legenda aurea*, T. Graesse, 2nd ed. (Leipzig, 1850), 712-718.

by barbarian hordes. Trajan instigates a search for his *magister militum*. At length Eustace is found and reinstated at the head of an army. Leading the army across the Hydaspes River he arrives in the country where, unknown to him, the shipmaster had brought Theopistis and left her heir to his property. Eustace's army encamps near her house. In her garden she overhears two of the soldiers discussing their childhood: they had both been separated from their parents, rescued from wild beasts, and raised by foster-parents. Recognition then follows between the brothers and their mother. The next day Theopistis goes to the *magister* of the army to request, as a Roman citizen, to be allowed to return to Rome. She recognizes him as her husband and informs him the sons are alive. The reunited family returns to Rome, but there the benevolent Trajan has been succeeded by Hadrian. Eustace refuses to sacrifice to the gods during victory celebrations and he and his family are burned in a brass bull. Their bodies miraculously remain intact, a testimony of their sanctity.⁷

Basic agreement between the *vita* and the romance of *Sir Isumbras* is striking. All nine extant manuscripts and the three printed versions of this romance offer the same general story.⁸ Sir Isumbras is a Christian knight, courteous, generous, and devoted to his wife and three sons. He is, however, heedless of the word of God. The Lord appears to him as a nightingale while he hunts in the woods. The

⁷ It is not the purpose of this study to investigate the sources for the narrative just outlined, even though many elements of the Eustace legend may have come from secular sources which also influenced parallel romances. For an analysis of such sources see Hippolyte Delehaye, "La Légende de saint Eustache," *Bulletin de l'Académie Royale de Belgique* 4 (1919), 175-210; G. H. Gerould, "The Eustace Legend, Fore-runners, Congeners, and Derivatives," *PMLA*, 19 (1904) 335-448, and A. Monteverdi, "I testi della leggenda di S. Eustachio," *Studi Medievali*, 3 (1910), 169-226; 392-498.

⁸ The edition cited throughout this study is that published by J. Zupitza and G. Schleich in *Palaestra*, 15 (1901), 1-128. Suggested emendations have been incorporated from F. Holthausen's review of the same in *Literaturblatt für germanische und romanische Philologie*, 23 (1903), 18. Because of important variant readings a list of *sigla* will be necessary: G: London, Gray's Inn 20 (ca. 1350); C: Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College 175. A, IX (second half of fourteenth century); T: Lincoln Cathedral, Thornton A, 5, 2 (ca. 1440); L: London, British Museum, Cotton Caligula A II (first half of fifteenth century); A: Oxford, Bodleian Library, Ashmole 61 (S. C. 6922) (ca. 1470); E: Edinburgh, Advocates Library 19, 3, 1 (second half of fourteenth century); N: Naples, Royal Library, xiii, B. 29 (1457); U: Oxford, University College 142 (second half of fifteenth century); D: London, British Museum, Douce 261 (1564); c: London, British Museum, *Syr Isenbras*, printed by William Copland (London, 1550?); d: Oxford, Douce Fragments, 78, printed from a press other than Copland's (sixteenth century); and m: Oxford, Bodleian Library, Malone 941, printed fragment (sixteenth century).

bird says that Isumbras must do penance for his neglect and his "pride of gold and fee", but he may choose to undergo the trial in youth or in old age. Isumbras chooses as did Placidus: he is better able to bear hardship while young, he states. His trial accordingly begins at once. After loss of possessions and livestock by natural forces (fire and plague), two of Isumbras' three sons are taken by a wolf and lion. He, his wife, and remaining son arrive at the seashore where a Saracen fleet has just arrived with the intention of invading the country. Coveting Isumbras' wife for her great beauty, the sultan "captain" in charge forces Isumbras to accept a payment of gold coins wrapped in his own red cloak. The wife is sent back to the sultan's kingdom in one of his ships and Isumbras is left alone on the shore with his remaining son. Soon afterward the son is carried off by a unicorn. In attempting to rescue the child Isumbras sees an eagle fly off with his red cloak and with it the sultan's payment of gold coins. Isumbras, now alone and destitute, endures hard labor in a mine for seven years. For another seven he wanders about as a palmer. At the end of fourteen years he arrives in the country where his wife has inherited the sultan's kingdom. Isumbras is taken into her service. He later discovers his cloak and gold coins in an eagle's nest, and these lead to recognition between himself and his wife. During a desperate battle against the Saracens, whom Isumbras is determined to convert to Christianity, the three sons come riding up as armed knights upon the three animals which had stolen them as children. Through their help Isumbras overcomes the Saracens and the family is joyfully reunited during the victory celebrations.

Essential differences between the life of Saint Eustace and the romance are determined by the fact that Isumbras is depicted as already Christian. He therefore suffers because of his sins, not because he may thereby acquire martyrdom. Isumbras is not martyred but allowed to live in happiness and prosperity once his trial or penance is over. His final victory is therefore translated from spiritual to temporal terms. Both versions of the story will now be considered more fully.

As a romance *Sir Isumbras* is related to a group of early fourteenth-century, tail-rhyme romances. They were produced in the East Midlands, probably in the vicinity of Norfolk. The earliest products of this school are found in Edinburgh, MS Auchinleck, ca. 1330. They are *Horn Childe*, *Reinburn*, *Roland and Vernagu*, *Amis and Amiloun*, and *The King of Tars*.⁹ The romance of *Sir Isumbras* is not contained

⁹ Connected with the idea that the tail-rhyme romances were produced by an East Midlands 'school' is the evidence presented for the commercial origin of Edinburgh,

in the manuscript, but is found in the next collection produced by the school, Edinburgh, Advocates Library MS 19. 31; also in the manuscript are *Sir Gowther* and *Sir Amadas*.¹⁰ Most of the romances contained in these and other manuscripts are related in three ways. They are technically linked through the tail-rhyme stanza (whether six, twelve, or sixteen lines), through such rhyming devices as assonance of nasals and dentals, through similar vocabulary, and through repeated phrases which could be called formulas.¹¹ They are also, for the most part, related in dialect.¹² Finally, they are related thematically: most fall within the "Eustace-Constance-Florence-Griselda" group first described by Wells.¹³ They either tell the story of the "Man Tried by Fate" or its feminine counterpart, "The Calumniated Wife". Certain romances in the group embody some elements from the Eustace legend either independently or through *Isumbras*. In none, however, is the legend of Saint Eustace represented so clearly or consistently as in *Isumbras*. In order to see how this is so, it would be well at this point to compare *Isumbras* briefly with other romances of the tail-rhyme group which are based upon the theme of the "Man Tried by Fate".

Sir Triamour is the only example of the "Calumniated Wife" (or "Constance") theme occurring singly. A queen is falsely accused of adultery. She is driven into the woods where she gives birth to Triamour. After twelve years the family is brought together by a

Advocates' Library, MS Auchinleck: see Laura Hibbard Loomis, "The Auchinleck 'Roland and Vernagu' and the 'Short Chronicle,'" *MLN*, 60 (1945), 94-97, and Ronald N. Walpole, "Stanzas 26 and 27 of the Middle English Romance, 'Roland and Vernagu,'" *Medium Ævum*, 20 (1951), 40-47.

¹⁰ For a description of the manuscript and its contents see A. McI. Trownce, "English Tail-Rhyme Romances," *MA*, 1 (1932), 94; Trownce dates it mid-fourteenth century, although Zupitza and Schleich assign it to the mid-fifteenth in their edition of *Isumbras*.

¹¹ The best summary of the technique is by A. McI. Trownce in his edition of *Athelston*. Publications of the Philological Society 11 (Oxford, 1933), introd., see especially 52-55; cf. also his "English Tail-Rhyme Romances," *MA*, 3 (1934), 36-38.

¹² In *Sir Isumbras* occur at least two dialect expressions from the Northeast Midlands, the center of the tail-rhyme 'school'. These are "his eghne stode one strowte", 620, and "crokede stede", 614: noted by Trownce, "English Tail-Rhyme Romances," *MA*, 3 (1934), 38. Topical references (stanzas xxxiv-v) suggest familiarity with iron mines; the most famous of such mines in medieval England was near the northern border of Northamptonshire. See Louis F. Salzman, *Medieval English Industries* (London, 1913), 26; Gaillard T. Lapsley, "The Account Roll of a Fifteenth-Century Iron Master," *EHR*, 14 (1899), 509-529; and *A History of Technology*, ed. C. Singer, E. J. Holmyard, et al. (Oxford, 1956), II, 10-14. Like Aelfric and the legend of Saint Eustace the author of *Isumbras* appears to be translating his matter into more familiar terms.

¹³ See John Edwin Wells, *A Manual of the Writings in Middle English, 1050-1400* (New Haven, 1916), 112-124.

tournament involving the hand of a princess. Triamour unknowingly fights with his father who later learns the circumstances of his birth and thus recognizes him. Triamour presents his mother and the family is united.

In other romances of the tail-rhyme group the "trial" theme may be combined with others. *Octavian* is similar to *Triamour* in that a queen is falsely accused of adultery and driven away. Subsequent incidents are more like those in *Eustace* and *Isumbras*. Two children are stolen by a lion and griffin. The queen wanders to the Holy Land where she supports herself by sewing. A battle against the Saracens is ultimately responsible for uniting the family.

Eglamour is another variant. A lady is set adrift with her small son who is later carried off by a griffin. Reunion between *Eglamour*, his wife, and his son takes place fifteen years later after the son unknowingly battles with his father. It should perhaps be noted that similar lengths of time between separation and reunion may, in most cases, be due to the requirements of the plot rather than direct borrowing: the lost child must be able to wield arms before he can be recognized.

In *Sir Torrent of Portyngale* a princess is set adrift by her father with two children who are later carried off by a griffin and leopard respectively. When the sons are capable of bearing arms, the princess is reunited with her children and their father, *Torrent*. In events and details the story most resembles *Octavian* and, to a lesser extent, *Eglamour*. The romance is particularly religious in tone and abounds in prayers, divine intervention, masses, sacraments, and the foundation of abbeys and churches.

Without the religious emphasis of *Torrent*, *Emaré* closely resembles other romances in the group, although like *Sir Gowther* it claims to be a Breton *lai*. As a result of the machinations of a wicked mother-in-law, a young queen is set adrift with her son. After seven years the family is reunited in Rome. The romance contains the episode of the forged letters, familiar from Chaucer's *Man of Law's Tale*. *Emaré* belongs to the "Constance" group even though several incidents are taken from other romances.¹⁴

A variant of the Constance legend, close to the story of "Patient Griselda" in the Clerk's Tale, is *The King of Tars*. A Christian princess bears a sultan a deformed child which is made perfect as soon as the

¹⁴ For a more detailed study of the Constance group see Margaret Schlauch, *Chaucer's Constance and Accused Queens* (New York, 1927) and Edith Rickert, ed., *The Romance of Emaré*. E. E. T. S., E. S. 99 (London, 1906), xxxii-xlvi.

child is christened and the sultan accepts Christianity. The story is simple and more didactic than other romances of the group.

Le Bone Florence represents another variant and contains similar incidents except that no child is involved and the queen is falsely accused of murder rather than adultery. She performs miraculous healings.

No child is mentioned likewise, in *The Erl of Toulous*. The romance resembles *Octavian* in that the queen is wrongly accused of adultery but is allowed trial by champion.

The romance of *Sir Isumbras*, then, is the only member of this group to reproduce the structure and sequence of events found in the Eustace legend. Three especially important links with the legend are Isumbras' trial for reasons of penance; separation from his wife as a result of force, not false accusations; and his children's fighting with him not against him in the final battle which reunites the family. The general tone of the work is, naturally, that of a romance. It is filled with wondrous elements and mythical beasts, and the author indulges in the usual *topoi* of such romances, e.g., praise of minstrelsy,¹⁵ emphasis upon physical prowess,¹⁶ and descriptions of armour or battles.¹⁷ Nevertheless, that he is grafting these elements upon the existing structure of the Eustace legend will become more apparent as we now consider thematic relations between the romance and the saint's legend. These major themes may be classified as "The Choice", "The Loss of Fortune", "The Separation of Family", "The Trial", "The Lost Treasure", "The Recognition", and "The Reunion".

"The Choice" offers the most significant correspondence between the Eustace legend and the romance of *Sir Isumbras*. It does not occur in other tail-rhyme romances. It is found rarely in several related romances extant in other vernaculars. These are all based upon the "Man Tried by Fate" motif and suggest some parallels with the Eustace legend and with *Sir Isumbras*. Of these only two are anterior to *Isumbras*: the twelfth-century French romance *Guillaume d'Engleterre* and the early thirteenth-century Swabian romance *Die gute Frau*. One is contemporary with the Middle English romance, i.e., the Middle High German *Wilhelm von Wenden* (ca. 1290-7) by Ulrich von Eschenbach; it is based apparently upon *Guillaume* and *Die gute Frau*.¹⁸ Two versions are later: an early fourteenth-century Spanish romance,

15 Cf., e.g., 19-21, 586-588.

16 Cf. especially T, 13-17, and stanzas xxxiv-v.

17 Cf., e.g., 464-468.

18 See Gustav Ehrismann, *Geschichte der deutschen Literatur bis zum Ausgang des Mittelalters* (Munich, 1935), II, 19-21, 83-84.

El Cavallero Cifar, and a German fifteenth-century poem, *Der Graf von Savoien*. Still later are several ballads related to the group, namely, the Breton versions of *The King of Romani* and the Danish *Sakarias*.¹⁹ Only in *Der Graf* and *Sakarias* is the hero presented with a choice and there it takes a form different from "The Choice" of the Eustace legend and *Sir Isumbras*. In three late, vernacular legends of Saint Eustace "The Choice" does not occur at all. - These are in *The South English Legendary*,²⁰ Bodleian MS Digby 86, and the *Gesta Romanorum*.²¹ All will be discussed more fully in context.

"The Choice" of present or future happiness is presented to Placidus and Isumbras after a description of character which opens each version of the story. Characterization has considerable bearing upon how "The Choice" and subsequent "Loss of Fortune" are received. Both Placidus and Isumbras are men of physical strength, wealth, and magnanimity. Placidus is a military man of consequence (*magister militum*) and enjoys honor as well as material possessions:

In diebus Trajani imperatoris, daemonum praevalente fallacia, erat quidam magister militum nomine Placida, genere secundum carnem insignis, opibus pollens et cunctis in honore tam in animalibus, quam in auro et argento et mancipiis ac universis rebus substantiae suae praeexcellens.²²

Isumbras, too, is a man of wealth and position:

A man he was ryche y nowze
Of ox to drawe in his ploweze
And stedes also in his stalle.
He was bothe curteys and hende,
Every man was his friende.

(L, N, 13-18).

¹⁹ A brief description of these parallels is given by Laura Hibbard Loomis, *Mediaeval Romance in England* (New York, 1960), 3-4.

²⁰ Ed. Carl Horstmann, *The Early South English Legendary*. E. E. T. S., O. S. 89 (London, 1887), 393-402. Horstmann's edition is of the earliest extant manuscript of the *Legendary*, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Laud Misc. 108 (S. C. 1486), ca. 1280; the legend of Saint Eustace does not appear in many of the later collections, nor always in exactly the same version when it does. The editor has supplied ll. 86-179 from the nearly identical text in British Museum, Cotton Julius D. IX, early fifteenth century.

²¹ *The Early English Versions of the Gesta Romanorum*, ed. Sidney J. H. Herrtage. E. E. T. S., E. S. 33 (London, 1879), 87-93. The *exemplum* is in the fifteenth-century British Museum, Harley 7333 but not in two other English manuscripts of the *Gesta*; see Herrtage, xxx.

²² *AA. SS. Boll.*, Sept. VI, 123. Most of the other *vitae* follow this reading. The vernacular versions tend to elaborate. Cf., e.g., Madrid, Bibl. nac. MS 9446, ll. 34-36:

Riches d'avoir, haut de parage,
De riches parens et d'amis;
N'avoit plus puissant el pais.

Ed. Holger Petersen, *La Vie de Saint Eustace* (Paris, 1928).

Probably it was his generosity which made 'every man his friend', since "one lyfe was none so fre", 24. Silver, gold, and other gifts he bestows upon minstrels. He gives a purse to the lad who announces Isumbras' wealth has gone but his family is safe (C, D, 82-84). He clothes his naked family in his own clothes (121-126). He dismisses his servants because he can no longer pay them (118-120). Placidus, too, uses his wealth generously. He aids the oppressed, clothes the naked, visits the imprisoned and the sick. The list of charitable acts grows with each later version of the legend until in Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale MS fr. 1374, it occupies ten verses.

Yet Placidus and Isumbras, in spite of their good works, pay no heed to the word of God. Hence, God intervenes by presenting them with "The Choice". Both Eustace and Isumbras are guilty of pride, *vanitas*. When the Lord appears for the second time to Eustace, He tells him that baptism is not enough in itself for final salvation. It will be necessary for Eustace to suppress worldly desires:

Oportet ergo, te humiliari de alta tua vanitate, et versus exaltari in spiritualibus divitiis.

(AA. SS. Boll., Sept. VI, 126).

When he has been made sufficiently humble (*cum enim humilitatus fueris*), Eustace will be restored to his former state (*propriam gloriam*). The real meaning of this phrase in the sense of Christian martyrdom is not, of course, realized by Eustace until much later. Eustace could be excused for his earlier paganism, since he was but *daemonum captus errore*, but "The Choice" and subsequent trial are based upon more profound spiritual purification. It is this second and more important aspect of the story which provides the plot for *Sir Isumbras*. Isumbras, like most heroes of medieval romance, is not a pagan. He is a Christian knight. The fact makes his "pride of gold and fee" all the more sinful in the eyes of the Lord:

Of Goddis werkes gafe he noghte,
His mercys for to nevene;
So longe he reynghed in his pride
That God wolde no lenger habyde,
To hym he sent a stevene.

(31-36).

For *vanitas*, then, both Isumbras and Eustace must suffer.

In the standard *vita* for Saint Eustace and in the romance of *Sir Isumbras* "The Choice" is similar. It is, first of all, presented to Eustace and Isumbras under comparable conditions. The announcement of

God's displeasure is made to Eustace as he hunts in the woods, separated from his men. The Lord in the form of a stag hints that Eustace must suffer for the glory he may achieve. Eustace returns to the woods after baptism, and it is at this point that he is presented with a choice. The Lord tells Eustace he will be set upon by devils because of his conversion and undergo severe trial; He asks Eustace to choose the time for such a trial, whether now or later: *Modo vis accipere imminentem tibi temptationem, an in extremis diebus*. Eustace replies that if God's will cannot be changed, then he will accept it now and pray for the strength to sustain it. All depends upon the will of God (*Domine Jesu Christe, fiat voluntas tua*, p. 126). Isumbras is likewise hunting alone in the woods when the Lord appears to him. Just as God had spoken to Eustace in the form of a stag, the bird which speaks to Isumbras is the Lord: "The kyng of hevene gretis the soo", 46. Isumbras is asked by the bird whether he wishes his trial now or later; because he is already Christian, the bird is able to present "The Choice" at the first meeting. To this Isumbras replies :

'Werldes wel I will for-stake,
And to Goddes mercy I me bytake,
To hym my saule I zelde!
In 3outhen I maye bothe ryde and goo,
When I ame alde I may nott so,
My lymmes wille waxe unwelde;
Now, Lorde, 3if it thi wille bee,
In 3owthede penance send thou mee,
And welthe appone myne elde!
(T, 53-61).

Isumbras, too, surrenders to the will of God, although, unlike Eustace, rationalizes his choice.

Only in the Latin *vitae* and vernacular legends closely related to them is "The Choice" presented in terms similar to those in *Sir Isumbras*. A variant of "The Choice" occurs in Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale MS fr. 1374: Eustace may choose wealth on the one hand or travail and martyrdom on the other (vv. 373-376). Among the parallel romances only two, both later than *Sir Isumbras*, include a choice. Eternal sorrow or ten years misery is offered in *Der Graf von Savoyen*; woe on earth and bliss in heaven is the alternative to present happiness in the Danish ballad, *Sakarias*. In several late versions of the Eustace legend there is no choice at all. Three of these have been mentioned above; two will now be considered more fully. Bodleian MS Digby 86 describes Placidus as living in wealth and happiness; there is no emphasis upon

his paganism, nor has he any sins. Suddenly, however, the Lord speaks to him in the form of a stag:

Placidas, ich seye hit the,
Thi nome shal i-chaunged be.
Christindom thou shalt fonge.
(49-51).

With only this command Eustace and his family hasten off to be baptized. They rest under a linden tree on their return through the woods. There an angel appears to tell them that they will achieve future bliss but at the present must lose "halle and bour and heye stede", 86. The angel offers them no further explanation and no choice of present or future woe. Similarly, an abrupt warning and no choice comes to Eustace in the *exemplum* of the *Gesta Romanorum* based upon the Eustace legend. A rich knight hears a nightingale singing in the woods. When he expresses a desire to understand its song, an old man appears. It means, he explains, that the knight will set out for a tournament but will suffer great persecution before he gets there. After admonishing him to be constant and patient if he expects to find happiness, the old man vanishes and the bird flies away.²³ A similar bird warning occurs in the Breton ballads.²⁴ In all these versions, including *Guillaume* and *Cifar*, there is no choice and the warning comes without any motivation; the same is true for related tail-rhyme romances.

"The Loss of Fortune", the second motif to be considered, is necessitated by "The Choice". This motif occurs in all versions of the Eustace legend, in *Sir Isumbras*, and in parallel romances and ballads. It is an essential development in the "Man Tried by Fate" story.

In the Latin *vita* for Saint Eustace the stag no sooner disappears than Eustace's horse wanders away. After he returns home his cattle die of the plague and then his slaves. Eustace and his family leave their house temporarily. While they are absent, thieves break in and carry off the gold, silver, and clothing. Nothing is left and the family flees in shame to Egypt during the night.

Events in *Isumbras* correspond to those in the *vita*, although certain details are changed or expanded to heighten the effect. As soon as the bird which brings the announcement of choice and loss disappears,

²³ Hereafter the *Gesta* version follows the standard *vita* for Saint Eustace except that, as in *Isumbras*, there is no martyrdom after the final reunion.

²⁴ The bird is a dove rather than a nightingale; it tells the king to leave his kingdom and go into Normandy. No reason is given for the command.

Isumbras' horse falls dead under him. His hawks and hounds disappear into the woods. Isumbras, like Eustace, accepts all this. The author, however, feels free to emphasize the pathos of the situation:

Whate wondir was thofe hym ware wo,
One fote byhoved hym to goo.
(70-71).²⁵

Upon his return a "lyttile knave" runs to meet the knight. He tells him that his belongings are burned and his beasts slain: only his wife and children remain unharmed. Isumbras meets his "hirde-men" who, weeping, announce there is not left a "stotte unto his plowghe". Isumbras, with Eustace's faith in the proceedings, comforts them all by saying that the affliction was not meant for them. God had sent that woe to him alone and would send more. He finds his wife and children standing naked under a thorn tree, driven out of their beds by the fire. Moved by the contrast between their wretched condition and his rich apparel, he puts his mantle around his wife and tears his surcote into three pieces for the children.²⁶ Isumbras and his family take open and ceremonious leave of their friends, in contrast to Eustace's secret flight. Little reason is given in the romance for this "carefulle departynge", although shame in poverty is implied as it is in the Eustace legend:

'We kane nonekyns werkes wyrke,
Owre frendis of us will son be irke,
Of lande I rede we fare.'
(115-117).

"The Loss of Fortune", therefore, comes about in similar ways in both Eustace and *Isumbras*. No other versions bear such close relation, even though the romance enriches the account by means of added details.

"Separation of Family" is the most characteristic theme linking the Eustace legend to a large group of romances. It is the central incident not only in *Isumbras* but in all members of the "Eustace-Constance-Florence-Griselda" family. It occurs also in the romances of *Valentine and Orson*, *Ogier*, *La Belle Hélène de Constantinople*, and *Beves of Hamtoun*.²⁷

²⁵ It is interesting that this particular detail occurs in only one other version of the story: the Digby life of Saint Eustace, which reads "A fote he most go", 102.

²⁶ The closest analogy to the incident is found in *Guillaume d'Engleterre*, ed. Wendelin Foerster. Romanische Bibliothek 20 (Halle, 1911), ll. 481-606. The children are born after Guillaume and his wife leave home, but when they come naked into the world their father wraps them in a fold of his mantle.

²⁷ I have deliberately limited the list to those romances which combine the dispersal

The exact order of events and details pertaining to the separation of Isumbras from his family corresponds to no one version, either in romance or hagiography. The account is based apparently upon the Eustace legend, but it also incorporates additional elements.

Saint Eustace first loses his wife. A shipmaster covets her for her beauty and the opportunity for possession arrives when Eustace cannot pay him the fare. When Eustace protests against leaving his wife, the shipmaster (described as *barbarus* and *immitis*) threatens to throw him into the sea.²⁸ Sorrowfully Eustace goes on his way with the two boys. The sons are soon carried off by a lion and a wolf as Eustace attempts to carry them, one at a time, across a river.

The wife is lost before the sons in *Guillaume*, *Die gute Frau*, the Breton ballads of *The King of Romani*, *Sakarias*, and the *exemplum* in the *Gesta Romanorum*. She is seized by shipmen in *Cifar*, the *Gesta*, and the Breton ballads. In *Cifar* the wife, Grima, is snatched off by sailors after the children are lost; quarrelling as to who shall possess her, the sailors kill each other. Under guidance of the Christ-Child, Grima reaches a port where she endows a convent with wealth from the ship (xii-xliv). The account in *Guillaume* is closer to *Isumbras* than it is to the Eustace legend, except that the sons are born after departure from home (cf. also *Wilhelm* and *Die gute Frau*). In *Guillaume* merchants, attracted by the wife's beauty, carry her off in a boat and toss the husband money in a red purse which lodges in the branches of a tree. Guillaume is forced to leave it when a wolf carries off one of his sons and the other simply disappears. When he returns to retrieve the purse, an eagle snatches it from his hand and flies away with it.

Sir Isumbras contains elements from several of these accounts. After the initial flight into the forest Isumbras and his family wander for five weeks as beggars. They are reduced to terrible weariness and hunger:

Nothyng sawe thay that come of corne,
Bot the floures of the thorne,
Upone the holtes hore.

(163-165).

of family motif with those of "The Man Tried by Fate" or the "Calumniated Wife". Although loss of wife and children occurs in the Greek romances of *Leucippe and Clitophon*, *Xenophon of Ephesus*, and *Apollonius of Tyre*, these do not seem relevant here. The theme was very early exploited by the hagiographers, e.g., in the *Clementine Apocrypha*. For an analysis of Oriental parallels, see Gerould, *art. cit.*, 344-353.

²⁸ *AA. SS. Boll.*, Sept. VI, 127.

Arriving at a river, Isumbras carries his eldest son across and leaves him on the bank to play "with the blome". While he recrosses the water to fetch the second child, a lion carries off the eldest and a leopard the other. The incident is exactly like that in the Eustace legend except for two things: Isumbras still has his wife with him, and a leopard has been substituted for a wolf. Isumbras and his wife continue on their way with the third son. In *Die gute Frau, Gesta*, and Breton ballads the sons are lost and the journey continues under quite different circumstances. When Isumbras, his wife, and youngest child come to the "Greckes see", they see coming into port "a thowsand schippes and moo", 217. (The description of these ships, incidentally, with their "toppe-castelles" seemingly wrought from gold and their pennants fluttering is an admirable example of the author's ability to elaborate upon his sources.) As the ships dock, Isumbras approaches them and begs for bread, even though it is now clear that this is a Saracen navy come to conquer Christendom. The Saracens send Isumbras away as a spy, but word comes back to the sultan in command that "zone pore mane" is marvelously fair and strong, and that his lady

es whitte as walles bone,
 Hir hyre es als the see fome,
 And bryghte als blome on tree.
 (250-252).

The succinct account of the wife's beauty in Eustace (*quod esset decora facie*) is here translated into conventional romance formulas, a transference already made in some vernacular versions of the legend.²⁹ Surveying the group on the shore, the sultan offers to make Isumbras a rich knight if he will come into his service. Disdainfully Isumbras refuses to fight on the Saracen side. The sultan then says that if Isumbras will sell him his wife, he will make her queen of all his land. Again, Isumbras refuses on Christian grounds:

I wedded hir in Goddes laye,
 To halde hir to myne endyng daye
 Both in wele and waa.
 (292-294).

Nevertheless, the sultan is as determined to possess her as was Eustace's shipmaster, and Isumbras is just as powerless to resist. The sultan tosses Isumbras gold wrapped in his own red mantle and sends the wife off in a ship bound for his distant kingdom. The details describing her

²⁹ Cf., e.g., the description of the wife in Madrid, Bibl. nac. MS 9446, ll. 784-802.

departure are apparently the author's own invention. Yet certain echoes of Isumbras' grief occur in the Digby life of Saint Eustace:

Bodleian MS Digby 86

The knyght sette hym done apone a
[stone,
And se hys wyfe was from hym go,
Takyne from hym with wronge.
He seyde alas that he was borne!
Hys wigte from hym nygezond was
[lorne,
Hym thought hys to longe.
After the schype his eye he caste:
Out of his syght than was sche paste.⁸⁰

Sir Isumbras

He sette hym one a stone.
With carefulle mode and dreary stevene,
He called on the kyng of hevene
To hym he made his mone.
(387-390).

The wondid knyghte hym downe sett,
And for his wyfe full sare he grett,
Whils he thaire schipe sayle myghte see.
(T, 355-357).

The Latin *vita*e and most other vernacular versions of the legend simply state that Eustace was threatened for attempting to resist the shipman's action and goes away lamenting to the sons that their mother has been betrayed to a foreign husband. This and other verbal echoes with the Digby life of Saint Eustace (cf. n. 25 above) suggest some direct relation to *Isumbras*; many essential elements, e.g., "The Choice", differ, however.

Also the author's invention is his account of the third son's disappearance. Only the Breton ballads mention three sons, and there the third is carried off by a seawolf. Isumbras, left on the shore with his remaining child, watches the Saracen ship out of sight and becomes blind with weeping. Finally he remembers the boy and gives him some of the food supplied as part of the sultan's payment. Father and son then fall asleep on a dry bank. In the morning an eagle, attracted by the bright color of the mantle, flies off with it. Isumbras runs after the bird until the sea stops him. Before he can return a unicorn bears away the boy. The incident is paralleled by events in connection with the "red purse" in *Guillaume*, described above; the role of the unicorn is there played by an ordinary wolf. Basically the episode is an expansion of the account describing the loss of the two sons in Eustace: it has been colored over with the stock-in-trade devices of medieval romance, if not directly influenced by one of the parallel romances, e.g., *Guillaume* or the source of the Breton ballads.

Isumbras' concern for his wife, sons, and the graphic details of his

⁸⁰ Ed. Horstmann, *Altenglische Legenden*, 214; missing lines are supplied by the editor from Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Ashmole 61 (S. C. 6922). This manuscript also contains *Sir Isumbras*, see n. 8 above.

grief at their loss provide striking examples of that dichotomy between realistic detail and marvelous incident in which medieval romance indulges. That an eagle should fly off with Isumbras' remaining wealth is indeed a marvelous incident, but yet the author carefully explains that it was because the bird was attracted by the mantle's bright color. There are many other examples of such rationalization: Isumbras' reasons for his 'choice' might be recalled. If one compares similar incidents in *Isumbras* and the Latin *vitae* for Saint Eustace, the latter seem less realistic even though they ostensibly deal with factual events or those which could be explained as Christian miracles. The main reason for this is their lack of detail. By concentrating on a straightforward narrative the *vitae* give only a skeletal outline of a story. Vernacular hagiography and the romances may fill in the outline more freely. A greater attempt at realism, natural detail, humor, and pathos may be found in the legends of Saint Eustace contained in the vernacular versions of MSS Bibliothèque Nationale fr. 1374 and Digby 86. At the same time they include elaborations of a more marvelous and supernatural kind. These versions illustrate well that ambiguous *genre* between hagiography and romance. They demonstrate that the author of *Isumbras* had already much at hand for his adaptation of the Eustace legend.

In both Eustace and *Isumbras* "Loss of Fortune" and "Separation of Family" are but preliminaries to a long period of hardship which I have termed "The Trial". Only in *Isumbras* is separation of family tied so neatly to the trial motif. Isumbras labors seven years as a "smethyman" and, forging his own armour, rides on the horse that "coles broghte" into battle against the Saracens. In vengeance he first seeks the wife-stealing sultan and slays him for 'the woe he caused', 464-468. The sultan, then, serves like the red mantle as a unifying factor in the story; such devices give the romance much more unity but less plausibility than the *vita*. Since Isumbras is still undergoing penance, he must refuse the proffered wealth and position from the Christian king for his part in the victorious battle. He wanders as a palmer for another seven years. He arrives in Bethlehem during the fourteenth year of trial "with hungre, and thirste, and bones sore", 515-521. It is at this point that his trial ends. In certain respects Isumbras' experiences during the trial are similar to those of Saint Eustace. Eustace, too, is reduced to menial and very severe labor: he works in the fields of Egypt. He remains at the same occupation fifteen years (some versions say fourteen) and at the end of that time still remains penniless and friendless. The end of his "Trial" comes about in much the same way as Isumbras'. An angel announces to both Eustace and

Isumbras that the trial has come to an end and that they will soon find their families.

A subsidiary motif of "The Lost Treasure" weaves together "The Trial" and "Recognition" motifs in *Isumbras*. The treasure motif does not occur in any Eustace legend. Gerould believes that it came independently from Asia and was attached to the Eustace story first in *Guillaume d'Engleterre*.³¹ In both *Isumbras* and *Guillaume* it serves as a recognition token. As mentioned above, Guillaume is given a red purse full of gold by the merchants who take his wife. Isumbras also receives gold in a red container (a mantle). Guillaume attempts to retrieve it but an eagle snatches it away. An eagle also flies off with Isumbras' cloak. The purse is wondrously dropped at Guillaume's feet by the eagle just as he is about to recount his adventures to the newly-found sons. The author of *Isumbras*, however, with characteristic rationality toward the marvelous furniture of his romance, says in the first place that the eagle flew off with the cloak because it was attracted by the color. Further, it is Isumbras who finds the cloak "owte-wappande with the winde" in the eagle's nest. The gold reminds him of the sale of his wife and his sorrow redoubles. He hides the mantle in his room until the queen's (his wife's) knights grow suspicious and break down the door. They find the gold under his bed and take it to the queen. She recognizes it and the mantle in which it is wrapped. After ordering Isumbras to explain how he got it, she recognizes him. In MSS A, T, E, C, c, and D recognition is confirmed also by a ring. In MS L the queen asks the palmer if there had been any token between him and his wife. When he produces half a ring, she lays the two parts together and accepts him as her husband. A ring serves as a recognition token in *Guillaume* and Breton ballads. Thus, in *Isumbras* the "Lost Treasure" serves as a link between "The Trial", "The Recognition", and "The Reunion".

In the Eustace legend "The Recognition" relies upon personal characteristics rather than external objects, although personal recognition between husband and wife in *Isumbras* is a final factor in the recognition scene. During Eustace's trial the Empire had been invaded by barbarians just as Isumbras' country experienced a Saracen invasion: as the shipmaster is termed a "barbarian", so the "shipmaster-sultan" in *Isumbras* becomes a Saracen. Therefore the Emperor Trajan seeks Placidus to head an army against the invaders and sends two messengers in search of him. They arrive in Egypt and by chance come to the

³¹ Gerould, *art. cit.*, 412.

town where Eustace lives. He recognizes them before they do him. Perplexed, Eustace falls to his knees and asks God what he should do. A voice from the sky (an angel, in some versions) answers that he is forgiven and that his trial is almost over. He will soon find his wife and children and achieve eternal bliss. Eustace conceals his identity and offers the messengers hospitality.³² While serving them he is overcome with the thought of his former wealth and the fact that these men once served him. He retreats to the courtyard in tears and bathes his face before returning to them. They recognize him now by a scar on his head; all return to Rome.³³ Eustace is reinstated at the head of the Roman army and sets out to stop the barbarian invasions. Eustace unwittingly leads the army into the adopted country of Theopistis, and the army encamps near her home. The two sons, who had been rescued from wild animals, raised separately, and enrolled in the Roman army are quartered in her house. Actual recognition between mother and sons differs in various versions of the legend.³⁴ In all cases the sons first recognize each other and are later recognized by the mother who confronts the head of the Roman army to find he is her husband. She then tells him she has found the sons and all return to Rome where they are martyred. However much the details

³² The incident differs curiously in the Digby version. Eustace is a 'corn-warden' and blows his horn to stop three messenger knights from riding through the grain. They recognize him immediately and the group returns to Rome.

³³ In MS B. N. fr. 1374 the discovery of Eustace by the messengers is elaborately described and illustrates once more the heights to which saints' legend, as romance, could attain. Eustace meets the messengers along the road and takes them for pilgrims. When he asks what relics they seek, they reply that they have been wandering many years in many lands (all listed) looking for a certain Placidus. They recognize him and urge him to return with them to Rome. Eustace pleads that he is nearly sixty years old and too old to fight for the emperor. Nevertheless, after a prayer for guidance, he departs with the 'pilgrims'. The journey back is also described with elaborate details.

³⁴ In Metaphrastes, Combefis, *AA. SS. Boll.*, Aelfric, the *Legenda aurea*, and most of the French versions the mother cannot believe she has found her sons until Eustace confirms their story about the wild beasts. In a tenth-century Latin poem which offers the prototype for several later versions the mother embraces her sons immediately and then goes to Eustace: see *Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Poet. lat. aevi carol.* (Berlin, 1899), IV, 593-599. More comparable to a romance version is the legend in *The South English Legendary*. The mother overhears her sons from the room where she is imprisoned and the next day is brought before the 'prince' (Eustace), when identities are revealed. In the *Gesta Romanorum* the mother is a 'fair lady' lodged in the same inn as her two sons. She recognizes them when they begin talking about their childhood. The following day mother and sons meet Eustace in the street; she recognizes him by a scar on his head. In the Digby version the mother hears the sons talking in an orchard; Eustace comes to her inn seeking the 'knights' in his service, and recognition takes place simultaneously.

may vary between versions of the Eustace legend, they all differ from *Isumbras* in that "The Recognition" between members of the family involves the sons first.³⁵

The end of *Isumbras'* trial and beginning of the recognition episodes take place in a manner similar to initial events in the Eustace. An angel appears to Eustace with the announcement that his trial is over; an angel appears to *Isumbras* soon after he arrives in Bethlehem as a palmer. The angel brings bread, wine, and the tidings that his sins are now forgiven. It is possible that this is an inversion of the refreshments which Eustace serves the messengers who come in search of him. Encouraged, *Isumbras* wanders through "seven kings' lands" until he unwittingly arrives before his wife's palace; she now rules the sultan's kingdom, which she inherited after his death. Eustace, it will be remembered, had also come innocently to his wife's home. The difference is that Eustace is in superior circumstances at the time, not his wife, although several versions of the legend describe the wife as independent and wealthy. *Isumbras* is taken into the palace and fed. As a palmer he attracts the queen's attention by his singular appearance and she offers him a permanent place in her household. Neither yet recognizes the other. Here occurs a scene already familiar from the Eustace legend. *Isumbras*, like Eustace, weeps as he remembers his past wealth and position. Hospitality is heaped upon him but he cannot eat:

So mekill he sawe of gamen and glee,
And Thoghte what he was wonnt to be,
Terys he lete downe falle.

(576-578).

Recognition between *Isumbras* and his wife comes about, as described above, by means of "The Lost Treasure" and also (as in Eustace), the wife's recognition of her husband.

In *Isumbras* the sons are restored after the parents' recognition of each other. The sequence resembles *Guillaume, Wilhelm, Der Graf*, and *Sakarias*. In *Isumbras* the reappearance of the lost sons is described in terms appropriate to romance. On the other hand, the miraculous nature of the event is given a Christian rationalization naturally assumed by the Eustace legend. *Isumbras* is made king by his wife and now enjoys more wealth than he had ever had. He attempts to force his newly acquired kingdom to accept Christianity. They rebel. A day

³⁵ Cf. also *Octavian, Emaré, Triamour, Eglamour*, and *Torrent of Portyngale*. For Eastern parallels, see Delehayé, *art. cit.*, 194-207.

of battle is set; the Saracens assemble to oppose him. His personal troop, Saracens, fails him at the last moment. His wife dons armour and stands at his side "agaynes thrytty thowsandez and maa", 738. They slay nine hundred heathen and are about to be taken prisoner when the three lost sons return:

There come rydande knyghttes three
 Appon thre bestes wylde;
 A lebarde and a unycorne,
 And on a lyone he come by-forne,
 That was their eldeste childe!
 (752-756).

The sons are clad in "angells wede" and led by an angel who prompts them to announce that they were sent into battle for Isumbras' sake and are his own sons. All rejoice to be reunited and, after lavish victory celebrations, they establish Christendom in five other lands. Isumbras divides his kingdom between himself and his three sons.³⁶ The union of the family is therefore brought about by miraculous means which, as in the Eustace legend, must be ascribed to the will of God. Isumbras, however, acquires a temporal kingdom, and the family lives henceforth in earthly wealth and happiness. Nevertheless, the romance closes with an echo of the heavenly bliss which ends the Eustace legend:

Thay lyffede and dyed in gud entent,
 Unto heven thaire saulis went,
 When that thay dede ware.
 Pray we to Jesu, heven kynge
 He gyffe us all his dere blyssynge
 Nowe and ever mare!
 (799-804).

This miraculous ending with its pious overtones brings us to a consideration of one of the most characteristic features of *Sir Isumbras*: the religious interpretation of the narrative.

The romance is linked, as has been demonstrated, to the Breton ballads through the bird-warning, the three sons, lost treasure, ring, and other elements. It is possible, therefore, that the ballads were based upon a Breton *lai*, now lost, and that such a *lai* influenced *Sir Isumbras* (several of the tail-rhyme romances of this group do associate themselves

³⁶ Cf. *Cifar*, cxviii, in which the sons also receive part of the kingdom: ed. Henri Michelant (Tübingen, 1872). The poem is dated 1305-10 by C. P. Wagner, "The Sources of *El Cavallero Cifar*," *Revue Hispanique*, 10 (1903), 10. This would mean a date slightly later than *Sir Isumbras* and preclude any direct relation between the two poems.

with Breton lays, e.g., *Emaré* and *The Erl of Toulous*). Were this the case, however, it might be expected that supernatural elements would be important to the story. Yet most events which could be considered supernatural in *Isumbras* are given religious explanation. An obvious example is the return of the three sons. In all versions of the Eustace legend and in parallel romances, the stolen children are rescued from wild beasts and raised by foster-parents. In the Breton ballads the three sons appear suddenly in the inn where their mother works as a servant; they tell her they have been raised by a "white maiden" who lives at the bottom of the sea. Although the sons make a sudden re-entry also in *Isumbras*, they return clothed in angelic garments and accompanied by an angel.⁸⁷ Also significant is Isumbras' reaction to their return. It is for him a sign of final absolution; falling to his knees to thank the "King of Heaven", he exclaims "My bale than hase he bett!". A seemingly fantastic occurrence, then, is interpreted like the bird warning as divine intervention. Divine intervention and plan, in fact, form the basis of the entire story just as it does in the Eustace legend. Both heroes must surrender to the divine will, and *fiat voluntas tua* sets the tone for the legend as well as the romance. It is therefore particularly appropriate that the story of Isumbras is enclosed between the invocation to Christ in the opening lines and the final prayer at the end, even though these could be considered common to many romances of the tail-rhyme group.⁸⁸

Further examples of religious interpretation in *Isumbras* are readily seen. The bird speaks, but it is the voice of the Lord (cf. Eustace's

⁸⁷ A. H. Krappe, "An Oriental Theme in *Sir Ysumbras*," *Englische Studien*, 67 (1932), 174-177, cites a parallel incident in the fifth-century Armenian chronicle of Moses of Khorni which occurs in connection with Cyrus' rebellion against Astyages. In a dream Astyages sees a woman miraculously give birth to three warriors on a mountain-top. One mounts a lion and rides to the West. The second, on a leopard, rides Northward. The third, mounted on a dragon (some manuscripts read 'eagle'), attacks Astyages directly. The fact that it is an allegorical representation, claims Krappe, accounts for the odd and forced effect when included in the romance of *Isumbras* as a factual episode. Krappe, however, overlooks a similar incident in the Breton ballads which undoubtedly owes much more to the popular folklore of Brittany than to Moses of Khorni. What is important here is that the author of *Isumbras* rationalizes the fantasy of the incident by a Christian interpretation not supplied in the Armenian chronicle or the Breton ballads.

⁸⁸ The romances probably incorporated the final prayer from popular religious works in the vernacular, which in turn adapted it from Latin sources. Cf., e.g. *Handlyng Synne*, ll. 10808-11, 10814-5, *et passim*, and the *Speculum Gy de Warewyke*, ll. 1029-34. The earliest manuscript of the latter, it might be noted, is the Auchinleck, which also contains the earliest tail-rhyme romances.

stag or Balaam's ass). In MS D and in the printed versions c and d it is an angel who speaks to Isumbras; an angel rather than a stag or bird also appears to Saint Eustace in the Digby manuscript. In MS A an angel rather than a unicorn carries off the youngest son. In MS A, too, it is an angel who flies off with the treasure. When Isumbras loses his possessions, his wife, and his children, he accepts it gladly, like Eustace, as the will of God and a necessary penance: cf. 52-60; 94-96; 111-114; 127-132. Isumbras cuts a cross upon his shoulder as he sets out upon his journey, 133. He accepts more manifestations of God's will, 151; 391-396; 514-516; 712-714; 799. He endures many hardships for his "are-mysdede" but receives divine absolution, 520-540. Possibly the bread and wine brought by the angel who announces the end of "The Trial" symbolize this absolution in the form of the Eucharist.

The threat of heathenism plays an important role in many medieval romances, but in *Isumbras* it receives special emphasis. On a literal level it corresponds to the anti-Christian threat in the Eustace legend, or, on a more allegorical level, the evil forces described by the Lord to Eustace as *diaboli*. Certainly in both stories the *diaboli* act indirectly as "The Loss of Fortune" and "The Trial". Again, on a literal level, Isumbras has much more contact with anti-Christian forces than does Eustace. Christendom is invaded by a Saracen force with a sultan at their head, 211-213. Isumbras asks for special aid against them, 439-444. Nuns gladly heal Isumbras' wounds, because he has slain "many haythen hound", 493-494. It is a Saracen who has taken away his wife, and a Saracen kingdom which she inherits. In stanzas lx and lxi Isumbras attempts to convert this kingdom; in the final stanzas of the romance he succeeds. In keeping with the secularization of many elements in the story, Eustace's final *corona victoriae* (*AA. SS. Boll.*, Sept. VI, 126, 135) becomes for Isumbras a real crown and Eustace's heavenly kingdom a temporal one. Yet there is implicit in the romance the final conclusion that Isumbras' "are-mysdedes" have been atoned for and that he, like Eustace, has been reduced to sufficient *humilitas* in the eyes of God to qualify him for ultimate happiness. Although religious and didactic elements play a part in most romances of the tail-rhyme group, that these elements have been stressed to a remarkable degree in *Sir Isumbras* and with considerable parallel to the Eustace legend this resumé has attempted to suggest.

In conclusion, therefore, it may be said that the very nature of the source has provided *Sir Isumbras* with its religious framework. The various adaptations of the Eustace legend and its influence upon other romances, e.g., *Cifar* or *Guillaume*, show that the basic theme, "The Man Tried by Fate", was a popular one and adapted itself well to either a

secular or religious setting. Of all secular versions of the story *Isumbras* remains the closest parallel to the legend as found in most *vitae*. In both stories "The Choice", "Loss of Fortune", "Separation", "Trial", and "Reunion" come about in similar ways. Some details, e.g., the treasure and third son, are added to the story in *Isumbras*; these may be drawn from other romances and folk-tales, Western and Eastern. Certainly the Eustace legend itself gathered material from many sources, not always ecclesiastical. Other details in *Isumbras* may be changed, or translated into terms understood and expected by the audience, e.g., the shipman in the legend becomes a sultan.

Under the influence of the tail-rhyme school the author of *Sir Isumbras* shaped religious and secular material into an artistic synthesis. In doing so he never obscured his ultimate dependence upon the story of Saint Eustace. There is thus an essential irony in the fact that *Isumbras* was condemned by William of Nassington and the author of the *Cursor Mundi*. More effectively than their works does it convey to "lewed men" the nature of God's providence and the endurance of man's faith.

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The Trial of Gilbert of Poitiers, 1148:

A Previously Unknown Record

MARVIN L. COLKER

GILBERT OF POITIERS (ca. 1076-1154), known as Gilbert de la Porrée, had been chancellor of the cathedral-school of Chartres, taught at Paris, and died as bishop of Poitiers.¹ His name as that of a particularly brilliant philosopher and theologian generally excites admiration among modern scholars. Barthélemy Hauréau characterizes him as "le plus docte et le plus ingénieux de tous les sectateurs du platonisme au XII^e siècle."² Max Manitius says of Gilbert "Ohne Zweifel war er einer der bedeutendsten Theologen des 12. Jahrhunderts, der allerdings seine eigene Wege ging."³ Similarly, Suitbert Gammersbach remarks "Gilbert Porreta gehört in die Reihe der führenden Geister der Frühscholastik."⁴ Étienne Gilson declares "Gilbert est avec

¹ On the life of Gilbert of Poitiers, see especially Max Manitius, *Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters* 3 (Munich, 1931) 210-214; A. Hayen, 'Le concile de Reims et l'erreur théologique de Gilbert de la Porrée,' *Archives d'hist. doct. et litt. du moyen âge* 10 (1935-1936) 35-38; Étienne Gilson, *La philosophie au moyen âge des origines patristiques à la fin du XIV^e siècle* (Paris, 1947) 262; Suitbert Gammersbach, *Gilbert von Poitiers und seine Prozesse im Urteil der Zeitgenossen* (Neue münstersche Beiträge zur Geschichtsforschung, Bd. 5; Cologne, 1959) 11-18, 21-29, 140-146; for an extensive bibliography listing works on the life and thought of Gilbert, editions of his writings, and studies of the Council of Rheims (1148), see Gammersbach, 150-157. To this bibliography on Gilbert may be added: Anton Maxsein, *Die Philosophie des Gilbertus Porretanus unter besonderer Berücksichtigung seiner Wissenschaftslehre* (diss., Münster i. W., 1929); Gilson, *op. cit.*, 262-268; N. M. Haring, 'Gilbert of Poitiers, Author of the *De discretionis animae, spiritus et mentis* Commonly Attributed to Achard of Saint Victor,' *Mediaeval Studies* 22 (1960) 148-191; Georg Misch, *Geschichte der Autobiographie* 3: *Das Mittelalter, Zweite Hälfte: Das Hochmittelalter im Anfang* (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1962) 1273-1286; N. M. Haring, 'The Porretans and the Greek Fathers,' *Mediaeval Studies* 24 (1962) 181-209; *idem* (ed.), 'The *Liber de diversitate naturae et personae* by Hugh of Honau,' *Archives d'hist. doct. et litt. du moyen âge* 29 (1962) 103-216; Antoine Dondaine, *Écrits de la "Petite École" Porrétaïne* (Conférence Albert-le-Grand 1962; Montreal and Paris, 1962); N. M. Haring, 'Die Väterammlung des Adhemar von Saint-Ruf in Valence,' *Scholastik* 38 (1963) 402-420. *Idem*, 'Das sogenannte Glaubensbekenntnis des Reimser Konsistoriums,' *Scholastik* 40 (1965) 55-90.

² B. Hauréau, *Notices et extraits de quelques manuscrits latins de la Bibliothèque Nationale* 6 (Paris, 1893) 19.

³ Manitius, *tom. cit.* 211.

⁴ Gammersbach, *op. cit.* 1.

Abélard, le plus puissant esprit spéculatif du XII^e siècle et si Abélard l'emporte sur le terrain de la logique, Gilbert dépasse de loin Abélard comme métaphysicien."⁵ Father Nicholas M. Haring speaks of "Gilbert's masterful style and penetrating subtlety"⁶ and of "the rare beauty of his style and the exceptional depth of his thought."⁷ Father Haring regards Gilbert as the most learned scholar of his time⁸ and claims for him a "well-deserved rank among the truly great thinkers of Western Civilization."⁹

In the Middle Ages, too, there were those who, like John of Salisbury¹⁰ and Otto of Freising,¹¹ were perceptive of Gilbert's genius, and he was sometimes regarded as superior to all the other scholars of his day.¹²

⁵ Gilson, *op. cit.* 262.

⁶ N. M. Haring, 'The Commentaries of Gilbert, Bishop of Poitiers (1142-1154), on the Two Boethian "Opuscula Sacra" on the Holy Trinity,' *Studies and Texts* I (1955) 27.

⁷ N. M. Haring, 'The Commentary of Gilbert of Poitiers on Boethius' "De Hebdomadibus,"' *Traditio* 9 (1953) 177.

⁸ Haring (*cit. supra* n. 6) 23-24: "a man whom many of his contemporaries celebrated as the most learned scholar of their time, which he undoubtedly was."

⁹ N. M. Haring, 'The Commentary of Gilbert, Bishop of Poitiers, on Boethius' "Contra Eutychen et Nestorium," *Archives d'hist. doctr. et litt. du moyen âge* 21 (1954) 248.

¹⁰ Cf. John of Salisbury, *Historia Pontificalis* 8 and 13 (ed. Marjorie Chibnall, *John of Salisbury's Memoirs of the Papal Court* [Nelson's Medieval Texts; London and Edinburgh, 1956], 15-16 and 28).

¹¹ Cf. Otto of Freising, *Gesta Friderici I* 52 (ed. G. Waitz, MGH, *In Usus Scholarum* [1912] 74-75).

¹² Cf. John of Salisbury, *Historia Pontificalis* 8 (ed. Chibnall 16): "Erat enim uir ingenii perspicacissimi, legerat plurima, et ut ex animi sententia loquar, circiter annos lx expenderit in legendo et tritura litterarum, sic in disciplinis liberalibus eruditus, ut cum in uniuersis nemo precederet; credebatur ipse potius in uniuersis precedere uniuersos." Cf. the *Planctus* of Laurentius, dean of Poitiers (ed. Jean Leclercq, 'Textes sur Saint Bernard et Gilbert de la Porrée,' *Mediaeval Studies* 14 [1952] 119): "Meruit eminere magisterii merito supra omnes doctores in tempore suo et obtinuit nomen grande super nomen magnorum qui sunt in terra." Cf. the death-roll discussing Gilbert (Oxford Magdalen College MS 118 fol. 135^v now represents this account; see the edition by Jean Leclercq, 'L'Éloge funèbre de Gilbert de la Porrée,' *Archives d'hist. doctr. et litt. du moyen âge* 19 [1952] 184): "Tanta uero in diuina et humana pagina fuit plenitudine scientie repletus, ut ad magisterii honorem prouectus super omnes nostris in temporibus in hac officii dignitate floreret." The death-roll (*ibid.*) also says of Gilbert: "Non philosophus tantum sed ex ipsius ore fons philosophie omnino manare crederetur. Liberalibus autem artibus ipsius animus adeo fuit informatus ut ab auditoribus suis simul cum artium auctoribus auctor et ipse putaretur." Cf. the epitaph of Gilbert in Paris Arsenal MS 1117B (ed. in *Gallia Christiana* II [1873] 1178): "Cunctis praececluit ipse magistris." This same epitaph (*ibid.*) calls Gilbert a second Boethius ("Hic alter recte dictusque Boetius ipse"). Cf. Everardus, *Dialogus* (ed. N. M. Haring, 'A Latin Dialogue on the Doctrine of Gilbert of

But Gilbert also had hardy opposition, and from such churchmen as Bernard of Clairvaux, Geoffrey of Auxerre, Gerhoh of Reichersberg, and Walter of St. Victor.¹³ The tension against Gilbert grew out of the feeling that he was attempting to insinuate new and novel ideas into the well-established faith¹⁴ and that he was exposing the divine mysteries and reducing them to a game of logic by practicing a kind of verbal slight of hand.¹⁵ Contemporaries frequently mention the subtlety of Gilbert's mind and the difficulty of keeping up with it.¹⁶

Poitiers,' *Mediaeval Studies* 15 [1953] 252): "Qui etsi pauca scripsit, si quis ea duce Spiritu intellectus perlegerit, peritior in omni facultate haec intelligendo efficietur quam si omnem aliorum percurreret paginam." On the mediaeval admirers of Gilbert, see Gammersbach, *Gilbert von Poitiers* 56-66, 118-136.

¹³ On the mediaeval opponents to Gilbert, see Gammersbach, *Gilbert von Poitiers* 43-52, 109-117.

¹⁴ Cf. Geoffrey of Auxerre, *Libellus Contra Capitula Gilberti Pictaviensis Episcopi* 1 (PL 185, 595): "Hi sunt panes absconditi quos celebris ille magister, Porreta agnomine nomine Gillebertus, suis non paruo tempore discipulis uenditarat: nec paucos eorum furtiuis inebriarat aquis, praesertim animos iuueniles nouitate gaudentes... Inter eiusmodi, noua dogmata celabantur; sed in lucem aliquando prodire." Cf. Alanus, *Vita Sancti Bernardi* 76 (PL 185, 516): "quasdam nouitates et ipse conscripserat" and "Ibi uenerabilis Abbas aduersus nouitates per biduum agens" and (*ibid.* col. 517): "praefatae nouitates dampnabantur." Cf. John of Salisbury, *Historia Pontificalis* 8 (ed. Chibnall 15): "uel quia ex nouitate uerborum absona uidebantur." Cf. Otto of Freising, *Gesta Friderici I* 54 (ed. Waitz 75-76): "Cuius dicti obscuritatem tamquam uerborum profanam nouitatem tam impacienter magister Iohelinus Suessionensium episcopus exceptit."

¹⁵ Cf. Geoffrey of Auxerre, *Libellus* 1 (PL 185, 595): "Hi sunt panes absconditi, quos celebris ille magister, Porreta agnomine nomine Gillebertus, suis non paruo tempore discipulis uenditarat: nec paucos eorum furtiuis inebriarat aquis... sine clauē, quae Christus est, in diuinas paginas irruentes; sine Spiritu, qui solus ea nouit, scrutantes ipsa etiam alta Dei." Cf. Geoffrey of Auxerre, *Vita Sancti Bernardi* III 15 (PL 185, 312): "discipulis suis panes proponebat absconditos" and "blasphemias euomuerat, graues quidem, sed uerborum quodam inuolucro circumseptas." Cf. John of Salisbury, *Historia Pontificalis* 12 (ed. Chibnall 26): "dicebatur a multis quod astu et obscuritate uerborum occultabat perfidiam." Cf. Walter of St. Victor, *Contra Quatuor Labyrinthos Franciae*, prol. (ed. P. Glorieux, 'Le "Contra Quatuor Labyrinthos Franciae" de Gauthier de Saint Victor,' *Archives d'hist. doct. et litt. du moyen âge* 19 [1952] 201): "Quisquis hec legerit non dubitabit quatuor labirinthos, id est Abeilardum et alium Lumbardum, Petrum Pictaviensem episcopum et Gislebertum Porretam uno aristotilico spiritu afflatos dum ineffabilia sancte Trinitatis et incarnationis scholastica leuitate tractarent, multas hereses olim uomuisse et adhuc errores pullulare."

¹⁶ Cf. Otto of Freising, *Gesta Friderici I* 48 and 52 (ed. Waitz 67-68 and 74-75): "consuetus ex ingenii subtilis magnitudine ac rationum acumine multa praeter communem hominum morem dicere" and "Hinc erat ut... sic in dictis se ostenderet difficilem ut numquam puerilibus uix autem eruditis et exercitatis quae ab eo dicebantur paterent animis." Cf. John of Salisbury, *Historia Pontificalis* 12 (ed. Chibnall 26): "ab aduersantibus non

His deep thinking had ample demonstration in 1148, at the Council of Rheims,¹⁷ where he was called to defend his views on the Trinity.¹⁸ At this trial Gilbert's learning and nimble thinking, as he rapidly cited authorities, dazzled.¹⁹ Indeed Pope Eugene III, who was presiding at the trial, could not follow Gilbert,²⁰ who was likewise too deep for St. Bernard²¹ and others to comprehend.²² After the brilliant, if also

potuit comprehendere." In cap. 13 of the same work (ed. Chibnall 28), John declares that Gilbert preached "ceteris subtilius." Geoffrey of Auxerre, in *Libellus* 40 (PL 185, 609), complains that Gilbert's explanations of Boethius' *Opuscula Sacra* were more obscure than the original text: "Lectoris diligentia perscrutetur glossam obscuriorem textu." Consider, furthermore, Everardus, *Dialogus* (ed. Haring 251): "Nolens condescendere capacitati plurium tam in legendo quam in scribendo minus studiosos ita submouit, ut sibi uideretur contumeliam diuinae scripturae uel etiam humanae philosophiae irrogare." See nn. 18 and 19 *infra*.

¹⁷ On the Council of Rheims (1148), see especially Hayen (*cit. supra* n. 1) 29-102; N. M. Haring, 'The Case of Gilbert de la Porrée, Bishop of Poitiers (1142-1154),' *Mediaeval Studies* 13 (1951) 1-40; Gammersbach, *Gilbert von Poitiers* 16-17, 65-75, 80-108; Misch, *Geschichte der Autobiographie*, tom. cit. 1273-1286; Haring 'Porretans and Greek Fathers' (*cit. supra* n. 1); *idem*, 'Glaubensbekenntnis', (*cit. supra* n. 1); and Dondaine (*cit. supra* n. 1) 13-16. Concerning our mediaeval sources on the Council, see two paragraphs below in the present paper.

¹⁸ Cf. Gammersbach, *Gilbert von Poitiers* 39: "Dem überwiegenden Teil von Gilberts Zeitgenossen, so muss man wohl sagen, ist dessen Trinitätslehre nicht nur dunkel, sondern geradezu häretisch erschienen."

¹⁹ Cf. Geoffrey of Auxerre, *Epistola ad Albinum* 6 (PL 185, 591): "Faciesbat episcopus in libris beati Hilarii, et de corpore canonum in quorundam Graecorum epistolis uerba minus intelligibilia, praesertim in tanta festinatione et in tanta ac tali multitudine, lectitari."

²⁰ According to Otto of Freising, *Gesta Friderici* I 58 (ed. Waitz 82), Pope Eugene III exclaimed "Multa, frater, dicis, multa et ea fortassis, quae a nobis non intelliguntur, legi facis." Everardus, *Dialogus* (ed. Haring 274) represents Eugene's difficulty: "Unde Papa Eugenius: 'Quomodo iudicabimus quod non intelligimus? Loquitur enim iste homo Deo, non hominibus.'"

²¹ Cf. the very bold statement of Everardus, *Dialogus* (ed. Haring 273 and Leclercq, 'Textes sur saint Bernard' 122): "Sed magistrum Gillebertum plene non intellexit (*sc.* Bernardus) nec causam dicti attigit et, sicut plerique sancti, aliqua se scire forte putauit que nesciuit, sicut Cyprianus, magnus martyr, et Origines et Hieronymus et etiam magnus Gregorius." By an inadvertence, probably due to the recurrence of *sicut* in the passage, Father Haring dropped from his edition (*loc. cit.*) "et sicut plerique" to "que nesciuit," and thus it is necessary to go back to the edition of Dom Leclercq (*loc. cit.*) for the missing words, even though Leclercq's edition intends, unlike Haring's, to provide only excerpts from the dialogue.

²² Cf. John of Salisbury, *Historia Pontificalis* 12 (ed. Chibnall 26): "Et quia ab aduersantibus non potuit comprehendere, dicebatur a multis quod astu et obscuritate uerborum occultabat perfidiam et religionem iudicis circumuenerat arte." Cf. Geoffrey of Auxerre, *Epistola ad Albinum* 6 (PL 185, 591): "Nec deerant qui pro eo se opponerent, licet parum intelligentes."

bewildering, defense, Gilbert was permitted to depart without condemnation or punishment.²³

Intense excitement must have been stirred by the Council,²⁴ which, held in the presence of the pope and other high-ranking churchmen from many sections of Europe,²⁵ enabled a spirited confrontation between the diametrically opposed factions of Bernard of Clairvaux, representing simple faith, and of Gilbert of Poitiers, representing independent reason.²⁶

The trial is certainly one of the more dramatic events of mediaeval history. Yet there are few contemporary sources for the episode.²⁷ Our main mediaeval literary informants are three: Otto of Freising and John of Salisbury, who were partisan to Gilbert, and Geoffrey of Auxerre, who was partisan to Bernard.²⁸ Otto, unlike John and Geoffrey, was not an eyewitness of the trial, as he was away then on a crusade.²⁹

In addition to the three authors, there is an important document

²³ On the outcome of the trial, see Grammersbach, *Gilbert von Poitiers* 71-75, 102-103.

²⁴ Cf. *ibid.* 80: "Der 'Fall Gilbert' muss in der damaligen wissenschaftlichen Welt ein ungeheueres Aufsehen erregt haben. Alles was Rang und Namen hatte, war nach Reims geeilt."

²⁵ On the dignitaries who attended the trial, see *ibid.* 81-85, and cf. Geoffrey of Auxerre, *Libellus* 4 (PL 185, 596): "congregatis quatuor regnorum episcopis, Galliae, Germaniae, Angliae, et Hispaniae."

²⁶ The characters of Bernard and Gilbert are masterfully contrasted in John of Salisbury, *Historia Pontificalis* 12 (ed. Chibnall 26-27).

²⁷ Cf. Leclercq, 'Textes sur Saint Bernard,' 107: "dossier assez pauvre des documents qui nous renseignent sur le concile de Reims de 1148" and "Il est peu de sources contemporaines qui nous informent sur le concile de Reims."

²⁸ Otto of Freising reports on the trial in his *Gesta Friderici* I 56-59 (ed. Waitz 80-85); John of Salisbury, in his *Historia Pontificalis* 8-14 (ed. Chibnall 15-41); and Geoffrey of Auxerre, in his *Libellus* (PL 185, 595-618) and in his *Epistola ad Albinum* (PL 185, 587-596), as well as in his *Vita Sancti Bernardi* 5 (PL 185, 510-512). On Otto as a source, see M. E. Williams, 'The Teaching of Gilbert Porreta on the Trinity as Found in His Commentaries on Boethius, *Analecta Gregoriana* 56 (1951) 112-124 and Grammersbach, *Gilbert von Poitiers* 58-61 and 131-136; on John of Salisbury as a source, see Williams, *op. cit.* 104-112, 124 and Grammersbach, *op. cit.* 56-58 and 136-139 and Chibnall (ed.), *John of Salisbury's Historia Pontificalis* xl-xli; on Geoffrey of Auxerre as a source, see Williams, *op. cit.* 82-104, 124 and Grammersbach *op. cit.* 44-47 and 109-112.

²⁹ Cf. John of Salisbury, *Historia Pontificalis* 8 and 11 (ed. Chibnall 17 and 25): "Quod uidi loquor et scribo" and "qui praesens aderam." Geoffrey, too, gives indication that he was present (e.g. "Ego fui qui obieci eidem episcopo, audientibus uniuersis" in *Epistola ad Albinum* 5 [PL 185, 590]). But Otto of Freising admits his absence, in *Gesta Friderici* I 57 (ed. Waitz 81): "dumque nos a Turcis dispersi Hierusalem tendentes per altum nauigaremus equor."

appearing in a twelfth-century codex containing principally the letters of Fulbert of Chartres and Hildebert of Le Mans, codex Vaticanus Reginensis Lat. 278. The document, also transcribed in the twelfth century, stands on folios 72-73 of the Reginensis.³⁰ This document, which its publisher Dom Jean Leclercq styles "Les 'actes' de cette suite au concile de Reims"³¹ is headed *Error Gilleberti Pictaviensis Episcopi*³² and is in three parts: the first part consists of the four wrong positions (called *Capitula*) with which Gilbert was charged and of citations from the Church Fathers after each wrong position to prove the fallacy of the position;³³ the second part consists of the symbolum, or profession of faith,³⁴ with which Gilbert concurred at the trial;³⁵ and the final part consists of a catalogue listing many of the archbishops, bishops, abbots, and *magistri scholarum* who were present in the Council.³⁶

The document was drawn up from an anti-Gilbertian view, as is clear from the heading *Error Gilleberti Pictaviensis Episcopi*; from the

³⁰ On the document in the Reginensis, see A. Wilmart, *Codices Reginenses* II (Vatican City, 1945) 83 (the codex as a whole is described on pp. 80-84) and the edition of Leclercq, 'Textes sur Saint Bernard' 107-109; see also Gammersbach, *Gilbert von Poitiers* 54-56 and Haring, 'Glaubensbekenntnis' (*cit. supra* n. 1) 65-67, 71. Neither Haring in his section entitled 'Das Konzil von Reims nach der Auffassung späterer Theologen,' 81-85, nor Leclercq mention the fact that William Fulman (1632-1688; see the *DNB* 7 [1950] 767-768) had already included in his own handwriting among his Collectanea, in present MS Oxford Corpus Christi College CCCXI fols. 222-223, the text of a document which takes cognizance of some participants at the Rheims Council and may be a direct transcription of the Reginensis text. On the Oxford manuscript see H. O. Coxe, *Catalogus Codicum Manuscriptorum Qui in Collegiis Aulisque Oxoniensibus Hodie Adseruantur* 2 (Oxford, 1852) 150-151; I am grateful to the authorities of the Bodleian and Corpus Christi College, Oxford for sending me a microfilm of fols. 222-3. It is also to be noted that Jean Mabillon, in his *Annales Ordinis Sancti Benedicti* lib. 79 (2nd ed.; 6 [Lucca, 1745] 399 ff.) published from an Ottobonian MS, which cannot be identified today and may be lost, a text similar to that of Leclercq's Reginensis—probably the Ottobonian and Reginensis texts were copied from the same source (see Gammersbach, *op. cit.* 84 n. 25). On Mabillon's document see F. Pelster, 'Petrus Lombardus und die Verhandlungen über die Streitfrage des Gilbert Porreta in Paris (1147) und Reims (1148), *Miscellanea Lombardiana* (Novara, 1957) 65-73; Gammersbach, *op. cit.* 55-56; 81-84; Haring, 'Glaubensbekenntnis' 84.

³¹ Leclercq, 'Textes sur Saint Bernard' 108.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.* 108-109.

³⁴ *Ibid.* 109.

³⁵ Cf. John of Salisbury, *Historia Pontificalis* 11 (ed. Chibnall 25): "Hiis episcopo consentiente."

³⁶ Leclercq, 'Textes sur Saint Bernard' 109.

series of wrong positions attributed to Gilbert, with only those quotations that were intended to refute him; and from the names of the *magistri scholarum* who seem to belong to the group of opponents of Gilbert.³⁷

The anti-Gilbertian character of the Vatican document was understood by Gammersbach: "Die Auswahl der Akten ist insofern anti-gilbertisch, als dem in vier Capitula formulierten "Error Gilleberti Pictaviensis Episcopi" nur Väterzitate aus dem Bernhardkreis folgen."³⁸ After thus pointing out the fact that the Vatican document represents only the case of the opposition to Gilbert, Gammersbach calls attention to the chief problem in reconstructing the history of the Rheims trial, the want of a record that would balance off the case of the opponents to Gilbert by disclosing the texts that Gilbert himself marshalled and hence the line of defense which he took: "Durch das Fehlen der von Gilbert vorgebrachten Väterstellen wird die Problematik der Reimser Diskussion nicht sichtbar."³⁹ But now it may indeed be possible to learn just what patristic passages Gilbert used in his stunning defense, through the assistance of a previously unknown record found on folios 96 to 100 of Trinity College Dublin codex 303 (C.3.21). Like the rest of the codex, which will be described more fully below, the Dublin record of the trial belongs to the latter part of the twelfth century. This document consists of four parts, to which I assign letters A to E. Parts A and D give the four errors or charges laid against Gilbert, which are substantially as reported in the Reginensis but conspicuously fuller;⁴⁰ part E presents the symbolum, which is known from the Reginensis as well as from Otto of Freising, Geoffrey of Auxerre, and John of Salisbury (who copied Geoffrey's text⁴¹ of the symbolum).⁴² But the heart and core of the document is also its most important contribution: part B, offering a group of thirty-one quotations from the Church Fathers, and part C, offering a valuable summary of the doctrines contained in these quotations. There is good reason, as will be shown, to believe that the quotations were used by Gilbert at his trial.

³⁷ Cf. *ibid.* 107-108: "Les écolâtres mentionnés paraissent tous appartenir au groupe des adversaires du Porrétaïn."

³⁸ Gammersbach, *Gilbert von Poitiers* 56.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ See nn. 1 and 82 *infra* on the Latin text.

⁴¹ Cf. John of Salisbury, *Historia Pontificalis* 11 (ed. Chibnall 25): "in scriptis memorati Gaufridi repperi."

⁴² See n. 86 *infra* on the Latin text.

First, it should be clear that like his opponents, Gilbert employed patristic passages to uphold his views at the Council—the trial may be considered as a war in which the opposing factions hurled at each other passages from the Church Fathers as the chief ammunition.⁴³ All three main literary sources Geoffrey of Auxerre, John of Salisbury, and Otto of Freising, state that Gilbert defended himself by the citing of authorities.⁴⁴ Adhemar of St. Ruf and the *Liber De Vera Philosophia* praise Gilbert's virile defense by means of such material.⁴⁵

What Church writers were quoted by Gilbert at his trial may be learned, in a small measure, from mediaeval sources. Geoffrey of Auxerre remarks "Faciebat episcopus in libris beati Hilarii et de corpore canonum in quorundam Graecorum epistolis uerba minus intelligibilia, praesertim in tanta festinatione et in tanta ac tali multitudine, lectitari."⁴⁶ And Hugo of Honau declares "Latebat tamen eum (sc. Petrum Tusculanum) quod beati Theoderiti et Sophronii scripta in Latinum translata saepe reuoluisset cum aliorum libris siue Graeco-

⁴³ Whereas his opponents had inscribed a single sheet with a few quotations, Gilbert, on the other hand, brought into the trial whole volumes of Church Fathers, from which the contexts of his testimonia could be ascertained: cf. Geoffrey of Auxerre, *Epistola ad Albinum* 3 (PL 185, 589): "cum magnorum uoluminum corpora per clericos suos Pictauiensis fecisset afferri et nos paucas auctoritates Ecclesiae in sola schedula haberemus, occasione accepta calumniabantur fautores illius hominis quod decurtata testimonia proferremus, cum ille codices integros exhiberet, ubi posset intelligi quemadmodum uerbis propositis praecedentia uel sequentia adhaerent." Cf. Otto of Freising, *Gesta Friderici* I 58 (ed. Chibnall 82): "Ille (sc. Gislebertus) orthodoxorum patrum, quas non in scedulis decidas, sed in corpore librorum integras attulerat, legi faciens auctoritates, eandem se quam illi fidem tenere asserebat." A notarius (cf. Otto *ibid.*) probably recorded the proof-texts cited by Gilbert's faction.

⁴⁴ Cf. John of Salisbury, *Historia Pontificalis* 13 (ed. Chibnall 30): "Congerebat et alia quibus refertus erat testimonia scripturarum ut per ea diuine simplicitatis astrueret ueritatem." Since "Congerebat" directly follows a long quotation from Ambrosius, *De Fide*, it is clear that "scripturarum" means writings of authority and is not confined to the Bible. Gammersbach, *Gilbert von Poitiers* 142, states "Wie keiner seiner Zeitgenossen war Gilbert in den Werken der Väter belesen." See nn. 19, 20, *supra* and 45 *infra*.

⁴⁵ Adhemar of St. Ruf, *Defensio Orthodoxae Fidei Gilberti Porretae*, prol. (ed. F. Pelster, 'Die anonyme Verteidigungsschrift der Lehre Gilberts von Poitiers im Cod. Vat. 561 und ihr Verfasser Canonicus Adhemar von Saint-Ruf in Valence (um 1180),' *Studia Mediaevalia: Festschrift R. J. Martin* (Bruges, 1948) 146: "in Remensi Concilio ubi ex sanctorum auctoritatibus se <et> scriptum suum uiriliter defendit." Cf. *Liber De Vera Philosophia* (ed. Paul Fournier, 'Un adversaire inconnu de S. Bernard et de Pierre Lombard,' *Bibl. Éc. Chartes* 47 [1886] 405): "Qui cum uiderent episcopum non solum rationibus irrefregalibus, sed etiam expressis auctoritatibus per omnia uiriliter resistentem, auctoritates tam multas non ausi dampnare, ne sic ipsi se ipsos manifeste probarent hereticos."

⁴⁶ Geoffrey of Auxerre, *Epistola ad Albinum* 6 (PL 185, 591).

rum siue Latinorum et maxime Athanasii et Hylarii, quorum suffragiis in Concilio Remensi coram Papa Eugenio contra suorum aemulorum oblocutiones usus fuit cum gloria."⁴⁷ The sources said by Geoffrey and Hugo to have been cited by Gilbert at his trial are all represented in part B of the Dublin document: Hilary,⁴⁸ Theoderitus,⁴⁹ Sophronius (to whose *Epistola Synodica*, twice quoted in the document,⁵⁰ Geoffrey may refer), and Athanasius (or more properly, Vigilius Tapsensis).⁵¹ Even more striking is the evidence from Otto of Freising, who records three quotations used by Gilbert in his defense at the trial: a quotation from Theoderitus, a quotation from Hilary, and a quotation from the enactments of a council of Toledo.⁵² All three quotations reported in Otto are found verbatim, or virtually verbatim, in part B of the Dublin document.⁵³ Furthermore, a correspondence exists between the summary (part C) of the quotations (part B) and the charges (parts A, D) in the record. Even much of the language of summary statement no. 3 and of charge no. 2 is identical. The summary shows that the quotations, singly or in groups, were drawn up to answer each of the errors charged against Gilbert at the Rheims trial. The statements of summation seem to substantiate the positions laid against Gilbert, positions which he, however, on the basis of patristic authority, regarded as sound and tenable. It is highly possible, then, that the Dublin document offers a most precious collection of quotations used by Gilbert of Poitiers in defense of himself at the Council of Rheims, 1148.

After the trial, as John of Salisbury discloses, Gilbert was sometimes tested by those who made a pretext of wanting to learn but Gilbert would escape their snares by referring to writings from authorities which he kept on hand, especially Hilary.⁵⁴ According to John, Hilary

⁴⁷ Hugo von Honau, *Liber De Diuersitate Naturae et Personae*, praef. (ed. A. Dondaine, 'Hugues Éthérien et Léon Toscan,' *Archives d'hist. doctr. et litt. du moyen âge* 19 [1952] 75; ed. Haring 122-123).

⁴⁸ See part B of the document, nos. 1-6.

⁴⁹ See *ibid.* no. 7.

⁵⁰ See *ibid.* nos. 29-30. Father Haring (*cit. supra* n. 6) 31, comments: "If he (*sc.* Gilbert) knew Greek at all, it must have been very little despite his special interest in the Greek Fathers."

⁵¹ See part B of the document, nos. 15-17, 20; cf. n. 36 *infra* on the text of the document.

⁵² See nn. 10, 21, 24 *infra* on the text of the document, and compare part B of the document, nos. 1, 8, 7.

⁵³ See n. 52 *supra*.

⁵⁴ Cf. John of Salisbury, *Historia Pontificalis* 12 (ed. Chibnall 26): "A pluribus sub discendi specie temptabatur sed auctoritatibus quas habebat ad manum et maxime Hilarii omnium tendiculas euadebat."

was most well known to Gilbert.⁵⁵ In fact, Gilbert seems to have had a special reputation for his mastery of Hilary and Augustine, though he is sometimes given credit for his knowledge of other Fathers as well. John of Salisbury, at one place, claims that Gilbert was more learned in Hilary and Augustine than in other Church authorities⁵⁶ and at another place, asserts that Gilbert knew quite thoroughly, just as common opinion held, the writings of Hilary, Jerome, and Augustine.⁵⁷ Similarly, the death-roll commemorating Gilbert speaks of his constant absorption in the works of Augustine, Athanasius, Jerome, and Hilary.⁵⁸ Gerhoh of Reichersberg accuses the Porretani of relying for their obscure christological notions upon great authorities, particularly Hilary and Augustine.^{58a} Interestingly enough, in the Dublin document, Augustine is cited thirteen times⁵⁹ (including three passages wrongly assigned to Augustine⁶⁰) and Hilary is cited six times.^{60a} They are the most frequently cited sources in the record, and the combined Hilary and Augustine (including Pseudo-Augustine) quotations in it constitute about two-thirds of the thirty-one excerpts. Athanasius (that is, Vigilius Tapsensis), mentioned in the death-roll, appears four times in the document.⁶¹

Another remarkable association with the document is provided by a brief memorandum of the proceedings against Gilbert, which is met on fol. 63 of Munich Staatsbibliothek cgm. 15824—the codex was once owned by a chapter library of Salzburg.⁶² This memorandum occurs at the end of Gilbert's fourth commentary on the tractates of Boethius. Both the commentary and the memorandum were inscribed in the

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* 13 (ed. Chibnall 29): "familiarissimus beatus Hylarius." Gammersbach, *Gilbert von Poitiers* 16, declares: "Die Werke des hl. Hilarius hatte sich nach Inhalt und Wortprägung wie wohl kein zweiter unter seinen Zeitgenossen zu eigen gemacht."

⁵⁶ John of Salisbury, *Historia Pontificalis* 8 (ed. Chibnall 17): "Familiaris erat beato Hilario et Augustino pre ceteris doctoribus."

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* 13 (ed. Chibnall 27): "Doctorum tamen uerba, Hylarii dico, Ieronimi, Augustini, et similibus, sicut opinio communis est, familiarius nouerat."

⁵⁸ Ed. Leclercq, 'L'Eloge funèbre' 184: "Magnos ecclesie dei doctores, Augustinum, Ieronimum, Athanasium, pre manibus et oculis semper habere cupiebat, Hylarii uero pictauiensis... eorum (eius MS) inquam assidue opera multiplicia perlegebat."

^{58a} Gerhoh, *Epistola* 23 (PL 193, 587B): "Ad huius pestiferæ doctrinæ sensum confirmandum putant se habere patronos magnos Hilarium et Augustinum."

⁵⁹ See part B of the document, nos. 10-11, 19, 21-23, 25-28; also 13, 18, 24.

⁶⁰ See part B of the document, nos. 13, 18, 24.

^{60a} See part B of the document, nos. 1-6.

⁶¹ See n. 51 *supra*, and n. 36 *infra* on the text of the document.

⁶² For a description of this codex, see Haring (*cit. supra* n. 9) 246 and C. Halm, *Catalogus Codicum Latinorum Bibl. Regiæ Monacensis* II, 3 (Munich, 1878) 38.

second half of the twelfth century.^{62a} The small piece reports the four errors along with the symbolum and represents, like the Vatican Reginensis, a hostile position toward Gilbert. Among the errors charged against Gilbert, in the Monacensis, is a belief that he upheld on the authority of a council of Toledo: "Hoc manifestissime uult illa auctoritas Toletani concilii que dicit non quod commune Trinitati sed quod proprium est Filii incarnatum est. Ista Gisilbertus."⁶³ The very passage cited here, from the canons of a Council of Toledo, does indeed appear in part B sections 8 and 9 of the Dublin document.

Still, it may be that the patristic collection in the Dublin document was the compilation of an early defender of Gilbert, rather like the patristic florilegium assembled on behalf of Gilbert by Adhemar of St. Ruf.^{63a} In fact, Adhemar quotes some of the same authorities, including Sophronius and Theodoretus,^{63b} and even has some texts roughly similar to a few texts of the Dublin codex—"roughly," because pronounced divergences emerge in the instances of correspondence: in Adhemar, III 3 (Haring, 'Vätersammlung,' 406) begins later and ends later than B 10-11 of the Dublin document; IV 6 (406), said to offer excerpts from Hilary, *De Trinitate* VIII 20-26 (PL 10, 251C-255C), would probably include the text of B 1-2; XIV 8 (411) seems to be shorter than B 24 and, unlike B 24, a free adaptation; XV 4 (412) is a shorter representation of the quotation in B 24; XV 7 (412) seems an adaptation, unlike B 25-26, which give the exact words; XVI 8 (413) is a longer passage than that of B 7; XIX 2 (414) begins later than, and seems to be a revision of, the quotation in B 18; XIX 8 (414) is a shorter representation of the quotation in B 20; XIX 15 (415) is a longer excerpt which probably includes the text represented by B 14; XXI 2 (417) displays a longer area in which may be situated the text of B 4-6; XXIV 2 (419) is a brief part of the excerpt in B 24; XXIV 5 (419) may be an adaptation of the quotation in B 31; XXIV 6 (419) begins later than B 29 and may be shorter.

The great majority of quotations in the Dublin collection do not

^{62a} See n. 74a *infra*.

⁶³ See Appendix to the present paper for the text of the memorandum in the Monacensis. I am grateful to the authorities of the Munich Staatsbibliothek for sending me a clear photograph of the text and allowing me to publish it.

^{63a} See Haring, 'Vätersammlung' (*cit. supra* n. 1). Since this publication records only the opening and closing words of each quotation in Adhemar's *Collectio*, it is difficult to ascertain whether or not a quotation is given in full and whether it is an exact text or an adaptation.

^{63b} See *ibid.* 408, 411, 413, 414, and 419.

appear in the collection of Adhemar, although he has more pieces. Also, none of Adhemar's passages accords well with any of the three passages reported by Otto of Freising as used at the trial by Gilbert: Adhemar VI 6 (Haring, 'Vätersammlung,' 406) does not give Hilary, *De Trinitate* VIII 21-22, which is in both Otto and the Dublin document,^{63c} but excerpts VIII 20-26 (PL 10, 251-255) of Hilary's work; Adhemar XVI 8 (413) does not give the short passage from Theodoretus which is in both Otto and the Dublin document^{63c} (Theodoretus, in *Acta Conciliorum Œcumenicorum*, ed. E. Schwartz, II 5 [1936] 152 lines 26-30) but a far longer passage (*ed. cit.* 151 line 31-153 line 2); and Adhemar does not give at all the passage from the Sixth Council of Toledo which is represented in both Otto and the Dublin document.^{63c}

Of course, it might be assumed that since Otto was not an eyewitness at the trial,^{63d} he may have mistaken a patristic collection by a follower of Gilbert as Gilbert's own quotations. But so gross an error is uncharacteristic for an historian of Otto's recognised stature—Manitius could remark of Otto "zum Geschichtschreiber geradezu geboren war" and "Dass er zur Kritik seiner Quellen befähigt war, ist selbstverständlich."^{63e} And the fact is that Otto, though he had been absent, was able to learn in considerable detail, and quite accurately, events of the trial.

It is likely, then, that Adhemar, in compiling a florilegium of passages in defense of Gilbert's ideas, would have examined Gilbert's own passages readied for the trial, would have amplified or contracted some of Gilbert's proof-texts, would have rejected certain of the extracts, and would have made numerous additions. Gilbert's quotations might even have provided the original nucleus for Adhemar's work, and hence perhaps arise the similarities between the Dublin document and Adhemar's *Collectio*. Dondaine has already observed: "Gilbert de la Porrée avait déjà accès à la plupart des autorités que le chanoine (*sc.* Adhemar) recueillera dans son *De Trinitate* ou la *Collatio*."^{63f}

Anyhow, whether the quotations of the Dublin document are those used by Gilbert himself at the trial in Rheims—and this seems a strong possibility—or are a compilation by an early sympathiser, the collection is highly valuable for the history of the Porretan movement.

^{63c} See n. 52 *supra*.

^{63d} See n. 29 *supra*.

^{63e} *Tom. cit.* (*supra* n. 1) 379.

^{63f} Dondaine, *Écrits* 65 n. 59.

Trinity College Dublin codex 303 (C.3.21), which houses the document on fols. 96 to 100, comprises one hundred leaves, consists of quaternions with a binion at the end, measures 206 mm. x 141 mm. (191-196 mm. x 101-104 mm.), has thirty-four lines to the full page, and seems to have been written by a single hand. The main contents of the codex (fols. 2-95^v) are Gilbert's commentaries on the *Opuscula Sacra* of Boethius, that is, on tractates 1, 2, 3 and 5 of this collection.⁶⁴ The text of the commentaries does not include the prologue that seems to have been added by Gilbert after the trial of 1148.^{64a} On fol. 1, may be noticed the Jupiter symbols of John Dee⁶⁵ and the cipher of Henry Savile.⁶⁶ The codex passed into the collection of Archbishop James Ussher,⁶⁷ Provost of Trinity College Dublin, and thence into the library of the College about 1660. T. K. Abbott, in his *Catalogue of Manuscripts in Trinity College Dublin* (Dublin and London, 1900, p. 47) wrongly assigns the twelfth-century codex to the fourteenth century and fails to make any mention of the document in the codex.

At the end of the fourth, and last, of Gilbert's commentaries in T.C.D. codex 303, on fol. 95^v, stands this explicit: "Seuerini boetij de trinitate liber explicit. G. pictauensis episcopi super boetium de trinitate tractatus explicit." Similarly, after the fourth commentary of Gilbert, on fol. 169^v, in Troyes codex Bibl. munic. 1841 (once G. 75 in the Library of the Monastery of Clairvaux) of the twelfth century, occurs "Explicit liber Boethii sanctae Trinitatis."⁶⁸ These explicits, especially that of the Dublin codex, strongly suggest that Gilbert's all four commentaries formed a unit that was called something like "Super Boetium De Trinitate Tractatus." So, it would seem that when Gilbert's contemporaries spoke of his commentary on Boethius' *De Trinitate*,⁶⁹ they probably meant collectively all four commentaries and

⁶⁴ Gilbert did not comment upon the fourth tractate, known as *De Fide Catholica*, which is sometimes regarded as not by Boethius (cf. Haring [*cit. supra* n. 7] p. 179 n. 11). The commentaries of Gilbert on the other tractates have been edited by Haring (see nn. 6, 7, and 9 *supra*).

^{64a} Cf. Haring (*cit. supra* n. 6) 26 and *idem* (*cit. supra* n. 7) 178 nn. 7, 10; cf. Gammersbach, *Gilbert von Poitiers* 23-24.

⁶⁵ The codex is not listed in M. R. James, 'List of Manuscripts Formerly Owned by Dr. John Dee,' *Supplement to the Transactions of the Bibliographical Society* 1 (1921).

⁶⁶ The codex is item no. 136 in J. P. Gilson, 'The Library of Henry Savile, of Banke,' *Transactions of the Bibliographical Society* 9 (1908) 184.

⁶⁷ Cf. William O'Sullivan, 'Ussher as a Collector of Manuscripts,' *Hermathena* 88 (1956) 40 n. 23.

⁶⁸ See Haring (*cit. supra* n. 6) 24 and *idem* (*cit. supra* n. 9) 246.

⁶⁹ Cf. Geoffrey of Auxerre, *Libellus* 3 (PL 185, 596): "Scripserat autem librum super

not simply the commentary on the first Boethian tractate, commonly known as *De Trinitate*.⁷⁰

Anyway, it is significant that the document dealing with the Rheims trial follows in the Dublin codex Gilbert's commentaries on the theological tractates of Boethius, for there is adequate historical evidence that it was these commentaries, or at least the commentary on the first Boethian tractate that brought Gilbert into trouble and was a center of contention at the Council.⁷¹ At the end of the trial Gilbert was instructed by Pope Eugene III to correct any doctrinal errors in his work on Boethius,⁷² a thing which Gilbert appears never to have done.⁷³

When editing the commentaries of Gilbert on Boethius' *Opuscula Sacra*, Father Haring did not use or remark on the Dublin codex. He did use these manuscripts:⁷⁴ (A) Paris Arsenal 1117B of the 12th century; (B) Basel Univ. Bibl. O II 24 of the 12th cent.; (C) Bamberg Staatl. Bibl. Q VI of the 12th cent.; (D) Paris Mazarine 656 of the 12-13th cent.; (E) Paris Mazarine 657 of the 13th cent.; (F) Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. 16371 of the 13th cent.; (G) Paris Sainte-Geneviève 1394 of the late 12th cent.; (H) Alençon, Bibl. Publ. 22 of the 13th cent.; (I) Bruges Bibl. Publ. 133 of the 12th cent.; (K) Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. 12120 of the 13th cent.; (L) London Brit. Mus. Harl. 3082 of the 12-13th cent.; (M) Munich Staatsbibl. clm. 17741 of the 12th cent.;

tractatum Boetii de Trinitate." Cf. Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sermones Super Cantica* 80, 8 (ed. J. Leclercq, C. H. Talbot, and H. M. Rochais, in *S. Bernardi Opera* II [Rome, 1958] 282; PL 183, 1170): "expositio illa in libro Gilleberti episcopi Pictauensis, quo super uerba Boetii de Trinitate, sanissima quidem atque catholica, commentabatur." Cf. John of Salisbury, *Historia Pontificalis* 8 and 11 (ed. Chibnall 15 and 23): "in commento eiusdem episcopi super Boetium de Trinitate" and "in commento eius super Boetium de Trinitate." Cf. Otto of Freising, *Gesta Friderici* I 58 (ed. Waitz 82): "In commentario enim super Boetium de trinitate..."

⁷⁰ Father N. M. Haring has edited the commentaries (see nn. 6, 7, and 9 *supra*).

⁷¹ See, for example, Geoffrey of Auxerre, *Libellus* 3 (PL 185, 596) and *Epistola ad Albinum* 3 (PL 185, 588-589) and *Vita Sancti Bernardi* III 15 (PL 185, 312); John of Salisbury, *Historia Pontificalis* 8 and 11 (ed. Chibnall 15 and 23); Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sermones Super Cantica* 80, 8 (ed. J. Leclercq *et alii* 282; PL 183, 1170); Adhemar of St. Ruf (ed. Pelster 145-146).

⁷² Cf. Geoffrey of Auxerre, *Libellus* 5 (PL 185, 597) and John of Salisbury, *Historia Pontificalis* 11 (ed. Chibnall 23-25).

⁷³ Haring (*cit. supra* n. 6) 25-27, *idem* (*cit. supra* n. 7) 178 n. 7, *idem* (*cit. supra* n. 9) 244.

⁷⁴ For descriptions of the manuscripts and textual discussions about them, see Haring (*cit. supra* n. 6) 28-30, *idem* (*cit. supra* n. 7) 178 n. 9 and 179-181, and *idem* (*cit. supra* n. 9) 245-247. I reproduce Father Haring's sigla and with one exception (see n. 74a *infra*), his datings.

(N) Munich Staatsbibl. clm. 18478 of the 12th cent.; (O) Munich Staatsbibl. clm. 15824 of the second half of the 12th cent.;^{74a}; (P) Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. 2178 of the 13th cent.; (Q) Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. 16341 of the 12th cent.; (R) Paris B. N. lat. 16342 of the 13th cent.; (S) Paris B. N. lat. 18093 of the 12th cent.; (T) Paris B. N. lat. 18094 of the 12th cent.; (U) Troyes Bibl. munic. 1841 of the 12th cent.; (V) Valenciennes Bibl. munic. 197 of the 12th cent.; (W) Rome Vat. lat. 560 of the 13th cent.; (X) Rome Vat. lat. 561 of the 12th cent.; (Y) Rome Vat. lat. 4254 of the 14th cent.; (Z) Rome Vat. Reg. lat. 420 of the 13th cent. Father Haring notes that among the manuscripts, FQPRVY constitute a group and that B frequently shows relationship to FQ.⁷⁵ He regards BFQ as representing "a fairly good text."⁷⁶

From the following examples it may be seen that the Dublin manuscript often agrees with (B)FQPRVY and sometimes quite strikingly with the PR subgroup. In the lists of examples below, I follow the page numbers of Father Haring's edition⁷⁷ and also the footnote numbers by which he calls attention to the individual readings; in each case, the reading before the colon is the reading adopted by Father Haring for his text. I depend upon his collations for all manuscripts except the Dublin text (cod.).

TRACTATE I

- | | |
|-------------|---------------------------------------|
| p. 41 n. 58 | refert: infert BFQRVY (with LT) cod. |
| 42.82 | contra: citra BFQV (with LT) cod. |
| 48.75 | insunt: insint BFQVY cod. |
| 61.8 | sed uoce: om. BFQ (with CL) cod. |
| 74.1 | et successione: om. BFQ (with L) cod. |
| 80.27 | de: om. FQPRV (with MT) cod. |
| 83.2 | eis: ea BFQ (with L) cod. |

TRACTATE II

- | | |
|-------------|-----------------------------|
| p. 90 n. 25 | esse: om. BPV (with L) cod. |
| 90.66 | et: om. BQPR (with L) cod. |
| 95.93 | et: om. BFQPV (with L) cod. |

^{74a} Father Haring (*cit. supra* n. 9) 246, dates the manuscript thirteenth century, but the script, still using caudate *e*, is clearly of the second half of the twelfth century. I have not seen photographs of any other manuscripts in his list.

⁷⁵ See Haring (*cit. supra* n. 6) 29, *idem* (*cit. supra* n. 7) 180-181, and *idem* (*cit. supra* n. 9) 247.

⁷⁶ Haring (*cit. supra* n. 6) 29 and *idem* (*cit. supra* n. 9) 247.

⁷⁷ See n. 70 *supra*.

TRACTATE III

- p. 188 n. 16 comprobat: approbat PR cod.
 190.40 aliquid: aliquid est PR (with C) cod.
 195.84 et: quia FQPRV (with E) cod.
 196.85 et: quia PRV cod.
 198.10 quam: quod PR cod.
 200.34 Sed numquam est totum esse: om. FQPR (with CL) cod.
 201.40 quidam: om. FQPRV (with CL) cod.
 205.34 denominatione: denominationem BFQPRV (with N) cod.
 207.50 sunt: sunt bona FQPR (with C) cod.
 208.57 id a quo sunt quicquid: id quod sunt a quo quicquid FQPRV (with CLS) cod.
 210.75 quam: quoniam PRV (with C) cod.

TRACTATE V

- p. 251 n. 20 quod est: om. FQRV (with LT) cod.
 251.26 motu: om. FR (with L) cod.
 252.11 noua aut: om. PR cod.
 255.2 afferebam: asserebam PR cod.
 255.4 afferebam: asserebam PR cod.
 264.36 intellige: intelligere FQPR (with L) cod.
 280.10 diuiduum: indiuiduum FQR (with KMS, *e corr.* Y) cod.
 280.13 dissimilia: similia FQPR (with L) cod.
 297.27 uero: om. PR cod.
 299.32 mixtura: natura PR (with DL) cod.
 307.17 est: om. PR cod.
 314.14 deus: om. FPR (with L) cod.
 315.14 certa: creata FQPRY (with LT, *e corr.* V) cod.
 316.1 ministra: ministrat PR (with D) cod.
 316.5 disputatione: disputationem PR (with DW) cod.
 316.11 et: om. PRVY (with L) cod.
 317.7 gemina: geminam PRY cod.
 318.17 eidem: eidem quidem FQPRVY cod.
 318.24 sumptam: susceptam PR cod.
 319.4 humana: humana natura FQVY cod.
 320.9 propagatione: propagine PRVY cod.
 321.18 igitur: ergo FQPR cod.
 325.13 omnibus: hominibus FPRY cod.
 325.24 quae: quod PRY (with L) cod.
 325.25 ostenderet: ostendit FQPRY ostenderit cod.
 326.10 est: id est PR cod.
 326.11 uidelicet: om. PR cod.
 327.20 exceptit: accepit FQRVY (with K) cod.
 327.27 dicit: dixit FQPRVY cod.
 329.21 quod: qui PR cod.
 330.6 nouae: nouae nomine PR nouae nominis cod.
 332.7 et: etiam FQPRVY (with LT) cod.
 332.24 possint: possunt FQPRV (with ST) cod.

334.14	conformitate: om. FQPR (with DW) cod.
335.11	corpora: corporea FPR (with TU) cod.
335.12	in: et FQPRVY cod.
340.3	quod: quae PRV (with E, <i>e corr.</i> Y) cod.
340.16	quod: qui FQVY cod.
341.7	quae: qui FQPRVY (with T) cod.
341.19	quoniam: quia FQVY cod.
344.27	ipsam: ipsa FQPRVY (with LT) cod.
345.18	deitate: diuinitate FQPRVY (with EG) cod.
347.8	non: om. FQPRVY (with DEW) cod.
348.5	diuina: diuina scilicet FQVY cod.
349.2	quaerendum: quaerendum est FQR (with EW) cod.
349.12	etiam: om. FQRV cod.
349.16	didicerat: dixerat PR cod.
349.21	calce: calcem FQPR (with E) cod.
349.23	quoniam: om. FPR cod.
349.28	dictae: praedicta FQPVY predictae cod.
350.1-2	coniunctione quadam: commixtione quadam siue coniunctione PR cod.
352.19	et patiendi: om. FQPR cod.
353.22	non: nec FQPR cod.
354.16	rationem: ratione FQPR (with T) cod.
354.19	quae: prae PR cod.
354.20	certis: caeteris PR cod.
356.9	non: nec FQPRVY (with E) cod.
356.12	factus: factus est FQPR (with E) cod.
357.4	docuit: docuit nos FQPRVY cod.
357.17	solo: om. PR cod.

The similarity between the Dublin text of the commentaries and (B)FQPRVY, and especially subgroup PR, must not be too forcefully pressed, since not a few instances arise when the Dublin codex presents a reading accepted as correct by Father Haring for his edition but not shared by members of (B)FQPRVY. Consider the following:

TRACTATE I

p. 39 n. 32	ENIM: om. BFRVY (with CLMT)
40.81	oratoris: oratoris quidem BFQR (with S, deleted in M)
42.66	intelligatur: intelligitur BFQR (with ENOT)
51.38	deo: eo BFQR (with C)
63.92	scilicet: id est BFQR (with LMT)
74.20	et (deleted in codex): om. FQR (with CDLMTW)
74.28	tantum: tamen FQR
79.99	habebam: habeam FQP (with DLM)
80.29	ac: et BRVY (with EHKNOU)
86.45	aliquid: aliquid FQPRY (with X)
88.25	monstrantur (monstrentur cod.): demonstrentur BFQPRVY (with DHLMTW)

TRACTATE II

- p. 89 n. 48 conformans: confirmans PRV (with W)
 91.49 una: unam BFQP (with LT)
 91.51 in: om. BPVY (with EILMTWX)
 93.11 id: idem FQR

TRACTATE III

- p. 184 n. 25 Eoque: Eo quod PR (with EM)
 184.29 ad: ab PRV (with X)
 188.21 dicunt: dicuntur PR (with X) dicitur B
 188.23 Principio: principio est PR
 193.62 diuersam: diuersas FQV (with CE)
 199.22 exemplo: exemplum PR
 200.32 dicitur: om. PR (with S)
 203.14 quod: quo BPR
 204.21 esset: om. PR
 208.63 sunt: sint FQV (with CLET)
 209.64 qui: quia PR (with N)
 209.69 respondet: respondit FPR
 210.77 actum: actu PR

TRACTATE V

- p. 260 n. 5 est: om. PRV
 260.15 natiua: natura PRV (with K)
 264.35 sin: si BPR (with E)
 265.22 corporeorum: incorporea PR
 265.26 corporum: corporeum PR
 273.22 native: naturae PRV (with T)
 280.11 quales: aequales PR (with U) qualitas LT consimiles B
 296.9 specifica: specificata PR
 299.31 aliquid: aliud PR
 303.29 proferunt: proferuntur PR
 305.18 earundum: earum PR
 315.19 assumpta: sumpta PR
 326.5 ab: ad PR
 326.6 ab: ad PR
 327.22 assumptum: sumptum FQPR
 328.9 igitur: om. PR
 329.22 addidit: om. PR (with D)
 332.12 Itaque: Itaque lapis PR
 334.4 esse: om. PR
 338.9 (6 by misprint) uero: om. FQVY
 343.15 namque: tamen PR
 343.24 impedire: implere PR
 344.14 connexio: connexio qua dicitur PR
 344.26 humanitatis: humanitati PR

345.15	quo: quod PR (with E)
346.23	humana: diuina PR
346.24	homo: deus PR
346.25	<i>pr.</i> est: est homo PR
348.22	nullo: nullo modo PR
351.15	naturam: om. PR
353.10	quis: qui PRVY (with U)
355.24	semper: saepe PR
357.19	bonum: om. PR

Indeed there are several moderately long omissions in PR that are not represented in the Dublin codex:

TRACTATE III

p. 201. n. 44 suum—esse: om. PR

TRACTATE V

p. 265 n. 18 solis—philosophorum: om. PR
 271.33 generatio nec abscessu: om. PR
 275.10 conuenit—quibus: om. PR
 280.20 lapidis uel huius (huius om. cod.): om. PR
 281.21 persona pars—quod: om. PR
 347.14 Et—uirtus: om. PR

In editing the complete document of the Dublin codex T. C. D. 303, I have copied the text directly from the codex and I have deliberately made as few changes as possible. The orthography of the original is retained, and no attempt is made to bring the patristic passages textually in line with recent editions. But obvious scribal slips are corrected, with proper notice of the manuscript readings in the footnotes. For convenience of reference I have lettered the larger divisions of the text and numbered the smaller sections.

It is my pleasure to thank the Board of Trinity College, Dublin, for generous permission to reproduce now, for the first time, the document, which I had the happy fortune to discover in 1961.

[A]¹

(f. 96) [1] Quod diuina natura, id est diuinitas, et eterna illa indiuisa et

¹ The four charges of part A are repeated in part D of the Trinity College Dublin record of the Rheims trial (see n. 82 *infra*). The charges in parts A and D correspond to the text of these charges in codex Vat. Reginensis Lat. 278 (12th cent.) fols. 72-73 (ed. Leclercq, *Mediaeval Studies* 14, 108), in Laon MS 176 (12th cent.) fol. 45-45^v and Douai

simplex essentia non sit Deus sed sit forma quedam qua Deus est sicut² humanitas non est homo sed forma qua^{2a} est homo. [2] Quod non unus Deus uel una substantia aut unum aliquid sit tres persone, id est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, sed essentia quidem uel natura una numero sit in eis pro qua dicitur esse unus Deus. Ipse uero tres persone tria sint differentia numero ac si tres homines humanitatem unam numero habere³ inuenirentur. [3] Quod proprietates personarum relationes quedam eterne⁴ sint que non sunt ipse persone sed res diuise^{4a} numero a diuina substantia, et habeant tres unitates, et sic multa eterna sint quorum nullum sit Deus. [4] Quod diuina natura non sit incarnata, sed tantum de persona Filii id concedendum sit. Natura autem⁵ illa que una est in tribus personis minime sit incarnata.

[B]

[1] Beatus Hilarius, Pictauiorum episcopus, in libro viii de Trinitate:⁶ "Discerne ergo, o heretice, spiritum Christi a spiritu Dei et excitati a mortuis spiritum Christi a spiritu Dei Christum a mortuis excitantis cum qui habitat in nobis spiritus Christi, spiritus Dei sit;⁷ et cum spiritus Christi a mortuis excitati, spiritus tamen Dei sit Christum a mortuis excitantis. Et quero nunc in spiritu Dei utrum naturam an rem nature significatam⁸ existimes. Non enim idem natura est quod nature res est sicuti non idem est homo et quod hominis est. Nec idem est ignis et quod ignis ipsius est. Et secundum hoc non idem est Deus et quod Dei est."

[2] Idem⁹ in subsequentibus:¹⁰ "Habitat enim in nobis Christus et habitante

MS 365 (12th cent.) fol. 2-2^v (these Laon and Douai texts are each partly published by Leclercq, *ibid.* 110: see also n. 82 *infra*), in Munich MS clm. 15824 (see Appendix to the present paper), and in Mansi, *Concilia*, 21, 711-712. On the other hand, all of these texts differ from the text of the charges in Geoffrey of Auxerre, *Libellus* 64-67 (PL 185, 617) and from the charges raised against Gilbert at the Paris inquiry of 1147 (Otto of Freising, *Gesta Friderici* I, 52, ed. Waitz 75). Concerning the four counts, see Gammersbach, *Gilbert von Poitiers* 86-87, also 55 n. 72 and 77 n. 16. In the Dublin codex a space was left for a large initial at the beginning of each section of parts A, C, and E (also for the initial of *Concilium* before E 1 and for the initial of the second *cum* in E 2), as well as at the beginning of B 1, 4-6, 8-15, 18-29, 31, and D 1-3 (also for the initial of *Gislebertus* before D 1). I shall supply in all these instances the required letter.

² sicut *bis* *cod.*

^{2a} que *cod.*

³ hre *cod.*

⁴ quedam eterne: eterne quedam (*corr. m. ead.*) *cod.*

^{4a} diuine *cod.*

⁵ aut *cod.*

⁶ Hilarius, *De Trinitate* VIII, 21-22 (PL 10, 252C-253 A). On the use of Hilary at the trial, see Dondaine, *Écrits* 16.

⁷ sit: sit christum am (*christum am exp. m. ead.*) *cod.*

⁸ sigcatam *cod.*

⁹ Dem *cod.*

¹⁰ Hilarius, *De Trinitate* VIII, 26 (PL 10, 255A-255C). Otto of Freising, *Gesta Friderici* I, 58 (ed. Waitz 84), indicates that Gilbert cited this very passage at the Rheims trial: "Et illa Hilarii: 'Discerne, igitur, o heretice, spiritum Christi ab spiritu Dei et excitati a

Christo habitat Deus. Et cum habitat in nobis spiritus Christi, habitante tantum spiritu Christi in nobis non alius habitat quam spiritus Dei. Quod si per Spiritum sanctum Christus in nobis esse intelligatur, hunc tamen ita spiritum Dei ut spiritum Christi esse noscendum est. Et cum per naturam Dei natura in ipsa inhabitat in nobis, indifferens natura Filii esse credatur a Patre cum Spiritus sanctus, qui spiritus est Dei et spiritus Christi est, res nature esse demonstratur unius. Quero nunc igitur quomodo non ex natura unum sunt. A Patre procedit spiritus ueritatis et a Filio accipit et a Filio mittitur. Sed omnia que habet Pater Filii sunt, et ideo qui ab eo accipit Dei spiritus est. Sed idem et spiritus Filii est. Res nature Filii est. Sed et eadem res et nature Patris est et Dei excitantis Christum a mortuis spiritus est. Sed idem et spiritus Christi est a mortuis excitati.¹¹ In aliquo differat natura Christi et Dei natura ne eadem sit si prestari potest ut spiritus qui est Dei non sit et Christi."

[3] Idem¹² in libro¹³ de synodis:¹⁴ "Sed quia frequens nobis nuncupatio (f. 96v) essentie¹⁵ ac substantie necessaria est, cognoscendum est quid significet essentia ne de rebus locuturi rem uerborum nesciamus. Et quidem essentia est res que est uel ex quibus est et que in eo quod maneat subsistit. Dicitur autem essentia et natura et genus et substantia unius cuius rei poterit. Proprie autem essentia ideo est dicta quia semper. Que ideo etiam substantia est, quia res que est, necesse est subsistat in sese. Quicquid autem subsistit, sine dubio in genere uel natura uel substantia maneat. Cum ergo essentiam dicimus significare naturam uel genus substantiam, intelligimus huius rei que in his omnibus semper esse subsistit."

[4] Item in eodem:¹⁶ "Non est portio aliqua sed totus est. Non est auctor ipse sed imago est: ymago Dei ex Deo in Deum nata. Non est creatura sed Deus est. Non alter Deus in genere sed unus Deus per substantie indifferents¹⁷ essentiam. Non persona Deus unus est sed natura quia nichil in se diuersum ac dissimile habeat natus et generans."

[5] Item in eodem:¹⁸ "Si ergo naturam neque aliam neque dissimilem ei quem impassibiliter generabat, dedit non potest aliam dedisse nisi propriam. Ita similitudo proprietas est, proprietas equalitas est. Equalitas nichil differt. Que autem nichil differunt unum sunt non unione¹⁹ persone sed equalitate persone nature."

mortuis spiritum Christi a spiritu Dei Christum a mortuis excitantis. Et quero nunc in spiritu Dei utrum naturam an rem naturae significatam existimes. Non idem est enim natura, quod naturae res est, sicuti non idem est homo, et quod hominis est, nec idem est ignis, et quod ignis est ipsius. Et secundum hoc non idem est Deus et quod Deus est." On Gilbert's use of Hilary at the Rheims trial, see also the statements of Hugo of Honau and Geoffrey of Auxerre (cited in n. 65 *infra*); cf. Haring, *Mediaeval Studies* 24, 190-191.

¹¹ excitati: excitati ne *cod.*

¹² Dem *cod.*

¹³ libro *cod.*

¹⁴ Hilarius, *Liber De Synodis* 12 (PL 10, 490A).

¹⁵ eentie *cod.*

¹⁶ Hilarius, *Liber De Synodis* 69 (PL 10, 526BC).

¹⁷ indiffrijis *cod.*

¹⁸ Hilarius, *Liber De Synodis* 74 (PL 10, 529A).

¹⁹ unioe *cod.*

[6] Item in eodem:²⁰ "Caret igitur similitudo, fratres, nature contumelie suspitione nec potest uideri Filius idcirco in proprietate Paterne nature non esse quia similis est cum similitudo nulla sit nisi ex equalitate nature. Equalitas autem nature non potest esse nisi una sit. Vna uero non persone unitate sed generis."

[7] Beatus Theodericus contra Sabellium:²¹ "Oportet igitur desiderantes spirituales diuitias et uolentem Christianorum dogmata uendicare rerum non ignorare proprietatem ne forte aliud pro aliis intelligens circa dogmata²² peccet. Qui enim naturam et personam idem esse intelligit aut in Arrii diuisionem incidit aut in confusionem²³ Sabellii."

[8] De concilio Toletano vii^o:²⁴ Conuenientibus Hispanorum Gallieque pontificibus: "Solus uerbum caro factum est et habitauit in nobis, et cum tota cooperata sit Trinitas formationem suscepti hominis, quoniam inseparabilia sunt opera Trinitatis, solus tamen Filius accepit hominem in singularitate persone, non in unitate diuine nature, id est idem quod proprium est Filii non quod commune est Trinitati. Nam si unam nati hominis Deique alteram confecisset personam, tota Trinitas corpus assumpsisset quoniam constat naturam Trinitatis esse unam, non tamen personam."

[9] Item de concilio Toletano xi^o:²⁵ "Vnius substantie credimus esse Deum Patrem credimus et Filium (f. 97) et Spiritum sanctum. Non tamen dicimus quod huius Trinitatis unitatem Maria uirgo genuerit sed tantummodo Filium

²⁰ Hilarius, *Liber De Synodis* 76 (PL 10, 530A).

²¹ Theodoretus, *De Trinitate*, PG 83, 1170AB; ed. E. Schwartz, *Acta Conciliorum Œcumenicorum* II, 5 (1936) 152. Otto of Freising, *Gesta Friderici* I, 58 (ed. Waitz 84), indicates that Gilbert cited this very passage at the Rheims trial: "Hac Theodereti contra Sabellium utens auctoritate 'Oportet igitur desiderantem spirituales diuitias et uolentem christianorum dogmata uendicare rerum non ignorare proprietatem, ne forte aliud pro aliis intelligens circa dogmata peccet. Qui enim naturam et personam idem esse intelligit, aut in diuisionem Arrii incidit, aut in confusionem Sabellii.'" Just as the author of the passage cited in the Trinity College Dublin record is named Theodorus (instead of Theodoretus or Theoderetus), so *Theodoricus* appears in the Vat. Reginensis record (ed. Leclercq, *Mediaeval Studies* 14, 108; cf. also *ibid.* 108 n. 10), and *Theodorici* and *Theoderici* are found in the manuscript tradition of Otto of Freising's *Gesta Friderici* I, 58 (see Waitz's apparatus, 84 note b). On Gilbert's use of Theoderitus at the Rheims trial, see the statement of Hugo of Honau (cited in n. 65 *infra*); cf. Haring, *Mediaeval Studies* 24, 187-189, 191.

²² dogmata (*corr. m. ead.*) *cod.*

²³ confusione *cod.*

²⁴ *Concilium Toletanum* VI, preamble (PL 84, 393C; PL 130, 485D) and cap. 1 (PL 84, 395B; PL 130, 487CD). Otto of Freising, *Gesta Friderici* I, 58 (ed. Waitz 84) indicates that Gilbert cited this very passage at the Rheims trial: "Item quod non natura, sed filii persona carnem suscepisse credenda sit, hac auctoritate Toletani concilii ostendit: 'Solus uerbum caro factum est et habitabit in nobis. Et cum tota cooperta sit trinitas formationem suscepti hominis, quoniam inseparabilia sunt opera trinitatis, solus tamen accepit hominem in singularitate personae non [in] unitate diuinae naturae, id est id quod est proprium filii, non quod commune trinitati.'" See n. 25 *infra*.

²⁵ *Concilium Toletanum* XI (PL 84, 456AB; PL 130, 539BC): cf. the reference in Munich MS clm. 15824 (see Appendix to the present paper) to either this council or to that of n. 24 *supra*.

qui solus naturam nostram in unitatem persone sue assumpsit. Incarnationem quoque huius Filii Dei tota Trinitas operata esse credenda est quia inseparabilia sunt opera Trinitatis, solus tamen Filius formam serui accepit in singularitate persone non in unitate diuine nature, id est in id quod est proprium Filii non quod commune Trinitati, que forma²⁶ illi ad unitatem persone coaptata est ut Filius Dei et Filius²⁷ hominis sit Christus.”

[10] Augustinus super psalmos:²⁸ “‘Infixus sum in limo profundi et non est substantia.’ Vnde ergo ‘non est substantia?’ An limus ille non est substantia? Intelligimus ergo quid sit ‘et non est substantia’ si prius intellexerimus quid sit substantia. Substantia quippe dicitur et diuitiarum secundum quam dicimus: ‘Habet substantiam suam et Perdidit substantiam suam.’”

[11] Idem de eodem:²⁹ “Intelligitur alio modo substantia, illud quod sumus quicquid sumus. Sed hoc ad intelligendum aliquando difficilius est quamquam res usitate sint. Sed quia verbum inusitatum est, indiget^{29a} considerationis et expositionis aliquantule. Cui tamen si intenti fuerimus, fortassis in ea non laborabimus. Dicitur ergo homo, dicitur pecus, dicitur terra, dicitur celum, dicitur sol luna lapis mare aer. Omnia ista substantie sunt eo ipso quo sunt. Nature ipse substantie dicuntur. Deus est quedam substantia. Nam quod nulla substantia nichil omnino. Substantia ergo aliquid esse est. Vnde etiam in fide catholica contra uenena hereticorum quorundam sic³⁰ edificamur ut dicamus Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum unius esse substantie. Quid est unius³¹ substantie? Verbi gratia: Si aurum est et Pater, aurum est et Filius, aurum est et Spiritus sanctus. Quicquid est Pater quod Deus, hoc Filius, hoc Spiritus sanctus. Cum autem Pater est, non illud est quod est. Pater enim non ad se sed ad Filium dicitur; ad se autem Deus dicitur. Itaque eo ipso quoque Deus est, hoc ipso substantia. Quia eiusdem substantie Filius, procul dubio et Filius Deus est. At uero quod Pater est, quia non substantie nomen est sed refertur ad Filium, non sic dicimus Filium Patrem esse quomodo dicimus Filium Deum esse. Queris quid sit Pater. Respondetur: ‘Deus.’ Queris quid sit Filius. Respondetur: ‘Deus.’ Queris quid sit Pater et Filius. Respondetur: ‘Deus.’ De solo Patre interrogatus, respondes:³² ‘Deum;’ de solo Filio interrogatus, ‘Deum’ respondes;³² de utroque interrogatus, ‘Deum’ respondes³² non ‘deos.’”

[12] De sinodo Bracarenensi cap. ii:³³ “Siquis extra sanctam Trinitatem mala nescio que diuinitatis nomina introducit dicens quod ipsa diuinitas sit Trinitas sicut Gnostici (f. 97v) et Priscillianus dixerunt, anathema sit.”

²⁶ forma: forma a (*alt. a exp. m. ead.*) *cod.*

²⁷ filius (*et i inter l et u ss. m. ead.*) *cod.*

²⁸ Augustinus, *Enarrationes Super Psalmos*, Ps. 68 sermo 1, cap. 4 (PL 36, 843-844; *Corpus Christianorum*, ser. lat., 39 [1956], 904).

²⁹ Augustinus, *Enarrationes Super Psalmos*, Ps. 68 sermo 1, cap. 5 (PL 36, 844-845; *Corpus Christianorum*, ser. lat., 39, 905-906).

^{29a} indige *cod.*

³⁰ sicut *cod.*

³¹ unius: unius esse (*esse exp. m. ead.*) *cod.*

³² respondens *cod.*

³³ *Concilium Bracarense* I, cap. 2 (PL 84, 563C; PL 130, 567A).

[13] Augustinus in libro questionum ueteris et noue legis:³⁴ "Vnus quidem sed non singularis. Habet exterius in misterio alterum qui sit cum altero."

[14] Ambrosius de fide ad Gratianum imperatorem:³⁵ "quod unius est substantie separari non potest, et si non sit singularitatis sed unitatis."

[15] Athanasius:³⁶ "Generans Pater ex se ipso Filium hoc genuit quod est ipse an aliud aliquid?"

[16] Athanasius:³⁷ "Ergo non extrinsecus neque ex nichilo neque ex aliqua precedente aut subsequente materia sed ex se ipso genuit et non aliud quam quod ipse genuit."

[17] Athanasius:³⁸ "Et nos confitemur quia alius alium genuit, sed si de ipso, id est de [id quod ipse est et] hoc quod ipse est, genuit, quia alterius substantie uel diuersi generis Filius esse non poterit ac si unius atque eiusdem cum Patre substantie erit."

[18] Augustinus in libro de fide sancte Trinitatis:³⁹ "Plane absque omni dubitatione credendum est Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum unum esse Deum omnipotentem eternum incommutabilem et singulus horum Deus et simul omnes unus Deus et singulus quisque horum⁴⁰ plena et perfecta et eterna substantia et simul omnes una substantia. Quia quicquid est Pater quod Deus est, quo substantia est, quo eternitas est, hoc Filius est, hoc Spiritus sanctus est. Ita etiam Filius, eo quod Deus est, quo substantia est, quo eternitas est, hoc Pater est, hoc Spiritus sanctus. Et quicquid Spiritus sanctus, eo quo Deus est, quo substantia est, quo eternitas est, hoc Pater est et Filius, una in tribus diuinitas, una essentia, una omnipotentia, et quicquid substantialiter de Deo dici potest. Si forte de Patre solo interrogatus fueris quid sit Pater, responde 'Deus.' Interrogatus de Filio, responde 'Deus.' Interrogatus de Spiritu sancto, responde 'Deus.' Si simul de Patre et Filio et Spiritu sancto, non deos sed Deum responde unum omnipotentem incommutabilem."

[19] Augustinus in libro vii'o de Trinitate:⁴¹ "Hoc est ergo ibi esse quod sapere. Quodsi hoc est ibi esse quod sapere, non per illam sapientiam quam genuit sapiens est Pater. Alioquin non ipse illam sed illa eum genuit. Quid enim aliud dicimus cum dicimus 'Hoc illi est esse quod sapere' nisi 'Eo est quo sapiens est?' Quapropter que causa illi est ut sapiens sit ipsa illi causa est ut sit."

³⁴ Pseudo-Augustinus, *Quaestiones Veteris et Noui Testamenti* 87b (PL 35, 2280). This b section is not found with 87 in the edition of A. Souter in CSEL 50 (1908), 148.

³⁵ Ambrosius, *De Fide Ad Gratianum Imperatorem* V, 46 (PL 16, 658D).

³⁶ Vigilius Tapsensis, *Contra Arianos, Sabellianos, Photinianos Dialogus* II, 4 (PL 62, 199D). Vigilius is similarly cited as Athanasius in the record of Vat. Reginensis Lat. 278 (see edn. of Leciercq, *Mediaeval Studies* 14, 108-109 and 108 n. 12, 109 nn. 15, 16). Athanasius is actually a speaker in Vigilius' dialogues. On the use of "Athanasius" by Gilbert at the Rheims trial, see the statement of Hugo of Honau (cited in n. 65 *infra*).

³⁷ Vigilius Tapsensis, *Contra Arianos* . . . , II, 4 (PL 62, 199D-200A).

³⁸ Vigilius Tapsensis, *ibid.* (PL 62, 200A).

³⁹ Alcuinus, *De Fide Sanctae et Indiuidualae Trinitatis* I, 2 (3) (PL 101, 15CD).

⁴⁰ horum: horum deus (deus *exp. m. ead.*) *cod.*

⁴¹ Augustinus, *De Trinitate* VII, 1 (PL 42, 935-936).

[20] Athanasius:⁴² "Si itaque horum trium commune⁴³ nomen requiras, unus Deus est, in quo uno⁴⁴ singulari nomine baptismi misterium celebratur. 'Baptizate' inquit 'gentes in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti.'⁴⁵ Iuxta quam nominis communionem, et Pater Deus et Filius Deus et Spiritus sanctus Deus dicitur et cum unusquisque⁴⁶ eorum singulariter Deus sit, deos tamen eos pluraliter dicere nature unitas non admittit quoniam nature plurale esse non potest, et ideo Trinitas non pluraliter dii sed unus dicitur Deus. Vbi uero peculiare aliquid (f. 98) et quod in aliud non recipiat inest, ibi et pluralitas et distinctio haberi potest. Quia ergo Pater proprie dicitur et Filius proprie nuncupatur et Spiritus sanctus propria appellatione distinguitur nec potest Pater Filius nec Filius Pater nec Spiritus sanctus aut Filius aut Pater intelligi, dilectissime,⁴⁷ secundum distinctionem personarum tres nominantur, qui tamen secundum nature unionem numerari non possunt. Et ideo tria sunt nomina in personis Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, unum nomen in natura Deus, et ob hoc tres unus Deus. Ergo nec confusio in tribus nec diuersitas in uno admittitur nomine, ac sic Trinitas unitas unus Deus secundum nature unionem et unus Deus Trinitas est secundum personarum distinctionem."

[21] Augustinus:⁴⁸ "Homines minus intelligentes quid et propter quid dicatur potentes uolunt habere sententias, et scripturis non diligenter scrutatis cum arripiunt defensionem cuiusque opinionis, et ab ea uel numquam vel difficile deflectuntur; docti atque sapientes magis putari quam esse concupiscunt. Ea que secundum formam serui dicta sunt uolunt transferre ad formam Dei et rursus que dicta sunt ut ad se inuicem persone referantur uolunt nomina esse nature atque substantie. Fides autem nostra est Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum unum Deum credere et confiteri nec tamen eum qui Filius Patrem dicere nec eum qui Spiritus est Patris⁴⁹ et Filii aut Patrem aut Filium nuncupare. His enim appellationibus hoc significatur quod ad se inuicem referantur non ipsa substantia qua unum sunt. Nam et Pater cum dicitur non nisi alicuius filii intelligitur et spiritus secundum id quod ad aliquid refertur⁵⁰ spirantis alicuius est."

[22] Augustinus in libro v'o de Trinitate cap. v:⁵¹ "In Deo⁵² autem nichil quidem secundum accidens dicitur quia nichil in eo non incommutabile est: non tamen omne quod dicitur, secundum substantiam dicitur. Dicitur enim ad aliquid sicut Pater ad Filium et Filius ad Patrem, quod non est accidens quia

⁴² Vigilii Tapsensis, *Contra Arianos* . . . , III, 9 (PL 62, 235A-235C). See n. 36 *supra*.

⁴³ commune: commune c (*alt. c exp. m. ead.*) *cod.*

⁴⁴ una (*corr. m. ead.*) *cod.*

⁴⁵ Matth. 28:19.

⁴⁶ unusquisque *cod.*

⁴⁷ rectissime *ed. cit.* (*supra* n. 42).

⁴⁸ Augustinus, *Epistula* (*Augustinus Pascentio, Domus Regiae Comiti Ariano*) 238, 14 (PL 33, 1043; CSEL 57 [1911], 543).

⁴⁹ pris *cod.*

⁵⁰ refertur *cod.*

⁵¹ Augustinus, *De Trinitate* V, 6 (sub cap. 5) (PL 42, 914).

⁵² deum (*corr. m. ead.*) *cod.*

et ille semper Pater et ille semper Filius et non ita semper quasi ex quo natus Filius aut ex eo quidem numquam desinat esse Filius Pater esse non desinat Pater sed ex eo quod semper natus Filius nec cepit umquam esse Filius. Quodsi aliquando esse cepisset aut aliquando esse desineret Filius secundum accidens diceretur. Si uero quod dicitur Pater ad se ipsum diceretur non ad Filium et quod dicitur Filius ad se ipsum diceretur non ad Patrem secundum substantiam diceretur et ille Pater et ille Filius. Sed quia et Pater non dicitur Pater nisi ex eo quod est et Filius et Filius non dicitur nisi ex eo quod est ei Filius et Filius non dicitur nisi ex eo quod habet Patrem non secundum substantiam hec dicuntur quia non quisque eorum ad se ipsum sed ad inuicem atque ad alterutrum ista dicuntur neque secundum accidens quia et quod dicitur Pater et quod dicitur Filius eternum atque incommutabile est eis. Quam ob rem (f. 98v) quamuis diuersum sit Patrem esse et Filium esse non est tamen diuersa substantia quia hoc non secundum substantiam dicitur sed secundum relatiuum quod tamen relatiuum non est accidens quia non est mutabile."

[23] Item in eodem cap. vii^o:⁵³ "Sicut secundum substantiam aio Homo est sic secundum substantiam nego cum dico Homo non est et cum queritur quantus sit et aio quadrupedalis est id est iiii^{or} pedum secundum quantitatem aio. Qui dicit non quadrupedalis est secundum quantitatem negat. Candidus est secundum quantitatem aio, non candidus est secundum quantitatem nego. Propinquus est secundum relatiuum aio, non propinquus est secundum relatiuum nego."

[24] Augustinus de fide sancte Trinitatis:⁵⁴ "Habent itaque singule in sancta Trinitate persone aliquid proprium quo inseparabili equalitate aliquam in se ostendant proprietatem. Pater solus est Pater et Filius solus est Filius et Spiritus sanctus solus est Spiritus sanctus. Et Pater hoc habet proprium quod ex omnibus que sunt solus est qui ab alio non est. Ac per hoc solus est in paternitatis persona non in deitatis essentia. Vnigenitus uero Dei Filius hoc habet proprium, quod ex solo, id est Patre consubstantialiter solus genitus est, et in hoc est sua proprietas. Spiritus sanctus itaque hoc habet proprium, quod ex Patre et Filio equaliter procedit et est amborum spiritus eiusdemque substantie et eternitatis cum Patre et Filio. Sed hec tria uere etiam tria sunt et ineffabiliter tria et essentialiter tria habentia proprietates suas."

[25] Augustinus in libro v^o:⁵⁵ "Itaque Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus quoniam unus Deus et utique Deus sanctus est et Deus spiritus est potest appellari Trinitas et spiritus sanctus sed ille spiritus scilicet qui non Trinitas sed intelligitur in eo quod proprie dicitur Spiritus sanctus relatiue dicitur cum ad Patrem et ad Filium refertur quia Spiritus sanctus et Patris et Filii spiritus est sed ipsa relatio non apparet in hoc nomine apparet autem cum dicitur donum Dei. Donum enim est Patris est et Filii quia a Patre procedit sicut Dominus dicit^{55a} et quod apostolus ait qui spiritus Dei non habet hic non est eius.^{55b} De ipso utique Spiritu sancto ait. Donum ergo donatoris et donator doni^{55c} cum dicimus relatiue utrumque ad inuicem dicimus."⁵⁶

⁵³ Augustinus, *De Trinitate* V, 8 (sub cap. 7) (PL 42, 916).

⁵⁴ Alcuinus, *De Fide Sanctae et Indiuiduae Trinitatis* I, 11 (12) (PL 101, 19D-20A).

⁵⁵ Augustinus, *De Trinitate* V, 11 (PL 42, 919).

^{55a} Joh. 15:26.

^{55b} Rom. 8:9.

⁵⁶ dñs cod.

[26] Item de eodem:⁵⁷ "Dicitur ergo relatiue Pater id quod relatiue dicitur principium et siquid forte aliud. Sed Pater ad Filium dicitur principium uero ad omnia que ab ipso sunt. Item relatiue dicitur Filius relatiue dicitur uerbum et ymago et his omnibus uocabulis ad Patrem refertur. Nichil autem horum Pater dicitur. Et principium dicitur Filius. Cum enim diceretur ei tu quis es respondit principium qui et loquor uobis^{57a} sed nunquid Patris principium creature quippe se ostendere uoluit cum se^{57b} dicit esse principium sicut et Pater principium est creature quod ab ipso⁵⁸ sunt omnia. Nam et creator relatiue dicitur ad creaturam sicut dominus ad seruum. Et ideo cum dicimus et Patrem principium (f. 99) et Filium principium non duo principia creature dicimus quia Pater et Filius simul ad creaturam unum principium est sicut⁵⁹ unus creator sicut unus Deus."

[27] In sermone beati Augustini de Trinitate:⁶⁰ "Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus non diuiduntur⁶¹ in diuinitate sed in personarum qualitate. Diuiduntur proprietatibus sed natura⁶² sociantur."

[28] Augustinus ad Maximum:⁶³ "Pater Filius Spiritus sanctus hec inquam proprietatis⁶⁴ sunt nomina non nature."

[29] Beatus Sophronius:⁶⁵ "Omnis itaque numerus contubernalem habet differentiam.⁶⁶ Omnis differentia atque discretio numerum superinducit ut insitum. Numeratur ergo beata Trinitas non essentiis non naturis nec diuersis deitatibus trinisue dominationibus, quod absit, sicut insaniunt Arriani et sicut noue Tritheone,⁶⁷ id est terdeitatis latratores essentias tres et tres dominationes et tres

⁵⁷ Augustinus, *De Trinitate* V, 14 (PL 42, 920).

^{57a} Joh. 8:25.

^{57b} si *cod.*

⁵⁸ iō *cod.*

⁵⁹ sicut *bis cod.*

⁶⁰ Augustinus, *Sermones De Diuersis: Sermo* 232, 4 (PL 39, 2174).

⁶¹ diuiduntur *cod.*

⁶² natura: natura s *cod.*

⁶³ Augustinus, *Epistula (Alypius et Augustinus Maximo Medico Recens ab Ariana Heresi ad Fidem Catholicam Conuerso)* 170, 6 (PL 33, 749-750; CSEL 44 [1904], 626).

⁶⁴ propinquitatis *edd. citt. (supra n. 63).*

⁶⁵ Sophronius, *Epistola Synodica ad Sergium Patriarcham Constantinopolitanum*, PG 87, 3155BC. On Gilbert's use of Sophronius at the Rheims trial, cf. Hugo of Honau, *Liber De Diuersitate Naturae et Personae*, praef. (ed. Dondaine 75; ed. Haring 122-123): "Latebat tamen eum (sc. Petrum Tusculanum) quod beati Theoderiti et Sophronii scripta in Latinum translata saepe reuoluisset cum aliorum libris siue Graecorum siue Latinorum et maxime Athanasii et Hylarii, quorum suffragiis in Concilio Remensi coram Papa Eugenio contra suorum aemulorum oblocutiones usus fuit cum gloria." Geoffrey of Auxerre, *Epistola ad Albinum* 6 (PL 185, 591), may also be referring to the use of Sophronius' *Epistola Synodica* (cf. the Dublin record, part B sections 29 and 30): "Faciebat episcopus in libris beati Hilarii, et de corpore canonum in quorundam Graecorum epistolis uerba minus intelligibilia, praesertim in tanta festinatione et in tanta ac tali multitudine, lectitari." Cf. Haring, *Mediaeval Studies* 24, 185-187.

⁶⁶ diffarā (*corr. m. ead.*) *cod.*

⁶⁷ trichone (*in-tricheone m. ead.*) *cod.*

similiter uani loquentes deitates sed substantiis et proprietatibus intellectualibus perfectis semotis subsistentibus numeri⁶⁸ diuisibilibus et non diuidentis deitatis."

[30] Idem in eodem:⁶⁹ "Igitur cum hoc quod Deus est Pater ipse Pater et neque Filius neque Spiritus sanctus sed quod Filius est secundum substantiam, et quod naturaliter Spiritus sanctus existit, et est cum hoc quod Deus est Filius ipse neque Pater⁷⁰ neque Spiritus sanctus. Sed quod Pater secundum naturam Pater et quod secundum substantiam Spiritus sanctus conspicitur, et est cum hoc quod Deus est Spiritus sanctus ipse Spiritus sanctus neque Pater esse cernitur neque Filius esse suscipitur sed quod Pater secundum essentiam creditur et quod Filius secundum naturam annuntiatur. Hoc quidem propter naturam et identitatem substantie et cognitionem essentie; illud uero propter alterificas horum trium proprietates propter dissimilitudinem proprietatum que inconfusam unam quandoque figurat personam. Sicut ergo esse Deus una queque inconuertibiliter possidet ita et proprietatem per quam ipsa persona figuratur immutabilem et immobilem obtinet que eidem soli est insita et ab ipsis aliis personis cum discernat et consitam atque honorificandam consubstantiali quaque et consensuam Trinitatem absque confusione conseruat."

[31] Ambrosius Mediolanensis ad Gracianum imperatorem:⁷¹ "Cum enim dico genitum,⁷² non proprietatem nature sed significationem generationis expressi et hoc exemplis euidentioribus approbabo. Nam si generaliter dicam filium, nec adam⁷³ cuius, potest intelligi et filius hominis et filius iniquitatis et filius pestilentie et filius diaboli sicut de Iudeis scriptura⁷⁴ testatur et quod in usu est et fetus pecudis et pulli columbarum. Et ideo in appellacione filiorum non est expressio significata nature. At uero si naturam designare desidero, aut hominem nuncupabo aut equum nominabo (f. 99v) aut auem dicam ut natura⁷⁵ possit intelligi. Ita ergo si naturam cupio designare diuinam, Deum uerum debeo nominare. Cum Filium autem dico, generatum significo. Cum Patrem quoque dico, generasse declaro.⁷⁶ Non ergo huic nature discretionem facias, cum sit hoc significatorium generantis et geniti. Significatoria autem huiusmodi exprimunt substantie qualitatem. Multi enim, ut dixi, filii sed diuersitas filiorum: alius per naturam⁷⁷ alius per gratiam. Multe creature inuisibiles et uisibiles: inuisibiles ut principatus et potestates throni et dominationes, uisibiles ut sol luna stelle homo terra. Ergo diuerse species et diuerse creaturarum substantie sunt. Itaque si uelis proprietatem creature alicuius exprimere, aut solem aut lunam nominabis⁷⁸ aut stellas, et sic intelligitur quid sit quod significandum putaueris. Ceterum si factum dicas aut creatum quod interdum Filium dicunt

⁶⁸ m'i cod.

⁶⁹ Sophronius, *Epistola Synodica* . . . , PG 87, 3158D-3159A.

⁷⁰ Pater: filius cod.

⁷¹ Ambrosius, *De Incarnationis Dominicae Sacramento* 97-100 (PL 16, 842A-842C).

⁷² gntium cod.

⁷³ i.e. addam.

⁷⁴ scripta cod.

⁷⁵ ut natura: natura ut (corr. m. ead.) cod.

⁷⁶ decaro (corr. m. ead.) cod.

⁷⁷ per: (ā ss. m. ead. et eras.) cod.

⁷⁸ noabis (corr. m. ead.) cod.

quia multa facta et creata sunt, non proprietatem substantie uideris significasse sed speciem qualitatis. Aliud est enim substantia aliud qualitas."

[C]

[1] Precedentia vii' tem prima capitula non idem esse personam et naturam ostendunt [et naturam ostendunt]. [2] Occtauum⁷⁹ et nonum⁸⁰ quod natura illa que una est in tribus personis non sit incarnata sed tantum persona Filii. [3] Cetera que secuntur usque ad "homines minus intelligentes"^{80a} quod natura una numero sit in eis pro qua dicitur unus Deus et quod ipsa diuinitas non sit Trinitas. [4] Que secuntur Augustini quod proprietates personarum diuerse sunt a diuina substantia et eterne et quod tres persone tres habent proprietates et unam essentiam. [5] Que secuntur Sophronii quod tres persone numero differant et eorum proprietates.⁸¹ [6] Vltimum Ambrosii^{81a} proprietatem persone a natura diuina diuersam esse demonstrat.

[D]⁸²

Gislebertus: [1] Quod diuina natura id est diuinitas⁸³ et eterna illa indiuisa et simplex essentia non sit Deus sed sit forma quedam qua^{83a} Deus est sicut humanitas non est homo sed forma qua^{83a} est homo. [2] Quod non unus⁸⁴ Deus uel una substantia aut unum aliquid sit tres persone id est Pater et Filius et sanctus Spiritus sed essentia quidem uel natura <una> numero sit in eis pro qua dicitur esse unus Deus. Ipse uero tres persone tria sunt differentia numero ac si tres homines humanitatem unam numero habere inuenirentur. [3] Quod proprietates personarum relationes quedam eterne sint que non sint [quod] ipse⁸⁵ persone sed res diuise numero a diuina substantia et habeant tres unitates et sic multa eterna sunt quorum nullum sit Deus. [4] Quod diuina natura non sit incarnata sed tantum de persona Filii id concedendum sit. Natura autem illa (f. 100) que una est in tribus personis minime sit incarnata.

⁷⁹ sic cod.

⁸⁰ nouū cod.

^{80a} See part B of the document, no. 21.

⁸¹ proprietatei (corr. m. ead.) cod.

^{81a} amborum cod.

⁸² The errors charged against Gilbert appeared already in part A of the record (see n. 1 *supra*). A reasonable explanation for the double appearance of the charges might be that the copyist or his source fused two texts, the first comprising parts A-C and the second comprising parts D-E. Even as the charges in part D are introduced by Gilbert's name as his assertions, so in Laon MS 176 fol. 45-45^v (ed. Leclercq, *Mediaeval Studies* 14, 110), each of the four charges is introduced by Gilbert's name; and in Douai MS 365 fol. 2-2^v (ed. Leclercq, *ibid.*), the charges are presented with the statement "Heresim concitat magister Gislebertus asserens." Cf. too "Ista Gislebertus" in Munich MS cdm. 15824 (see Appendix to this current study).

⁸³ diuitas cod.

^{83a} que cod.

⁸⁴ unus: unus homo (homo exp. m. ead.) cod.

⁸⁵ ipse bis cod.

[E]⁸⁶

Concilium: [1] Credimus simplicem naturam diuinitatis esse Deum nec aliquo sensu catholico posse negari quin diuinitas sit Deus et Deus diuinitas. Sic ubi uero dicitur Deum sapientia sapientem, magnitudine magnum, eternitate eternum, unitate unum, diuinitate Deum esse et alia huiusmodi, credimus non nisi ea sapientia que est ipse Deus sapientem esse, non nisi ea magnitudine que⁸⁷ est ipse Deus magnum esse, non nisi ea eternitate que est ipse Deus eternum esse, non nisi ea unitate unum que est ipse, non nisi ea diuinitate Deum que est ipse, id est se ipso sapientem magnum eternum unum Deum. [2] Cum uero de tribus personis loquimur, Patre Filio Spiritu sancto, ipsas unum Deum unam diuinam substantiam esse fatemur. Et e conuerso. Cum enim de uno Deo una diuina substantia loquimur, ipsum unum Deum unam diuinam substantiam esse tres personas profiteamur. [3] Credimus solum Deum Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum eternum esse nec aliquas omnino res, siue relationes siue proprietates siue singularitates uel unitates dicantur et huiusmodi alia, adesse Deo que sint ab eterno que non sint Deus. [4] Credimus ipsam diuinitatem, siue substantiam diuinam siue naturam dicas, incarnatam esse sed in Filio.

APPENDIX

Text of Munich Staatsbibliothek clm. 15824 (Haring's MS O),¹ fol. 63

Hec capitula Remis collecta fuerunt contra magistrum G.: [1] Vnum capitulum. Quod diuina natura, que diuinitas dicitur, Deus non sit sed forma, id est qua Deus est, quemadmodum humanitas non est homo sed forma qua est homo. [2] Secundum capitulum. Quod cum Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus unum esse dicuntur, non nisi una diuinitate esse intelligantur, nec conuerti possit ut Deus unus uel una substantia uel unum aliquid Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus esse dicatur. [3] Tercium² capitulum. Quod tres persone tribus unitatibus sint tria et distinctae proprietatibus tribus, que non sunt ipsae personae sed sunt tres res eternae et ab inuicem a diuina substantia numero differentes.

⁸⁶ The text of the symbolum is likewise found in the following sources: Geoffrey of Auxerre, *Libellus* 67 (PL 185, 617B-618AB); John of Salisbury, *Historia Pontificalis* 11 (ed. Chibnall 24); Otto of Freising, *Gesta Friderici* I, 59 (ed. Waitz 85); in the record of Vatican MS Reginensis Lat. 278, fols. 72-73 (ed. Leclercq, *Mediaeval Studies* 14, 109); in the record of Munich MS clm. 15824 (see Appendix to the present paper), in a text of Laon MS 176, fol. 45-45^v (ed. Leclercq, *Mediaeval Studies* 14, 110); and in a text of Douai MS 365, fol. 2-2^v (ed. Leclercq, *ibid.*). In the Laon text each of the charges against Gilbert is answered by a statement of the symbolum; in the Douai text, the symbolum (headed *Responsio domni Bernardi abbatis Clare Vallis*) follows the charges. See also the symbolum in Mansi, *Concilia*, 21, 712-713. Concerning the symbolum consult Gammersbach, *Gilbert von Poitiers*, 67-71.

⁸⁷ quod cod.

¹ Haring, *op. cit.* (*supra* n. 9 on the introduction), 246.

² Teium O.

[4] Quartum capitulum. Quod diuina natura non sit incarnata. Hoc manifestissime uult illa auctoritas Toletani³ concilii que dicit non quod commune Trinitati sed quod proprium est Filii incarnatum est. Ista Gisilbertus.

Contra quod patres in Remensi concilio congregati ista conscripserunt: [1] Credimus et confitemur simplicem naturam diuinitatis esse Deum nec aliquo sensu catholico posse⁴ negari quin diuinitas sit Deus et Deus diuinitas. Sic ubi uero dicitur Deum sapientia sapientem, magnitudine⁵ magnum, eternitate eternum, unitate unum, diuinitate Deum esse [nec aliquo sensu catholico posse negari quin diuinitas sit Deus et Deus diuinitas. Sic ubi uero dicitur Deum sapientia sapientem, magnitudine magnum, eternitate eternum, unitate unum, diuinitate Deum esse]⁶ et alia huiusmodi, credimus non nisi ea sapientia que est ipse Deus sapientem esse, non nisi magnitudine magnum que est ipse Deus magnum esse, non nisi eternitate que ipse est eternum esse, non nisi ea unitate unum que est ipse, non nisi ea diuinitate Deum que est ipse, id est se ipso sapientem magnum eternum unum Deum. II. Cum de tribus personis loquimur, Patre et Filio et Spiritu sancto, ipsas unum Deum unam diuinam substantiam esse fatemur, et e conuerso, [et] cum de uno Deo una diuina substantia loquimur, ipsum unum Deum unam diuinam substantiam esse tres personas confitemur. III. Credimus et confitemur solum Deum Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum eternum⁷ esse nec aliquas omnino res, siue relationes siue proprietates siue singularitates uel unitates dicentur et alia huiusmodi, adesse Deo que sint ab eterno et non sunt Deus. IIII. Credimus et confitemur ipsam diuinitatem, siue diuinam substantiam siue naturam diuinam dicas, incarnatam esse sed in Filio. Ergo Trinitas incarnata in Filio, quod falsum est et hereticum.

AUTHORITIES CITED IN THE TRINITY COLLEGE DUBLIN RECORD OF THE TRIAL

(Authorities are cited only in Part B of this record)

AVGVSTINVS Enarrationes Super Psalmos: 10, 11; Epistolae: 21, 28; Sermones: 27; De Trinitate: 19, 22, 23, 25, 26; PSEUDO-AVGUSTINVS: see ALCVINVS.

PSEUDO-AVGUSTINVS Questiones Veteris et Noui Testamenti: 13. ALCVINVS (AVGVSTINVS in the codex) De Fide Sanctae et Individae Trinitatis: 18, 24.

AMBROSIVS De Fide ad Gratianum Imperatorem: 14; De Incarnationis Dominicae Sacramento: 31.

ATHANASIVS: see VIGILIVS TAPSENSIS.

CONCILIVM BRACARENSE I: 12; CONCILIVM TOLETANVM VI (VII in the codex): 8; CONCILIVM TOLETANVM XI: 9.

³ See the text of the Dublin record, part B sections 8 and 9 and nn. 24, 25 *supra*.

⁴ *passee ut uid.* (corr. m. ead.) O.

⁵ *magnitudine* (et i *supra* g sed *partim* eras.) O.

⁶ The scribe blundered by repeating a considerable amount of text.

⁷ *etnum* O.

HILARIUS Liber De Synodis: 3-6; De Trinitate: 1-2.

SOPHRONIVS Epistula Synodica ad Sergium Patriarcham Constantinopolitanum: 29, 30.

THEODORETUS (THEODERICUS in the codex) De Trinitate: 7.

VIGILIUS TAPSENSIS (ATHANASIUS in the codex) Contra Arianos, Sabellianos, Photinianos Dialogus: 15-17, 20.

While the present paper was in the hands of the printers, there appeared Father N. M. Haring's 'Das sogenannte Glaubensbekenntnis des Reimser Konsistoriums' in *Scholastik* 40 (1965) 55-90. This important article (recognized in nn. 1, 17, and 30 on my introduction) discusses not only the *capitula* against Gilbert and the symbolum adopted by the Rheims Council but also produces critical editions of the *capitula* (pp. 86-88) and of the symbolum (pp. 88-90). In his editing, Father Haring utilizes Munich MS clm. 15824 and Vatican Reg. 278. But he does not offer the text of the Dublin document, and nowhere in his paper does he mention it. By comparing the Dublin document with the texts published by Father Haring, it will be readily seen, apart from the distinctive large body of patristic *auctoritates* and the summary of them in the Dublin codex, that the symbolum in the Dublin manuscript is quite like Haring's textform B (published on 89-90) and that the *capitula* in the Dublin codex approximate textform D and especially Laon MS 176 and Douai MS 365 (see Haring, 87-88, 88 n. 189) but that the first and fourth statements of the Dublin *capitula* are markedly fuller than the corresponding statements in any of the texts offered by Father Haring.

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L'Ordre franciscain au temps de Guillaume d'Occam *

LÉON BAUDRY

Fratres sunt Ordo et Ordo est Fratres.
(Occam, *Opus nonaginta dierum*, c. 62).
Fratres sunt simplices usurarii, hoc est
utuntur rebus, nullum jus habentes per
quod valeant in iudicio litigare. (*Ibid.* c. 2).

DE bonne heure, du vivant même de saint François, des dissentiments surgirent dans la famille franciscaine. A l'origine, saint François n'avait pas le moins du monde l'intention de fonder un nouvel ordre religieux. Jusqu'en l'année 1209, il ne savait même pas quel genre de vie il pourrait personnellement adopter lorsque, le 24 février, servant la messe à la Portioncule, il entendit l'ordre donné par le Christ à ses Apôtres: "Allez et prêchez, ne prenez ni or, ni argent, ni monnaie dans vos ceintures, ni sac pour le voyage, ni deux vêtements, ni bâton, car l'ouvrier mérite sa nourriture". La messe finie, quand le prêtre lui eut, à sa demande, expliqué ce passage: "Voilà, se dit-il ce que je désire observer de toutes les fibres de mon cœur". Sans plus attendre il laissa là son bâton, son sac et ses chaussures, enleva son manteau pour ne garder qu'une tunique, remplaça par une corde la ceinture qu'il portait et se mit à prêcher la pénitence. Quelques semaines plus tard, deux habitants d'Assise, un riche marchand, Bernard de Quintavalle, et un juriste, Pierre de Catane, venaient le rejoindre. Un matin ils entrèrent tous les trois à l'église Saint-Nicolas pour y prier et demander à Dieu de leur faire connaître sa volonté. S'avancant vers l'autel, François prit un évangélaire, l'ouvrit à trois reprises au hasard, et tomba sur les paroles suivantes: "Si tu veux être parfait, va, vends tout ce que tu as... ne prends pour la route ni bâton, ni pain... Si quelqu'un veut venir après moi qu'il renonce à soi-même". "Voilà, dit-il à ses com-

* Abbé Léon Baudry published in 1949 a work entitled *Guillaume d'Occam, sa vie, ses œuvres, ses idées sociales et politiques*, [Tome I: *L'Homme et les œuvres*. After his death his friends found among his papers two chapters of a second volume; the first "Les rapports de la raison et de la foi," was published in *Arch. d'hist. doct. et litt. du moyen âge*, 37 (1962) 33-92; chapter two is presented here. The editorial board of *Mediaeval Studies* believes that it is worth preserving this fruit of many years of study of the works of William of Ockham.

pagnons, quelle sera notre règle et la règle de ceux qui voudront s'unir à nous."

Le premier à le faire fut un homme du peuple, nommé Giles, suivi bientôt de neuf autres, parmi lesquels un prêtre, appelé Sylvestre.

Voyant sa compagnie s'accroître tous les jours, François résolut de rédiger une règle et de la faire approuver par le Pape. Cette règle, malheureusement disparue, était "simple, elle tenait en peu de mots"; quelques versets de l'Évangile accompagnés de prescriptions sommaires concernant l'habit que l'on porterait, les occupations auxquelles on devrait se livrer. Les Frères s'engageaient à vivre "selon la forme de l'Évangile, dans l'obéissance et la chasteté", sans rien posséder en propre ni en commun. Innocent III jugea cette dernière clause trop dure. "Je ne doute pas de vous, dit-il à François et à ses compagnons, mais je me demande si ceux qui viendront après vous ne trouveront pas ce genre de vie au dessus de leurs forces". Toutefois, sur les instances du cardinal Jean de Saint-Paul, il consentit à approuver leur règle, mais de façon purement verbale; il leur fit donner la tonsure et leur permit de prêcher.

Joyeux, François et ses compagnons regagnèrent, à Porto Rivo, une misérable cabane qui pouvait à peine les contenir. Obligés de la quitter, ils construisirent près de la Portioncule des huttes faites de branchages et de boue. Chaque matin ils s'en allaient deux par deux dans les villes et les campagnes prêchant la pénitence, servant les lépreux, travaillant de leurs mains pour se procurer le nécessaire, quêtant de porte en porte quand le nécessaire venait à leur manquer. Le soir, ils se retiraient dans les ermitages ou des lieux écartés pour se livrer à la prière et à la méditation. Remués par leur parole ardente, simple, directe, à laquelle leur exemple donnait la force de la chose vécue, des hommes de toute catégorie sociale, des pauvres et des riches, des laïcs et des clercs, des ignorants et des lettrés, vinrent vite et en grand nombre grossir leur rangs. Dans une lettre écrite en 1216, Jacques de Vitry montre les Frères Mineurs circulant partout, dans la Lombardie, la Toscane, les Pouilles, la Sicile.

Pour diriger des centaines d'hommes dispersés sur de vastes territoires il fallait, de toute nécessité, une organisation. François le comprit. Au chapitre de 1217, il divisa l'Italie et les divers pays à évangéliser en un certain nombre de provinces ayant chacune son ministre provincial. Outre ce problème la multiplication des Frères en posait un autre extrêmement délicat. Les lettrés et les clercs désiraient pouvoir continuer leurs études. Pour prêcher ne fallait-il pas connaître les Ecritures? Ne fallait-il pas aussi connaître les sciences humaines nécessaires ou utiles pour les bien interpréter? Comment acquérir un tel savoir sans locaux appropriés, sans livres et sans bibliothèques? En outre tous les nouveaux venus n'étaient pas des âmes aussi fortement trempées que François et ses premiers com-

pagnons. Quelques-uns trouvaient que la règle était trop dure, pour ne pas dire impraticable. Il fallait, disaient-ils, tenir compte des circonstances, en atténuer la rigueur, cependant que d'autres voulaient la maintenir dans toute sa pureté. Peu à peu deux partis se formèrent, plus ou moins travaillés par une hostilité sourde. Une crise était à prévoir. Elle éclata aux environs de 1219.

Mettant à exécution un projet qu'il caressait, semble-t-il depuis 1212, François s'était embarqué pour le Levant, après avoir confié à deux vicaires, Matthieu Nardi et Grégoire de Naples, le soin de diriger les Frères en son absence. Grégoire et Matthieu entreprirent presque aussitôt de modifier la règle, au grand scandale d'une partie de la communauté. Prévenu par un frère lai qui réussit à le rejoindre en Syrie, François prit immédiatement le bateau avec Elie, Pierre de Catane et Césaire de Spire. Vers la fin de juillet 1220, il débarquait à Venise, convoquait un chapitre pour le 29 septembre et se mettait en route pour Bologne. Arrivé aux abords de la ville, il apprit que les Frères y occupaient une maison nouvellement construite qu'on appelait déjà la maison des Frères. Il la fit aussitôt évacuer. C'est seulement après avoir reçu du cardinal Hugolin l'assurance formelle qu'elle était sa propriété personnelle qu'il permit aux Frères d'y rentrer.

Le séjour de François en Syrie avait sérieusement ébranlé sa santé. Craignant de ne pouvoir pas à lui seul faire face à la crise, il demanda au pape de lui donner un protecteur de l'Ordre dans la personne du cardinal Hugolin. Puis, le 29 septembre, il remit la direction de l'Ordre à Pierre de Catane afin de se consacrer tout entier à l'élaboration d'une nouvelle règle, dont tous reconnaissaient la nécessité et sur les grandes lignes de laquelle le chapitre fit connaître son avis. Avec l'aide de Césaire de Spire, François eut tôt fait de la rédiger. Mais, quand Hugolin et les ministres en eurent pris connaissance, ils la trouvèrent longue, peu cohérente et imprécise.

Retiré à Fontè Colombo en compagnie de deux Frères, François mit un nouveau texte sur pied. Il le confia à Elie, devenu ministre général à la mort de Pierre de Catane. Quand, quelques jours plus tard, François réclama son manuscrit, Elie répondit qu'il l'avait égaré. François se remit donc au travail. Le nouveau texte, soumis au chapitre de 1223, souleva lui aussi des critiques. Hugolin fit faire diverses corrections. Après y avoir, à son tour, apporté quelques retouches, le pape Honorius III l'approuva solennellement le 29 septembre par la bulle *Solet annuere*.¹

¹ Sur tout ce qui précède voir P. Robinson, "Francis of Assisi," dans *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, VI, 221; L. Olier, "Francis, Rule of Saint," *ibid.* 208. On trouvera dans l'article de Robinson la liste des ouvrages à consulter auxquels on ajoutera les ouvrages de Sabatier et de Joergensen.

Cette règle ne suffit pas à ramener la paix dans la famille franciscaine. Avant de mourir, regrettant peut-être les concessions auxquelles il avait du consentir, François rédigea son Testament dans lequel, après avoir rappelé la manière de vivre de ses premiers disciples, leur parfaite pauvreté, il exhortait les Frères à observer la règle et le Testament à la lettre sans en rien omettre, sans y rien ajouter, sans se permettre de l'interpréter.

Il était à prévoir que ces exhortations ne seraient pas unanimement suivies. La règle ordonnait formellement aux Frères de ne jamais recevoir d'argent directement ou par personnes interposées, de ne jamais s'approprier ni maison, ni lieu, ni quoique ce soit. Comment concilier ces défenses avec ce qu'exigeaient la stabilité, le travail intellectuel, la formation des novices, les soins à donner aux malades ? Dans le cruel embarras où les jetait ce problème, les ministres se souvinrent que le cardinal Hugolin, devenu pape sous le nom de Grégoire IX, avait vécu dans l'intimité de François, que peut-être il connaissait mieux sa pensée, ses intentions profondes ? Ils lui demandèrent de trancher le problème. Le 29 septembre 1230 Grégoire donnait sa réponse par la bulle *Quo elongati*. Il déclarait que, n'ayant pas reçu l'approbation du chapitre ni celle du Saint-Siège, le Testament n'avait pas force de loi. Puis, tout en confirmant la défense faite aux Mineurs de rien posséder en propre ni en commun, afin de leur faciliter l'observation du précepte qui leur avait été donné de ne jamais recevoir d'argent, il instituait un *nuntius apostolicus* qui recevrait les dons faits par les fidèles, les administrerait et donnerait aux Frères ce dont ils pourraient avoir besoin.²

Cette première interprétation de la règle allait être suivie de plusieurs autres. Signalons les deux principales. En 1279 parut la décrétale *Exiit* de Nicolas III. D'après cette bulle tout ce qui était donné aux Mineurs devenait, à moins de réserves expresses des donateurs, la propriété du Saint-Siège. Les Frères Mineurs n'en avaient que l'usage et ils devaient en faire un usage conforme à la pauvreté. Quelques ans plus tard, Martin IV instituait des syndics chargés de recevoir au nom du Saint-Siège, les dons des fidèles, d'administrer les biens mis à la disposition de l'Ordre et de défendre ses intérêts devant les tribunaux. Il faut l'avouer, qu'on s'écartait de plus en plus de l'idéal tracé par saint François. Une lutte sans merci s'engagea entre les Spirituels et les membres de la Communauté. Elle n'avait rien perdu de sa virulence, lorsque en 1321 la querelle de la pauvreté passa du plan pratique au plan théorique. Il ne s'agissait plus de savoir comment interpréter et appliquer la règle, mais de savoir si le Christ et les Apôtres n'avaient rien possédé en propre ni en commun.

² Décision analogue donnée par Innocent IV dans la bulle *Ordinem vestrum* du 10 novembre 1245.

Alors que le problème était porté devant le pape, le chapitre de Pérouse prit sur lui de déclarer que la réponse affirmative était saine et catholique. Excédé de voir le peu de cas que l'on faisait de sa fonction, Jean XXII commença par déclarer que le Saint-Siège renonçait à la propriété des biens mis à la disposition des Mineurs, puis après mûr examen, il décida solennellement que serait désormais considéré comme hérétique quiconque soutiendrait que le Christ et les Apôtres n'avaient rien eu en propre ou commun. Le coup était rude pour les Frères Mineurs. Toute leur théorie se trouvait en quelque sorte sapée par la base.³

Inutile de rappeler comment Guillaume d'Occam fut amené à s'occuper du problème.⁴ L'étude qu'il en fait est extrêmement minutieuse. Dans l'*Opus nonaginta dierum* il analyse, il dissèque phrase par phrase les constitutions de Jean XXII. Des assertions du pape il n'en est pour ainsi dire pas une qu'il ne taxe d'erreur ou d'hérésie.⁵ Nous n'entrerons pas dans le détail des discussions savantes, subtiles, passionnées auxquelles il se livre. Ce serait long, fastidieux. Au reste ce ne sont pas ces discussions en elles-mêmes qui importent pour nous, mais la doctrine dont elles s'inspirent. Essayons d'en dégager l'essentiel.

Si nous voulons savoir en quoi consiste l'Ordre franciscain, il nous faut d'abord écarter une conception de la réalité sociale admise par Jean XXII et dont il tire contre nous argument.

Au cours du dernier siècle canonistes et juristes en sont venus à personifier la vie collective. Ils voient dans toute société, chapitre, cité, peuple, nation une personne morale, juridique, distincte de ses membres. Quelques-uns ne craignent pas d'en faire un individu. D'autres, moins osés, parlent d'une personne représentative, fictive, imaginaire à laquelle, nous disent-ils, le droit peut convenir bien que le fait ne le puisse pas.

Cette théorie ne saurait manifestement nous convenir. Elle prend pour accordé qu'il existe d'autres réalités que les réalités individuelles et qu'à des mots distincts toujours des réalités distinctes correspondent, illusion que nous avons ailleurs maintes fois dénoncée.⁶ Elle suppose qu'un tout

³ Cf. Baudry, *Guillaume d'Occam...* I (Paris, 1949), 104.

⁴ *Ibid.* 112.

⁵ A maintes reprises, Guillaume déclare les opinions de Jean XXII "extravagantes, chimériques, irrationnelles, plus dignes d'être tournées en dérision que réfutées": error fantasticus et irrationabilis, magis derisione quam improbatione dignus. *De imperatorum et pontificum potestate*, ed. W. Mulder, p. 34; cf. *Opus nonaginta dierum*, ed. M. Goldast, c. 6, p. 1024, l. 47; *Tractatus ostendens*, MS Paris, Bibl. Nat., lat. 3387, fol. 218b, 221a, 222a.

⁶ On trouvera l'indication des endroits où Guillaume réfute cette conception dans L. Baudry, "Le philosophe et le politique chez Guillaume d'Occam," dans *Arch. d'hist. doct. et litt. du M.A.*, 14 (1939) 212.

renferme plus d'être que les éléments qui le constituent. Conception dont nous avons souvent montré et dont il est facile d'apercevoir la fausseté. Quand on assemble des pierres et des pièces de bois pour bâtir une maison on n'engendre aucune réalité nouvelle et des hommes n'engendrent pas davantage quand ils se groupent pour former un peuple ou constituer un royaume.⁷ Affirmant qu'à une collectivité le fait ne saurait convenir, cette théorie contredit l'Écriture et les Pères dans lesquels nous lisons : "la foule se tenait dehors et priaît, toute la ville fut en émoi, le peuple s'assit pour boire et pour manger, le saint Synode a défini", et maintes formules semblables.⁸ Elle entraîne des conséquences fausses, blasphématoires, impies, car, étant une société, l'Église est une personne fictive, rien de réel ne peut lui convenir, il faut lui refuser toute juridiction.⁹ Enfin cette théorie est incohérente, elle aboutit à une impossibilité logique. Le droit se rapporte nécessairement à un acte. Attribuer un droit à une personne que par ailleurs on déclare incapable d'agir qu'est-ce sinon énoncer une contradiction ?¹⁰

Contrairement à ce qu'affirme Jean XXII l'Ordre n'est donc pas une personne fictive, puisqu'une telle personne n'existe pas. L'Ordre n'est pas non plus une seule personne réelle. Il reste donc qu'il soit une pluralité de personnes comme un peuple est une pluralité d'hommes. D'un mot "les Mineurs sont l'Ordre et l'Ordre est les Mineurs".¹¹ Et puisque les Mineurs

⁷ Si domus construatur ex lignis et lapidibus, nulla res de novo advenit ligno et lapidibus; *Summulae*, I, c. 6, p. 31. Cf. Baudry, *art. cit.*, p. 21, n. 6.

⁸ Si ea quae sunt facti ordini nequeunt convenire, eadem ratione quae sunt facti nulli communitati vel collegio possunt convenire et, per consequens, nec populo nec turbæ poterunt convenire, quod scripturae sacrae et sacris canonibus et doctrinis sanctorum noscitur repugnare. Luc. I enim legitur: Omnis multitudo populi erat orans foris. *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 62, p. 1108, l. 24-40; c. 6, p. 1024, l. 46-50; *Compend. error.* c. 4, p. 962, l. 39-51; *De imp. et pont. pot.*, p. 34; *Non invenit*, ed. Scholz, *Unbekannte...* t. 2, p. 402; *Tract. ostendens*, MS cit., fol. 222a-b.

⁹ Si ordo fratrum minorum est persona representata et imaginaria, eadem ratione ecclesia et quaelibet communitas esset persona representata et imaginaria, ergo nullum reale nec jurisdictionem potest habere, quae dicere est blasphemum et impium. *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 62, p. 1108, l. 11-20. Cf. c. 6, p. 1024, l. 52-55; *Non invenit*, édit. cit. p. 402; *Tract. ostendens*, fol. 222a-b.

¹⁰ Omne jus ad aliquem actum ordinatur. Cui ergo illud quod facti est convenire non potest nec illud quod juris est eidem potest convenire. *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 62, p. 1108, l. 44. Contradictionem includit quod illi qui potest habere jus utendi non possit competere usus facti. *Compend. error.* c. 4, p. 962, l. 51-55. Cui per se et natura rei et non tantum per accidens repugnat actus realis eidem repugnat jus exercendi actum realem. *Tract. ostendens*, MS cit. 222a.

¹¹ Frates sunt ordo et ordo est fratres. Ordo non est unica vera persona, sed est verae personae, sicut populus non est unus homo sed est plures homines, sicut ecclesia est verae personae. *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 62, p. 1108, l. 52-61. Communitas non est una vera persona, sed est plures verae personae... sicut communitas fidelium est multi fideles unam fidem profitentes. *Ibid.* c. 6, p. 1025, l. 5-6. Il ne faut pas conclure comme De Lagarde (*La naissance de l'esprit*, t. 5, p. 167-171), semble l'avoir fait, que pour Guillaume la vie collective se réduit à une pluralité d'absolus fermés les uns

ont pour trait caractéristique d'observer la règle que leur a donnée saint François, c'est de cette règle que leur Ordre tient son originalité.

La règle des Mineurs leur prescrit de renoncer à toute propriété non seulement individuelle mais collective. Dictée "par l'amour de Dieu", cette renonciation est, pour reprendre les expressions même de Nicolas III dans sa décrétale *Exiit*,¹² "méritoire, sainte, conforme à la très parfaite pauvreté que, montrant et suivant la voie de la perfection, le Christ et les Apôtres ont enseignée par la parole et par l'exemple". Elle permet aux Mineurs d'imiter, autant qu'on peut le faire après la chute, la vie que les hommes auraient menée si Adam et Eve n'avaient pas péché. En condamnant cette doctrine Jean XXII a contredit Nicolas III et Clément V qui dans leurs bulles *Exiit* et *Exiit de paradiso*¹³ l'ont explicitement approuvée. Il s'est contredit lui-même, puisque dans sa constitution *Quorumdam exigit*¹⁴ il a déclaré les constitutions de Nicolas et Clément "salutaires, claires, lumineuses élaborées avec grand soin". Enfin il contredit l'Écriture et les Pères.

LA PAUVRETÉ DU CHRIST

Que le Christ ait recommandé la pauvreté à ceux qui veulent le suivre dans la voie de la perfection, de multiples passages de l'Évangile en fournissent la preuve. Quand, envoyant ses Apôtres prêcher il leur prescrit de n'emporter ni or, ni argent, ni pain pour le voyage, quand il fait la même recommandation aux 72 disciples, n'est-ce pas, ainsi que l'ont vu Raban Maur, saint Ambroise et saint Jérôme, la pauvreté qu'il leur prêche ?¹⁵ Ne la prêche-t-il pas encore quand il déclare: "Ne soyez en peine ni pour la nourriture ni pour le vêtement ?"¹⁶ "Si quelqu'un veut te faire un procès et te prendre ta tunique, donne lui même ton manteau et ne réclame pas ton bien à celui qui te le prend".¹⁷ Ne le fait-il pas d'une façon plus explicite encore quand il nous dit: "Celui qui ne renonce pas à tout ce qu'il possède ne peut pas être mon disciple"¹⁸ Et surtout quand

aux autres. Les individus ont au contraire des rapports déterminés des relations précises les uns avec les autres, mais ces relations n'ajoutent aucune réalité nouvelle aux individus qu'elles unissent.

Cf. R. Guelluy, *Philosophie et théologie chez Guillaume d'Ockham* (Paris, 1947), 109.

¹² *Bullarium francis.* III, 407.

¹³ *Ibid.* V, 83.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* V, 128.

¹⁵ Matth. x, 9; Marc vi, 8; Luc ix, 3, 4; *Op. nonag. dier.*, c. 94, p. 1167, l. 16-65.

¹⁶ Matth. vi, 25; Luc xii, 22.

¹⁷ Matth. v, 40; Luc vi, 29; *Compend. error.*, p. 963, l. 5-10; 964, l. 15; *Op. nonag. dier.*, c. 109, p. 1202, l. 33-43; 1204, l. 33-36.

¹⁸ Luc xiv, 33; *Op. nonag. dier.*, c. 9, p. 1032, l. 8.

au riche adolescent qui, ayant observé tous préceptes, lui demande ce qui lui reste à faire pour être parfait, il répond: "Si tu veux être parfait, va, vends tout ce que tu possèdes et distribue-le aux pauvres".¹⁹ Comment nier la clarté, la précision parfaite de ce texte ? Par la vente et la distribution que l'on fait de ses biens on renonce indubitablement à tout son droit, on renonce à les posséder non seulement en propre mais en commun.²⁰ La pauvreté enseignée par le Christ exclut donc toute propriété même celle des choses indispensables à l'entretien de la vie et à l'exercice de la fonction dont on peut être chargé, telles que la nourriture, le vêtement, puisque le Christ vient de nous le dire, ce sont là choses dont celui qui veut être parfait n'a pas à se préoccuper.²¹

On dira qu'on ne peut pas donner une interprétation aussi générale aux paroles du Christ. Comment admettre en effet qu'il ait conseillé au jeune homme de vendre ses vêtements et de le suivre tout nu ? Nous verrons plus tard en détail la réponse à cette difficulté. Pour l'instant notons simplement que le Christ n'a pas demandé au jeune homme et, en sa personne, à ceux qui veulent être parfaits de ne pas s'alimenter, se vêtir, mais de renoncer à la propriété des choses indispensables pour vivre, de ne pas plus les tenir pour siennes qu'on ne le ferait si on les avait vendues et de se contenter d'en user.²²

On dira encore que si le Christ a conseillé au riche adolescent de renoncer à tous ses biens, il ne lui a pas interdit d'en posséder plus tard d'autres en propriété.²³ Évidemment cette interdiction ne figure pas dans le texte, mais pour qui connaît les Écritures elle s'y trouve implicitement contenue. En effet reportons-nous au chapitre neuvième de saint Luc. Nous y lisons, c'est le Christ qui parle: "Celui qui a mis sa main à la charrue et qui regarde en arrière est impropre au royaume de Dieu",²⁴ c'est à dire "quiconque a embrassé la perfection ne saurait y renoncer sans déchoir, sauf peut-être dans le cas de nécessité, quand une cause raisonnable et urgente

¹⁹ Matth. xix, 21; Marc x, 21; Luc xviii, 22.

²⁰ Certum est autem quod per venditionem et in pauperes factam distributionem omni juri renunciatur. *Compend. error.*, c. 4, p. 964, l. 9; Per venditionem et distributionem in pauperes dominium et proprietas relinquitur. *Tract. ostendens*, MS cit., fol. 226c: Qui omnia vendit et dat pauperibus omnia relinquit tam in speciali quam in communi... quia per donationem factam pauperibus omnia dimittuntur etiam in communi. *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 78, p. 1136-7; Ergo paupertas evangelica omne dominium et proprietatem excludit. *Ibid.* c. 23, p. 1066, l. 59-65; c. 9, p. 1031, l. 13-17.

²¹ *Ibid.* c. 10, p. 1042, l. 60.

²² *Ibid.* c. 9, p. 1031, l. 18-23, 29-65; c. 10, p. 1042, l. 36-56.

²³ *Ibid.* c. 9, p. 1031, l. 23-25.

²⁴ Luc ix, 62.

l'y contraint". Puis donc que la pauvreté rentre dans la perfection, c'est pour toujours que le Christ invite ceux qui veulent être parfaits à la pratiquer.²⁵

Sachant que le Christ a enseigné la pauvreté, nous pouvons déjà tenir pour assuré qu'il l'a lui observée, puisque, selon qu'il est écrit au livre des Actes il a joint l'exemple à la parole.²⁶ Cela ne résulte-t-il pas, comme le remarque saint Jérôme, du fait qu'il n'avait pas de quoi payer le tribut ?²⁷ N'est-ce pas ce que lui-même affirme quand il déclare; "Les renards ont leur tanière et les oiseaux du ciel leur nid. Le Fils de l'Homme n'a pas où reposer sa tête" ?²⁸ Comprenons bien le sens de ces paroles. Elles ne signifient pas que le Christ n'avait pas d'endroit dont il put user pour prendre son repos, puisqu'au témoignage des Évangélistes, d'autres le recevaient dans leur maison, lui donnaient l'hospitalité. Elles signifient donc qu'aucun lieu ne lui appartenait en propriété.²⁹

Erreur, affirme Jean XXII. Le Christ était Dieu. Comme Dieu il possédait toutes choses et comme homme il les possédait toutes dès l'instant de sa conception. Plus tard "quand il eut commencé de faire des miracles et de prêcher il acquit au moins quelques biens à titre onéreux ou à titre gracieux". La preuve, on n'en saurait souhaiter de meilleure, se trouve dans le témoignage de ses Apôtres et de ses disciples. Saint Matthieu et saint Jean nous disent qu'il possédait des vêtements. Saint Jean-Baptiste laisse entendre qu'il portait des chaussures. Lorsqu'à la Cène il dit à Judas: "Ce que tu as à faire, fais le vite" les convives auraient-ils pu croire qu'il lui commandait d'acheter quelque chose pour la fête ou de donner quelque chose aux pauvres, s'il n'avait pas eu d'argent à sa disposition ? Enfin ne possédait-il pas le pain et le vin dont il se servit pour instituer l'Eucharistie ? Si donc le Christ a été pauvre ce n'est pas faute d'avoir eu quelque chose en propriété, mais faute de percevoir les fruits de ce qui lui appartenait.³⁰

La première remarque à faire, c'est que cette théorie manque de cohé-

²⁵ *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 9, p. 1032, l. 1-17.

²⁶ Si autem hoc docuit non dicendum quod in se idem non servaverit, cum Act. I dicitur; Coepit Jesus facere et docere. *Comp. error.* c. 4, p. 964, l. 9-10.

²⁷ Matth. xvii, 24-27.

²⁸ Matth. viii, 20; *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 94, p. 1168, l. 5-8; 35-38.

²⁹ Ex quibus patenter habetur quod Christus pro illo tempore non habebat hospitium. Aut ergo non habuit quoad usum facti, aut non habuit quoad dominium seu proprietatem. Primum non potest dici quia constat quod habuit hospitium quoad usum et manebat in domo, sicut etiam evangelistae in locis plerisque testantur. Restat quod Christus, licet habuerit hospitium quoad usum facti, non tamen habuit ubi caput reclinaret quoad dominium et proprietatem. *Tract. ostendens*, fol. 227b. Cf. *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 93, p. 1159, l. 33-65.

³⁰ Quia vir reprobus; *Bull. Franc.*, V, 441-442.

rence. Si le Christ avait dès sa conception la propriété de toutes choses, si, comme l'affirme Jean XXII, il ne pouvait pas renoncer à cette propriété sans contrevenir à l'ordre de son Père, comment pouvait-il acquérir par achat ou à titre gracieux ce qu'il possédait déjà ?³¹ Ensuite ce n'est que par antonomase, en vertu de l'union hypostatique que toutes choses peuvent être dites propriété du Christ. On joue sur l'équivoque des mots quand on affirme qu'il les possédait en tant qu'homme.³² Jean XXII prétend que le Christ a procédé à des achats et des ventes. Pareille assertion ne se rencontre nulle part dans l'Écriture.³³ L'Écriture ne dit pas non plus que le Christ portait des chaussures, mais qu'il portait des sandales. La parole de Jean-Baptiste à laquelle Jean XXII se réfère doit s'entendre au conditionnel: si le Christ portait des chaussures je ne serais pas digne d'en dénouer la courroie.³⁴ On dira que Jésus avait au moins en commun la propriété des sommes que Judas portait dans sa bourse. Non, ni lui ni les Apôtres n'en avaient la propriété au sens propre du mot. Ils avaient simplement le pouvoir d'en disposer pour subvenir à leurs besoins et pour venir en aide aux indigents. Ils n'avaient pas le droit d'en faire un autre usage. La propriété en restait aux donateurs, spécialement aux saintes femmes, qui suivaient Jésus et l'aidaient de leurs ressources. Et c'est ainsi que l'entendent saint Grégoire, saint Augustin, saint Jérôme, saint Jean Chrysostome.³⁵

Enfin quand l'Écriture dit qu'à la Cène le Christ déposa et qu'au moment de la crucifixion les soldats se partagèrent ses vêtements, cela ne signifie pas nécessairement qu'il en avait la propriété, car les mots mien, tien, sien peuvent avoir des sens multiples et par exemple désigner des choses dont on a permission ou coutume de se servir.³⁶ C'est le cas pour les vêtements du Christ; il n'en avait pas la propriété, il n'en avait que l'usage. Il pouvait et on pouvait dire qu'ils étaient siens parce qu'il les portait habituellement tout comme on disait que Nazareth était la ville de Marie et de Joseph parce que c'était leur résidence habituelle. De qui ces vêtements étaient-ils la propriété? La question est pour nous sans intérêt. Veut-on absolument une réponse? Trois solutions sont possibles. Les

³¹ *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 94, p. 1169, l. 3; *Tract. ostendens*, fol. 228c.

³² *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 93, p. 1152, l. 1.

³³ *Quod autem Christus rem aliquam vendiderit vel adquisierit nusquam habetur. Cf. De imperat. et pontific. potestate*, p. 33.

³⁴ *Op. nonag. dierum*, c. 94, p. 1169, l. 35; p. 1167, l. 40.

³⁵ *Ibid.* c. 94, p. 1168, l. 8-65; *Compend. error.* c. 4, p. 963, l. 21-29. Par propriété au sens propre Guillaume entend le pouvoir de disposer d'une chose à son gré et de la revendiquer en justice. *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 2, p. 1000, l. 11 et 45; c. 4, p. 1014-1015.

³⁶ *Ibid.* c. 2, p. 1001, l. 50.

vêtements du Christ continuaient d'appartenir à ceux qui les lui avaient donnés. Ils étaient devenus la propriété de Dieu, le Christ en tant qu'homme n'en ayant que l'usage comme sous l'ancien Testament le temple et les vases qu'il contenait et dont les ministres du temple se servaient étaient la propriété de Dieu. Enfin ces vêtements n'avaient plus de propriétaire, ils étaient devenus *res nullius*.³⁷

Concluons. Le Christ, en tant qu'homme n'avait des choses dont il usait que le simple usage de fait. S'il lui est arrivé de donner ceci ou cela à telles ou telles personnes, ce n'est pas de sa propre autorité mais au nom d'autrui qu'il l'a fait. Il n'a pas été pauvre parce qu'il aurait volontairement renoncé à percevoir les fruits de biens qui lui auraient appartenu, il l'a été parce qu'il a renoncé à posséder quoique ce soit en propre ou en commun.³⁸

LA PAUVRETÉ DES APÔTRES

La mission dont le Christ avait chargé les Apôtres les obligeait à pratiquer la même pauvreté. Les Apôtres devaient prêcher le mépris des richesses. Si, remarque Raban Maur,³⁹ ils en avaient possédé soit en propre soit en commun, on les aurait inévitablement soupçonnés d'en prêcher le mépris par esprit de lucre. De toute nécessité avant de la prêcher aux autres ils devaient donner l'exemple de la pauvreté.⁴⁰

L'ont-ils fait ? Leurs paroles, leurs gestes ne permettent pas d'en douter. Écoutez ce qu'en leur nom Pierre disait au Christ: Nous avons tout quitté et nous vous avons suivi; quelle sera notre récompense ?⁴¹ On en convient, ces paroles ne signifient pas nécessairement que les Apôtres ont renoncé à toute propriété. Mais remises dans leur contexte, rattachées à ce qui précède et à ce qui suit, elles deviennent claires, nettes, précises. En effect c'est après avoir vu le riche adolescent invité à vendre et distribuer ses

³⁷ *Ibid.* c. 94, p. 1168, l. 23-35.

³⁸ Christus, in quantum homo passibilis et mortalis, in rebus quibus utebatur habuit simplicem facti usum et nullum jus... uterdi nec consumendi, nec... vendendi, nec ex rebus quarum usum habebat alia acquirendi, et ita... utebatur illis licentia eorum quorum scilicet fuerunt, sine jure proprio. Et quando dedit res illas nec dedit auctoritate propria, in quantum erat homo, sed auctoritate aliorum. *De imperat. et pontific. potestate*, p. 33.

³⁹ *Comm. in Mattheum*, lib. 2, c. 10; PL 107, 893.

⁴⁰ Apostoli... nullatenus debuerunt verbo et facto innuere quod causa lucri, non causa hominum, praedicarent. Sed, si habuissent proprietatem auri vel argenti vel aliarum rerum, innuissent facto quod causa lucri, non hominum, praedicassent, teste Rabano. *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 106, p. 1197, l. 21-30. Cf. c. 23, p. 1070, l. 29-45.

⁴¹ Matth. xix, 27.

richesses s'en aller tout triste que Pierre les prononce. Il veut de toute évidence marquer une opposition entre l'attitude des Apôtres et celle du jeune homme. Le renoncement auquel il fait allusion c'est donc celui-là même que le Christ vient de conseiller à ceux qui veulent être parfaits. Et puisque celui-là consiste, nous l'avons montré, dans l'abandon de toute propriété personnelle et collective, c'est bien à toute propriété personnelle et collective que, par la bouche de Pierre, les Apôtres déclarent avoir renoncé. En outre, répondant à la déclaration de Pierre, Jésus promet à ses Apôtres que "lorsque le Fils de l'Homme siégera sur son trône de gloire, ils siégeront eux aussi sur douze trônes pour juger les douze tribus d'Israel". La promesse d'une récompense aussi magnifique n'implique-t-elle pas que leur renoncement était aussi définitif, aussi complet que possible ? Au reste l'interprétation que nous donnons de ce passage n'est pas nouvelle; c'est celle qu'en donnait saint Augustin quand il disait y trouver la preuve que les Apôtres avaient fait vœu de pauvreté parfaite.⁴²

Nous avons un autre témoignage en ce qui concerne la pauvreté de Pierre. Un jour qu'il montait au temple en compagnie de saint Jean, un impotent de naissance lui demanda l'aumône. "Je n'ai, dit-il, ni or ni argent; ce que j'ai je te le donne; au nom de Jésus de Nazareth marche".⁴³ On dira que cela signifie que Pierre n'avait pas d'argent à ce moment-là et rien de plus. Tout autre est l'avis de saint Jérôme, de saint Augustin, de saint Ambroise, de saint Bernard: Pierre n'avait pas d'argent parce qu'il voulait se conformer au précepte du Christ.⁴⁴

Un texte plus précis nous est fourni par les Actes.⁴⁵ En réponse à des plaintes auxquelles donnait lieu le service quotidien les Apôtres répondaient: Il ne convient pas que nous délaissions la parole de Dieu pour servir aux tables, marquant par là qu'ils ne voulaient même pas s'occuper de la répartition des ressources communes entre les membres de la communauté.⁴⁶

On connaît enfin la recommandation de saint Paul à Timothée:⁴⁷ "lorsque nous avons la nourriture et le gîte nous sommes satisfaits", inter-

⁴² Augustinus intellexit ipsos non habere aliquid quomodo Christus consuluit adolescenti dimittere omnia, quia, occasione illius, dixit Petrus in persona omnium apostolorum; Ecce nos reliquimus omnia: sed Christus consuluit adolescenti dimittere omnia in speciali et in communi, quia vendita et data pauperibus dimittuntur in speciali et in communi. *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 17, p. 1059, l. 37-44; c. 11, p. 1039, l. 56; p. 1040, l. 19.

⁴³ Act. iii, 1-7.

⁴⁴ *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 9, p. 1030, l. 48; c. 93, p. 1162, l. 25; c. 102, p. 1187, l. 40.

⁴⁵ vi, 3.

⁴⁶ *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 106, p. 1198, l. 24-26.

⁴⁷ I, vi, 7.

prété comme il suit par saint Augustin et saint Jérôme: les Apôtres n'avaient aucune chose de ce monde en propriété. Ils n'en avaient que l'usage. On dira qu'en beaucoup de choses l'usage ne se sépare pas de la propriété. Cette difficulté demande une discussion approfondie. Nous la retrouverons plus tard.⁴⁸

Au dire de Jean XXII,⁴⁹ après avoir résolu de suivre le Christ et même après la Pentecôte, les Apôtres auraient possédé quelques biens. Ils avaient cinq pains et deux poissons lors de la multiplication des pains. Ils pouvaient acheter des aliments dans la ville de Sichar. Pierre possédait une maison où le Christ venait guérir sa belle-mère. Matthieu le recevait chez lui et donnait en son honneur un grand festin. Les Apôtres avaient deux épées au moment de la Passion. Les vêtements dont alors ils disposaient leur appartenaient en toute propriété, puisque le Christ leur conseillait de les vendre pour se procurer des armes. Il n'y avait pas de différence entre la règle de vie que les Apôtres devaient suivre et celle que devaient suivre les disciples. Or parmi les disciples quelques-uns, Joseph d'Arimathie, Simon le lépreux, Lazare, Marthe, Marie, enfin Tabitha possédaient des biens en abondance. Reportons-nous d'ailleurs aux chapitres 2 et 4 des Actes. Nous y lisons que les croyants vendaient leurs biens et remettaient le prix aux Apôtres pour être réparti entre tous les membres de la communauté, selon les besoins de chacun. La communauté et par suite les Apôtres, qui en faisaient partie, devenaient propriétaires de ces biens et cela au sens propre du mot, puisque, vivant sous la loi romaine, les croyants en étaient légalement propriétaires et qu'ils transmettaient leurs droits aux Apôtres et à la communauté. Bien plus, après la répartition de ces biens entre les membres de la communauté chacun devenait propriétaire de la portion qui lui était assignée. Ce que les Apôtres recevaient leur appartenait donc en propre. Et c'est ce que l'ange qui délivre saint Pierre de prison laisse suffisamment entendre quand il lui dit: Ceints-toi et chausse tes sandales.

Ces considérations paraissent, en vérité, de peu de poids. Les pains et les poissons dont parle Jean XXII appartenaient à un enfant et non pas aux Apôtres.⁵⁰ En achetant des aliments dans la ville de Sichar les Apôtres ne violaient pas leur vœu de complète pauvreté. Résidant alors parmi les Samaritains, qui leur étaient hostiles et dont ils ne pouvaient espérer le plus minime secours, ils se trouvaient dans le cas de nécessité. Or nécessité ne connaît pas de loi. En outre ils pouvaient procéder à des achats sans

⁴⁸ *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 11, p. 1043, l. 41.

⁴⁹ *Quia vir reprobis, Bullar. francisc.*, V, 412, 414, 443-446.

⁵⁰ *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 103, p. 1192, l. 4.

posséder d'argent. Il suffisait que d'autres, par exemple les saintes femmes, en possédassent et les missent à leur disposition, car, on en voit la preuve tous les jours, autre peut être celui qui achète et autre celui qui paie; c'est le cas, par exemple, quand un serviteur fait les emplettes et que le maître règle la facture.⁵¹

Quand saint Matthieu et saint Marc parlent de la maison de Pierre ils ne veulent pas dire que cette maison lui appartenait, mais qu'elle lui avait jadis appartenu ou qu'elle était sa résidence habituelle, comme il est dit, par exemple, que Nazareth était la ville de Marie et de Joseph bien qu'ils n'en fussent aucunement propriétaires.⁵²

Lorsque Matthieu reçut le Christ et donna en son honneur un grand festin, il n'avait pas été appelé définitivement à l'apostolat et par suite n'avait pas encore reçu du Christ l'ordre de renoncer à toute propriété.⁵³ Quand au moment de la Passion le Christ dit à Pierre de remettre son épée dans le fourreau, cela ne signifie pas que cette épée était la propriété de Pierre, mais qu'il la portait. Et si l'on demande qui donc en était le propriétaire, nous pourrions répondre qu'il ne nous appartient pas de le rechercher, car, selon le mot de saint Jérôme, en bien des cas, mieux vaut douter que décider à la légère.⁵⁴

Sans doute au moment de la Passion le Christ invite les Apôtres à se munir d'une bourse ou d'un sac et à celui qui n'a pas d'épée de vendre son manteau pour en acheter une. Mais, comme le remarque Bède,⁵⁵ ce n'est que d'une dispense qu'il s'agit et cette dispense n'abolit pas le précepte, car elle n'autorise pas les Apôtres à s'approprier ces sacs ou ces bourses mais à les porter avec soi, ce qu'ils pouvaient faire parce qu'ils se trouvaient alors en cas de nécessité et qu'en cas de nécessité il est permis d'user de la chose d'autrui et même de la vendre et qu'alors bien des choses sont permises à celui-là même à qui elles étaient absolument interdites. Ne voyons-nous pas en effet le Christ approuver David et ses compagnons d'avoir mangé les pains de proposition pour apaiser leur faim, ce qui en temps normal n'était permis qu'aux prêtres?⁵⁶

⁵¹ *Ibid.* p. 1197, l. 17-26. Cf. c. 83, p. 1141, l. 17.

⁵² *Ibid.* c. 98, p. 1182, l. 10-35, 49-50. Cf. c. 11, p. 1045, l. 21-31.

⁵³ *Ibid.* c. 98, p. 1182, l. 47-60.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* c. 11, p. 1045, l. 35-39, 54-59.

⁵⁵ *In Lucæ evangelium expositio*, PL 92, 601. Même renvoi à Bède et même interprétation chez Bertrand de la Tour, Vital du Four et Jean Peccham. Voir F. Tocco, *La questione della povertà* (Naples, 1910), 71, 77, 244.

⁵⁶ Matth. xii, 3-4; Marc ii, 25-26; Luc vi, 3-4: *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 11, p. 1045-1046; c. 102; p. 1190, l. 6; 1191, l. 37-40. Au chapitre 11, p. 1046, l. 11, Guillaume déclare sans y insister que les mots "qu'il achète une épée", ne doivent pas s'entendre à la lettre mais dans un sens mystique: *Hoc secundum nonnullos doctores mystice, non secundum litteram debet intelligi.*

Quand Jean XXII affirme que le Christ n'avait pas donné aux Apôtres une autre règle de vie qu'aux disciples, en entendant par disciples l'ensemble des croyants, il contredit manifestement l'Écriture. Ne lisons-nous pas en effet dans saint Matthieu qu'il avait prescrit aux Apôtres de ne porter ni or ni argent, ni chaussures ni deux tuniques et de pratiquer la continence ? Toutes choses qu'il n'avait pas imposées à l'ensemble des chrétiens. L'argument que le pape tire de l'exemple de Joseph d'Arimathie, de Simon le lépreux etc. manque donc absolument de valeur, puisque la majeure en est fautive.⁵⁷

On allègue que les premiers croyants mettaient leurs biens et leur propriété à la disposition des Apôtres et de la communauté et qu'ainsi les Apôtres, qui faisaient partie de la communauté, devenaient propriétaires de ces biens au sens propre et légal du mot. Remarquons d'abord que les premiers chrétiens ne donnaient pas leurs biens, leurs champs et leurs maisons à la communauté, mais qu'ils les vendaient et mettaient le prix à la disposition des Apôtres. On ne peut donc pas dire, comme le fait Jean XXII,⁵⁸ que les Apôtres ont possédé des champs et des maisons en Judée et qu'ils auraient pu les garder s'ils l'avaient voulu.⁵⁹ Notons ensuite qu'il y a une grande différence entre la propriété que les Juifs avaient de leurs biens avant de les vendre et celle que la communauté avait du produit de leur vente. Soumis, à ce point de vue, à la loi romaine, les Juifs avaient la propriété pleine et entière de leurs biens. Ils pouvaient en disposer à leur guise, les vendre, les donner, donner plus à celui-ci et moins à celui-là selon leur bon plaisir. La communauté ne pouvait pas disposer à son gré des sommes mises à sa disposition. Elle ne pouvait pas les aliéner sauf pour sustenter tel ou tel de ses membres; elle ne pouvait pas donner plus au moins indigent et moins au plus indigent, beaucoup

⁵⁷ *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 100, p. 1184, l. 50; *Tractatus ostendens*, fol. 228d-229a; *De imperat. et pontific.* p. 48.

⁵⁸ Au dire de Mulder (*Op. cit.* p. 35, n. 2), cette erreur ne se trouverait pas dans la bulle *Quia vir reprobus*. Cependant nous y lisons: *Apostolis fuit licitum in Judea, si voluissent, retinere praedia. Nec voto compulsi sunt quod illa non retinuerunt, sed voluntate propria, quia se non contracturos moram ibi, sed transituros praevidebant ad gentes.* Ed. cit. p. 412.

⁵⁹ *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 5, p. 1016, l. 52-57; c. 123, p. 1228, l. 22; *Compend. error.* c. 6, p. 966, l. 10-24; *Tract. ostendens*, fol. 255a; *De imperat. et pontific.* p. 40-41. L'exposé le plus complet se trouve dans ces deux derniers ouvrages. Citons le texte du *De imperat.*: *Si Apostoli, post missionem Spiritus sancti praedia habuerunt in Judea, aut habuerunt illa ex donatione credentium de quibus Act iv fit mentio, aut aliunde scilicet jure hereditario aut emptione aut aliquo modo alio. Secundum dici non potest quia Apostoli ante passionem Christi omnia reliquerunt nec habebant unde potuissent sibi praedia acquirere. Primum etiam dici non potest quia... credentes non dederunt praedia sua nec communitati nec collegio Apostolorum nec alicui Apostolorum, sed ipsa vendiderant et praedia assignaverunt pro sustentatione.*

au premier et presque rien au deuxième. Elle était tenue de les répartir proportionnellement aux besoins de chacun sans, remarque la glose ordinaire, tenir compte de la dignité des personnes ou de leur fonction. Elle n'avait donc pas la même propriété qu'en avaient les Juifs avant de les lui transmettre.⁶⁰ Elle en avait la propriété seulement en ce sens qu'elle pouvait les revendiquer en justice si d'autres les lui avaient enlevés ou prétendaient s'en emparer, car il ne convenait pas que, vivant au milieu d'infidèles avarés et hostiles les premiers chrétiens ayant des enfants à nourrir, abdiquassent tout droit et tout moyen de se défendre.⁶¹ Il faut toutefois bien comprendre ce point. Cette propriété, ce pouvoir d'estimer en justice n'appartenait pas aux Apôtres à titre personnel ni à titre collectif, ni même en tant qu'ils faisaient partie de la communauté; il appartenait à ceux des chrétiens qui n'avaient pas comme eux fait vœu de pauvreté, qui, même, car il y en avait parmi eux, avaient conservé la propriété de leurs biens et qui dès lors pouvaient en son nom défendre les intérêts de la communauté.⁶²

Et qu'on ne dise pas qu'après la répartition des ressources communes chacun, y compris les Apôtres, devenait propriétaire de la portion qui lui était assignée, car, dictée par un pur sentiment de charité fraternelle, cette répartition avait uniquement pour but de permettre à chacun de subvenir à ses besoins. Il n'était donc pas nécessaire qu'on lui en octroyât la propriété; il suffisait qu'on lui accordât la faculté d'en user, de les consommer. En outre, si les croyants en étaient devenus propriétaires, ils auraient pu vendre leur portion ou la donner à d'autres. Ils se seraient appauvris cependant que d'autres se seraient enrichis. L'intention principale des donateurs, savoir qu'il ne devait pas y avoir d'indigents au sein de la communauté, aurait été violée. Enfin le pape Clément⁶³ n'aurait eu aucune raison d'affirmer que les premiers chrétiens menaient la vie commune, à moins d'admettre que deux frères mènent eux aussi une telle vie quand, après s'être partagé un héritage, ils vivent chacun de la part qui lui revient.⁶⁴

Sans doute l'ange attribue à Pierre les vêtements et les chaussures qu'il portait dans sa prison. Mais il voulait par là simplement dire que Pierre

⁶⁰ *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 4, p. 1010, l. 11-14; 1012, l. 50; c. 5, p. 1015, l. 20-42; c. 106, p. 1196, l. 8-20; *Compend. error.* c. 6, p. 965.

⁶¹ *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 4, p. 1012, l. 40-45; 1013, l. 11; 1015, l. 10-26; c. 6, p. 1023, l. 22-37; c. 11, p. 1044, l. 4-14.

⁶² *Ibid.* c. 4, p. 1012, l. 40-45; c. 6, p. 1021, l. 24-29; 1023, l. 25-30; c. 106, p. 1195, l. 21, p. 1196.

⁶³ *Epist.* V, PG 1, 507.

⁶⁴ *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 9, p. 1033, l. 27; *Tract. ostendens*, fol. 225b-d.

avait la "puissance licite" de s'en servir pour se vêtir et de se chauffer.⁶⁵

Notre conclusion se trouve dès lors solidement établie: les Apôtres ne possédaient rien en propre ni en commun. Ils avaient l'usage des choses mises par d'autres à leur disposition. On aura beau scruter l'Écriture, on n'y trouvera jamais l'affirmation que les Apôtres avaient le droit de vendre ces choses, de les donner et de les échanger, ni même rien qui puisse donner à croire qu'ils possédassent ce droit.⁶⁶ Affirmer le contraire, comme le fait Jean XXII,⁶⁷ c'est manifestement mentir.

L'ÉTAT D'INNOCENCE ET PROPRIÉTÉ

En refusant de s'approprier quoique ce soit, les Apôtres adoptaient un mode de vie, non pas certes identique, mais analogue à celui que les hommes auraient mené si Adam et Eve n'avaient pas péché. Cette opinion ne date pas d'hier. Ce fut autrefois celle du pape saint Clément,⁶⁸ de saint Remi et de bien d'autres que l'on pourrait citer.

Elle n'a cependant pas trouvé grâce auprès de Jean XXII. A son avis, la propriété, même individuelle, aurait existé avant la chute. Il en donne pour preuve ces paroles de Dieu s'adressant à Adam: "Croissez, multipliez-vous, remplissez la terre et soumettez-la et dominez sur les poissons de la mer et les oiseaux du ciel".⁶⁹ Ces paroles, remarque Jean XXII, furent prononcées alors qu'Eve n'existait pas encore, car elles figurent au premier chapitre de la Genèse et c'est seulement au deuxième que ce livre nous rapporte comment Eve fut formée. Il ne peut donc pas s'agir d'une propriété collective, puisqu'Adam existait seul et que la propriété collective suppose une pluralité de personnes.⁷⁰

En argumentant ainsi Jean XXII prend pour accordé que dans le récit des événements, la Bible suit toujours l'ordre chronologique. Bien des

⁶⁵ *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 9, p. 1037, l. 45. Au cours de ce même chapitre, p. 1037, l. 11-17, Guillaume déclare que les premiers chrétiens n'avaient pas seulement le simple usage de fait des choses dont ils disposaient: quia ante illam divisionem habuerunt in eis jus quoddam commune quod per divisionem minime perdidierunt. On verra plus tard l'importance de cette remarque.

⁶⁶ *Scripturae sacrae falsum imponit dicens ipsam testari Christum et Apostolos habuisse in rebus quibus usi fuerunt jus utendi, vendendi, donandi et aliqua ex eis acquirendi, civile et mundanum, et quod talia de hujusmodi rebus fecerunt, quod est aperte mendacium, quia hoc in Scriptura nequaquam reperitur, imo omnia quae in Scripturae sacra de rebus Christi et Apostolorum habentur absque jure civili et mundano possunt salvari. Compend. error.* c. 3, p. 961, l. 44-49.

⁶⁷ Bulle Cum inter nonnullos, *Bullarium francis.*, V, 257-258.

⁶⁸ *Epist.* V, PG 1, 506-507.

⁶⁹ Genèse, i, 28.

⁷⁰ *Quia vir reprobis*, éd. cit., p. 412.

endroits prouvent qu'il n'en est pas ainsi.⁷¹ Et c'est précisément ce qui arrive dans le cas qui nous occupe. La bénédiction donnée à Adam est mise au pluriel; elle l'invite à se multiplier. Or il ne peut pas y avoir procréation d'enfants sans participation de la femme. Adam n'existait donc pas seul quand Dieu lui adressa les paroles susdites.⁷² Au reste admettons qu'alors il fut seul, l'argument serait encore sans valeur, car la possession en commun n'exige pas une pluralité actuelle de copropriétaires; elle exige simplement que ces copropriétaires aient existé ou qu'ils doivent exister un jour. Faites périr tous les moines d'un monastère à l'exception d'un seul. Celui-ci posséderait encore en commun les biens de la communauté, car il ne les détiendrait pas pour lui seul, mais pour lui et pour ceux qui viendront plus tard vivre avec lui.⁷³ Ainsi en aurait-il été d'Adam dans l'hypothèse admise par Jean XXII car ce n'est pas pour lui seul que Dieu lui aurait donné la propriété des choses de ce monde mais pour lui, pour la future Eve et tous leurs descendants.⁷⁴

Est-ce à dire que, dans l'état d'innocence, la propriété aurait existé au moins sous sa forme collective ? Jean XXII le prétend.⁷⁵ Après la chute, remarque-t-il, Adam et Eve et leurs enfants se sont réparti des biens en autant de propriétés distinctes. C'est donc qu'auparavant ils possédaient ces biens en commun.

Raisonner de la sorte c'est supposer que la propriété qu'on a de certains biens demeure identique lorsqu'ils sont possédés en propre après l'avoir été en commun et vice versa. Cette proposition est fausse. De nombreux exemples en fournissent la preuve. En voici deux. Le bienfaiteur d'un monastère a la propriété pleine et entière des biens qu'il donne: il peut les vendre, les donner, en disposer à son gré. Le monastère ne le peut pas. La propriété en commun qu'il en a n'est donc pas pleine et entière. Des créanciers ont reçu des gages communs de plusieurs personnes ou de plusieurs collectivités. Ils ont, en certains cas, le droit de les vendre. Supposons qu'ils les vendent séparément à des acheteurs différents. Ces gages deviennent la propriété de ceux qui les achètent. Et cependant les créanciers ne les possédaient pas en commun.⁷⁶ Il n'était donc pas néces-

⁷¹ *Op. nonag. dier. c. 27*, p. 1075, l. 4, 37-54.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 1074, l. 6-11.

⁷³ *Ibid.* p. 1074, l. 12-35; 1075, l. 7-15.

⁷⁴ *Esto quod dominium rerum fuerit datum Adae ante formationem Evae, non tamen habuit tunc dominium proprium quia illud dominium non fuit sibi datum pro se solo sed pro se et pro muliere formanda de ipso ac pro omnibus posteris eorumdem.* *Ibid.* p. 1074, l. 36-39; c. 88, p. 1146, l. 52-56; *Breviloquium*, éd. Baudry (Paris, 1937), p. 98-99.

⁷⁵ *Quia vir reprobus*, p. 417-418; *Op. nonag. dier. c. 14*, p. 1051, l. 47-49.

⁷⁶ *Op. nonag. dier. p. 1053*, l. 53.

saire que, pour se répartir des biens en propriétés distinctes, Adam et Eve et leurs enfants en eussent d'abord la propriété collective. Celle-ci n'existait donc pas plus que la propriété individuelle dans l'état d'innocence. Ni l'une ni l'autre n'auraient existé si Adam et Eve n'avaient pas péché.⁷⁷

Quelle sorte de « dominium » Dieu leur avait-il donc octroyé en leur disant : « Dominez sur les poissons de la mer et les oiseaux du ciel et sur les animaux qui marchent sur la terre » ?

Ce dominium consistait d'abord en « une parfaite puissance de régir les êtres », puissance faite à la fois « de force corporelle et de sagesse naturelle » capable de s'exercer sans rencontrer la moindre résistance, si bien que pour Adam et Eve « rien ne pouvait se produire à l'encontre de leur volonté ». ⁷⁸ Bref ils avaient sur les choses temporelles un dominium analogue à celui que les anges ont sur elles et les démons parce qu'ils les assujettissent et les dominent. ⁷⁹ Un tel dominium n'a jamais existé parmi les hommes depuis la chute. ⁸⁰ Si l'on voulait quelque chose à quoi on puisse le comparer, ce n'est pas dans la propriété mais bien plutôt dans la puissance de faire des miracles qu'il faudrait le chercher. ⁸¹

Dieu avait en outre accordé à Adam et Eve pour eux et pour leurs descendants le pouvoir d'user des biens de la terre pour s'en nourrir, à l'exception toutefois des fruits de l'arbre de la science du bien et du mal, mais sans qu'ils pussent se les approprier autrement que par l'usage qu'ils en faisaient. ⁸²

⁷⁷ Dominium quod vocatur proprietas nullo modo fuit in statu innocentiae et numquam fuisset si primi parentes non peccassent, qui quia nulla res alicui personae vel collegio speciali appropriata fuisset. *Ibid.* c. 26, p. 1073, l. 6-8.

⁷⁸ Dominium datum primis parentibus fuit potestas rationabiliter regendi ac gubernandi temporalia absque eorum resistentia violenta... ita quod nihil contra eorum voluntatem accidisset. *Ibid.* c. 14, p. 1050, l. 35-58. Potestas naturalis corporis et sapientia naturalis qua volebant omnia absque ipsorum resistentia gubernare. *Ibid.* p. 1051, l. 32.

⁷⁹ Concedendum est quod primi parentes habuerunt dominium temporalium sicut potest dici quod angeli habent dominium demoniorum et rerum temporalium quia demonia et res temporales angelis subiunguntur et ipsi dominantur eis. *Ibid.* c. 26, p. 1073, l. 14.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.* c. 14, p. 1052, l. 12. Pas même pour les Apôtres car, s'ils pouvaient faire des miracles, les animaux ne leur obéissaient pas comme ils obéissaient à Adam et Eve dans l'état d'innocence.

⁸¹ *Ibid.* p. 1051, l. 23-24. Selon De Lagarde, *La Naissance...* VI, 179, n. 31, dans le *Breviloquium* (p. 85) Occam ne reprendrait pas l'opposition entre ce que De Lagarde appelle, d'une expression peut-être mal choisie, « le magnétisme adamite » et le dominium des hommes de ce siècle. Cependant Guillaume le mentionne en termes rapides, il est vrai, mais précis, à la page 98.

⁸² *Breviloquium*, p. 85: *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 14, p. 1050, l. 48-55; c. 92, p. 1150, l. 8-10; c. 28, p. 1076, l. 59-64. Quand M. de Gandillac (*Le mouvement doctrinal du XI^e au XIV^e siècle*, dans Fliche-Martin, *Histoire de l'église*, vol. 13, p. 436, n. 41) écrit que « dans l'état d'innocence les hommes pouvaient tout posséder en commun... selon l'équité naturelle, » il ne faut pas entendre qu'ils avaient en commun la propriété de toutes choses, mais qu'ils avaient en commun le pouvoir d'en user.

Ces deux prérogatives étaient réellement distinctes. Le péché d'Adam et Eve leur fit perdre la première, il ne leur enlève pas la seconde. En outre après le péché il leur fut permis de s'approprier des biens temporels. C'est qu'en effet le péché enfanta parmi les hommes l'avarice et la cupidité; la paresse les détourna de gérer les biens matériels avec soin, car en règle générale les méchants négligent ce qui ne leur appartient pas en propre. Il convenait donc que les biens temporels cessassent d'être communs et que les individus pussent se les approprier.⁸³

Toutefois la propriété n'apparut pas aussitôt après la chute.⁸⁴ Les hommes eurent d'abord le pouvoir de se diviser les biens temporels et de se les approprier parce que ce qui n'est pas à personne appartient au premier occupant.⁸⁵ Ce pouvoir ne constituait pas plus un *dominium* commun qu'aujourd'hui le pouvoir d'acquérir ce que la terre, le ciel et la mer contiennent n'en est un, car s'il en eût été ainsi nul n'aurait pu s'approprier quoi que ce soit sans le consentement de la communauté.⁸⁶ Ce pouvoir ne fut pas donné aux hommes par le péché, mais, à l'occasion du péché, par Dieu directement, sous le concours ou la participation de l'homme.⁸⁷ Il est commun à tout le genre humain, il constitue un droit fondamental auquel chacun, hormis le cas de nécessité, peut renoncer, mais dont, en principe, nul ne peut être privé malgré lui.⁸⁸

Utilisant ce pouvoir que Dieu leur avait donné, les hommes partagèrent les biens temporels. On vit, dans cette troisième période, apparaître les propriétés que nous connaissons aujourd'hui. Quelques unes d'entre elles furent introduites par une concession spéciale de Dieu. C'est, par exemple, Dieu qui donna aux Hébreux la propriété des dépouilles prises sur les

⁸³ *Breviloquium*, p. 85-86.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

⁸⁵ *Primi parentes post peccatum non habuerunt dominium commune omnium temporalium proprie loquendo de dominio, sed habebant potestatem appropriandi sibi et acquirendi dominium commune quia quae in nullius bonis sunt occupanti conceduntur. Op. nonag. dier. c. 14, p. 1051, l. 51-55.*

⁸⁶ *Illa proprietas non fuit proprie dominium commune sicut nec modo potestas appropriandi seu acquirendi illa quae coelo terra marique capiuntur est proprie dominium commune quia, si esset proprie dominium commune, nullus deberet sibi appropriare aliqua ipsorum absque communitatis consensu. Ibid. c. 14, p. 1051, l. 54-57; 1053, l. 35-39, 43-45.*

⁸⁷ *Potestas appropriandi res temporales personae et personis aut collegio data est a Deo humano generi... absque ministerio et cooperatione humana. Breviloquium, p. 87. Cf. Op. nonag. dier. c. 92, p. 1150, l. 19-26.*

⁸⁸ *Ex dictamine rationis naturalis convincitur quod expedit posse peccantibus quod etiam habeant potestatem appropriandi sibi aliqua, nisi eorum aliqui eadem potestate sponte se privent, ita quod nullus debet in principio cogi talem potestatem dimittere. Op. nonag. dier. c. 14, p. 1051, l. 60-65; c. 60, pp. 1102, l. 61; c. 65, p. 1112, l. 1.*

Égyptiens.⁸⁹ Les premières résultèrent de conventions passées entre les hommes avant même qu'il y eût des rois et des princes comme le montre l'exemple de Cain et Abel, des fils de Noé, d'Abraham, d'Isaac, de Joseph, etc.⁹⁰ Cette répartition des biens n'était, certes, pas conforme à l'équité naturelle qui aurait existé dans l'état d'innocence, ni à l'équité naturelle qui devrait exister entre des hommes suivant en toutes choses la raison. Elle n'est pas contraire à l'équité naturelle existant entre des hommes enclins au désordre et au mal puisqu'elle dérive à la fois d'un droit fondamental, le droit de s'approprier les biens temporels, et de ce que dicte la raison dans l'état de choses créé par le péché.⁹¹

LE SIMPLE USAGE DE FAIT

Nous sommes maintenant en mesure de résoudre un problème extrêmement important rencontré au cours de nos explications. L'usage d'une chose est-il distinct de la propriété et du droit d'user au point qu'il puisse en être séparé ?

S'il s'agit d'un usage illicite, la réponse n'est pas douteuse. Le voleur use de l'habit, du pain, du vin et autres objets qu'il dérobe. Cependant, nul ne l'ignore, il n'en a pas la propriété, il n'a pas le droit d'en user.⁹²

S'il s'agit d'un usage licite, une première chose est certaine: cet usage n'exige pas la propriété. De multiples exemples en fournissent la preuve. Sous l'ancienne loi, traversant les vignes et les moissons d'autrui, les Juifs pouvaient y cueillir des raisins et des épis pour les manger sur place.⁹³

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* c. 88, p. 1144, l. 51-65.

⁹⁰ *Primum dominium proprium temporalium post lapsum fuit jure humano seu ordinatione aut voluntate humana introductum... absque legibus regum. Ibid.* l. 22-46; p. 1146, l. 19-35. *Breviloquium*, p. 88-90, 98.

⁹¹ *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 92, p. 1150, l. 11-15; *III Dialog. tract.* 2, lib. 3, c. 6, p. 933, l. 57-60. On le voit, Guillaume ne nie pas le droit de propriété. Il n'aura donc pas à se déjuger quand plus tard il prendra la défense des propriétés individuelles contre les empiètements du pape et des princes. Sa théorie de la propriété diffère nettement de celle de Duns Scot. Duns Scot en fait un droit fondé sur les lois de l'état. Guillaume la fait résulter d'un droit humain antérieur à toute législation et qu'on ne saurait violer sans injustice. La différence avec saint Thomas est moins accentuée. Comme saint Thomas, Guillaume fait, en un sens, dériver la propriété de son utilité sociale. Comme lui il admet qu'elle comporte des limites tracées par les exigences de l'intérêt public. Numquam possunt temporalia appropriari quin tempore necessitatis debeant esse communia. *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 65, p. 1112, l. 61. Retentio proprietatis non debet esse sine cura quia hoc est reipublicae nocivum. *Ibid.* c. 12, p. 1047, l. 54.

⁹² *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 4, p. 1010, l. 56-59; c. 41, p. 1089, l. 42; *De imperat.* p. 27; *Tract. ostendens* fol. 217c.

⁹³ Deutéronome, xxiii, 25-26.

Le serviteur, le fils de famille avant d'avoir hérité des biens paternels, l'hôte, l'invité à un festin usent des choses qui ne leur appartiennent pas. Quand des prêtres séculiers ou des religieux célèbrent la messe en dehors de leur paroisse ou de leur monastère, ils n'ont pas la propriété des ornements sacerdotaux et des vases sacrés, du pain, du vin mis à leur disposition.⁹⁴ Dans le cas de nécessité l'indigent use légitimement de la chose d'autrui. Il n'en acquiert pas pour autant la propriété, car si l'état d'extrême nécessité dans lequel il se trouve cesse avant que la chose ait péri, le propriétaire peut la revendiquer et l'indigent est tenu de la rendre.⁹⁵

La raison de tout cela est facile à saisir. Deux conditions suffisent pour que l'usage de fait ne soit pas illicite. Premièrement que l'usage de la chose ne soit pas interdit à celui qui veut en user. Deuxièmement qu'il ait reçu de celui qui a pouvoir de l'accorder l'autorisation de s'en servir. Ces deux conditions peuvent être remplies sans que l'individu ait en propre ou en commun la propriété de ce dont il fait usage. En outre, nous reviendrons plus tard sur ce point, après ou avant la chute Dieu a donné à tout le genre humain, dans la personne de nos premiers parents, le pouvoir très général d'user des biens de ce monde, pourvu que rien n'y fasse obstacle. Si donc rien ne s'y oppose on peut, en vertu de cette autorisation très générale user licitement d'une chose sans la posséder en propre ou en commun. Voici un habit abandonné que personne, individu ou collectivité, ne revendique. Vous pouvez, au moins en cas de nécessité, vous en vêtir sans vouloir en acquérir la propriété.⁹⁶

Séparable de la propriété, l'usage de fait l'est également du droit d'user! On sait à quelle critique Jean XXII a soumis cette affirmation de Michet de Cézène et de ses partisans. Les Frères Mineurs, déclare-t-il, prétendent n'avoir que le simple usage de fait, c'est à dire l'usage séparé de tout droit sur les choses dont ils disposent. Prétention manifestement injustifiable. Trois hypothèses sont possibles. Ou bien l'usage que les Mineurs font des biens mis à leur disposition est injuste, ce qu'ils n'admettent pas et ne sauraient admettre. Ou bien il n'est ni juste ni injuste, ce qu'on ne saurait accorder, car, procédant d'une volonté réfléchie tout acte humain est fait en vue d'une fin. Si la fin est bonne l'acte l'est; si la fin est mauvaise, l'acte l'est aussi. Il n'y a pas, il ne peut pas y avoir d'acte humain individualisé qui soit indifférent, c'est à dire ni bon ni mauvais, ni juste ni injuste. Il ne reste donc qu'une solution. Les Frères Mineurs font un usage juste

⁹⁴ *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 4, p. 1012, l. 6-20; c. 6, p. 1022, l. 44-59; c. 9, p. 1036, l. 15-19; c. 20, p. 1063, l. 53 ss.; c. 31, p. 1079, l. 29-39; c. 32, p. 1081, l. 46ss; c. 41, p. 1089, l. 47; c. 83, p. 1140, l. 15-50; *Compend. error.* c. 2, p. 959, l. 31-45; *Tract. ostendens*, fol. 217c, 218a.

⁹⁵ *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 3, p. 1006, l. 15-32.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.* c. 4, p. 1010, l. 59ss; *Breviloquium*, V, c. 4, p. 135-136.

des choses dont ils se servent; ils ont donc sur elles un droit car ce que l'on fait justement, c'est en vertu d'un droit qu'on le fait.⁹⁷

Cette argumentation est tout simplement sophistique.⁹⁸ Jean XXII a confondu les trois sens que l'on peut donner et que l'on donne au mot juste. Un acte peut être dit juste parce qu'il satisfait aux exigences de la justice *particulière* qui règle les rapports de l'homme avec ses semblables. Si l'on adopte ce sens, bien des actes humains, cependant licites, méritoires, ne sont ni justes ni injustes. Tels, par exemple, les actes de chasteté, de force, de prudence, de miséricorde, de libéralité. Vous donnez à une personne une chose qui ne lui est pas due. Votre acte n'est ni juste ni injuste puisque d'une part vous n'êtes pas tenu de donner et que d'autre part il ne vous est pas interdit de le faire. Un acte est encore dit juste quand il est prescrit par la justice *légal*e qui veut que chacun obéisse à la loi. Alors encore bien des actes de vertu ne sont ni justes ni injustes; ils ne sont pas justes puisqu'il n'y a pas de loi humaine qui les prescrive. Ils ne sont pas injustes car ils pourraient être justes si une loi humaine les prescrivait. Enfin un acte peut être dit juste parce qu'il est bon, conforme à la raison. Ces distinctions faites, il devient clair que la critique de Jean XXII ne porte pas. Elle repose sur ce principe: il n'y a pas d'actes indifférents, pas de milieu entre le juste et l'injuste, pas de différence entre le juste et le licite. Or nous venons de le montrer, ce principe est faux.⁹⁹

Pour achever de nous convaincre, pour mieux comprendre la pensée de Michel à Cézène et de ses partisans et en saisir le bien fondé, distinguons à la suite de saint Augustin¹ un *jus fori* ou droit positif résultant d'une ordonnance humaine ou divine explicite et un *jus poli* ou équité naturelle qui, indépendamment de toute ordonnance humaine et même de toute ordonnance divine purement positive est conforme à la raison droite.²

⁹⁷ *Quia vir reprobus*, edit. cit., p. 433-434.

⁹⁸ *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 62, p. 1107, l. 29; c. 65, p. 1110, l. 21.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.* c. 60, p. 1103, l. 31-43; c. 62, p. 1107, l. 35-49; c. 65, p. 1111, l. 46-54; c. 66, p. 1113, l. 38.

¹ *De vita clericorum*, sermo 365, c. 3, PL. 39, 1572. Il ne faut donc pas dire que Guillaume emprunte cette distinction à Duns Scot, puisque, au début de son exposé, il renvoie à saint Augustin en le citant d'après le Décret.

² *Jus fori* vocatur *jus* quod ex pactione sive ordinatione humana vel divina explicita constituitur... *Jus* autem *poli* vocatur aequitas naturalis quae, absque omni ordinatione humana et etiam divina pure positiva est consona rationi rectae, sive sit consona rationi pure naturali, sive sit consona rationi rectae acceptae ex illis quae sunt nobis divinitus revelata. *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 65, p. 1110, l. 30-55. *Jus poli* non est aliud quam potestas conformis rationi rectae absque pactione. *Jus fori* est potestas ex pactione. *Ibid.* p. 1112, l. 49. Notons, en passant, que Guillaume semble distinguer deux sphères dans le *jus poli*, l'une constituée par le droit naturel et l'autre par le droit divin. Par exemple il est conforme à la raison droite que le prédicateur de l'Évangile soit sustenté par ceux qui bénéficient de sa parole. Mais la raison purement naturelle est impuissante

Lorsque les Frères Mineurs affirment avoir l'usage des choses dont ils disposent sans avoir le droit d'en user ils veulent dire qu'ils n'ont pas sur elles un droit qui leur permet de les revendiquer en justice, parce que, comme ils pouvaient le faire, ils ont renoncé à ce droit.³ Mais le *jus fori* ou droit naturel à user des biens temporels leur reste, car ce droit est tel que nul ne peut y renoncer et que, si, en bien des cas il se trouve limité et en quelque sorte empêché de passer à l'acte, il ne peut jamais être complètement aboli. C'est pourquoi en cas d'extrême nécessité chacun peut user de la chose d'autrui quand il en a absolument besoin pour vivre.⁴

On dira que les Frères Mineurs ne sont pas dans le cas d'extrême nécessité quand ils usent des biens mis à leur disposition.⁵ Sans doute. Mais, quand on est empêché d'user d'une chose par cela seul qu'elle appartient à autrui, la permission du propriétaire suffit pour qu'une autre personne puisse en user licitement.⁶ Or tel est le cas des Frères Mineurs. La permission que leurs bienfaiteurs leur donne supprime l'obstacle qui empêchait leur droit naturel de s'exercer. Elle ne leur fait pas acquérir un nouveau droit.⁷ C'est qu'en effet il ne faut pas confondre la permission, la "licence" ou, comme disent les juristes, "la grâce" avec le droit. Le droit est une prérogative dont le détenteur ne saurait être privé contre son gré sans faute de sa part et sans cause raisonnable.⁸ Les grâces sont de deux

à le prouver, comme elle est impuissante à prouver pleinement, *sufficienter*, que ce qu'il prêche est vrai, utile, nécessaire à ceux à qui il s'adresse. *Ibid.* c. 65, p. 1110, l. 55-60.

³ Appellans probans quod usus licitus potest a jure utendi separari non loquitur de jure poli sed de jure fori, sicut saepe explicat manifeste; quare argumentum praedictum non probat. *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 65, p. 1113, l. 1. Ubi cumque dixerunt vel dicunt quod Fratres Minores non habent jus utendi rebus et consimilia semper loquebantur et loquuntur de jure quo quis valet in judicio litigare. *Ibid.* c. 62, p. 1106, l. 61. Cf. c. 65, p. 1110-1111; c. 31, p. 1079, l. 30; c. 32, p. 1082, l. 58.

⁴ Uti temporalibus rebus pertinet ad jus naturale cui nemo licite renunciare potest: non tamen pertinet ad jus naturale quin possit, in multis casibus, limitari et quodam modo coarctari ne in actum licite exeat impediri... Non tamen istud jus naturale potest totaliter evacuari quia nunquam sic possunt temporalia appropriari quin tempore necessitatis debeant esse communia... Et ideo tempore necessitatis extremae potest quilibet jure poli uti qualibet re temporalis, quando aliter vitam suam conservare non posset. *Ibid.* c. 65, p. 1112, l. 1-14. Cf. c. 60, p. 1102, l. 61; c. 3, p. 1006, l. 14; c. 11, p. 1046, l. 6; c. 61, p. 1104, l. 18-25.

⁵ *Ibid.* c. 65, p. 1111, l. 54.

⁶ Ubi uti aliqua re temporalis determinata aliquis per hoc solummodo impeditur quia res illa est aliena ... sola permissio illius cujus est res, quae per licentiam declaratur, sufficit ad hoc quod jure poli utatur eadem re. *Ibid.* c. 65, p. 1112, l. 14-18.

⁷ Per permissionem et per consequens per licentiam solummodo removetur impedimentum prohibens habenti jus naturale utendi ne exeat in actum utendi et nullum jus novum sibi confert. *Ibid.* c. 65, p. 1112, l. 19.

⁸ Jus utendi est potestas licita utendi re extrinseca qua quis sine culpa et absque causa rationabili privari non debet invitatus et, si privatus fuerit, privantem poterit in judicio convenire. *Ibid.* c. 2, p. 997, l. 31; c. 3, p. 1005, l. 63; c. 60, p. 1103, l. 7; c. 61, p. 1104, l. 26-44.

sortes. Les unes ne peuvent pas, les autres peuvent être révoquées à volonté par celui qui les octroie. Par les premières on acquiert un certain droit. Les secondes n'en confèrent manifestement aucun, puisque celui qui les concède peut les retirer sans autre motif que son bon plaisir et sans que le bénéficiaire puisse faire appel de sa décision et le traduire en justice.⁹ C'est en vertu d'une grâce de ce dernier genre que les Mineurs usent des biens dont ils disposent. Cette autorisation peut leur être à tout moment retirée. Et ils n'ont pas plus le droit d'en appeler en justice que l'indigent invité à la table d'un riche ne peut le faire si le riche lui retire l'autorisation de manger les aliments placés devant lui.¹⁰

Bref les Mineurs n'ont que le simple usage des biens dont ils disposent. Cet usage est licite parce qu'ils possèdent, comme tous les hommes, le droit naturel d'user des biens de ce monde et qu'est levé l'obstacle qui empêchait ce droit de s'exercer. Mais, et c'est en cela que consiste leur marque distinctive, ils n'ont aucun droit humain, aucun droit positif leur permettant de revendiquer devant les tribunaux l'usage de fait qui leur a été concédé.¹¹

PAUVRETÉ ET PERFECTION

La pauvreté se trouve donc chez les Frères Mineurs portée à son plus haut degré. Telle était l'opinion de Pierre de Tarentaise. Telle n'est pas celle de Jean XXII. On a beau, remarque-t-il, renoncer à la propriété de tels ou tels biens; on n'en devient pas plus pauvre si, comme c'est le

⁹ Quaedam est licentia quae revocari a concedente non potest... Et per talem licentiam jus quoddam acquiritur. Alia est licentia quae ad placitum concedentis revocari potest et per talem licentiam nullum jus videtur acquiri. *Ibid.* c. 61, p. 1104, l. 56. Cf. c. 2, p. 997, l. 35; c. 3, p. 1006, l. 1; c. 64, p. 1109, l. 38.

¹⁰ Concedentes Fratribus Minoribus licentiam habitandi in locis suis possunt illam licentiam ad libitum revocare, nec Fratres virtute talis licentiae possunt pro inhabitatione locorum hujusmodi in judicio litigare. Ideo ipsis per licentiam hujusmodi nullum jus acquiritur. *Ibid.* c. 64, p. 1109, l. 36. Cf. c. 2, p. 997, l. 36-41.

¹¹ Fratres Minores sunt simplices usurarii, hoc est utuntur rebus, nullum habentes jus per quod valeant in judicio litigare. *Ibid.* c. 2, p. 1001, l. 19; p. 998, l. 22; c. 3, p. 1002, l. 22-25. Cette théorie a soulevé pas mal de critiques et même de railleries. Pour porter sur elle un jugement équitable il faudrait (1) se souvenir des circonstances dans lesquelles elle a vu le jour et la confronter avec les vues émises par saint Bonaventure et Jean Peccham; (2) se souvenir encore que le célèbre canoniste Bérenger Frédol commença par y être favorable; (3) ne pas oublier que des auteurs aussi sérieux que Thomas Sanchez, Molina, le cardinal Bellarmin, n'ont pas jugé les critiques de Jean XXII concluantes; (4) Tout récemment le Père Constantius ab Aldeaseca (*Natura juridica paupertatis*, Rome, 1943, p. 61) a proposé une théorie dont on peut se demander si elle diffère beaucoup de celle de Guillaume.

cas des Frères Mineurs on en garde l'usage, la jouissance.¹² Qui ne voit le vice de l'argument ? Le serviteur use des biens appartenant à son maître. Dira-t-on qu'il est devenu riche ?¹³ La nue propriété peut, dans certains cas, se vendre à bon prix ? Si les Mineurs avaient la propriété des biens mis à leur disposition, ils trouveraient sans peine des marchands avares et malveillants qui la paieraient très cher pour leur en enlever plus tard la jouissance et l'usage.¹⁴ C'est donc bien une pauvreté complète absolue qu'à la différence des autres ordres religieux les Frères observent, à condition toutefois qu'ils soient intérieurement détachés des biens de ce monde¹⁵ car, s'ils se montraient âpres au gain, s'ils se montraient soucieux de leurs intérêts au point de traduire en justice ceux qui y portent atteinte, reniant leur idéal, ils n'auraient plus de franciscain que le nom; on devrait les tenir tout simplement pour de faux Frères.¹⁶

En si haute estime qu'ils tiennent la pauvreté, les Frères Mineurs, contrairement à ce qu'affirme Jean XXII, ne la confondent pas avec la perfection. Par elle-même, déclarent-ils, la pauvreté n'a pas de valeur morale; loin d'être nécessairement et toujours une vertu, elle peut être un vice, par exemple quand elle a pour cause la sottise, la négligence, la paresse, par exemple encore quand on se propose une fin mauvaise en l'adoptant, comme cela arrive chez les hypocrites qui l'adoptent pour se faire voir et se faire admirer.¹⁷ Afin de préciser quelle est, sur ce point, leur pensée, ils distinguent une perfection première, fondamentale, essentielle, consistant dans la charité parfaite et une perfection secondaire qui se rencontre dans les autres vertus.¹⁸ La pauvreté est une perfection au deuxième sens du mot. En effet une chose rentre dans la perfection ainsi entendue si elle est ardue, pénible, difficile et si elle prédispose à la perfection fondamentale en supprimant ou diminuant ce qui y fait obstacle. La pauvreté réalise indiscutablement la première de ces conditions. En-

¹² *Bullar. Francisc.*, V, 236.

¹³ *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 77, p. 1134, l. 35.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 1133, l. 26; *Compend. error.* c. 1, p. 959, l. 21-30; c. 6, p. 969, l. 12; *Non invenit*, p. 399; *De imperat.* p. 37; *Tract. ostendens*, fol. 217a-b.

¹⁵ Ad essentiam paupertatis evangelicae pertinent duo, scilicet non adherere temporalibus nimio ardore et carere temporalibus. *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 22, p. 1066, l. 41.

¹⁶ Si Fratres in iudicio litigant pro illis rebus... illi pseudo fratres sunt censendi. *Ibid.* c. 25, p. 1072, l. 8.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* c. 76, p. 1130, l. 1; p. 1127, l. 19.

¹⁸ Perfectio est duplex quaedam scilicet essentialis quae reddit hominem perfectum ita est caritas perfecta qua habita perfecte est homo perfectus quantumcumque careat aliis secundum actum, licet aliis virtutibus stante illa caritate secundum praeparationem animae carere non possit. Alia est perfectio quasi essentialis vel secundaria quae in aliis virtutibus invenitur. *Ibid.* c. 18, p. 1060, l. 40; c. 76, p. 1126, l. 22.

clins au vice, portés à suivre leurs passions, les hommes ne renoncent pas sans peine à posséder quoique ce soit.¹⁹ Elle réalise aussi la deuxième. Au témoignage de saint Jérôme, de saint Jean Chrysostome et de saint Augustin, la possession de richesses, même minimes,²⁰ est un obstacle au parfait amour de Dieu. Quand on possède les biens de ce monde, il est bien rare qu'on ne s'y attache pas, bien rare aussi qu'on n'en conçoive pas de l'orgueil, de la vanité. La richesse est donc un obstacle à la perfection puisqu'elle est une occasion de péché.²¹

Entendons-nous bien toutefois. La pauvreté n'est pas une condition essentielle de la perfection. Les richesses ne sont pas un obstacle absolu au parfait amour de Dieu. On peut "les acquérir, les posséder, les garder sans pécher"; on peut en avoir en abondance et néanmoins être parfait, comme furent les saints de l'Ancien Testament et tant de princes, de rois qui, largement pourvus des biens de ce monde, aimèrent et servirent Dieu.²² Bien plus elles peuvent être un moyen de perfection quand on en use pour faire l'aumône, vêtir les pauvres, racheter les captifs et exercer les autres œuvres de miséricorde²³ ou quand on accepte de les posséder et de les gérer par amour du prochain ou par souci de l'intérêt public. En ce dernier cas un chrétien pourrait, sans déchoir de la perfection, garder l'empire de l'univers entier.²⁴ Jean XXII calomnie donc Michel de Cézène et ses partisans quand ils les accuse d'affirmer que ceux-là seuls sont parfaits qui renoncent à toute sorte de propriété.²⁵

Concluons. L'Ordre n'est pas autre chose que l'ensemble des Frères Mineurs, c'est à dire des religieux n'ayant que le simple usage des biens mis à leur disposition. Tout son être se réduit à l'être de ses membres, comme celui d'une maison se réduit à l'être des matériaux assemblés pour la construire. Toutefois l'analogie n'est pas complète. Ruinez un édifice

¹⁹ *Ibid.* c. 76, p. 1126, l. 40 ; c. 18, p. 1060, l. 46.

²⁰ *Ibid.* c. 76, p. 1129, l. 12-22.

²¹ *Ibid.* p. 1124-1125.

²² Habere divitiarum dominium non est malum secundum se, imo possunt haberi acquiri et conservari absque peccato. *Ibid.* c. 114, p. 1208. Habentes proprietatem magnarum divitiarum possunt esse perfecti. Unde et reges et principes retinentes suas divitias in speciali possunt esse perfecti. *Ibid.* c. 11, p. 1041, l. 57.

²³ *Compend. error.* c. 2, p. 958-959; *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 76, p. 1129, l. 60.

²⁴ Sic posset aliquis absque impedimento perfectionis, hoc est absque diminutione caritatis, totius mundi dominium retinere. *Ibid.* c. 18, p. 1061, l. 19-32. Guillaume ne reniera donc pas son idéal franciscain quand il déclarera que, dans certains cas, *casualiter*, le pape peut se substituer au pouvoir civil pour administrer la chose publique.

²⁵ Ille impugnatus appellanti falsum imponit cum asserit eum illos solos vocare perfectos qui omnium temporalium abdicant proprietatem, simplici usu facti retento. *Ibid.* c. 109, p. 1202, l. 44; p. 1203, l. 6-8.

et n'en laissez subsister qu'une seule pierre, il n'y a plus d'édifice, tandis que s'il ne subsistait plus un seul Frère Mineur il y aurait encore un ordre franciscain, parce qu'il ne posséderait pas la règle transmise par saint François pour lui seul, mais pour lui et ceux qui pourront plus tard venir le rejoindre.²⁶ Nous retrouverons une idée analogue quand il s'agira de préciser en quoi l'Église consiste.

²⁶ *Breviloquium*, III, c. 15, p. 99; *Op. nonag. dier.* c. 27, p. 1074, l. 12; c. 88, p. 1146, l. 53.

Penitus Manet Ignotum

ANTON C. PEGIS

I

THE striking phrase forming the title of the present note occurs in chapter 49 of the third book of St. Thomas' *Summa Contra Gentiles*. By the end of the preceding chapter it had been shown that man's ultimate felicity lies, not in this life or in the mode of knowing proper to it, but in that knowledge of God that the soul will have in the afterlife when it will know Him in the way that the separate substances do.¹ Once reached, this conclusion required St. Thomas to show that the knowledge in question is not that by which separate substances know God through their essences, since such knowledge is from effect to cause. The created essence of the separate substance is an infinitely inadequate medium in or through which to see the essence of the cause, God. Through itself the separate substance knows that God exists, that He is the eminent or transcendent cause of all things, remote from all, not only those things that exist but also those that can be conceived by the mind.²

We too can somehow reach this same knowledge of God. From His effects we know that God exists, that He is the cause of other things, super-eminent in relation to all and removed from them. This result is the highest and most perfect point of our knowledge of God in the present life. Dionysius teaches such a doctrine in his *Mystical Theology*, where he says that "we are joined to God as to one unknown." This, St. Thomas comments, is the case because, while we know what God is not, what God is remains absolutely unknown; *quod quidem contingit dum de eo* [scil. God] *quid non sit cognoscimus quid vero sit penitus manet ignotum*. And to show the ignorance that characterizes this most sublime knowledge of God, it is said of Moses in *Exodus* that "he went to the dark cloud wherein God was".³

¹ St. Thomas, *Summa Contra Gentiles* (= *SCG*), III, 48, §§ 1, 10, 17; 50, § 5.

² *SCG* III, 49, §§ 1-2, 3-8 (the limits of the knowledge of God from effect to cause), 10 (how separate substances know better than we do that God exists).

³ *SCG* III, 49, § 9. Professor V. J. Bourke translates the paragraph differently and rather under-translates "penitus" by "quite". Now the purpose of the present paragraph is to characterize the most perfect knowledge of God that we have *in this life*, and the point is precisely that we do not know what this eminent and transcendent God is. Hence the further point about

Penitus ignotum is a very strong expression. It says that we know absolutely nothing about what God is. It might seem plausible to suppose that the expression came to St. Thomas from the Pseudo-Dionysius because the doctrine does. By its deliberate density and brevity, the *Mystical Theology* certainly teaches in the strongest possible terms that God is beyond whatever we can think or say in any effort we make to affirm or deny anything of Him. That is why negation is the best road to God whose beyondness we know as a dark cloud reached by a total unknowing. There is no doubt that St. Thomas has repeated and affirmed this doctrine in his own way, which means that he established it on the foundation of his own metaphysics. Our immediate question is: is the expression *penitus ignotum* an invention on St. Thomas' part?

At first glance, the situation before us seems to suggest that such is the case. The last sentence of chapter one of the *Mystical Theology* says that Moses entered the mystical cloud of unknowing and there, attached wholly to him who was above all things, "when all knowledge ceased he was united through something higher to that which is absolutely unknown, and knew, in knowing nothing, in a way that surpasses the mind: τῷ παντελῶς δὲ ἀγνώστῳ τῆς πάσης γνώσεως ἀνενεργησίᾳ κατὰ τὸ κρεῖττον ἐνούμενος, καὶ τῷ μηδὲν γινώσκειν ὑπὲρ νοῦν γινώσκειν⁴.

The Latin translators of Dionysius have rendered the expression παντελῶς δὲ ἀγνώστῳ variously:

Hilduin:	<i>omnimode autem ignoto</i>
Eriugena:	<i>omnino autem ignoto</i>
Sarrazin:	<i>omnino autem ignoto</i>
Grosseteste:	<i>perfecte autem ignoto</i> . ⁵

The translation *penitus autem ignoto* for the Dionysian expression does not seem to have appeared until the fifteenth century.⁶ Did St. Thomas, then, invent *penitus ignotum* as his own equivalent of *omnino autem ignoto* that he saw in the translation of Eriugena-Sarrazin? There would be nothing surprising in such an explanation and, subject to future discoveries, it would be reasonable to accept it.

Penitus ignotum, however, offers an interesting complication that broadens the problem without resolving it. In 1268, some three years after the

Moses is not his ignorance of any sublime knowledge, but the sublimity of the ignorance itself. As for "quite", it needs to be understood in the sense of "utterly" or "absolutely" to satisfy the strength of "penitus". For Mr. Bourke's views, see *St. Thomas Aquinas: On the Truth of the Catholic Faith*, Book III, Providence, tr. V. J. Bourke (2 vols., N.Y., 1965), 2, 170.

⁴ Pseudo-Dionysius, *De Mystica Theologia*, ch. I; *Dionysiaca*, vol. I (Paris, 1937), 578.

⁵ *Dionysiaca*, *ibid.*

⁶ *Dionysiaca*, pp. civ and 578.

assumed date for the completion of the *SCG*,⁷ William of Moerbeke translated the Greek text of Proclus' *Elements of Theology*. St. Thomas then wrote his commentary on the *Liber de Causis* (1272),⁸ showing in detail how the work of Proclus was, with serious modifications, the basis of the Platonic teaching of the unknown author of the *Liber*. It is correct to emphasize that St. Thomas' commentary on the *Liber*, so meticulously compared by him with the text of the *Elements*, is not only his last review of Platonism in its ultimate principles, but also a major effort to examine Platonic and Christian teaching on the nature of the divine being and to locate the Platonisms of Proclus, Dionysius and the *Liber de Causis* within this comparison.

Proposition 6 of the *Liber* has to do with the transcendence of the first cause, arguing that we cannot express or say what it is because there is no way of knowing it in itself or through an adequate effect. Commenting on the proposition, St. Thomas quotes from both Dionysius and Proclus to explain the unknowability of the first cause, and while his doctrinal explanation of "causa prima superior est narratione" is the most important accomplishment of this exposition, let us notice a curious fact. *Omnino ignotum*, taken from the Latinized Dionysius, and *penitus ignotum*, taken from the Latinized Proclus, serve side by side and seemingly without interrelation in St. Thomas' exposition. Here, in fact, is the immediately relevant part of the commentary:

"De causa autem prima hoc est quod potissime scire possumus quod omnem scientiam et locutionem nostram excedit; ille enim perfectissime Deum cognoscit qui hoc de ipso tenet quod, quidquid cogitari vel dici de eo potest, minus est eo quod Deus est. Unde Dionysius dicit I capitulo *Mysticae Theologiae*, quod homo *secundum melius* suae cognitionis unitur Deo sicut *omnino ignoto*, eo quod *nihil* de eo *cognoscit*, *cognoscens* ipsum esse *supra* omnem *mentem*. Et ad hoc ostendendum inducitur haec propositio: 'Causa prima superior est narratione'.

Per *narrationem* autem oportet 'affirmationem' intelligi, quia quidquid de Deo affirmamus non convenit ei secundum quod a nobis significatur; nomina enim a nobis imposita significant per modum quo nos intelligimus, quem quidem modum esse divinum transcendit. Unde Dionysius dicit II capitulo *Caelestis Hierarchiae* quod *negationes in divinis sunt verae, affirmationes vero incompactae vel inconvenientes*. Hanc etiam propositionem Proclus ponit cxxiii^{am} sui libri, sub his verbis: 'Omne quod ens ipsum quidem propter super-substan-

⁷ On the dating of the *SCG*, see the long discussion of A. Gauthier in his recent historical introduction to the Latin-French edition of the text (*Saint Thomas d'Aquin, Contra Gentiles, Livre Premier. Texte de l'Édition Leonine, Introduction de A. Gauthier, Traduction de R. Bernier et M. Corvez*. Paris, 1961, 18-59).

⁸ The text of St. Thomas' Commentary on the *Liber de Causis* will be cited according to the edition of H. D. Saffrey (*Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Super Librum de Causis Expositio*. Fribourg-Louvain, 1954).

tialem unionem indicibile est et incognoscibile omnibus secundis, a participantibus autem capabile est et cognoscibile: propter quod solum primum penitus ignotum tanquam amethectum ens”⁹.

Thus, St. Thomas knows the expression *penitus ignotum* from the Latin version of Proclus' 123rd proposition. A comparison with the Greek text of the *Elements* reveals that *penitus ignotum* translates παντελῶς ἄγνωστον. St. Thomas gives no hint that he is aware of the curiousness of the situation. One may ask whether, by any chance, he knew *penitus ignotum* from William of Moerbeke when he was writing *SCG* III, 49, § 9. If not, we must suppose that, after inventing the expression to interpret *omnino ignotum* in Dionysius, he quoted the same expression as a translation from Proclus of the same παντελῶς ἄγνωστον that *omnino ignotum* had translated in Dionysius. St. Thomas even commented on the Platonic meaning of *penitus ignotum* as used in Proclus. In Moerbeke's Latin, Proclus had spoken of “solum primum penitus ignotum tanquam amethectum ens.” St. Thomas interprets: “What is absolutely first, which according to the Platonists is the very essence of goodness, is absolutely unknown because it does not have anything beyond it that can know it; and this is the meaning of its name ‘amethectum,’ that is, ‘something that does not exist after something else’”¹⁰. This interpretation is pure Proclus, as can be seen from the very beginning of the *Elements*, Propositions 12 and 13.

Thus, St. Thomas can feel free to use *penitus ignotum* to express in his own name the meaning of the divine unknowability in the *SCG*, and he can feel just as free to point out the Platonic meaning of the expression as it appears in the Latin Proclus. Moreover, the point of his commentary on Proposition 6 is to show the difference between the Platonic and the Christian

⁹ *Super Librum de Causis*, Prop. 6; ed. H. D. Saffrey, 43-44.

¹⁰ “Se illud quod est primum simpliciter, quod secundum Platonicos est ipsa essentia bonitatis, est *penitus ignotum*, quia non habet aliquid supra se quod possit ipsum cognoscere; et hoc significat quod dicitur *amethectum*, id est non post existens alicui” (*Super Librum de Causis*, Prop. 6; ed. cit., 44). — Moerbeke's Latin translation of Proclus' *Elements of Theology* has been edited by C. Vansteenkiste (“Procli *Elementatio Theologica* translata a Guilelmo de Moerbeke” [*Tijdschrift voor Philosophie*, 13, 1951, 263-302, 491-531]). For the present quotation see 499. The Greek text of the *Elements*, edited in 1933 by E. R. Dodds, has recently appeared in a second edition (Oxford, 1963).

St. Thomas, as is known, thought that the *Liber de Causis* was Arabic in origin; there was no Greek original, but the text was based on Proclus' *Elements of Theology*. See St. Thomas, *Super Librum de Causis*, Prooemium; ed. H. D. Saffrey, n. 3. On the *Liber de Causis* itself, including our present knowledge of its authorship, origin and influence on the Latin world, see H. D. Saffrey, “L'État actuel des recherches sur le *De Causis* comme source de la métaphysique au moyen âge” (*Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter* [*Miscellanea Mediaevalia*, II], ed. P. Wilpert. Berlin, 1963, 267-281).

conception of the divine unknowability as the basis for measuring how far Dionysius and the author of the *Liber de Causis* were and were not Platonists. As between his own *penitus ignotum* in the *SCG*, therefore, and that of Proclus quoted by him in his commentary on the *Liber de Causis*, there is a doctrinal difference of immense proportions. The Christian God is unknowable and so is the Platonic One, which is the highest Good and the highest God. What is the difference between these two unknowabilities as St. Thomas sees them?

II

The Thomistic doctrine of the divine unknowability begins in *SCG*, I, 14. There St. Thomas establishes that we must use the negative way of remotion in investigating what God is, basing ourselves on the conclusion of 1, 13, namely, that there exists a first being, called God, known to us as *omnino immobilis*.¹¹ The negative way imposes itself because "the divine substance surpasses by its immensity every form that our intellect can reach"; and that is why we cannot apprehend the divine substance by knowing what it is. But we can have some sort of knowledge of it by knowing what it is not. How is this? The more things we remove from God, the nearer we reach to a knowledge of Him. Just as in knowing the *esse proprium* of a thing we approach it by adding increasingly narrowing and distinctive differences to it, so in the knowledge of God, whom we cannot approach by enclosing His nature in more and more distinguishing affirmations, we must use negative differences to set God off from other things. For example, God is not an accident or a body. By this method we can distinguish God more and more from what is other than He; and the limit of such a setting off of God will be reached when He will be known as distinct from all things; *et tunc de substantia ejus [Dei] erit propria consideratio cum cognoscetur ut ab omnibus distinctus*. Even so, and always assuming it can be reached, this remarkable *propria consideratio* of the divine substance will not include a knowledge of what it is: *non cognoscetur quid in se sit*.¹²

Looking back and commenting on what he had accomplished on the basis of the *via remotionis* (I, 14-43), St. Thomas put man's demonstrative knowledge of God in its proper place. Through such a demonstrative knowledge, he acknowledged, man arrives more nearly at a proper knowledge of God. By means of demonstration many things are removed from God whose removal enables us to see Him as distinct from them. By using

¹¹ *SCG* I, 14, § 4.

¹² *SCG* I, 14, §§ 2-3.

demonstration St. Thomas himself proved that God was immobile, eternal, incorporeal, absolutely simple, one, and the like. Only, St. Thomas arrived at a proper knowledge of God by negation; that is, instead of being able to affirm what God was, and know in this way how He was separated from other things, through negations St. Thomas had a proper knowledge of God which enabled him to say what God was not, while what God was remained unknown.¹³ In other words, we can now rejoin our earlier conclusion. A created nature used as a medium, that is, as a means or a likeness, in a knowledge of God proceeding from effect to cause is, by the fact of being created, infinitely inadequate to represent God: it can tell us that God is, not what He is.¹⁴ From this point on, the problem is to see how, nevertheless, man can progress in the knowledge of God and in what that progress consists.

St. Thomas posits three ways in which a cause may be known from or in its effect and he argues that, except where the effect is proportioned to the whole power of the cause, in none of them do we know *what* the cause is.¹⁵ Of these ways, moreover, none applies either to separate substances or to man; in no instance can their knowledge of God, which is from effect to cause, be more than a knowledge that He exists. Even so, separate substances and man can make progress toward God. As we have seen, God is the cause of all things, beyond them, and removed not only from all things that are but also from all that can be conceived by a created mind. This remoteness is the place of God; it is also the ultimate and most perfect peak of our knowledge in the present life; and it consists in knowing of God what He is not, while what He is remains *penitus ignotum* to us. Yet we can make progress within this unknowing.

Let us first notice that separate substances know that God exists better than we do. The reason is simple: they know Him through a higher effect and therefore a more revealing one. The nearer an effect is to its cause, the more it reveals that cause, and the more evidently does it appear that the cause exists: *tanto evidentius apparet de causa ejus quod sit*. Now separate substances, knowing God through knowing their own substances, are (and know) effects of God that are nearer to Him and carry His likeness more revealingly than any effects by which we know God. They therefore know with greater certainty and clarity that God exists. Separate substances also know more things than we do as well as higher things, that is, things nearer to God. They are therefore able, in their negative knowledge, to

¹³ SCG III, 39, § 1.

¹⁴ SCG III, 49, §§ 3-8.

¹⁵ SCG III, 49, § 3.

approach nearer to God by removing from Him both more and higher things than we can. Another way of saying this is to say that, just as a farmer does not know the eminence and the dignity of the presidential office as does a governor or a senator, so we human beings, who are intellectual *rustici*, do not know the divine eminence as well as do separate substances (though neither we nor they know God's true eminence). Granted, therefore, that we know God to be above all beings, we still do not know His eminence as do the separate substances, who know the highest ranks of being (themselves) and know God to be above them. All this means that the causality and the power of a cause are better known according as more and greater effects show them forth. In this instance, though we know that God is the cause of all things, separate substances know His causality and power better than we do.¹⁶

St. Thomas had already formulated these conclusions in the strongest possible terms in his commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius. To the question whether the mind of man can arrive at a knowledge of God, he had pointed out that in this life man can know God only from His effects, and that these effects, falling short of the power and thus of the essence of their cause, can tell us only that the cause exists. The situation is therefore clear: *et ideo non possumus in statu viae pertingere ad cognoscendum de ipso* [scil. *Deo*] *nisi quia est*. But St. Thomas then added: "Nevertheless, among those who know that God exists one knows it better than another because a cause is known by so much more perfectly from an effect as the relation of the cause to the effect is the more grasped through the effect".¹⁷

Where, as in the present instance, an effect falls short of its cause, the relationship of the effect to the cause can be considered under three headings; its coming from the cause, the likeness to its cause that it has acquired, its failure to achieve a perfect likeness to its cause. On this basis it can be said that the mind of man can progress in three ways in the knowledge of God, without reaching a knowledge of what He is and knowing only that He is. It can progress by knowing in a better way His efficacy in producing things; by knowing Him as the cause of higher effects which, in bearing some likeness to Him, all the more show forth His eminence by their greater nobility; by knowing Him more and more to be removed from all the things that appear in His effects. Thus, as Dionysius says, the mind of man knows God in His causality, eminence and removal from all things; *Unde dicit*

¹⁶ *SCG* III, 49, § 10.

¹⁷ "Et tamen unus cognoscentium quia est alio perfectius cognoscit, quia causa tanto ex effectu perfectius cognoscitur, quanto per effectum magis apprehenditur habitudo causae ad effectum" (*Expositio Super Librum Boethii de Trinitate*, I, 2; ed. Bruno Decker [Leiden, 1955], 66).

Dionysius in libro De Divinis Nominibus quod cognoscitur [scil. *Deus*] *ex omnium causa et excessu et ablatione*.¹⁸ Only, as the first objector pointed out, the same Dionysius had said in his *Mystical Theology* that that which at the peak of our knowledge remains unknown is in no way knowable to us; and, precisely, at such a peak we are joined to God as to an unknown. How then is God knowable to us? St. Thomas' reply is to the point. "In this sense are we said to know God as an unknown in the peak of our knowledge because the mind is then found to have advanced most in knowledge when it knows His essence to be above everything it can apprehend in the state of this life; and thus, although what the essence of God is remains unknown, that it exists is known".¹⁹

The most important consequence of this result for St. Thomas himself is the sequel to the proposition *Deus est*. In the language of the *Summa Theologiae*: "Since we cannot know what God is but rather what He is not, we cannot consider how He is but how He is not." How? The text continues: "We can show how God is not by removing from Him whatever does not befit Him".²⁰ We are now back at that moment when, as in SCG I, 14, beginning with God as *omnino immobilis* we climb by negation toward His simplicity, thence to follow, still by negation, the more awesome road to the knowledge that God *habet esse secundum totam virtutem ipsius esse*.²¹ But this noble truth, in telling us from creatures how God is not, tells us in a better way that God exists. Our problem lies here. Man is never through with the proposition that God exists; he is never through saying that God exists. He can know it better and better by locating it better and better in relation to the things that God is not but whose transcendent cause He is. Man must come to unsay the whole universe in order to say *God exists* properly. As St. Thomas has noted, *tunc de substantia ejus erit propria consideratio cum cognoscetur ut ab omnibus distinctus*.²² Only, to say supremely well how God is not other things, and yet not to know what He is, this is in truth to be joined to Him as to that which is absolutely unknown.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I, 2, obj. 1; ed. cit., p. 63. The reply: "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod secundum hoc dicimur in fine nostrae cognitionis deum tamquam ignotum cognoscere, quia tunc maxime mens in cognitione proficisci invenitur quando cognoscit eius essentiam esse supra omne quod apprehendere potest in statu viae, et sic quamvis maneat ignotum quid est, scitur tamen quia est" (ad 1; p. 67). On the whole doctrine, see also VI, 3; ed. cit., 220-223.

²⁰ *Sum. Theol.*, I, 3, *Prooemium*.

²¹ SCG I, 22 § 1; 28, § 2; *Sum. Theol.*, I, 3, 4; 4, 2.

²² SCG I, 14, § 3.

III

The Platonic and Neoplatonic doctrine of the unknowability of the One and the Good does not here concern us. We can see the doctrine emerging in the fifth book of Plato's *Republic* in a sentence that must surely be at the origin of the *παντελῶς ἄγνωστον* of later Platonism. "That which is wholly a being," says Socrates, "is wholly knowable, while that which is in no way a being is in every way unknowable: τὸ μὲν παντελῶς ὄν παντελῶς γνωστόν, μὴ δὲ μὴδαμῇ πάντῃ ἄγνωστον".²³ On this basis, Socrates argues in the next book of the *Republic* that the Good, which is the source of both the knowability and the being of all knowable things, "is itself not a being, but, by its eminence and power, is still higher than being: οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβεία καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος".²⁴ Of the One, whose relations to the Good of the *Republic* remain to this day a Platonic mystery, the *Parmenides* says that "it is not named or expressed or thought or known, nor does any being perceive it."²⁵ Plotinus is the heir of these Platonic notions. The One is beyond being, inexpressible and unnameable, grasped by us not as something perceived but as something greater than ourselves and unknown to us.²⁶ We do not know what the One is, Proclus has added, we know what it is not according to its superiority to what is; and this grasp of what the One is not, Proclus has even pointed out, is itself a negation.²⁷ And Proclus has done no more than translate this doctrine into verse when, in his hymn, he said to his highest God that "You alone are unknowable, since whatever is known has been caused by You".²⁸

Nor are we concerned here with the whole complex question of the relations of St. Thomas to Platonism and his strenuous and delicate effort to make a common synthesis of Plato and Aristotle. It is much easier to sympathize with his conviction, so clearly mirrored in the commentary on the *Liber de Causis* and in the *De Substantiis Separatis*, that such a synthesis was necessary to stem the tide against extreme forms of Aristotelianism and Platonism then circulating in Paris through the influence of Averroes, Avicenna and Avicbron, than to see how such a synthesis was possible.

²³ *Republic* V, 477A.

²⁴ *Republic* VI, 509B.

²⁵ *Parmenides* 142A.

²⁶ *Enneads* V, 3. 13-14; 4. 2; 5. 5; 6. 6.

²⁷ Proclus, *In Platonis Parmeniden*, Book VI (in *Procli Philosophi Platonici Opera Inedita* [ed. V. Cousin, Paris, 1864]), col. 1080, lines 28-31.

²⁸ Greek text in L. J. Rosan, *The Philosophy of Proclus* (New York, 1949), 54.

Indeed, to think that it was possible by the device of measuring both Plato and Aristotle by the Thomistic doctrine of being acting as the metaphysical framework of a Christian view of the origin of the universe, is to confess that the synthesis was a new (and Thomistic) creation rather than a reconciliation. Neither the Platonic doctrine of participation nor the Aristotelian doctrine of the origin of motion in a separate and unmoved intelligence could be made into a doctrine of creation. But, as chapter nine of the *De Substantiis Separatis* reveals, St. Thomas tried such a transformation and even such a reconciliation;²⁹ he tried, that is, to show that the eternal worlds of Plato and Aristotle, while opposed to the Catholic Faith on the ground of their eternity, were not opposed on the ground of being unoriginated. In short, an eternal world (and the worlds of both Plato and Aristotle were eternal worlds) could be visualized as created. Only, once again, was it not Thomas Aquinas who was thus interpreting Plato and Aristotle in the light of his own metaphysical discovery, namely, the notion of an eternal creation as a philosophical (though contrary to fact) possibility?

It would be a mistake to think of such a reconstruction of Plato and Aristotle as a gratuitous interpretation on St. Thomas' part. The triumphant fact that St. Thomas could always adduce, and adduce especially against Averroes and his followers, was that neither Plato nor Aristotle denied the idea of creation, so that their ignorance could not be interpreted as anything more than what it was. In this sense, St. Thomas' effort to make Plato and Aristotle into his own doctrinal predecessors was neither gratuitous nor disinterested; it was an effort to save philosophy itself from an error which, by reason of their ignorance, they never committed but which, as the example of Averroes makes perfectly clear, could be committed in their name, namely, the error of denying or otherwise attacking the idea of creation on the basis of the eternity of the world. To save both Plato and Aristotle by means of the doctrine of creation was to direct them toward a world that their metaphysics never knew and yet never denied. The *De Substantiis Separatis* is committed to such a philosophical possibility and development at the very time when Paris was heading toward the condemnation of 1277.

Only such a background can explain and justify the serene and seemingly high-handed way in which St. Thomas, in composing his extraordinary commentary on the *Liber De Causis*, constructed without hesitation a metaphysical view of Plato drawn from the *Elements* of Proclus, passed

²⁹ *De Substantiis Separatis*, IX; ed. F. J. Lescoc (Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Tractatus de Substantiis Separatis [West Hartford, Conn., 1962]), 86-87, 90-91.

from *Plato* to the *Platonici* without warning, assumed the existence of a common tradition (*communes sententias*) among the *Platonici* and the *Peripatetici*, and then conducted a fascinating struggle between the Platonic doctrine of participation (interpreted *via* Proclus) and the Christian doctrine of creation, not the least interesting of whose aspects was the doctrinal location of the unknown author of the *Liber de Causis* between the two traditions.

The confrontation of *omnino ignotum*, taken from the Latin Dionysius, and *penitus ignotum*, taken from the Latin Proclus, lies at the center of this conflict. One must have read St. Thomas' commentary on Propositions 2 to 5 of the *Liber de Causis*, and especially his analysis of the notions of eternity and being, in order to realise what is at stake in the passage from Proposition 6, quoted above, in which *omnino ignotum* and *penitus ignotum* appear side by side as translations of one and the same Greek term but representing two different metaphysical worlds. We have only to consider the opening words of Proposition 6, "Causa prima superior est narratione...",³⁰ in order to be face to face with two divine unknowabilities, the unknowability of the Platonic Good and the unknowability of the Christian God. Moreover, it is St. Thomas who points out the difference between the two in his own commentary on Proposition 6 of the *Liber de Causis*.

The most important thing that we can know with reference to the first cause, St. Thomas writes, is to know that it surpasses all knowledge and speech; "for he knows God most perfectly who holds this about Him, that whatever can be thought or said of Him is less than what God is." That is why — and we now rejoin Dionysius — it is said "in the first chapter of the *Mystical Theology* that it is through the higher part of his knowledge that a man is joined to God as to one utterly unknown (*omnino ignoto*) because then he knows nothing about Him, knowing Him to be above every mind." To express this point, Proposition 6 had begun by saying that God was above "narration," by which, St. Thomas explains, "we are to understand 'affirmation,' because whatever we affirm of God does not apply to Him in the way it is signified by us; for the names that we use signify according to our manner of understanding, which the divine being (*divinum esse*) transcends." In this spirit, Dionysius had said in his *Celestial Hierarchy* that when we deal with divine things our negations are true, whereas our affirmations are unsuitable. Proclus, St. Thomas continues, expressed this same notion in his own words in Proposition 123 of his *Elements*. There Proclus said that every true being (the Greek text of Proclus reads *θεῖον*, which Moerbeke has translated by *quod ens*), in virtue of its super-essential unity, is itself ineffable and unknowable to all

³⁰ *Liber de Causis*, Prop. 6; ed. H. D. Saffrey, 42.

secondary beings, though it may be grasped and known (*aliqua*liter, St. Thomas adds in his commentary) by what participates in it (as the Idea of life itself can be known somewhat by those who participate in it, St. Thomas explains). On this basis, Proclus concluded that the absolutely first divine reality was completely unknowable (*παντελῶς ἄγνωστον*, *penitus ignotum*) because it was unparticipable.³¹ Indeed, the First or the One was unparticipable since, as Proclus had said in Proposition 116, "every god is participable, except the One".³²

Only, having watched Proclus reach this conclusion, where does St. Thomas locate the difference between himself and the author of the *Elements* on the divine unknowability? There are three ways in which anything may be known. It may be known as an effect is known through its cause, it may be known through itself, or, thirdly, it may be known through its effect. Let us grant to both St. Thomas and Proclus that the first and the third ways are not here in question. Let us grant, in other words, that there is no cause higher than God from which to know God as an effect, just as God as a cause is beyond His effects and therefore not adequately knowable by any of them. It is the second way that really tests both St. Thomas and Proclus. It says, in effect, that God is not known in the way in which a thing can be known through itself. The author of the *Liber de Causis* had proved this point by examining the different ways in which things are known through themselves. Sensible things are known by the sense, imaginable things by the imagination, necessary and immobile things by the intellect, and generable or corruptible things are known by the reason. Hence, St. Thomas continues, in expounding this line of reasoning, "since the first cause is above every such genus of being, it cannot be known in anyone of these ways." Proclus offers the same line of proof under Proposition 123. But St. Thomas has a problem. "Now, as to this argument, it is clear that the first cause is above sensible and imaginable and corruptible things; but, that it is above eternal intelligible realities, this is not evident. Moreover, the proof for it is not here included." St. Thomas, in other words, finds no proof in the commentary under Proposition 6 of the *Liber de Causis* that the first cause is beyond intelligible realities. This is not a minor lacuna since it calls into question the whole Platonic metaphysics of the relations between the One and the intelligibility proper to the world of being. When St. Thomas adds,

³¹ Proclus, *Elements*, Prop. 123; ed. E. R. Dodds, 108; tr. Moerbeke, ed. C. Vansteenkiste, 499. For St. Thomas, see *Super L. de Causis*, Prop. 6; ed. cit., 43-44.

³² Proclus, *Elements*, Prop. 116; ed. E. R. Dodds, 102. St. Thomas comments on this proposition in *Super L. de Causis*, Prop. 3; ed. cit., 18.

consequently, that the proof is available in Proclus, he is fully aware that Proclus is doing more than supplying an incidental piece of information.

"Proclus", he says, "proves the point on the principle that all intellectual or rational knowledge is of beings. For that which is first grasped by the intellect is being, and that in which the character of being is not found cannot be grasped by the intellect." So far, so good. St. Thomas can certainly agree with this proposition on his own ground, and he can do so without qualification. But the sequel is the purest and deepest Platonism, as St. Thomas very well knows and indeed spells out. "Hence, since the first cause is above being, the consequence is that the first cause is above eternal intelligible realities. Now, according to the Platonists, the first cause is above being insofar as the essence of goodness and unity, which is the first cause, transcends separate being itself, as was said above." St. Thomas must therefore part company with this conception of the transcendence of the first cause. He does so in the following measured words: "But, according to the truth of the matter, the first cause is above being (*ens*) insofar as it is infinite being itself (*ipsum esse infinitum*). That is called 'a being' (*ens*) which participates in 'being' (*esse*) in a finite way; and it is this that is proportioned to our intellect whose object is 'what a thing is,' as it is said in *De Anima III*." We now know where we are, but St. Thomas draws his conclusion even more clearly. "Therefore, only that is graspable by our intellect which has a quiddity that participates in being (*esse*); but the quiddity of God is being itself (*ipsum esse*), and hence He is above the intellect".³³

God, then, is above the intellect of man, not for the Platonic reason that unity is above being, but because an *ens*, whose quiddity is the proportioned object of the human intellect, is related to God as a finite creature is related to an infinitely transcendent creator. On the problem of the unknowability of the One, the Platonic line of demarcation ran between

³³ St. Thomas, *Super L. de Causis*, Prop. 6; ed., cit. pp.45-46 (the first way), 46-47 (the second way), 47-48 (the third way). The decisive part of the whole text has to do with the second way: "Proclus probat per hoc quod omnis cognitio intellectualis vel rationalis est entium: illud enim quod primo acquiritur ab intellectu est ens, et id in quo non invenitur ratio entis non est capabile ab intellectu; unde, cum causa prima sit supra ens, consequens est quod causa prima sit supra res intelligibiles sempiternas. Causa autem prima, secundum Platonicos quidem, est supra ens in quantum essentia bonitatis et unitatis, quae est causa prima, excedit etiam ipsum ens separatim, sicut supra dictum est. Sed secundum rei veritatem causa prima est supra ens in quantum est ipsum esse infinitum, ens autem dicitur id quod finite participat esse, et hoc est proportionatum intellectui nostro cuius obiectum est quod quid est ut dicitur in III De anima, unde illud solum est capabile ab intellectu nostro quod habet quidditatem participantem esse; sed Dei quidditas est ipsum esse, unde est supra intellectum" (p. 47). For the reference to the *De Anima*, see III, 4. 429 b21 and III, 7. 431 a1 6; also St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, 84, 7 and I, 85, 1.

the One above being and the no less divine and eternal orders of being below it. But the Thomistic line of demarcation runs between a unique and eternal God, infinitely transcendent as *ipsum esse*, and His finite creatures. As we meet it in the *SCG*, the expression *penitus ignotum* is, so far as we know, a Thomistic interpretation of the *omnino ignotum* that St. Thomas had read in the Latin Dionysius. Within the limits of the *SCG*, both expressions convey one and the same notion, the infinite transcendence of the Christian God as pure being and the correlative perfection of the unknowing by which the human intellect seeks to grasp such a God. The appearance of *penitus ignotum* as a translation of Proclus had no particular effect on St. Thomas' vocabulary. As we have seen, he simply distinguished between *omnino ignotum* and *penitus ignotum* as though they were, in Dionysius and Proclus, respectively, two different notions, or at least two metaphysically distinct notions.

That God is, in St. Thomas' sense, *omnino* or *penitus ignotus* is itself a radical doctrine and one that has not escaped controversy among students.³⁴ Yet the aim of the doctrine was not to say that we have no positive knowledge of God; the aim was rather to remain faithful to the divine transcendence. In his commentary on the *De Divinis Nomnibus* of Dionysius, St. Thomas even committed himself to a startling expression on this point. *Hoc ipsum est Deum cognoscere*, he wrote, *quod nos scimus nos ignorare de Deo quid sit*.³⁵ To know God consists in this for us here and now: we know that we do not know what God is. We have no quidditative knowledge of God, and this we know in a positive way. From this moment on our problem in knowing God has been expressed by St. Thomas in the classic language of Dionysius: we know Him as the eminent cause of creatures and their perfections who, in infinitely transcending them, is perfect in a way that they are not and therefore whom we must unsay if we are to be faithful to His transcendence. What, then, can we say of God that we cannot also unsay? And what does this mean except that we know we do not know what He is?

This question was surely in St. Thomas' mind from the very beginning of the *Summa Contra Gentiles* when he was thinking of the motives at the origin of the Christian revelation and especially why it was that God revealed to men truths that transcended their comprehension. There are easily understandable reasons to explain why revelation should have

³⁴ See, for example, J.-H. Nicolas, "Affirmation de Dieu et connaissance" (*Revue Thomiste*, LXIV, 2, April-June, 1964, 201-222).

³⁵ In *Librum B. Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus Expositio* (ed. C. Pera, Rome-Turin, 1950), VII, Lectio 4, § 731.

included so many naturally knowable truths that the philosophers had already investigated, and St. Thomas has set forth these reasons in a remarkable way in *SCG* I, 4. But why propose to men for belief truths that are above their comprehension? If, as St. Thomas himself says, the divine wisdom provides for each thing according to the mode of its nature, why was it necessary that men should be asked to believe not only truths that they could know but also truths that exceeded their reason?

Of course, a first and decisive answer to this question lies in the fact that, since men are being directed by God to an end that they cannot otherwise know or seek, they had to be told about the eternal beatitude which is in fact their destiny. But there is another reason for the revelation of such otherwise humanly unknowable truths. They are necessary to men so that they might have a truer knowledge of God. We are now in the presence of the divine transcendence. "Then only do we know God truly when we believe Him to be above everything that it is possible for men to think about God; for, as was shown above, the divine substance transcends the natural knowledge of man. Hence, by the fact that some truths are proposed to man about God that exceed his reason, the opinion that God is something above that which he can think is strengthened in man." St. Thomas' own words are worth pondering, "Tunc enim solum Deum vere cognoscimus quando ipsum esse credimus supra omne id quod de Deo cogitari ab homine possibile est: eo quod naturalem hominis cognitionem divina substantia excedit, ut supra ostensum est. Per hoc ergo quod homini de Deo aliqua proponuntur quae rationem excedunt, firmatur in homine opinio quod Deus sit aliquid supra id quod cogitare potest".³⁶ These remarkable words, which remind us inevitably of St. Anselm's *Proslogion*, surely express one of the most cherished themes of the Thomistic theology. God transcends anything and everything that we can think about Him. But to be true to Him we must unknow Him rather than simply be ignorant of Him. We must seek Him in all His creation, we must unsay everything that His creatures are, in order thereby to stand nearer and nearer to His transcendence. When St. Thomas said that God was utterly unknown, what was he saying but that man should seek the divine transcendence by a total unknowing?

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³⁶ *SCG* I, 5, § 3. For "supra", see I, 3, §§ 3-4.

The Continuity of Papal Political Theory in the Thirteenth Century.

Some Methodological Considerations

BRIAN TIERNEY

THE transmission of political concepts in the Middle Ages provides a complex but rewarding theme of study for the historian of ideas. Some of the major problems in the field are semantic ones for, very often, words and phrases remained the same for century after century while the concepts that they signified changed radically. To take a particularly familiar example, the scriptural allegory of the "two swords" was used in an anti-papal sense by King Henry IV and his partisans in the eleventh century but it meant something quite different to St. Bernard of Clairvaux in the twelfth. The words of St. Bernard in turn were repeated by a whole line of popes and eventually were incorporated into *Unam Sanctam* by Boniface VIII. But in the process of transmission their meaning had changed yet again.¹ It is the same with many of the key phrases of medieval political discourse — Gelasius's *autoritas sacrata pontificum et regalis potestas* for instance or *plenitudo potestatis* or *consilium et consensus*. They meant different things at different times and were exploited in different ways by opposing theorists. The task of analyzing them is further complicated by the fact that, often enough, the process of transmission has continued down to our own day. The medieval "advice and consent" recurs in modern constitutional documents. The problems of church and state are still very much with us. Hence there is a constant danger of distorting medieval concepts by defining them in language that is overladen with specifically modern connotations.

¹ The changing significance of the sword imagery has been discussed in a series of articles by A. Stickler. See his, "De potestate gladii materialis ecclesiae secundum 'Quaestiones Bambergenses ineditas'," *Salesianum*, 6 (1944), 113-140; "Der Schwerterbegriff bei Huguccio," *Ephemerides Juris Canonici*, 3 (1947), 1-44; "Il 'gladius' nel Registro di Gregorio VII," *Studi Gregoriani*, 3 (1948), 89-103; "Il 'gladius' negli Atti dei Concilii e dei RR. Pontefici fino a Graziano e Bernardo di Clairvaux," *Salesianum*, 13 (1951), 414-445. See also H. Hoffmann, "Die beiden Schwerter im hohen Mittelalter," *Deutsches Archiv*, 20 (1964), 78-114. Hoffman discusses Innocent III's contribution to the growth of a "hierocratic" doctrine of the two swords.

Given this whole situation it is not surprising that much of the recent controversy about the political theory of the medieval popes — whether it was essentially “dualistic” or “hierocratic” in orientation — has turned on problems of continuity and discontinuity. In particular a major dispute has arisen concerning the relationship between the teachings of Pope Innocent III (1198-1216) and those of Pope Innocent IV (1243-1254).² An older point of view saw both pontiffs as crudely ambitious pretenders to a universal temporal lordship and this interpretation has been given a more sophisticated formulation by Walter Ullmann who finds in the pontificate of Innocent III a decisive re-affirmation of an older monistic tradition of the papacy at a time when some leading canonists were beginning to defend the autonomy of the secular power.³ According to this argument Innocent IV was merely a faithful follower of the theocratic doctrines expounded by his great predecessor. This whole approach has been challenged by an eminent group of modern historians — prominent among them Maccarrone, Mochi Onory, Kempf and Tillmann — who maintain that the political theory of Innocent III was based on a cautious discrimination between the spheres of action of spiritual and secular rulers.⁴ If, then, Innocent IV was an out-and-out proponent of papal theocracy as has been very commonly assumed, it becomes necessary on this view to postulate a sharp change in the political theory of the medieval papacy between 1200 and 1250.

² The dispute involves more than a mere point of chronology. If we assume that the views of Innocent IV were much more theocratic than those of Innocent III then, given the extreme peril to the Roman church from the activities of Frederick II in the 1240s, it becomes relatively easy to dismiss all claims of the medieval papacy to universal temporal power as a mere passing aberration induced by a very abnormal political situation.

³ W. Ullmann, *Medieval Papalism* (London, 1949), 146, “The vigorous pontificate of Innocent III exercised a decisive influence on the shaping of curialist theory. Huguccio and his English and Spanish followers were to sink into oblivion.” The author’s interpretation of papal political thought in the centuries before Innocent III is set out in his *Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages* (London, 1955).

⁴ M. Maccarrone, *Chiesa e Stato nella Dottrina di Innocenzo III* (Rome, 1940); S. Mochi Onory, *Fonti Canonistiche dell’ Idea Moderna dello Stato* (Milan, 1951); F. Kempf, *Papsttum und Kaisertum bei Innocenz III* (Rome, 1954); H. Tillmann, *Papst Innocenz III* (Bonn, 1954). Several different interpretations of Innocent III’s claims in the temporal sphere are discussed by A. Walz, “‘Papst-kaiser’ Innocenz III. Stimmen zur Deutung,” *Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae*, 18 (Rome, 1954), 127-138. See also A. Hof, “‘Plenitudo potestatis’ und ‘Imitatio imperii’ zur Zeit Innocenz III,” *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, 66 (1954-55), 39-71; O. Hageneder, “Das Sonne-Mond-Gleichnis bei Innocenz III,” *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung*, 65 (1957), 340-368; *idem*, “Exkommunikation und Thronfolgeverlust bei Innozenz III,” *Römische Historische Mitteilungen*, 2 (1959), 9-50; “Das päpstliche Recht der Fürstenabsetzung (1150-1250),” *Archivum Historiae Pontificiae*, 1 (1963), 53-95.

A new twist to the whole discussion has been given by one of the most recent contributors to it, Joannes Cantini. He accepts the major conclusions of the second group of historians mentioned above but carries their arguments a step further. Cantini carefully combed through the writings of Innocent IV (the great canonical commentary on the *Decretales* as well as Innocent's own decretal letters) and for the first time brought together in a single work all the texts of this pope that bear on problems of church-state relations. His conclusion is startling. Innocent IV, Cantini claims, was a dualist too. We thus have a third position in the general debate, one which maintains that there was an essential continuity between the doctrines of Innocent III and those of Innocent IV but which reaches this conclusion by a line of argument diametrically opposed to that of the other scholars who have upheld it.⁵

The very fact that the political pronouncements of the two pontiffs have given rise to such very different interpretations raises two possibilities for consideration. The first is that both popes may simply have fallen into self-contradictions. In that case the very nature of the source material will probably ensure that conflicting interpretations of their ideas continue to appear. The other possibility is that modern criticism has not yet penetrated deeply enough into the texture of thirteenth century thought to discern an underlying coherence of argument that really existed below the surface of apparently conflicting texts. Our main concern is with this second possibility. In particular we hope to identify certain methodological difficulties which are currently impeding the development of any agreed interpretation of the political theories of the medieval popes.

There seem to be four such outstanding "difficulties". The first lies in the employment of an inadequate modern terminology to characterize medieval ideas, and especially in the abuse of the current jargon words "dualistic" and "hierocratic". The second difficulty is one of thought rather than language. It consists in anachronistic attempts to force medieval thought into the mould of modern concepts of sovereignty. The third difficulty arises from a widespread disposition to treat the various papal pronouncements as mere attempts to define a static existing structure of public law whereas they become intelligible and can be seen as self-con-

⁵ J. Cantini, "De autonomia iudicis saecularis et de Romani pontificis plenitudine potestatis in temporalibus secundum Innocentium IV," *Salesianum*, 23 (1961), 407-480. Cantini provides a good bibliography of earlier work on the political theory of Innocent IV. At p. 416-417 he lists some forty authors who have treated the pope as an extreme exponent of papal theocracy. The most recent survey of the question, that of John Watt, "The Theory of Papal Monarchy in the Thirteenth Century: The Contribution of the Canonists," *Traditio*, 20 (1964), 179-317, presents a more nuanced and balanced account with which I am in general agreement.

sistent only when they are understood as dynamic attempts to bring about change in an existing system, to initiate processes of historical development that the popes regarded as desirable. Finally, and associated with this last point, there has been inadequate emphasis in modern interpretations of thirteenth century papal thought on the medieval doctrine that general consent was necessary to bring about licit and effective changes in an existing structure of laws and rights. If we approach the political thought of the thirteenth century popes with these considerations in mind it may be possible to show that the doctrines of Innocent III and Innocent IV were both self-consistent and consistent with one another and that, if the popes did indeed uphold a medieval ideal of papal world-monarchy, that ideal was far removed from any modern theory of Austinian sovereignty.

Let us begin with the difficulties posed by the conflicting texts of Innocent III. At the very outset of his pontificate Innocent issued a series of pronouncements that seem at first glance to be uninhibited assertions of an extreme theocratic doctrine. He described himself as a ruler "set between God and man, below God but above man, who judges all and is judged by no-one". He congratulated the king of Armenia for having appealed to the pope on a purely temporal issue. He declared to the Tuscan noble Acerbus that "just as the moon derives its light from the sun... so too the royal power derives the splendor of its dignity from the pontifical authority". He explained to the Greek patriarch that Peter had been given "not only the universal church but the whole world to govern," and to the Greek emperor that the priesthood was as superior to the kingship as the soul to the body.⁶ As for the western empire, Innocent summoned his cardinals to a secret consistory on Christmas Day, 1200 — just four centuries after the coronation of Charlemagne — and read to them a *Deliberatio* asserting that the empire pertained to the Roman see "first and last", "principally and finally" — principally because the empire had been translated to the west from Constantinople by the papacy and finally because the emperor was "anointed, crowned and invested with the empire by the pope".⁷ Moreover, according to Innocent, the temporal jurisdiction of the pope was not restricted to the empire. In the decretal *Per Venerabilem* he maintained that the pope was a supreme judge to whom appeal could be made in every kind of case, whether ecclesiastical or

⁶ Migne, *PL* 217, 658; 214, 813, 377, 759; 216, 1185.

⁷ *PL* 216, 1025; F. Kempf, *Regestum Innocentii III papae super negotio Romani imperii*, *Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae*, 12 (Rome, 1947), 75. Cf. P. A. Van den Baar, *Die kirchliche Lehre der Translatio Imperii Romani* (Rome, 1956), 99-111.

secular, whether civil or criminal, whenever the matter was difficult and ambiguous so that lesser judges disagreed about it.⁸ This claim was put forward in an involved exegesis of an obscure passage of Deuteronomy and it has puzzled some modern scholars. It did not puzzle thirteenth century canonists. They all interpreted it in the sense just given and Innocent — a brilliant canonist himself — must surely have known that they would so interpret it when he included *Per Venerabilem* in an official collection of papal decretals which he promulgated in 1210.⁹ Before that he had explained to the bishop of Vercelli (an imperial city outside the papal states) that, although secular cases there were normally to be heard by the consuls of the city, an appeal could be made to the bishop or to the pope whenever it was alleged that the consuls had failed to do justice, and this especially when the empire was vacant.¹⁰

Many historians have found in Innocent's numerous interventions in the secular politics of his age ample evidence that he was guided throughout his pontificate by the theocratic principles that seem so evident in his early decretals. The difficulties of interpretation arise from the fact that, in no really important political crisis, did Innocent ever assert simply and lucidly that he was acting by virtue of a supreme temporal authority that inhered in his office. In the decretal *Novit* which asserted the pope's right to mediate in a feudal dispute between King Philip of France and King John of England Innocent maintained that the dispute involved a question of sin and also a breach of a solemn oath and also a threat to the peace of Christendom. All of these matters, he insisted, were the proper concern of the pope as head of the church. But he also stated quite explicitly, "We do not intend to judge concerning a fief, judgment on which belongs to (King Philip)."¹¹ Again, in the disputed imperial election of 1202, Innocent asserted an effective right of choice between the two candidates by insisting on the powers inherent in his ecclesiastical role as consecrator of the emperor-to-be; but, in a spirit rather different from that of the *Deliberatio* of 1200, he conceded that in principle the right of electing an emperor belonged to the German princes.¹² Again, Innocent several times acknowledged — in letters to the rulers of Hungary and of France for instance¹³ —

⁸ PL 214, 1133.

⁹ *Quinque Compilationes Antiquae*, ed. E. Friedbreg (Leipzig, 1882), 128. The significance of the decretal is discussed in my article "'Tria quippe distinguit iudicia...' A Note on Innocent III's Decretal *Per Venerabilem*," *Speculum*, 37 (1962), 48-59.

¹⁰ PL 215, 892.

¹¹ PL 215, 326.

¹² PL 216, 1065 (Kempf, *Regestum*, 168).

¹³ PL 214, 871; 215, 526. These and other examples are cited by R. Castillo Lara, *Coaccion Ecclesiastica y Sacro Romano Imperio* (Turin, 1956), 168.

that the powers of kings came from God and he repeatedly declared that he did not wish to usurp the rights of secular rulers. Even in the decretal *Per Venerabilem* which contained Innocent's most extreme claim to universal temporal jurisdiction he began by asserting that he was well aware of Christ's saying "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's" and that, accordingly, he did not want "to prejudice the rights of any one else or to usurp any power that is not ours." Similarly he wrote to the bishops of France, "Let no-one suppose that we wish to diminish or disturb the jurisdiction and power of the king," and to the princes of Germany, "Just as we do not want our own justice to be usurped by others so too we do not want to claim for ourselves the rights of the princes."¹⁴

There is an evident conflict of utterances between the rhetoric of Innocent III's more general pronouncements on papal power and the legalistic caution of his specific claims to intervene in particular cases. If, now, we wish to argue that there was an essential continuity between his thought and that of Innocent IV it is necessary to show, firstly, that the more extreme claims which have sometimes been regarded as especially characteristic of the later pope were in fact anticipated by his predecessor and, secondly, that the qualifications and reservations which can be found in the writings of Innocent III occur also in those of Innocent IV.

We shall discuss below Innocent IV's interpretation of the Donation of Constantine. For the rest, his view that the word *Quodcumque* (in the famous phrase, "Whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth...") was used by Christ to confer on Peter jurisdiction over all kinds of affairs as well as over all classes of persons echoed faithfully a doctrine that Innocent III had enunciated both in the decretal *Solita* and in a sermon composed for the feast of St. Sylvester.¹⁵ Innocent IV's further explanation in the same context that this universal authority of the papacy could also be proved from

¹⁴ PL 214, 1132: 215, 326: 216, 1065 (Kempf, *Regestum* 168).

¹⁵ Innocent IV's claim was set out in the encyclical letter *Eger cui levia* ed. E. Winkelmann, *Acta imperii inedita seculi XIII et XIV* (Innsbruck, 1885), 697, "Generali namque legatione in terris fungimur regis regum, qui non solum quemcumque, sed ne quid de rebus aut negociis intelligeretur exceptum, sub neutro genere generalius universa complectens, etiam quodcumque ligandi super terram pariter et solvendi apostolorum principi nobisque in ipso plenitudinem tribuit potestatis..." Cf. Innocent III, PL 216, 1185, "Nobis enim in beato Petro sunt oves Christi commissae, dicente domino, 'Pasce oves meas,' non distinguens inter has oves et alias... Ut illud tanquam notissimum omittamus quod Dominus inquit ad Petrum et in Petro dixit ad successores ipsius, 'Quodcumque ligaveris super terram' etc., nil excipiens qui dixit 'Quodcumque'"; PL 217, 482, "Nihil exceptit qui dixit 'Quodcumque'." Cantini does not regard *Eger cui levia* as an authentic work of Innocent IV. His arguments (*art. cit.*, 410-416) seem to me not altogether convincing and I hope to discuss the question on another occasion.

Paul's words at 1 Corinthians 6.3 seems borrowed directly from Innocent III's *Per Venerabilem* where the same text was used for the same purpose.¹⁶ The claim of the later pope that the apostolic see possessed a supreme appellate jurisdiction whenever there was "a necessity of law because the judge is doubtful or a necessity of fact because there is no superior judge" was a conflation of the doctrines set out in Innocent III's *Per Venerabilem* and *Licet* (his letter to the bishop of Vercelli).¹⁷ Finally, Innocent IV's view that the pope conferred the power of the sword on the emperor seems a mere re-statement of the view that Innocent III had adopted when he declared that the emperor was "invested with the empire by the pope."¹⁸

If we turn now to the "dualistic" texts emphasized by Cantini we find precisely the same tensions in the writings of Innocent IV that we encounter in the decretals of Innocent III. Innocent IV too referred several times to the divine origin of royal power. He stated explicitly that there were kings who did not "hold" their kingdoms from the pope (though he found other grounds for asserting jurisdiction over them);¹⁹ and he insisted, in letters to the kings of France, of Castille and of Portugal, that he did not wish to diminish royal rights but to augment them.²⁰ In discussing Innocent III's statement that he did not intend to judge concerning a fief Innocent IV not only agreed that the pope ought not to judge in such a matter "directly" but added that a litigant who brought a feudal issue before the papal curia on the ground that sin was involved would probably have a hard time proving his case.²¹ Over and over again Innocent IV

¹⁶ Innocent IV, *loc. cit.*, "...etiam ut doctor gentium huiusmodi plenitudinem non restingendam ostenderet, dicens, 'An nescitis quoniam angelos iudicabimus. Quanto magis secularia?'" Innocent III, *PL* 214, 1133, "Paulus etiam, ut plenitudinem potestatis exponeret, ad Corinthios scribens ait, 'Nescitis quoniam angelos iudicabimus. Quanto magis saecularia?'"

¹⁷ *Innocentii IV Pontificis Maximi in quinque libros decretalium commentaria* (Venice, 1570) ad X. 2.2.10, fol. 121va (Cantini, 460), "Licet in multis distincta sunt officia et regimina mundi, tamen quandocumque necesse est, ad Papam recurrendum est, sive sit necessitas juris, quia iudex dubius est quam sententiam de iure ferri debeat; vel necessitas facti, quia alius non sit iudex superior..." Cf. Innocent III, *PL* 214, 1133, "...cum aliquid fuerit difficile vel ambiguum ad iudicium est sedis apostolicae recurrendum"; *PL* 215, 892, "Licet tamen ipsis... ad nostrum si maluerint audientiam appellare, hoc praesertim tempore quo, vacante imperio, ad iudicem saecularem recurrere nequeunt..."

¹⁸ Winkelman, *op. cit.* 698; *PL* 216, 1025.

¹⁹ *Commentaria ad X. 2.2.10*, fol. 121rb, "Sed quid si alius rex est negligens vel alius princeps qui superiorem non habet? Dicimus idem, scilicet quod succedit (papa) in iurisdictionem eius... Sed hoc non facit quod ab eo teneat regnum sed de plenitudine potestatis quam habet quia vicarius est Christi."

²⁰ Cantini, *art. cit.*, 422-423, citing E. Berger, *Les Registres d'Innocent IV* (Paris, 1884-1911), 5211, 6247, 1932.

²¹ *Commentaria ad X. 2.1.13*, fol. 119ra. Cf. Cantini, 430.

expressed the view that, in the ordinary course of events, secular cases were to be tried before secular courts, and Cantini finds especially convincing evidence of this "dualistic" conviction of the pope in the fact that Innocent thought it necessary to compile a list of special cases in which, by way of exception, an ecclesiastical judge could intervene in a secular suit — thus conceding the general principle that normally such intervention was not justified. These "exceptions", which are of considerable importance for understanding thirteenth century papal thought were based in large part on the decretals of Innocent III with supplementary material drawn from the texts of Gratian's *Decretum*. They fell into three classes. (1) Secular cases involving certain classes of persons who were especially entitled to the protection of the church — e.g. clerics, orphans, widows and *miserabiles personae* in general. (2) Secular cases related in any way to spiritual affairs. This category included all legal issues where sin was involved. (3) Secular cases where there was a failure of justice in the lay courts. This could come about because no superior judge was available as when the empire was vacant, or because the lay judge was negligent or biased, or because the case was so difficult and ambiguous as to cause disagreement among the lay judges.²²

After Cantini's work there is no great difficulty in showing that Innocent III and Innocent IV expressed substantially the same opinions on problems of church and state. It is more difficult to decide whether those opinions were consistent ones. At any rate, it seems to me that merely to set out the views of the two popes is sufficient to establish that their positions cannot be adequately characterized by either of the two currently fashionable terms, "dualistic" and "hierocratic." Both words are too vague. If "dualistic" implies, as it well might, an attitude favoring, "a wall of separation between church and state," then obviously no medieval pope was a dualist. If, on the other hand, anyone was a dualist who acknowledged that two orders of jurisdiction were needed for the governance of human affairs, a secular one and a spiritual one, and that normally each order ought to judge according to its own laws through its own courts in the cases appropriate to its own jurisdiction — then all the medieval popes were dualists. Cantini goes to great lengths to prove that Innocent IV was indeed a dualist in this latter sense but the effort seems superfluous. No one, so far as I know, has ever denied the fact. The disputed question is this. Granted that the popes acknowledged the need for two orders of jurisdiction, how did they conceive of the relationship between those two orders? Above all did they regard the secular order as so subordinated

²² *Commentaria ad X.* 2.2.10, fol. 121rb. Cf. Cantini, 428-432.

to the spiritual that the head of the ecclesiastical hierarchy could, in the last resort take cognizance of any kind of case and so control the whole range of human activity?

In discussing this question the word "hierocratic" is no more helpful than the word "dualistic." Presumably a starkly simple, unqualified "hierocratic" doctrine would have asserted that the pope, as God's vicar on earth, possessed an absolute and unlimited authority over all men and all their affairs. It would follow then that all legitimate authority was derived from the pope, that he could appoint and depose secular kings or their subordinate governors at will, hear appeals from their courts, enact secular legislation, settle disputes between temporal princes as a superior lord set over them or even, in the last resort, abolish the structure of secular offices altogether and govern the world through clerical delegates. The truth is that the popes claimed some of these rights but not others. Moreover this fact is not really a matter of dispute. The historians who insist most vehemently that the medieval pontiffs were "hierocrats" have to concede that, since it was illicit for priests to shed blood, the popes always had to recognize the need for a permanently enduring order of temporal rulers who could actually exercise the "power of the sword." And the historians who maintain most emphatically that the popes were "dualists" have to concede, since the relevant texts are quite explicit on the point, that medieval pontiffs did on occasion claim to depose temporal rulers and to exercise secular jurisdiction. Even on points of detail, if we were to ask precise, specific questions instead of vague, general ones — e.g. did Innocent III or Innocent IV maintain that the papal curia was the proper court to hear such-and-such a case in such-and-such a defined set of circumstances — probably still we should find very little disagreement. Once again the texts are explicit and usually they leave no great room for argument. The dispute therefore seems to be less and less about what the popes' claims actually were and more and more about which label — "dualistic" or "hierocratic" — we ought to pin on them. Cantini indulges in this kind of argumentation to an extraordinary degree. He concedes that Innocent IV claimed a supreme appellate jurisdiction in temporal affairs; he then adds that the pope claimed this authority as a spiritual privilege divinely conferred on the apostolic see; but, finally, concluding his argument with a most improbable twist, he alleges that this makes Innocent IV a dualist after all since all his claims were spiritual ones.²³ A historian of the opposing school would use exactly the same argument to prove that Innocent was a "hierocrat" in that he regarded his spiritual

²³ Cantini, 431-432.

authority as being so all-embracing as to include jurisdiction over temporal cases.

To sum up then. The words "dualistic" and "hierocratic" served a useful purpose in the earlier stages of the modern debate in pointing up genuine divergencies of approach among different schools of historians. I have used them often enough myself. But their continued employment is serving only to conceal the fact that a considerable area of agreement has emerged out of all the recent controversies. If it is impossible to abandon them altogether they ought at any rate to be subjected to rigorous definition in future work.

Even if we succeed in avoiding mere pseudo-problems of language in investigating the ideas of the thirteenth century popes we are left with many real problems of thought to unravel. For instance, if the pope inherited the fulness of the power of Christ who had been both priest and king, as Innocent III liked to maintain, how could any assertion of political authority on his part possibly constitute a usurpation? More specifically, if the pope was empowered to judge everyone and everything, as Innocent IV maintained in one context, how could it be improper for him to judge directly concerning a fief as the same pope declared elsewhere?

These questions are related to our second "methodological difficulty," the tendency to read into medieval definitions of papal authority modern concepts of sovereignty that are not really contained in them. When we encounter a claim to "plenitude of power" it is perhaps natural to think at once of contemporary theories of despotism or positivism, to relate such a claim to patterns of thought in which all law is conceived of as the arbitrary will of a sovereign legislator and all rights as derived from him and revocable at his pleasure. If we next go on to ask whether the medieval popes claimed such sovereign power it becomes impossible to extract a coherent answer from their writings. Some texts seem to support such pretensions: others clearly repudiate them. But we should encounter just the same difficulty if we asked our question of any thirteenth century ruler. The very way of posing the question makes it impossible to find a satisfactory answer, for medieval men simply did not think in Austinian categories. It seemed to them perfectly consistent to assert that a king was the supreme lord in his own realm while at the same time maintaining that his legislative and judicial authority were limited by divine and natural law, by the need to obtain counsel and consent in the conduct of arduous affairs and by the licit rights of his subjects, among which were rights of jurisdiction that some of them held. A king who attempted to swallow up all the jurisdiction of inferior lords would be denounced as a tyrant.

In this world of thought the papal texts which disclaimed any intention of usurping the rights of jurisdiction inhering in secular princes would not

have seemed inconsistent with the other texts which asserted the supreme temporal jurisdiction of the papacy. The co-existence of both sets of texts merely demonstrates that the popes were claiming the powers of a thirteenth century temporal ruler, not those of a nineteenth century Austinian sovereign. Their declarations that they did not intend to judge certain types of cases illustrate the same point. Even in England, the country where royal jurisdiction had developed most fully in the days of Innocent III, it was not assumed that royal courts could hear any and every case as a matter of right. Royal justice extended directly to certain classes of persons who were immediately subordinate to the king and to certain classes of cases in which the rights of the crown were in some way involved while, in addition, the king possessed a vaguely defined appellate jurisdiction based on his duty to redress wrongs in cases where there had been defect or denial of justice in any lower court. That is to say the categories of cases in which royal jurisdiction was normally exercised corresponded closely to those mentioned by the popes as appropriate for the exercise of the temporal jurisdiction of the papacy. Again, it is well known that Innocent III distinguished between his temporal power over the papal states and the authority which he possessed in other lands. ("Not only in the patrimony of the church where we wield full power in temporal affairs but also in other regions we may exercise temporal jurisdiction occasionally, having examined certain causes"²⁴); and the text has sometimes been taken to mean that any temporal interventions of the papacy outside Central Italy must be regarded as merely "indirect" consequences of its spiritual authority. But any thirteenth century king could have defined the nature of his temporal power in much the same words that the pope used. Philip Augustus of France might well have said, "Not only in the royal demesne where we wield full power in temporal affairs but also in other parts of the realm we can exercise temporal jurisdiction occasionally, having examined certain causes."

If it is necessary at all to define the claims of the medieval papacy to temporal power in terms of modern political experience — and it may be unavoidable to some extent since modern experience shaped our own thought and language — the model of Austinian sovereignty is the very last one that we should choose. A much more appropriate analogy could be made with the pluralistic, federally organized societies which are as characteristic of the modern world as unitary centralized states. The

²⁴ PL 214, 1132. In all the subsequent argument we are concerned solely with the papal claim to temporal power. It is possible to make a case for the view that, in the spiritual sphere, the papal claims did approximate to a modern theory of absolute sovereignty. The question is discussed at length in M. J. Wilks, *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1963).

functions that the medieval papacy claimed for itself correspond fairly closely to those of a supreme court of judicature in such a society. Any supreme court would be abusing its functions if it "usurped" the jurisdiction of lower courts by persistently meddling in matters that those courts could deal with satisfactorily. The judges necessarily have to define limited classes of cases that properly pertain to their jurisdiction. Such cases will normally include ones where there is a disputed point of law to be settled, or where there appears to have been a failure of justice in a lower court, or where the litigants are such that no other court is competent to judge them. It was in just such cases that Innocent III and Innocent IV proposed to exercise the temporal jurisdiction that they believed to be inherent in their office.

There remains to be considered yet one further matter in which the two popes seem to have fallen into inconsistencies of thought. Both of them declared repeatedly that a regal as well as a sacerdotal power had been implanted in the papacy from its very first foundation. This view was based on the assumption that Peter, the first pope, had received the full powers on earth of a Lord who was "a priest after the order of Melchisedech," that is to say both priest and king. Since Christ's kingship was conceived of as universal the argument would seem to imply that all earthly kings could possess only a derivative authority bestowed on them by the pope. Yet in fact Innocent III and Innocent IV seem clearly to have recognized the autonomy of certain secular kings although they insisted that the empire was held from the pope. To complicate matters further Innocent IV introduced a distinction between *de iure* and *de facto* power, maintaining that the pope was *de iure* (though not *de facto*) the temporal overlord of the king of France and indeed of all other kings.²⁵ This problem is related to our third "methodological difficulty" which arises from the widespread neglect of a central element in the political thought of the medieval popes, their conception of a "potential" power inherent in the apostolic see that became explicit only through the unfolding of a long historical process in which the popes themselves were involved as active participants.

The idea of the divine will shaping the destiny of the human race through a series of political structures succeeding one another in time was of course a common-place one at the beginning of the thirteenth century. It found expression, for instance, both in the eccentric speculations of a Joachim of

²⁵ Where Innocent III described the king of France as a ruler who recognized no temporal superior Innocent IV commented tersely, "De facto. Nam de iure subest imperatori Romanae ut quidam dicunt. Nos contra. Imo papae." *Commentaria ad X.* 4.17.13, fol. 285rb. For other kings cf. *infra* n. 27.

Flora and in the more conventional description of a succession of empires presented by a chronicler like Otto of Freising. Innocent III very frequently appealed to Old Testament history in the course of his political argumentation and Innocent IV described explicitly the sequence of governments that God had provided for His people. In the beginning, Innocent wrote, God had ruled all things directly, without intermediaries. Then, from the time of Noah, he began to govern the world through human agents, and subsequently patriarchs, kings and judges succeeded to the office of rulership. This lasted down until the time of Christ "who was our natural Lord and King." Christ in turn established Peter and the successors to Peter as his vicars on earth. It was for this reason Innocent IV argued, that the pope could claim a supreme appellate jurisdiction in temporal cases.²⁶ In another passage the same pope turned his attention away from the Christian world altogether and discussed the question whether licit governments could exist among infidels. He argued, with more magnanimity than some of his contemporaries, that, since all men were children of God and some sort of government was a necessity for "rational creatures," legitimate rulers could arise among all peoples. But, he concluded, Christ had possessed power over all men and so even infidel kings were subject to the jurisdiction of Christ's vicar, the pope. In practice of course infidel rulers did not recognize papal jurisdiction and so, in describing their position, Innocent applied to them the same terminology that he used to define his temporal power over the Christian king of France. "The pope has jurisdiction and power over them all *de iure* though not *de facto*."²⁷ There was, that is to say, a sharp divergence between the theological doctrine of pontifical power that the popes propounded and the actual structure of public law that existed in their own day. The two could be brought into accord only if the regal authority that Christ had bestowed on the papacy came to be acknowledged by all the princes of the earth as a genuine *de facto* power.

It was in this connection, and with especial reference to the Donation of Constantine, that Innocent IV referred to a "potential" authority inherent in the papacy:

"They do not discern shrewdly or know how to investigate the origins of things who think that the apostolic see first received rule over the empire from the prince Constantine, for this rule is known to have been inherent in the

²⁶ *Commentaria ad X.* 2.2.10, fol. 121va. Cf. Cantini, 466. On the historical dimension in Innocent IV's thought see J. Watt, *art. cit. supra* n. 5, 244-245.

²⁷ *Commentaria ad X.* 3.34.8, fol. 255vb. Cf. Cantini, 467, "Omnes autem tam fideles quam infideles oves sunt Christi per creationem licet non sint de ovili ecclesiae... Et sic per praedicta apparet quod Papa super omnes habet jurisdictionem et potestatem de iure licet non de facto."

apostolic see naturally and potentially beforehand; for our Lord Jesus Christ, the son of God, was a true king and true priest after the order of Melchisedech... and he established not only a pontifical but a regal monarchy in the apostolic see."²⁸

These words have often been regarded as marking a radical advance in papal claims to temporal power. But, in fact, the doctrine is essentially similar to that which Innocent III had proclaimed half a century earlier in his own comment on the Donation. Innocent III did not find it necessary explicitly to deny that papal temporal power was derived from Constantine's grant because in his day the papacy had never countenanced the idea that this might indeed be the case.²⁹ He did, however, assert very plainly that the regal power of the papacy came directly from Christ and he affirmed this in language very similar to that of Innocent IV:

²⁸ Winkelmann, *op. cit.*, 698, "Minus igitur acute perspicunt, nescientes rerum investigare primordia, qui apostolicam sedem autumant a Constantino principe primitus habuisse imperii principatum, qui prius naturaliter et potencialiter fuisse dinoscitur apud eam. Dominus enim Ihesus Christus, dei filius, sicut verus homo verusque deus, sic secundum ordinem Melchisedech verus rex et verus sacerdos existens... in apostolica sede non solum pontificalem sed et regalem constituit monarchatum..." Cantini tried to use the concept of "potential" power to prove that Innocent IV was a dualist even though he claimed to be *de iure* overlord of the king of France. He argued that, since the pope proposed to exercise his temporal jurisdiction only in certain special cases, he was claiming only a "potential" power, leaving the king's "actual" power untouched. Cantini then equated this claim to potential power with the claim to *de iure* lordship. But, when Innocent wrote that he was *de iure* but not *de facto* overlord of the king of France, he did not mean that he intended to exercise his power only in certain cases. He meant quite obviously that the king of France did not recognize him as a temporal overlord at all although he ought to have done so. Cantini's misunderstanding of the concept of "potential" power was perhaps inevitable, for he denied the authenticity of the one document of Innocent IV in which the term was used, i.e. *Eger cui levita*. In this letter the term "potential" was used in two senses, neither of them consistent with Cantini's interpretation. Firstly, the word referred to a regal power implicit in the papacy which became actual only when it was recognized by temporal rulers. This is the sense discussed above. Secondly, it referred to the familiar doctrine that there were certain powers inherent in the church — notably the power to shed blood — which could never be exercised by the pope (or any priest) and which became actual only when the church's material sword was conferred on a lay ruler.

²⁹ In 1236 Gregory IX relied heavily on the Donation of Constantine to prove both his right to rule in the papal states and his right to depose the emperor. But the Donation provided a very weak foundation for such claims since the validity of Constantine's grant could be attacked on legal grounds even if the authenticity of the document describing it was accepted. It became necessary, therefore, for subsequent papal publicists to point out that the political claims of the papacy were not based solely on the Donation. On the one occasion when Innocent III appealed to an imperial grant of power in order to justify papal intervention in a political dispute he added at once, "...illud humiliter omittamus... cum non humanae constitutioni sed divinae legi potius innitatur, quia nostra potestas non est ex homine sed ex Deo." *PL* 215, 326).

"Blessed Sylvester was not only a great priest, but the greatest, sublime with pontifical and regal power, truly the vicar of Him who is King of kings and Lord of lords, a priest for ever after the order of Melchisedech..."³⁰

Innocent III, like Innocent IV, never based his claims to "regal" power on any merely human concession of authority to the apostolic see but always insisted on the powers that Christ Himself had conferred on Peter. His attitude is especially evident in the letter which he sent to King John of England accepting the king's offer to become a vassal of the papacy. For a pontiff who believed that the powers originally conferred on the papacy by divine grant were limited to the spiritual sphere there would have been no difficulty in acknowledging that, by this transaction, the apostolic see was acquiring for the first time a temporal jurisdiction to which it had had no valid claim before. Innocent did nothing of the sort. He preferred instead to deploy the same scriptural imagery that he had used in describing the Donation of Constantine.

"The King of kings and Lord of lords, Jesus Christ, a priest for ever after the order of Melchisedech, has so established in the church the priesthood and the kingship that the kingship is priestly and the priesthood is royal... and he has set over all one whom He appointed to be his vicar on earth..."³¹

Innocent most certainly did not intend to state that John's kingship had a priestly character. His words were rather a repetition of the claim that Christ had conferred regal as well as sacerdotal powers on his own office. The pope continued:

"Prudently heeding this, beloved son, and mercifully inspired by Him in whose hand are the hearts of kings, and who sways them as He wishes, you have decreed that your person and your kingdom should be temporally subject to the one to whom you knew them to be spiritually subject so that kingship and

³⁰ PL 217, 481, "Fuit ergo B. Silvester sacerdos, non solum magnus sed maximus, pontificali et regali potestate sublimis. Il ius quidem vicarius qui est Rex regum et Dominus dominantium, Sacerdos in aeternum secundum ordinem Melchisedech..." Innocent very frequently mentioned that he was the vicar of "a priest after the order of Melchisedech," of a lord who had been priest and king, e.g. in the decretals *Per Venerabilem* and *Solitae* and in the letter to King John cited below. The doctrine of a regal authority inherent in the apostolic see could evidently have referred simply to papal sovereignty in Central Italy. The point is that Innocent III brought in the reference to Melchisedech over and over again when he was quite clearly discussing his powers over other regions.

³¹ PL 216, 923, "Rex regum et Dominus dominantium Jesus Christus, sacerdos in aeternum secundum ordinem Melchisedech, ita regnum et sacerdotium in Ecclesia stabilavit ut sacerdotale sit regnum et sacerdotium sit regale... unum praeficiens universis, quem suum in terris vicarium ordinavit." The letter is also printed from the original charter that survives in the British Museum by C. R. Cheney and W. H. Semple, *Selected Letters of Pope Innocent III* (London, 1953), 177-183.

priesthood, like body and soul, should be united in the one person of the vicar of Christ..."³²

Finally Innocent re-stated his conviction that the acknowledgment by contemporary kings of the temporal power of the papacy would mark the historical climax of a divinely guided process that had begun with the first foundation of the church:

"He has deigned to bring this about who, being alpha and omega, related the end to the beginning and the beginning to the end, so that those provinces which formerly had the holy Roman church as their proper teacher in spiritual affairs now have her as their special lord in temporal matters also..."³³

Innocent III and Innocent IV did not then regard the papacy as actually possessed of all temporal power but as in a state of evolution toward that position. Its achievement, they believed, would mark the fulfilment of a divine plan for the governance of mankind. They taught, as a matter of theological doctrine, that Christ had conferred on Peter His own royal and priestly powers, but they realised that, in the sphere of law, the regal power remained merely "potential" until civil rulers were willing to recognize it. Thus, when Innocent III wrote of John's surrender and Innocent IV of Constantine's Donation, both pontiffs were maintaining that a temporal prince who submitted himself to the pope was merely consenting to acknowledge a regal power already inherent in the apostolic see, but neither was denying that a new legal relationship had indeed been created by the act of the ruler in so consenting.

This brings us to our final point, the very great influence of the medieval doctrine of consent on the formation of papal political theory. There was a lively debate among the canonists of the thirteenth century on the question whether a ruler could licitly make new laws at all without the consent of his subjects and all agreed that consent was necessary for laws that were to be both licit and effective.³⁴ Moreover, as we have noted, the power of any temporal ruler in the thirteenth century was conceived of as

³² PL 216, 924. "Quod tu, fili charissime, prudenter attendens, illo misericorditer inspirante in cujus manu sunt corda regum, et quo voluerit vertit illa, teipsum et regna tua etiam temporaliter ei subicere decrevistis cui noveras spiritualiter esse subjecta; ut in unam vicarii Christi personam, quasi corpus et anima, regnum et sacerdotium uniantur..."

³³ PL 216, 924, "Ille utique hoc dignatus est operari qui cum sit alpha et omega finem retulit ad principium, et principium protraxit ad finem; ut illae provinciae quae olim sacrosanctam Romanam ecclesiam propriam in spiritualibus habuere magistram, hunc etiam in temporalibus dominam habeant specialem."

³⁴ Luigi de Luca, "L'Accettazione Popolare della Legge Canonica nel Pensiero di Graziano e dei suoi Interpreti," *Studia Gratiana*, 3 (Bologna, 1955), 193-276.

limited by a whole complex of rights inhering in his subjects. The popes themselves acknowledged, not only that they could not in practice, but that they ought not in principle to deprive lay rulers of long established rights without their consent. As Innocent III wrote to Count William of Montpellier, "You know that you are subject to other (lords) and so you cannot submit yourself to us in this matter without injuring them *unless they give consent...*" And, to the princes of Germany, "We do not wish to claim for ourselves the rights of the princes. We acknowledge, *as we ought*, that the princes... have the right and power to elect a king."³⁵

In a later age Pope Pius IX pointed out that the temporal power of the medieval popes rested solely on general consent. "Its source was not the Infallibility but the authority of the pope. The latter, according to the public law then in force and by the consent of the Christian nations... extended to judging, even in the temporal field, both Princes and States."³⁶ In a sense the words are obviously true. Medieval popes had no armies or police power to enforce their commands throughout Europe and the sword of excommunication often proved a blunt weapon when it was used in the political arena. Evidently enough, in practice, the popes could exercise jurisdiction in temporal affairs only in so far as lay rulers consented to their doing so. But Pius IX greatly over-estimated the degree of consent that actually existed in the Middle Ages. For a more sceptical discussion on that point we might turn to a contemporary canonist. Bazianus, who was writing at the end of the twelfth century, asked in one of his *Quaestiones* whether the pope, by virtue of his *plenitudo potestatis*, could enact a law decreeing that the Roman curia should henceforth be a general forum for all cases, spiritual and secular. He concluded that the pope could not do this without the direct inspiration of the Holy Spirit and he added, not without irony, that he would believe in such inspiration only if everyone, clergy and princes alike, consented to the new ordering of things. Bazianus evidently believed that, short of a miracle indeed such consent would never be forthcoming.³⁷

³⁵ PL 214, 1132; 216, 1065 (Kempf, *Regestum*, 168).

³⁶ "Questo diritto (i.e. deporre i sovrani e liberare i popoli dall' obbligo di fedeltà) essersi talvolta, in supreme circostanze esercitato dai Pontefici; ma nulla aver esso che fare coll' *infallibilità pontificia*. La di lui fonte però non essere stata la *infallibilità*, ma sì l'*autorità* pontificia. Questa, secondo il diritto pubblico allora vigente, e per l'accordo delle nazioni cristiani, che nel Papa riverivano il supremo giudice della cristianità, stendesi a giudicare anche civilmente dei Principi e dei singoli Stati." *Civiltà Cattolica*, series VIII, vol. 3 (1871), 485.

³⁷ "Quod tunc esse credimus si omnes tam clerici quam principes ad hoc consentirent et hoc vellent." The *Quaestio* is printed in A Stickler, "Sacerdotium et Regnum nei Decretisti e Primi Decretalisti," *Salesianum*, 15 (1953), 607-608. The discrepancy between existing secular law and the popes' conception of divine law extended to innumerable points of detail apart from the

If we bear in mind that a major task for the thirteenth century popes was to maximize consent to a temporal jurisdiction which they believed was inherent in their office but which the society of their age was extremely reluctant to acknowledge it becomes much easier to discern the orderly pattern of thought that runs through their various pronouncements. This is especially true of Innocent III. The language in which he set out the papal claim to universal temporal jurisdiction was abstract, symbolical, sometimes deliberately ambiguous; the letters containing the claim were always addressed either to remote potentates abroad or to much lesser figures closer to home. When Innocent sought to intervene in the disputes of the great princes of the western world he never relied on a claim to general overlordship for he knew that any such pretension would have been angrily and publicly rejected by the lay rulers. Rather he always found some "exceptional" reason, which the princes themselves might be persuaded to accept, in order to justify his action. The king of France would have indignantly denied that the pope was his temporal overlord but there was a chance at least that he would heed Innocent's claim to judge a matter of sin. The princes of Germany would never have conceded that the pope could appoint emperors at his own will but they might have been persuaded, especially the ecclesiastical ones, by a careful exposition of the canonical rights of a consecrator.

An important stage in the development of Innocent III's political policy came with his promulgation of the official collection of papal decretals known as the *Compilatio Tertia* in 1210. When Innocent commanded that these decretals, which contained many of his most important political pronouncements, were henceforth to be used "in the schools and in the courts"³⁸ he ensured that neither his general claims nor his specific reasons for intervening in particular cases would be lost sight of in the subsequent development of medieval canon law. If all had gone well the intellectuals in the schools would have been won over to a theory of universal papal sovereignty while an accretion of precedents in the courts would have shown that virtually any case of major political significance could be included in one or another of the "exceptional" categories that justified the exercise of papal jurisdiction; and, eventually, the theories of the schools and the practice of the courts might have fused into an unchallengeable complex

general reluctance to accept the full claims of the papacy to temporal jurisdiction. In England, for instance, the laws of advowson, of testamentary dispositions and of bastardy were all out of accord with ecclesiastical teaching. Here again effective change could come about only through consent. When the barons of England were urged by the English bishops to reform the law of bastardy they replied, "*Nolumus leges Angliae mutare*" — and the law was not changed.

³⁸ *Quinque Compilationes Antiquae*, 105.

of papal power. It was in just such a fashion that papal control over the internal machinery of church government grew up between the twelfth century and the fourteenth. It was in this way too that decentralized feudal kingdoms grew into ordered national monarchies — that is to say by the growth of theories of royal supremacy side by side with small, step by step extensions of the jurisdiction of the kings' courts. The process could take place, however, only in so far as there was widespread consent to the extension of royal jurisdiction expressed in a general willingness of litigants to take advantage of new procedures that kings made available. So too, in the ecclesiastical sphere, there was no question of the popes asserting judicial supremacy over an unwilling church. It was rather the eagerness of bishops, abbots and other litigants to appeal to Rome that stimulated the process of judicial centralization. On the other hand, Innocent III's evident willingness to do justice in various kinds of secular cases evoked no such response.

The medieval popes sought to actualize all the potentialities of the regal power that had been implanted in their office — so they believed — by Christ Himself. The complexity of their statements merely reflects the complexity of the task they set themselves. As theologians they could deploy every resource of Scriptural allegory and symbolism to proclaim all the height and breadth and depth of papal power. As politicians and diplomats they had to work within the framework of public law that existed in their own day. As legislators they could bring about effective changes in that law only by winning general consent for their proposals. As it turned out the temporal power of the papacy never did become firmly established outside Italy precisely because the necessary consent was never forthcoming from the Christian princes and prelates and peoples of Europe.

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A Study in Political Failure

The Florentine Magnates: 1280-1343

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NO order in Florentine society is more complex and various than the magnates. My purpose is to trace out their history from the last two decades of the thirteenth century, to the year 1343. The earlier limit is dictated by the fact that documentary evidence towards a definition of this order appears only with the late Dugento, while the year 1343 marks the beginning of a concerted and sustained effort to bring this patriciate under the force of public law. After completing this inquiry, I hope to be able to draw certain inferences that may be of some use to cultural historians of the later North Italian Middle Ages.

I

The term "magnate" first appears in a public document in the year 1281 and is employed to designate a specific category of citizens who were to be required by law to post security for their good behavior.¹ This cautionary measure came as a result of a general pacification of the city bravely initiated by the pope's representative, Cardinal Latino. In 1280 His Holiness was vitally interested in establishing concord

¹ Definitions of the term "magnate" are legion. Words such as "nobiles," "milites," and "magnates" were frequently used interchangeably. Cf. G. Fasoli, "Ricerche sulla legislazione antimagnatizia nei comuni dell'alta e media Italia," *Rivista di Storia del Diritto Italiano*, 12 (1939) 241 ff. No attempt will be made in the present study to comment upon the origins of those classified as "milites vel magnates." For examples of disquieting evidence that makes generalization difficult, see J. Plesner, *L'emigration de la campagne à la ville libre de Florence au XIII^e siècle* (Copenhagen, 1934), *passim*. For a cautious and sensitive appraisal of the inadequacies of precise socio-economic distinctions between classes in a late medieval commune, see E. Cristiani's recent study of Pisa: *Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa* (Naples, 1962) 13-63. The socio-economic background of the Florentine patriciate-noble and commoner alike—is treated by E. Fuimi in his "Fioritura e decadenza dell'economia fiorentina," *Archivio Storico Italiano*, 116 (1958) 443-509.

among the feuding factions and contending orders in the Arno city. Rome stood much in need of Florentine support if the papacy was to realize its grand North Italian political objectives, and as long as the pontiff's great Guelf ally was torn by internecine strife, Florence would be less than useful to him. The need for public order and the desirability of being concerned with the good of the commonwealth rather than with one's private interests was not only a persistent theme in the sermons of such great preachers as Cardinal Latino, but it was also at the heart of the thirteenth century classical revival, and indeed it is entirely fitting that Cicero's and Aristotle's political teachings should have been incorporated into the civic humanism of the medieval commune. The same message prompting men to maintain a well-ordered state peopled with a law-abiding citizenry was also proclaimed by communal artists whose frescoes praising "buon governo" were soon to adorn the walls of the many town halls of Tuscany.²

The legislation of 1281 differed markedly from its medieval forebears: first, in that it required magnates to post a money bond which would be confiscated in case of a serious breach of the law, rather than merely waiting for a crime to be committed and then assessing the penalty according to the gravity of the offense. Secondly, this law was an innovation in that it required a certain segment of the citizenry to take an oath of peace instead of resorting to the traditional medieval remedy of calling upon all men to exchange the kiss of peace in the cathedral.³ Cardinal Latino's program was directed towards the pacification of long standing and fierce quarrels, especially among the *grandi* and *possenti* of such aristocratic families as the Adimari, Donati, Pazzi, and Tosinghi. It was these clans from the highest echelons of the patriciate whose lawless behavior the Cardinal and the commune were determined to check. The persistence of "broils, discords," and even "great wars" among these *consorterie* encouraged the chief magistracy of the republic to designate as magnates the feuding families of the Adimari, Bardi, Buondelmonti, Bostichi,

² N. Rubinstein, "Political Ideas in Sienese Art," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institute*, 21 (1958), 179-207; H. Wieruscowski, "Art and the Commune in the Time of Dante," *Speculum*, 19 (1944) 14-33.

³ N. Rubinstein, "La prima legge sul sodamento," *Archivio Storico Italiano*, 93 (1935), 161-172. The council of *i savi* was to deliberate on the posting of security by magnates and to settle problems pertaining to the practical application of the statutory disposition. The *sapientes* were to determine who was to post "satisfactionem." Cf. *Le Consulte della Repubblica fiorentina dall'anno 1280 all'anno 1298*, ed. A. Gherardi (Florence, 1896-98), I, 33.

Cavalcanti, Donati, Foraboschi Frescobaldi, Gherardini, Giandonati, Malispini, Manieri, Mozzi, Rossi, Tornaquinci, Tosinghi, and Visdomini. "Guerre et scandala" perpetrated by these magnates are to be a recurring motif in the annals of the city, and the aforementioned families were singled out by the Florentine chroniclers as being most prone to respond to the vendetta.⁴ Although the contentions of a Giovanni Villani or a Dino Compagni cannot be accepted uncritically, the fact remains that only one of the long list of fierce and lawless families mentioned in their chronicles was to escape the harsh restraints imposed by the Ordinances of Justice in late 1293. Perhaps that family—the Falconieri—whose proclivity for the blood feud was as pronounced as any clan in Florence, evaded the rigors of this ordinance because they had supported Giano della Bella, the leader of the popular revolution of that year.⁵ It would appear then that the term "magnate" came to be applied to many individuals from the city's leading families who chronically practiced the time-honored and customary act of private vengeance during the years between 1281 and 1293.

The consummation of peace, so devoutly to be wished—was fervently sought throughout the world of the late Middle Ages, and the heroes of those days were saints like Francis, who exorcised the demons of discord from the towns, or blessed kings like St. Louis, whose life stood as a religious monument to be worshiped by the many who hungered for peace. But the peace associations, so encouraged by the church, and the peace guilds, sponsored by the lay rulers, could only achieve their sacred ends when an effective machinery for enforcing public law came into being. Only then would the rule of law be a viable alternative that could compete effectively with the ancient and honorable form

⁴ G. Villani, *Cronica*, ed. F. Dragomanni (Florence, 1845), VIII, 1; D. Compagni, *Cronica*, ed. I. del Lungo (Florence, 1889, I, 22. For a discussion of *vindictae* and *guerr(a)e* as a general European phenomenon, with special emphasis on the Florentine experience, see N. Rubinstein, *La lotta contro i magnati a Firenze* (Florence, 1939).

⁵ R. Davidsohn, *Forschungen zur Geschichte von Florenz* (Berlin, 1896-1927), vol. III, n. 23. The Falconieri were active in England as merchants and bankers; with the early Trecento, however, the men of this clan demonstrated an appetite for violence and soon were outlawed as Ghibellines. On 12 September 1304, Schiatta was condemned by the vicar of the podestà to decapitation and destruction of his property for raiding the in the government. *Libri Fabarum*, 13, f. 1. (Henceforth abbreviated as *LF*.) abbreviated as *CC*. All documents cited are to be found in the *Archivio di Stato* in was banished. Cf. *Camera del Comune*, 1 bis., f. 70. (Henceforth this source will be convicted for similar crimes in the Mugello and finally, on 15 October 1315, the family Florence.) They were back in the city even before their ban was removed and serving *contado* and killing, robbing and kidnapping "populares florentinos." Others were

of gaining revenge. It is worth noting that to a Dante the ultimate and all consuming purpose of peace was religious. When this blessed goal was reached, men would be liberated from the cares of this world and permitted to contemplate their true end—the salvation of their souls. To the men of letters of the early *Quattrocento*, the ends of peace were secular. Leonardo Bruni Aretino, foremost humanist of his generation, and Florentine chancellor, believed that the fruits of peace would enable man to cultivate his personality and to pursue virtue through the active political life. To the men of Dante's time the state, metaphorically speaking, was "a mystical body"—an expression frequently used to characterize the Eucharist—and the *Signoria* was hailed as "savior" and "redeemer," while to the later humanists, governments and societies were man-made and their ends were secular.⁶

Much could be done to temper the violent and impulsive medievals who thought more of honor than they did of that brief moment of life granted to man before he crossed over into eternity. The cult of the Virgin, the promptings of chivalry, the subtle teachings of the Romance, the psychologizing of the new Italian poetry, each sought to instill compassion and the quality of introspection in the men of the late medieval world. And these cultural developments can be viewed with profit within the context of the pervasive yearning for peace so much in evidence in this society. While Florence was certainly not isolated from these grand European cultural movements, her experience and success with the repression of extreme anti-social behavior were to play a part in creating a particular regional political milieu that came to rely upon law rather than on the sermons, the religious pageants, and the civilizing nightly rituals of the waning Middle Ages. The Florentines came to know that the demons of discord would inevitably return to mock the efforts of the saint and that therefore the greatest possibility for security rested in a government before which all citizens were equal. This ideal, however, was only to become explicit in the new civic humanism of the early *Quattrocento*.⁷

⁶ C. T. Davis, "An early Florentine Political Theorist: Fra Remigio De' Girolami," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 104 (1960) 671; E. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies* (Princeton 1957), 193-232. The chief magistrates of the commune were the priors, and according to Giovanni Villani, the term "prior" was taken from the passage in the Holy Gospel where Christ says to His disciples: "Vos estis priores." *Cronica*, VII, 79. For an example of the use of religious metaphors in an important public document, see E. Cristiani, *op. cit.*, 500.

⁷ E. Garin, "I cancellieri umanisti della Repubblica fiorentina da Coluccio Salutati a Bartolomeo Scala," *Rivista Storica Italiana*, 71 (1959) 200; H. Baron, *Humanistic and*

One might begin with a paradox: In order to achieve equality it would be necessary first to have inequality, and this is something of a truism throughout the history of thirteenth and fourteenth century Florence. In 1282 Cardinal Latino's program of pacification collapsed and the leaders of the city's mercantile and industrial patriciate inaugurated a new *Signoria* founded upon the primacy of the seven major Florentine guilds. For the next century and a half, this magistracy was to insist repeatedly that its sacred duty was the maintenance of "veram et perpetuam concordiam et unionem conservationem et augmentum pacifici et tranquilli statuts artificum et artium et omnium popularum et etiam totius comunis et civitatis et districtus Florentie."⁸

Not only were certain of the magnates to be an integral part of this regime, but particular members of this class were to be among the warmest champions of its efforts to preserve public order. Just as these men had supported Cardinal Latino in his ill-fated endeavors, so now they were to give encouragement to the new regime and call upon the *Signoria* to intervene and pacify the feuding families of their own class. Many were to be as anxious as the humblest burghers for protection against the violence of the lawless *consorterie*. At least one half of the city's magnate families were matriculated in the greater guilds between 1282 and 1293, and these men differed little in outlook, interests, and patrimony from the great burghers. During this interval it was generally considered to be unnecessary for men of this stripe to post security

Political Literature in Florence and Venice at the Beginning of the Quattrocento (Cambridge, Mass., 1955). All the major chroniclers of the fourteenth century from Dino Compagni through the Villanis and Stefani were bitter critics of those whose behavior was factious, and each attributed the misfortunes of the city to the machinations of these intractable citizens. Cf. Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, *Cronica fiorentina*, ed. N. Rodolico, *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, new ed., XXX, part 1 (Città di Castello, 1903-1955), rub. 775, 790; G. Villani, *Cronica*, IX, 271. Donato Velluti contended that the virus of factionalism served to encourage the political aspirations of the lower orders, since the vying cliques each bid for their support. *Cronica domestica*, ed. I. del Lungo (Florence, 1914) 241. Compagni observed that the nobility of the contado "who obey her (Florence) more from fear than love," enjoyed the spectacle of discord since it humiliated the arrogant Florentines. *Cronica*, I, 1.

⁸ G. Salvemini, *Magnati e popolani in Firenze dal 1280 al 1295* (Florence, 1899) 384. The tendency in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was to use ecclesiastical authority to buttress the cause of peace. In commenting on the peace of Cardinal Latino, Compagni says, "...they (the Guelfs and Ghibellines) wisely agreed to come to terms...under the yolk of the church, in order that the bonds of the agreement might be maintained by the church's power." (Translation of *The Chronicle of Dino Compagni* by E. Benecke and A. Howell, London, 1896), 8.

for their good behavior since they were reputed to be law abiding citizens who followed a respectable economic calling.⁹ Furthermore, the fused elite of the greater guilds—magnate and commoner alike—were in agreement on fundamental issues from the complex coinage question, to the working out of the intricate details of the republic's ambiguous foreign policy and if one confines his researches to the abbreviated minutes of the various communal council meetings where these matters were discussed, then, indeed, the relations between magnate and great burgher appear to be most idyllic during the decade after 1282. Recent scholarship has made much of this concord and demonstrated that the ruling families of Florence were composed of men who rose to eminence as a result of the economic revolution which transformed Tuscany in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Few of these clans were feudal in origin and the overwhelming majority were distinctly nouveaux—scions of houses of “modest beginnings.”¹⁰ That certain of these “boni homines” were magnates was, to a large extent, a juridical matter, for wherein did the Bardi or Frescobaldi *magnati* differ from their fellow bankers, the great *popolani* of the houses of Peruzzi and Acciaiuoli? Without minimizing present day historical descriptions of this quasi fused patriciate, and acknowledging that the great magnate bankers and wool merchants

⁹ G. Salvemini, *op. cit.*, p. 187; R. Ciasca, “Dante e l'arte dei medicie e speciale,” *Archivio Storico Italiano*, 89 (1931) 91-95.

¹⁰ Marc Bloch's treatment of the French nobility suggests that this cadre was being transformed into a legal class during the later Middle Ages. We find, “what had long been by mere convention a hereditary vocation,” being transformed “into a legalized and jealously-guarded privilege...” Cf. *Feudal Society*, trans. L. Manyon (Chicago, 1961), 322. The import of this would be that it became increasingly difficult to pass into the ranks of the French nobility after the twelfth century. Moreover, there was a marked tendency to associate the term “nobility” with the exercise of specific juridical prerogatives. For an assessment of recent literature on this theme, see Georges Duby, “Une enquête à poursuivre: la noblesse dans la France,” *Revue Historique*, 226 (1961) 1-22. The North Italian situation was not comparable since there had been extensive interpenetration between noble and commoner and many nouveaux clans had risen to the top echelons of communal society. Social mobility was pronounced and economic distinctions tended to blur from the eleventh through the thirteenth century. Cf. G. Luzzatto, *Studi di storia economica veneziana* (Padua, 1954) 125-165; E. Cristiani, *op. cit.*, 129-134. To argue, however, that because of this socio-economic interpretation the North Italian urban patriciate achieved homogeneity would be fallacious. See Jacques Heers' incisive discussion of “Le divorce entre les deux aristocraties est très net,” in *Gênes au XV^e siècle* (Paris, 1961) 511-562; M. Rabozzi, “Lotte in Novara fra antica e nobiltà,” *Bollettino Storico per la provincia di Novara* (1948) I 5-20. No study comparable to that of Heers' exists for Florence. Cf. E. Fiumi, *op. cit.*, 443-509.

were to continue to serve the commune as wise counselors and responsible bureaucrats over the next centuries, it should be emphasized that the problem of the magnates has another and most sorely neglected side.

Florentine chroniclers and those versed in the prevailing Aristotelian political theory were quick to suggest that no good regime could deny representation to the magnates; never at any time, no matter how democratized civil life became, were these men excluded from all public offices.¹¹ Not only was their talent and rich experience indispensable to the *Signoria*, but the very tenure of any regime depended upon winning the consent and support of a majority of the great *popolani* and *magnati*. However this does not preclude the existence of dissident elements, and it is precisely here that the current historical view of the magnates falls short. One cannot assess correctly the character of the magnates by merely reading minutes of the communal councils, for throughout Florentine history those men who were brought into the government were in fact the ones who tended to be sympathetic with the objectives of the ruling *Signorie*. Nowhere is this practice more obvious than during the decade of the 1280's; those magnates who were co-opted were of course in fundamental agreement with the great *popolani*. By 1285, however, it had become apparent that there were other magnates, even kin of those holding high office, who, in the language of the day, "were not content to live *la vita civile*."¹² Because of the continued lawless behavior of these men, the *Signoria* felt compelled to convoke a general parliament. The first speaker at this citizen assembly, an eminent lawyer, maintained that since the discords which embroiled the city had been provoked exclusively by unruly magnates, this order should be forced to settle its differences so that the city might once again have peace. The next counselor, the hosier, Nerio, advocated that the *Signoria* itself reduce the *discordia* so prevalent among this class.¹³ Despite the sage advice and the repeated

¹¹ G. Villani, *Cronica*, XI, 118; D. Compagni, *Cronica*, II, 12. Speakers before the *Signoria* never tired of advocating that Florence's neighbors, Siena, Volterra, Pistoia, etc. could cure all varieties of civic maladies if they would only grant the magnates a larger share of offices. *Consulte et Pratiche*, 10, f. 93r; *ibid.*, 11, f. 105r *ibid.*, 12 f. 149; *ibid.*, 14, fols. 14r-31r. (Henceforth this source will be abbreviated CP). Magnates were in fact excluded from office in only a few of the North Italian towns. Cf. G. Fasoli, "La legislazione antimagnatizia a Bologna fino al 1292," *Rivista di Storia del Diritto Italiano*, 6 (1933) 351 ff. Frequently "the ferocious dispositions" of the statutes were confined to the realm of theory.

¹² G. Salvemini, *op. cit.*, 308.

¹³ The jurist was Dominus Raynerius del Sasso. Cf. *Le Consulte*, I, 169-170.

efforts of the *Signoria* to terminate private warfare among the magnates, strife appears to have intensified during the ensuing years. Giovanni Villani was of the opinion that the collapse of this regime and the rise of the popular *Signoria* of 1293 was occasioned by the unabating civil wars within the ranks of the magnates.¹⁴ Only too seldom was the *Signoria* able to make peace prevail between the warring families. When this was accomplished, however, there was ample cause for joyous festivals and colorful public pageants; even the parsimonious communal councils enthusiastically voted subsidies to commemorate these rare instances in order to impress the volatile populace with memories of the blessings of harmony and the triumphs of public law.¹⁵

These victories of public law over private prerogatives could not be insured through government by exhortation or admonition; as early as 1281, a special citizen militia had been organized composed of one thousand men, "amatores et zelatores boni et pacifici status dicte civitatis," to assist the republic's magistrates in performing their official duty against lawless *magnates et potentes*.¹⁶ At first this militia was the responsibility of the greater guilds and they alone were permitted to assemble under the standards of their *arti*: but soon the five middle guilds were granted this privilege and finally, the honor was bestowed

¹⁴ *Cronica*, VIII, 1. Despite concerted effort during the 1280's, the regime had been unable to dissuade the magnates from recourse to the vendetta. As early as 1281 the magnates were prohibited from exercising this prerogative. Worth noting is the fact that this right was guaranteed to all the other orders of society. It would seem then that vendetta among classes other than the magnates did not pose so great a problem for a *Signoria* concerned with the keeping of public order. Among the top echelons of communal society it was thought to be dishonorable to resort to public courts for vindication. It should be remembered that in the early commune the aristocracy was distinguished by two ancient and related privileges: the right to bear arms and the right to execute justice. Cf. N. Rubinstein, *La lotta contro i magnati a Firenze* (Florence, 1939) 50-54; E. Cristiani, *op. cit.*, 82-89.

¹⁵ The *Signoria* expended 2,000 lire for the celebration of a marriage that reconciled the feuding houses of the Lamberti and the Della Tosa. At a meeting of the communal councils shortly thereafter, a speaker proposed that a vote be taken "super eo quod libre 2,000 que possunt expendi in matrimoniiis contrahendis pro pace facienda inter Tosinghos et Lambertos possint expendi occasione matrimoniorum et occasione pacis." *Le Consulte*, I, 360, 372 (11 April 1290). The *Signoria* was anxious to offer every inducement to those who would make peace. Cf. *Le Consulte*, I, 372; *Archivio Notarile*, A, 983, f. 25r, C. 102, f. 82. The one act of the despised tyrant Walter of Brienne which was to win him kudos was his pacification of contentious magnate clans. For copies of peace pacts signed by these houses, see *Balia*, 1.

¹⁶ G. Salvemini, *op. cit.*, Appendix IV, 337-346.

upon the nine lesser guilds of the city. By 1288 the force behind public law had gained momentum and was now rooted in the guild corporations of the city.¹⁷

And yet even this more broadly based *Signoria* was unable to quell the chronic violence. The arrest and condemnation of a great magnate would be enough to trigger public rioting and aristocrats such as Corso Donati, offspring of a family Dante was to call "the outrageous tribe that playeth dragon," could marshal the city mobs against the troops of the podestà or the capitano and prevent them from arresting a high-born culprit; then when the melee was over, and the minions of the law were frustrated, Corso and his cohorts would go unpunished.¹⁸ Figures like Corso filled their countrymen with equal parts of fear and fascination; those who damned him went on to praise him in the same breath for his fatal gifts of beauty and charm. He, in the company of other patricians, was to constitute that core of rugged individualists who made the Florentine politics of the late *Dugento* so unpredictable. If prediction were in order one might suggest that it was the suppression of this type of individualist that was to make possible the more collectivized Renaissance state with its more cohesive ruling class.¹⁹

Just as troublesome to the regime was the regular practice of commuting sentences and laying aside verdicts against magnate families such as the Pazzi or Frescobaldi.²⁰ Here again we can observe something of the division, or better still the tension, between magnates who sat in the government and those who remained outside. A Della Tosa might warmly support severe legislation enacted by the *Signoria* prohibiting the granting of judicial dispensation for high crimes, while one of his own clan or class might suffer the consequences of this

¹⁷ R. Davidsohn, *Storia di Firenze* (Florence, 1957), vol. II, part 2, 294-296, 419; *Forschungen zur geschichte von Florenz*, vol. III, n. 1197.

¹⁸ G. Villani, *Cronica*, VII, 114; R. Davidsohn, *Storia di Firenze*, vol. II, part 2, p. 417.

¹⁹ In speaking of "how the great man of the people, Giano della Bella, was driven out of Florence," Villani opines that the leader of the popular revolution "was presumptuous and desired to avenge his wrongs..." Then he draws the moral for his audience: "And note that this is a great example to those citizens who are to come, to beware of desiring to be lords over their fellow-citizens or too ambitious; but to be content with the common citizenship." *Cronica*, VIII, 8. Dino Compagni's chronicle is replete with vivid descriptions of political individualism whose quest for "vainglory" debased communal politics. No portrait is more striking than that of the Black Guelf leader, the magnate, Corso Donati, who is depicted as a later day Catiline. Compagni's sympathies, like those of Villani, are with "la gente comune;" only those men had the public good at heart. D. Compagni, *Cronica*, II, 20; II, 9; G. Villani, *Cronica*, VIII, 13; VIII, 69.

²⁰ *Provisioni Protocoli*, 1, fols. 60r-61r; *Le Consulte*, I, 347,360.

Draconian measure.²¹ No single medieval practice did more to impede the attempts of magistrates to bring the *potentes* and *magnates* of the city to justice than did repeated grants of judicial dispensation. And yet these enactments reveal something of the dualism implicit in medieval ways: either the culprit would be visited with a vengeful justice or be graced with merciful compassion. Thirteenth century sentimentality was especially drawn to the plight of the mighty whose horrendous fall from high estate could evoke the extremes of laughter or tearful pity. Therefore, the emotions of *il popolo* made the ministrations of justice against the overmighty a precarious venture at best. Finally, there was no such entity as an independent judiciary in the Italian city-state, and the *Signoria* could and did either prompt or set aside court verdicts. Chroniclers bemoaned this practice and lamented that the powerful were able to commit the greatest atrocities with impunity, while the poor and the weak were hanged, broken on the wheel, or decapitated for every trifling misdemeanor.²² The irony was that the same men who were appalled by these conditions were not above using their political influence to assist magnates who sought to escape the rigors of communal law.²³

Much more matter-of-fact as a cause for obstructing justice was the persistent communal need for revenue and the dilemma of the *fideiussores*. Pardons were granted regularly, depending upon the needs of the *Camera*, at a rate of fifteen per cent of the original condemnation. Such a pardon liberated those who had gone surety (the *fideiussores*) for a lawless magnate. There were in the city numerous magnates who either would not or simply could not afford to post bond, and since the well-being of the republic depended upon the suppression of crime among the magnates, *fideiussores* were to be sought among the affluent of any class.²⁴ This meant that great *popolani* were much involved in the fate of lawless magnates and, therefore, ambivalence tended to be nurtured. There was also the troublesome question of the liability of the *consorteria* itself, intensified by the tangle of medieval property laws. In addition, there loomed the awesome prospect of the destruction of the homes of the tainted families. Problems of dowry and the plight of children made any reprisal a

²¹ *Ibid.*, I, 308 (2 October 1285).

²² M. Stefani, *Cronica fiorentina*, rub. 555; M. Villani, *Cronica*, III, 58; D. Compagni, *Cronica*, I, 5.

²³ D. Velluti, *Cronica domestica*, 20-21.

²⁴ *Le Consulte*, I, 376.

matter of grave concern to those magnates and *popolani* who served in the councils of the republic at this time. Their vote for or against judicial dispensation was cast not only in light of the above knowledge, but very frequently on the basis of intimate personal experience. Florence was governed by a closely knit elite and tragedy was rarely a private matter. Men were seldom alone, and this absence of privacy was reflected in the display of life in the streets, the side-walk business transaction, the open markets and broad piazzas, and the autobiographical celebrations of the loves and hates of a Dante or a Boccaccio. Only much later were the Renaissance architects to be concerned with the modern notion of privacy.

The role of the *Signoria* as peace-maker was further complicated by the mixed reception which greeted its efforts. The overall tendency of Florentine legislation was to intrude more and more into matters formerly decided by the councils of a *consorteria* or a tower society, and some among the magnates welcomed this intervention. Once vendetta was proclaimed, its reverberations affected the guilty and innocent alike, and the blood-stained torso of Mars was more than an image from *The Divine Comedy*. Certain magnates accepted the decisions of communal arbitrators, rather than lay down their lives before "that mutilated stone." In other instances, where private justice was a *fait accompli*, the parties involved willingly subscribed to a settlement dictated by a public magistrate and signed peace pacts guaranteeing that they would desist from further vengeance. Often judicial dispensation was not granted by communal courts until these conditions were met.²⁵ Soon the commune demanded half the property of the aggressor and sought to limit the right of vendetta to the individual who had personally suffered insult or injury; in this way the *consorteria* was to be prevented from seeking revenge in the name of some distant kinsman. The magnates both desired and despised the intervention of the *Signoria* in this sensitive area, but the cumulative effect of repeated legislation by successive *Signorie* accustomed them to turn to the state for settlement of feuds. The only action of the loathed despot, Walter of Brienne (1342-43), to receive unanimous acclaim was the establishment of peace pacts among the warring magnates. After 1343 stringent enforcement of communal law was to do much to tame the more obdurate elements and to engender a deeper respect for the authority

²⁵ M. Becker, "Gualtieri di Brienne e l'uso delle dispense giudiziarie," *Archivio Storico Italiano*, 113 (1955) 245-251; A. Enriques, "La vendetta nella vita nella legislazione fiorentina," *Archivio Storico Italiano*, 91 (1933), 85-146.

of public law. The continued growth of communal bureaucracy also would serve to reduce the incidence of crimes of violence among all classes and produced an environment in which the ties of community were strengthened at the expense of private loyalties.²⁶

Until 1292 the magnates held twelve per cent of the seats in the priorate, and this statistic has been utilized by recent historians in an attempt to demonstrate that Salvemini's and Davidsohn's descriptions of the preceding decade, as an interval characterized by class conflict between the entrepreneurs of the guilds and the land-holding magnates, are fallacious. Unfortunately, however, the newer arguments are not altogether convincing.²⁷ Already it has been suggested that those magnates co-opted for the priorate were not entirely typical of their class; nor was twelve per cent a very sizable representation for this order. Such an apportionment was actually discriminatory since the magnates numbered approximately one-quarter of the more affluent citizens of the commune, and their membership was about equal to that of the *popolani* matriculated in the greater guilds.²⁸ If one adds the six per cent representation accorded the lesser guilds to the twelve per cent granted the magnates, then one has a *Signoria* composed of eighty-two per cent *popolani grassi* who, for the most part, were great bankers, industrialists, and international traders. As has been indicated previously, the twelve per cent of the magnates who sat in the *Signoria*

²⁶ M. Becker, "An Essay on the Novi Cives and Florentine Politics, 1343-1382," *Mediaeval Studies*, 24 (1962), 35-82. Later in the Trecento, when a public luminary was slain in a vendetta, the Signoria would decree "quod acerrima vindicta fiat" against the assassin. Furthermore his consorts were to be punished, their property to be devastated, and the entire clan to be visited "cum perpetua ruina." The regime would then sponsor a lavish state funeral for the victim "in order to honor his memory." *CP.*, 19, f. 63r (16 September 1380). The public figure in this instance was Giovanni Mone, grain merchant and one of the "Eight Saints" in command of the war against the papacy. Cf. *Provisioni*, 64, f. 19. (Henceforth this source will be abbreviated *P.*).

²⁷ The leader of the revisionists who led the critique of the older views was Nicola Ottokar. For a survey of his writings and a sympathetic analysis of the weaknesses inherent in his philosophy of history, see E. Sestan, "Nicola Ottokar," *Rivista Storica Italiana*, 71 (1959) 178-184.

²⁸ This rough figure is derived from a statement in *Le Consulte*, I, 202. Ser Arrigus Gratie proposed that a *prestanza* be exacted from 6,200 of the citizenry. Of this number, 1,500 or so were magnates. The ratio of magnates to affluent *popolani* rate-payers was not altered substantially in the subsequent period. The *Monte*, or funded communal debt, was composed of outstanding *prestanze* accumulated between 1326 and 1343. The total number of rate-payers was 8,000 and if we subtract the names of petty rate-payers from this figure, our ratio of affluent *popolani* to *magnati* is still roughly four to one. Cf. *Monte, campione dell'impianto del 1345*, S. Giovanni, S. Spirito, S. Maria Novella, S. Croce.

were great capitalists of the same stripe, but two troublesome questions yet remain: How representative were these men of the many included in this heterogeneous group juridically defined as magnates? And how enthusiastically were the policies, sponsored by the elite of the greater guilds, received by those magnates excluded from the *Signoria*? The older accounts by Salvemini and Davidsohn erred in attempting to uncover evidence of magnate dissent in the abbreviated minutes of the council meetings, but the modern revisionists, Ottokar and Fiumi, have also erred in presuming that the harmony which existed between a small segment of the Florentine magnates of the greater guilds and their commoner confreres can be projected to include that remaining half of the city's magnate families not inscribed in any guild, as well as that large group of magnates who inhabited rural Tuscany.

That magnates participated in the *Signoria* from 1282 to 1292, and that they were to continue to serve each succeeding regime, must be taken into account by anyone desirous of understanding the rise of a heightened sense of civic consciousness within this group. As to the unrepresented majority, it will be necessary to examine the effect of public policy upon their great variety of interests. The magnates in the *Signoria* were part of the world of the guilds, and the dominant trend was towards a highly economically regulated society. Like neighboring city-states, Florence was profoundly concerned with achieving the goal of economic self-sufficiency. This entailed extensive legislation fixing dates for the planting of crops and their harvest, restricting the flow of agricultural labor, insuring the cultivation of idle lands, regulating the prices of agricultural commodities, checking the illegal export of foodstuffs, establishing the terms of tenement; the commune was now intervening in the most intimate details of rustic life.²⁹ All of this was to be done so that agrarian production might increase and the republic might then achieve a higher degree of self-sufficiency. Control over rural markets, the fisheries along the Arno, the cattle trade, as well as over the distribution of such essentials as salt, was accompanied by the imposition of a host of indirect levies on foodstuffs and wines. The extension of communal gabelles into remote territories under Florentine jurisdiction meant that state courts had to be established to enforce collection of imposts and that a multitude of fiscal practices had to be regularized. To the seventy or so magnate families of the *contado*, this signified an encroachment upon ancient

²⁹ I wish to thank Dr. Philip Jones, of Oxford, for permitting me to read his manuscript on the agrarian history of Italy in the late Middle Ages. This manuscript will be published in the forthcoming volume of *The Cambridge Economic History*.

prerogatives and traditional ways. The triumph of communal sovereignty was to be a gradual and uneven process, but the result was certain—the slow dissipation of the seigneurial power of unfriendly magnates. At first the commune did little to interfere with the ancient rights of those lords whose loyalty to the republic had been demonstrated, and even in 1289, when the *Signoria* proclaimed an end to serfdom in Florentine dominions, the tenurial nexus between these lords and their serfs remained unbroken.³⁰ The regime did, however, assert the principle that the men of the *contado*, no matter what their status or condition might be, were to be amenable to communal levies, and that all rustics were to be liable for service to the commune. The tendency was, then, to replace the suzerainty of the lord with that of the commune, and to require that the men of the *contado* do castle guard, repair bridges and walls, maintain roads and, in fact, be responsible for that great variety of other public services so augmented during the course of the *Dugento*. Similarly, Florentine sovereignty impinged upon the lordship of magnates over rural communes and *popoli*, and soon these hamlets were being assessed, taxed, and judged according to the prescriptions of Florentine statutes rather than by more traditional formulae. This latter development, involving the abrogation of private feudal rights, lasted well over a century and resistance to it was tenacious. The growth of territorial law and its final victory over more personal types of medieval jurisdictions was haphazard, and what the commune could not achieve legally, she gained through purchase and adroit diplomacy.³¹

The initiative for regulating the magnates of the *contado* came not only from the *Signoria*, but from the rectors of the rural communities as well. Tearfully they besought the priors of the republic to put an end to the chronic violence perpetrated by certain *magnates et potentes*, calling upon the government to prevent these lawless men from acquiring property in the vicinity and contending that, if these "evil

³⁰ E. Besta, *Le persone nella storia del diritto italiano* (Padua, 1931), 99 ff; R. Caggese, *Classi e comuni rurali nel medio evo italiano* (Florence, 1908), II, 277; L. Simeoni, "La liberazione dei servi a Bologna nel 1256-1257," *Archivio Storico Italiano*, 109 (1951), 3-26. The liberation of the *manentes* did not imply the ceding of the land on which they worked. Cf. E. Cristiani, *op. cit.*, 151-156 and the important study of R. Romeo, "La Signoria dell'abate di S. Ambrogio di Milano sul comune rurale di Origgio nel secolo XIII," *Rivista Storica Italiana*, 69 (1957), 340-377, 472-506.

³¹ *Delizie degli toscani*, ed. I. di San Luigi (Florence, 1770-1789), VII, 191. See legislative debate of 5 September 1380: Quod fiat ita quod Tarlati et Ubertini stent in devotione communis. Quod cito nox viva mittatur ad filios domini Magii et alios Ubertinos et Petramalem ad exhortandum eos. Et cum pecunia subveniatur. *CP.*, 19, f. 63.

men" were allowed to extend their holdings, it would not be long before the villagers would find themselves under their "heel." The *Signoria* frequently heeded the petitioners and announced that magnates might not purchase estates in particular areas "pro bono et quieto statu districtus."³² In 1286 the podestà and capitano were authorized by the *Signoria* to force the most unruly of the *potentes* to sell their properties and thus relinquish their extra legal dominion. Rural communities were urged to take action against these transgressors, "maxime magnates," and to confiscate their lands. Gradually there emerged in the *contado* a highly integrated regime whereby the syndics of country parishes came to assume greater responsibility for the actions of their constituency. In the case of the magnates this meant that the rural parishes were now liable for their unpaid gabelles and subject to fine if criminous citizens or banished magnates were found in the region. Moreover, rural magistracies were also to be condemned if they failed to report crimes to the Florentine judiciary.³³ The problem of brigandage remained chronic, and as the city and the *popoli* of the *contado* became mutually interested in the construction of roads, the rustic *popolares* entreated the *Signoria* to protect them from the many extortions and larcenies committed by magnates against those *contadini* transporting goods to market.

The monasteries, abbeys, and pious foundations of Tuscany also turned to the *Signoria* for redress of grievances, for they suffered not only from the usurpations of their magnate neighbors, but also from the numerous peculations and appropriations of church property by magnates such as the Aliotti, Buondelmonti, Girolami, Tosinighi and others. Especially notorious were the Della Tosa and Visdomini clans who used their ancient authority as patrons and defenders of the bishopric to sequester church revenues whenever the See was vacant. Dante's taunt: "So did their fathers who, whene'er your church is vacant, stand guzzling in consistory," could have been directed against any number of high-born patricians³⁴

³² *Statuti della Repubblica Fiorentina*, ed. R. Caggese (Florence, 1910-21), 100 (1284); G. Salvemini, *op. cit.*, 356-357; G. Rondoni, *I più antichi frammenti del costituito fiorentino* (Florence, 1882), 43.

³³ The first extensive records concerning the activities of the Florentine magistrates are to be found in the *Camera del Comune, Entrata, I bis*. This particular volume of the treasury records of some 350 folios is dated from October, 1342 to July, 1343, but contains transcripts of many cases of a much earlier vintage.

³⁴ *Paradiso*, XVI, 112-115. For a summary of the role of the Florentine patriciate in the Tuscan church, see R. Davidsohn, *Firenze ai tempi di Dante*, Trans. E. Theseider (Florence, 1929), 1-18.

Not only was it commonplace to find these great clans encroaching upon the prerogatives of the church, but the unanimous opinion of *Trecento* chroniclers was that these *potentes* used their ecclesiastical influence to intimidate and oppress the poor and the weak.³⁵ During intervals when the political power of these magnates was at a low ebb, both the clergy and laity, who administered ecclesiastical estates, pressed suit against these aristocratic despoilers. The position of the church, however, remained ambiguous because, while on the one hand many of the Tuscan prelates were themselves magnates, on the other, there was wide-spread trepidation at the prospect of allowing church property to slip away. The ecclesiastical hierarchy was itself torn on the question of whether to support popular *Signorie* in their policies designed to recover church properties from the usurpers or to ally with the oligarchical opposition. Popular regimes frequently protected church estates only to levy taxes on them, while oligarchical governments were more mindful of ancient ecclesiastical liberties where taxation was involved.³⁶

The view of the *Signoria* towards the magnates of the church was equally as troubled since there was a mounting concern that the great feudatories of the *contado*, such as the Ubaldini, the Ubertini, the Pazzi of Valdarno, and the Counts Guidi, would use their enormous ecclesiastical *auctoritas* to undermine the republic and make it the victim of the vagaries of ever shifting Italian church politics. Over the next century a variety of communal statutes were enacted calculated to prevent just such a horrendous eventuality.³⁷ Clearly this was an

³⁵ Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, *op. cit.*, rub. 616; G. Villani, *Cronica*, XII, 43; N. Rodolico, *I Ciompi*, 42. Cf. also M. Becker, "Some Economic Implications of the Conflict Between Church and State in Trecento Florence," *Mediaeval Studies*, 21 (1959), 1-16.

³⁶ M. Becker, "Church and State in Florence on the Eve of the Renaissance," *Speculum*, 37 (1962), 511-514. During intervals when the *Signoria* was democratized, monasteries and pious foundations made accusations against magnates who usurped church property. The culprits were prosecuted vigorously under the appropriate provisions of the Ordinances of Justice. Cf. R. Davidsohn, *Forschungen zur geschichte*, vol. IV, 164-165; J. Plesner, *op. cit.*, 104-169. Frequently clergy had reason to fear the vendetta of irate magnates. Religious establishments were willing to concede prerogatives and jurisdiction to Florence in return for the *Signoria*'s pledge to defend the clergy from their enemies. P. Santini, *Documenti dell'antica costituzione del comune di Firenze*, (Florence, 1952), 253.

³⁷ *Statuti della Repubblica Fiorentina*, 273-274; A. Panella, "La guerra degli Otto Santi e le vicende della legge contro i vescovi," *Archivio Storico Italiano*, 99 (1941), 36-49. For disquieting evidence of usurpations of ecclesiastical prerogatives by such magnate families as the Aliotti, Della Tosa, Gherardini, Visdomini, etc., see *Manoscritti varii*, 46. For the influence of the great feudatories on the Tuscan Church, see F. Schneider, *Die Reichsverwaltung in Toscana von der Gründung des Langobardenreiches bis zum Ausgang der Staufer* (568-1268), (Rome, 1914), 299-346.

invasion of ancient feudal prerogatives and it was accompanied by the erosion of imperial privileges until, by the end of the *Trecento*, even the overweening Counts Guidi, so remote from the city, were now subject to communal levies. During the 1280's, assessments on the lands of the Ubaldini were raised three times, and while certain great lords were able to conserve specific feudal rights, the trend was clearly in the direction of mounting state sovereignty. Communal commissions were certainly not unsympathetic to these time-honored privileges, but they were guided by scrupulously legalistic criteria, and in the absence of compelling evidence, the decision went against the accused. Not infrequently, tortuous litigation culminated in communal purchase of property and rights.³⁸

The magnates of rural Tuscany were as little united as their urban counterparts, and communal rectors were called upon repeatedly to make peace between contentious clans. Sometimes state intervention was blatant and the militia of the republic did battle with the warring feudatories. Upon occasion peace was restored only after the beleaguered nobles formally submitted to the jurisdiction of the commune on the condition that the *Signoria* cancel all outstanding condemnations against the clan "sine aliqua solutione."³⁹ The net public power was further extended into the far reaches of Florentine territory when the great feudal magnates were compelled to have city dwellers post security for their continued good behavior.

The law was becoming increasingly discriminatory against those judged by their contemporaries to be the most energetic harbingers of "raw egoism"—the anti-social magnates. And that this repression should occur at a time when these magnates were still the backbone of the Florentine armies is itself noteworthy. In fact it was to be less than four years after that glorious June 11, 1289, when the charge of the elite magnate cavalry won the day against Arezzo at the Battle of Campaldino, and long before citizen troops were rendered obsolete by foreign mercenaries, that the magnates were to be struck by the cruelest measures in the republic's annals—the discriminatory Ordinances of Justice of 1293.⁴⁰

³⁸ For an inquest conducted by communal magistrates pertaining to certain properties "qui occupata erant...per quosdam potentes et magnates contra communem Florentie," see *Atti del Esecutore*, 33.

³⁹ In this instance the object of the *Signoria*'s benevolence was the Pazzi of the Valdarno who acknowledged "sint et esse debeant ad honorem subiectionem et obedientem et servicium communi." *Le Consulte*, I, 347 (12 January 1290).

⁴⁰ N. Ottokar, *Studi comunali e fiorentini* (Florence, 1948) 86 ff.

Over the next generation, despite the incessant pleas of magnates, who continued to serve in the vanguard of the city's host, that their bravery and patriotism should be rewarded with the abrogation of these dread ordinances, newer and harsher restraints were placed on this class by the *Signoria* in 1309, 1321, and 1324. It would seem that facile generalizations attempting to correlate anti-magnate laws with the dwindling military importance of the magnates are overhasty; severe constraints long antedated the decline in military contribution of this order.

The regime of 1282-92 lacked precise objective criteria for defining the magnates. The *Signoria* was itself a composite of the urban aristocracy and in its actions towards the magnates it made numerous exceptions to the general provisions of the law. Theoretically, an entire family might be required to post security, but in practice important exemptions were granted.⁴¹ To the men governing the city during this critical decade there was no proper definition of the term magnate and, therefore, public policy was as inconsistent as it was pragmatic. Beyond the statement that certain individuals whose behavior was a threat to the peace and tranquility of the city would be compelled to post bond as magnates, little can be said. Nor was there a precise notion of the membership of a *consorteria* until 1293: it is only then that magnate clans were defined and fused into an order now designated as the Florentine nobility. The movement towards a more exact description of the nobility occurs between 1289 and late 1292 when specific criteria are formulated to distinguish commoner from noble. Hitherto, this imprecise and vaguest of all medieval social designations was bestowed upon those who held certain feudal estates, or had received the accolade from the church, the emperor, a foreign lord, or even from the Florentine *Signoria* which had held regalian rights since 1260.

The *Signoria*, in the years immediately before the enactment of the Ordinances of Justice, was confronted with the problem of financing protracted and, for the most part, ill-starred military ventures. That this policy culminated in the debacle of 1292 did much to discredit

⁴¹ G. Salvemini, *op. cit.*, 186-187. Nicola Ottokar has demonstrated that Davidsohn's reading of *Diplomatico S. Spirito* (31 January 1289) is incorrect and that magnates judged to be "impotentie" were released from this onerous obligation. Cf. *Il comune di Firenze alla fine del dugento* (Florence, 1926), 249. Finally, even the Draconian Ordinances of Justice of January 1293 permitted the *Signoria* to treat separately with those magnates "qui eisdem dominis Prioribus insufficientes et impotentes videbuntur." Cf. G. Salvemini, *op. cit.*, 407.

those who had been responsible for formulating foreign policy. During those four critical years, the *Signoria* relied heavily upon the magnates for counsel since these men were most experienced in military matters and most familiar with the intricate workings of Italian diplomacy. The records of the council meetings disclose that there was no division among the elite on foreign policy questions, and the regime blundered ahead with a high degree of unanimity.

There is some justice in blaming the magnates for certain disasters that befell the republic and later there was sentiment charging the great houses with conducting foreign affairs in accord with their own private interests rather than out of concern for the general welfare. When the list of magnates was drawn up in 1293, it included the names of those who had directed the disastrous war effort, and the framers of the ordinances were not influenced by the prior juridical status of a given individual. Families such as the Acciaiuoli, Medici, Peruzzi, and Strozzi great commoners who had less political influence at this time and were little implicated in the war effort, were to profit most from the restraints placed upon such clans as the Bardi, Cerchi, Mozzi and Spini who had been deeply involved. It was the latter who were reckoned among the Florentine nobility in 1293 and, therefore, rendered ineligible for the highest elective offices. Many other families who would have been regarded as "noble" by Dante's contemporaries, by virtue of their claims of lineage and ancient title, were not inscribed upon the rolls as "magnates et nobiles." Among their number were the Altoviti, Baldovinetti, Della Bella, Chiermontesi, Guigni, Importuni, and Pagolotti. Not only were they not so closely identified with the calamities of those years, but certain of them proved to be warm supporters and even leaders of the popular revolution of 1293.⁴²

From 1289-92, Florentine legislation revealed certain characteristics that were to be of consequence to the magnates. Under the pressure of war and the attendant need for revenue, the *Signoria* tightened lax administrative practices, introduced reforms into the treasury system, and revised the tax structure.⁴³ No longer could the city afford the

⁴² G. Villani, *Cronica*, IV, 2, 13; *Paradiso*, VI, 127 ff.; N. Ottokar, *op. cit.*, 174 ff.

⁴³ For the most recent analysis of those alterations in the communal fiscal structure, see N. Ottokar, *op. cit.*, 216 ff. Beginning in April of 1289 and continuing throughout the fall of that same year, the *Signoria* created new offices such as the "sei rationerii," enjoined to control the "pecunia communis," and appointed foreign rectors "ad reinveniendum iura communis." The special purpose of these latter officials was to prevent "fraus, dolus aut symonia in averi communis." Apparently abuses in the public sale of

casual controls over communal property and rights, nor the loose accountability of government officials so prevalent in easier days. Now it was imperative that the city act to conserve its wealth and augment its income so that it could support the military campaigns in progress. Actions such as the liberation of the serfs in Florentine territories have not been viewed within this context, but if they are placed within the sequence of the legislation of these years, then this measure stands as one of a series of enactments designed to extend public control in order to increase state funds. Upon being freed the serf was immediately subject to communal imposts. Public authority was also strengthened at the expense of private rights when communal syndics and foreign magistrates were appointed to put an end to the many frauds and abuses of office holders and overmighty citizens.

This trend towards a more impersonal and impartial type of regime was also to be much in evidence during 1323-25, 1328-29, and after 1343. During each of these intervals comparable developments culminated in the foundation of a popular *Signoria*, and fundamental to the establishment of this democratized regime was the vigorous enforcement of the *divieto*. This law prohibited members of the same family from holding high office simultaneously, and required that an individual could only stand for reelection to the *Signoria* after a suitable lapse of time (usually two or three years).

The chronicler, Dino Compagni, much immersed in city politics, and several times prior of the republic, contended that the rulers of the commune, the great *popolani*, co-opted certain of their magnate kinsmen and together they constituted an elite whose membership was repeatedly re-elected to the *Signoria*.⁴⁴ In November of 1292, when the reaction against this elite had gained momentum, the councils met to discuss the ever vexing question of the *divieto*. The speakers expressed fresh political sentiments: in addition to advocating the strict enforcement of the *divieto*, Ubertino Strozzi and Bonisegna Becchinugi proposed

communal lands and the auctioning of taxes to farmers of these levies was rampant. Cf. also R. Davidsohn, *Forschungen*, 4, 304-305; B. Barbadoro, *Le finanze della repubblica fiorentina* (Florence, 1929), 253-55.

Controversy has centered around communal grain policy and the extent to which it was regulated by harsh governmental decrees at this time. It should be noted that the *Signoria* was much concerned with the grain trade since this traffic yielded the republic substantial income; gabelles were the principal source of communal revenue. *Le Consulte*, I, 4 ff. For bibliography see D. Herlihy, *Pisa in the Early Renaissance* (New Haven, 1958), 110-112.

⁴⁴ D. Compagni, *Cronica*, I, 5, 8, 20; G. Villani, *Cronica*, VII, 131; VIII, 39; X, 128; XI, 59; *Le Consulte*, II, 671-672.

that each guild be limited to a single seat in the priorate.⁴⁵ Jacopo de Certaldo made the radical suggestion that all who had previously served as prior should be henceforth barred from this office. He then went on to offer another novel view: let there be twelve priors, four from the major guilds, four from the *populares*, and a like number from the lesser guilds of the city.

What these speakers were committed to was the concept of a guild government as opposed to the rule of the great families of the *arti*. Before 1292 no serious effort had been made to equalize representation among the guilds, now offices were to be distributed, at least in theory, upon a corporate rather than a personal basis. An even bolder suggestion was made by Tiero Burbassi, no friend of the magnates: Let the *Signoria* be elected by the representatives of the seven major and five middle guilds. He then added this startling proviso: No one may be chosen to the priorate who is himself a knight or has a relative who has received *la dignità cavalleresca*. The prohibition was to apply to all families who had received knightly honors over the past thirty years. With slight modifications, this was to be the formula incorporated into the Ordinances of Justice of 1293. Those who held patents of nobility were now to be included among the city's magnates and to be compelled to post security as well as to suffer disfranchisement from the highest communal offices.

It is evident from the speeches of Burbassi and others that the introduction of this new juridical category was intimately connected with the problem of reducing the political influence of the great families. This end was to be achieved through the strict enforcement of the *divieto* and the application of a more specific definition of the term "magnate". Communal society was moving towards the rule of the guilds and away from domination by individual entrepreneurs. Offices were to be distributed so that representation would be accorded, more or less proportionately, to the various corporate guilds of the city, and with the enactment of the legislation of 1293-95, this ambitious plan was realized. For the first time, the nobility, magnates and knights alike, were excluded from the *Signoria*, certain of the communal councils, and high guild office. In this way the hegemony of the Adimari, Bardi, Cavalcanti, Donati, Frescobaldi, Mozzi, Rossi and others over civic life was disrupted. This new nobility created by the Ordinances of Justice was now to feel the full force of anti-magnate legislation, and no longer were individual members of these clans,

⁴⁵ *Le Consulte*, II, 225.

who incidentally happened to be great guildsmen, exempted from the restraints imposed upon their order.

The new government was grounded in the collectivized world of the twenty-one guilds, but the footing was far from secure, for its tenure depended upon the suppression of the intense political individualism of the older families. Just as the earlier regimes had endeavored to restrain the lawlessness of men by designating them as magnates, so the new *Signoria* of twenty-one *arti* sought to check the ascendancy of particular clans over public life by placing upon them the disability of noble status. Liabilities upon this group were enlarged in April of 1293 when they were excluded from the Council of One Hundred, the Council of the *Capitano*, the consulship of the guilds, and, finally, the priorate itself. This disfranchisement was accompanied by a substantial increase in the number of magnates required to put up bond for their continued good behavior.⁴⁶ No longer were exemptions granted, but now the entire *consorteria* was to be included—even down to the least legitimate of its offspring. One could dwell at great length upon the many onerous measures enacted between the years 1293 and 1295, and easily lose sight of an essential feature of civic life as it developed over the next half century. While it is true that the nobility were deprived of the right to hold a variety of offices, they did continue to occupy critical posts and to exert much influence over public policy.

At the outset it should be understood that the *Signoria* was deeply conscious of the differences between noble families as well as the dissimilarities among member of the same clan. The Ordinances of Justice permitted the priorate to exempt certain less menacing members of noble families from their inhibiting provisions and set forth the formula that magnate houses which had not been required to post security over the past five years were to be reclassified as *popolani* or commoners.⁴⁷ Without minimizing the possibility of political favoritism, and the abuses inherent in any such policy, it can be suggested that while on the one hand the ordinances increased the size of the Florentine nobility by declaring that any clan which included a knight was ipso facto noble, the more cooperative members of a family could be disassociated from the order. Much more significant is the fact that many magnates could and did have impressive public careers between

⁴⁶ R. Davidsohn, *Storia di Firenze* (Florence, 1957), 2, 2, 633.

⁴⁷ G. Salvemini, *op. cit.*, 406-408.

1295 and 1343. These men demonstrated strong sympathies for the policies of the ruling oligarchy and many of these politically trustworthy men were eventually allowed to assume commoner status. They, unlike such magnates as Corso Donati, were to shun the individualistic political act and follow the labyrinthine path dictated by ever shifting communal interests. A history of a few of these noble families should suffice to suggest the extent of their participation in public life and to indicate the possibilities still open to members of this class desirous of serving the commune.

The magnate house of Adimari was typical of that large group of patrician families so useful to the regime in its relations with the church.⁴⁸ Over the first four decades of the fourteenth century Florence tended to rely heavily upon the Guelf system of alliances with the pope and King of Naples. The Adimari held high ecclesiastical office in Tuscany and were well represented in the captaincy of the Guelf party. Therefore it is not surprising to find many Adimari serving as communal ambassadors to the papal curia. Regularly Adimari were sent on sensitive diplomatic missions to neighboring communities and to far off Guelf cities. Like so many others from their order, this family also supplied numerous captains and podestàs to enforce Florentine jurisdiction in the *contado*. Magnate status was no disadvantage when one exercised authority over the rustics. Similarly, it was commonplace for a member of such a clan to serve as judicial officer over a large town in the Florentine domain. This most affluent family, great realtors in both the city and countryside, were frequently members of special committees selected by the government to make recommendations in the critical area of communal finance. Here there was no unanimity of opinion and the Adimari, like other patrician houses, fell out among themselves.

It is ironical to note that the government and its advisors were in substantial agreement on the objectives of Florentine foreign policy and yet reluctant to vote taxes necessary for its implementation. The Adimari were well versed in the twin questions that were of utmost concern to the various *Signorie* throughout this trying period—foreign policy and state finance. Especially vexing was the decline of citizen armies and the coming of mercenaries and military protectors. The Adimari favored the remedy espoused by an overwhelming majority

⁴⁸ *Estimo*, 1, f. 29; CC., 1 bis., fols. 55r-56; *Libri Fabarum*, 13, I, f. 24r (Henceforth this source will be abbreviated as LF.). LF., 16, II, f. 21r; LF., 19, f. 104r; *Diplomatico*, S. Maria Novella (13 April 1287).

of the men then in power: when the military situation had deteriorated, and communal debts mounted until the republic's credit was in jeopardy, then the *Signoria* should call in a foreign lord who would bring victory to Florence on the battlefield, and restore stability in the counting-house.

Contemporary chroniclers singled out the magnates and charged them with being subverters of the republic and champions of despotism. A more objective appraisal indicates that while one of the Adimari was indeed appointed as communal syndic to bestow the lordship of the city on Charles, Duke of Calabria in 1326, and another Adimari stood up in the Council of the Podestà and spoke on behalf of a provision to grant additional powers to the then despot of the city, Walter of Brienne in 1342, the fact remains that the tendency to embrace despotism at moments of fiscal and military crises was also pervasive among the great *popolani* who ruled the city until 1342.⁴⁹

Not only did the Adimari support despots and military protectors, but they, along with other leading magnates and commoners, held high office under these foreign lords. Their response was to the exigencies of the moment and their view of politics pragmatic and adaptable. In their actions they conformed to the pattern of an oligarchy and for this they were justly rewarded. In January of 1338, five members of the clan were granted the dignity of knighthood in the name of the commune and *il popolo*. It should be borne in mind that after the early 1330's one could enjoy the status of knighthood without being subject to the disabilities imposed upon magnates by the Ordinances of Justice.⁵⁰ Perhaps these Adimari were a trifle too successful politically and too well identified with the ruling oligarchy

⁴⁹ Messer Tommaso Altoviti counseled that Brienne be made Captain and Protector of the city. Further he spoke in favor of the prorogation of the despot's tenure. *LF.*, 21, fols. 95-108 (May-June 1342). Taddeo Antella and Salvsetro Baroncelli likewise favored the establishment of Brienne's *Signoria*. *Duplicati Provvizioni*, 3, fols. 21r-22r (September 1342). The Guicciardini, Lotti, and numerous other *popolani* championed Brienne's cause. *Ibid.*, 3, fols. 17-18; *LF.*, 21, f. 91r. Taddeo Adimari spoke in the Council of the Podestà for conferring additional powers on Brienne; shortly thereafter he was in the service of the despot as ambassador to Volterra. Another Adimari was both ambassador to Bologna and Vicar of Pistoia during Brienne's tenure.

⁵⁰ G. Salvemini, *La dignità cavalleresca nel comune di Firenze* (Florence, 1896), 65. Mediaeval legislation is characterised by its imperfect implementation and even before the decade of the Thirties, perhaps as early as 1315 or 1316, upon occasion knighthood was conferred upon certain eminent *popolani* such as the Acciaiuoli, Medici, Peruzzi, and Strozzi for service to the commune and *il popolo*. Neither the recipients of this honor or their kinsmen were barred from the *Signoria*. Cf. *Delizie degli eruditi toscani*, 12, 262-273.

of the 1330's, for soon they came to commit the same type of offense that was to discredit the patriciate in 1343. Over the years they practiced the sins of a self-assured ruling class during an era when the boundary between private and public rights was barely discernible; they proceeded to appropriate state property and usurp communal prerogatives and, finally, they converted certain influential offices in the *contado* into a family preserve.

If many of the Adimari had become an integral part of the confident elite that governed the republic until the early 1340's, others of this house not only stood outside this circle, but even placed themselves beyond the pale of communal law. The enactment of the Ordinances of Justice in 1293 and their periodic revisions over the next half century, made the penalties for magnate violence ever more severe; even so, the rate of crime among this order was little diminished.

During the 1330's, of the seventy-two city families inscribed among the magnates, forty-six stood convicted by the republic's magistrates for serious breaches of the law.⁵¹ This means that approximately two-thirds of the city's magnate families contributed to the pervasive lawlessness of these times. Each house averaged four condemnations for high crimes, ranging from assault to homicide and, for the most part, their victims were commoners. The Gherardini led the way with thirteen convictions, followed by the Aleis and the Frescobaldi with ten apiece; the Giandonati amassed eight, while the Buondelmonti and Cavalcanti were charged with seven each. This list is far from complete since it only records those crimes for which judicial dispensation was granted. From 1339 to 1341 the *Signoria* permitted payments to be made into the communal treasury in return for the cancellation of condemnations. Therefore, when it is suggested that the magnates who constituted less than six per cent of the population perpetrated one hundred forty-six high crimes over a single decade, this figure actually represents a tiny fraction of the total, for we have only sparse records of those crimes committed by magnates against whom the commune was able to enforce the court's mandate.⁵²

The persistence of violence in a family so nearly assimilated into the arena of public life as were the Adimari, suggests that the enforcement

⁵¹ *Guidici degli Appelli*, vols. 121-125.

⁵² Court records before 1342 are sparse and discontinuous, therefore, in addition to the source cited above, the earliest volumes of the *Camera del Comune* provide us with the only extensive documentation on magnate crimes. Had the *Atti* of the Executor of the Ordinances of Justice been preserved, this figure would have been much greater, for this official had mapor jurisdiction over criminous acts of magnates.

of law was less than forthright, and that communal councils and rectors were not unmindful of the status of these patricians. The general practice of granting judicial dispensation for serious offenses was a regular feature of oligarchical rule; only during brief intervals before 1343, when the base of the regime was sufficiently broadened, and popular government held sway, was this deeply rooted custom reversed.⁵³ Of the forty-six magnate families granted dispensation, thirty-five were related to the great *popolani* who held high public office, and many among the beneficiaries were from clans regularly serving in the government. The Frescobaldi, second only to the Gherardini in number of remissions received, provided the republic with numerous podestàs and captains for the *contado* and cities under Florentine dominion. Moreover, they furnished the regime with military officers, captains of rural leagues, and officials over fortifications.⁵⁴ Invaluable was their activity as syndics in charge of hiring mercenaries, but even more vital was the role they played in the many diplomatic missions dispatched to the papal curia and the other great courts of Europe. This was a family whose commercial and personal contacts spanned the continent, and from the many branches of their firm came pertinent news from distant points which benefited the *Signoria*. They, like the Buondelmonti and Gherardini, stood high in the Tuscan church, the captaincy of the *Parte Guelfa*, and the councils of the pope.

Very like these families were the Bardi, and perhaps this most ubiquitous of all magnate clans best illustrates the extent of power and influence still concentrated in the hands of the nobility.⁵⁵ A detailed description of the activities of the Bardi would be similar with that of the house of Adimari: the law abiding and the lawless, the public-spirited and the indifferent—all would exist side-by-side in the *consorteria*. At critical moments in the history of this clan, communal councils saw fit to grant errant Bardi judicial dispensation and to

⁵³ Cf. M. Becker, "Florentine Popular Government (1343-1348)," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 106 (1962), 375-377.

⁵⁴ *LF.*, 13, 1, f. 18r; *LF.*, 17, fols. 155r, 186r; *LF.*, 19, fols. 48r-51, *LF.*, 20, f. 3r; *P.*, 14, f. 19r; *Capitoli Protocoli*, 12, f. 68 r. This same family that provided the republic with some of its ablest civil servants also sired some of the most committed traitors. Rebellious Frescobaldi gave aid (in the form of grain) and comfort (in the form of lances) to the enemies of the *Parte Guelfa* and the republic. *CC.*, 1 bis, f. 185.

⁵⁵ This proud family boasted some seventy or so separate households. Cf. *Estimo*, 306. Twenty-four men from this clan were required to sign peace pacts with rival consorterie. Cf. *Balie*, 1 (18 September 1342). For materials on their role in public life, see *P.*, 9, f. 140r; *P.*, 13, f. 59r; *P.*, 14, fols. 138, 188; *LF.*, 14, fols. 3, 187; *Capitoli Protocoli*, 12, fols. 48, 187; *LF.*, 21, f. 52r; *Duplicati Provvisioni*, 4, fols. 1r, 116r.

absolve them from the onerous verdicts of the republic's courts. After 1343, and then only for a brief interval, was this most prominent of all Florentine families to be struck by the full force of communal law. When these condemnations were leveled, virtually every member of the house was affected since, according to the reformed version of the Ordinances of Justice of 1344, liability for crimes by magnates was extended to include very distant kinsmen. At this time Bardi influence over communal politics was negligible; only the year before *il popolo* had burned many of the finest Bardi palaces, and their company was on the verge of bankruptcy. In earlier days, when they were respected and feared, the regime would have been very reluctant to take reprisals against sixty-two members of this family in the space of a month. Before 1340 Bardi were the principal consultants to the *Signoria* on financial matters, and along with their banking confreres, the *popolani* house of Peruzzi, they were the mainstay of Florentine treasury operations. They acted as bankers for the commune, conducted complex foreign credit transactions, imported needed grain from the republic's great Guelf ally, the Angevin Kingdom of Naples, served as paymaster for troops, hired mercenaries, loaned money to the *Camera del Comune* so that the city could honor its treaty commitments, were among the most experienced of Florence's tax farmers, and the most trusted of the diplomats. While the Bardi themselves were unable to hold office in the priorate of either of its colleges, their commoner partners did so and, according to the chronicler, Giovanni Villani, acted as spokesmen for the interests of their company. This, coupled with the repeated appearance of Bardi before the *Signoria* when crucial public questions were being debated, and the inclusion of magnates from this clan in the various *balie* (extra-ordinary commissions), meant that the claims of their kinsmen for preferential treatment were not likely to be overlooked.

Instance after instance, comparable to those cited from the history of the Bardi, could be offered to illustrate the persistent duality of magnate behavior. Similar inferences could also be drawn from the abundant data pertaining to the actions of individual members of such great commoner families as the Acciaiuoli, Alberti, Altoviti, and a host of others. What was clearly in evidence by the 1330's might best be characterized as a government staffed by a fused patriciate, and this type of regime drew heavily upon the talents and resources of the Florentine aristocracy. When it acted in this decade to remove certain disabilities from the knights of the city so that now they were permitted

to sit in the *Signoria* and to serve as consuls of the guilds, the regime was giving form to this imperative.⁵⁶

Throughout the early decades of the Trecento the various *Signorie* had regularly distinguished between the law abiding and the lawless magnates, frequently rewarding the former by conferring commoner status upon them. These men joined the knights and together they were restored to full participation in political life. Moreover, the regime differentiated between the great and powerful magnate clans and those of slight affluence and little prestige. Soon the latter were juridically disassociated from the former and numbered among the *popolani* of the city. The *Signoria* was consistently responsive to petitions from lesser magnates who asserted that they had much more in common with the peaceful and law abiding artisans and shopkeepers of the city than they did with their dissolute and reckless *consorteria*. Finally, the commune expressed its gratitude to the great magnates who served the republic so generously when it granted them subsidies, immunities, and tax exemptions. Often they were the central figures in patriotic ceremonies and festivals.⁵⁷

From the foregoing it would be possible to project the conclusion that the machinery of state would continue to operate smoothly. Pragmatically, and with great circumspection, communal political society would also gravitate towards the formation of a homogeneous oligarchy whose membership would no longer be differentiated by the legalistic distinctions between magnate and *popolano*. Not only do the events of the 1340's indicate this projection to be erroneous, but even the earlier history of Florence reveals the presence of fissures in the governing classes. Each succeeding regime, until 1343, was plagued by violence among the patriciate and in part the continuance of these criminous acts was encouraged by the preferential treatment accorded the magnates. The *Signoria* played a dual role: on the one hand it granted judicial dispensation to habitual offenders, while on the other

⁵⁶ This step merely afforded legal recognition to a practice that had been indulged in before. Cf. footnote 50; *P.*, 27, f. 51; G. Salvemini, *op. cit.*, 105.

⁵⁷ Magnates who desired *popolano* status averred that they were *debiles et impotente*. Cf. *P.*, 15, f. 174r (9 May 1318). For honors visited upon a single magnate family, the Della Tosa, see Dino Compagni, *Cronica*, III, 38. At the death of Rosso della Tosa, three of his kin were made "cavalieri del popolo" and the deceased was accorded a magnificent public funeral. The heirs of Gottifredo were awarded exemptions from communal imposts because of their sire's prowess in battle. Cf. *P.*, 15, f. 6 (27 July 1316). See *Le Consulte*, I, p. 47 for a proposal of a communal counselor: "...quod in adventu ipsius Cancellarii (refers to the officer of King Rudolph) Potestas, Capitaneus et milites et magnates civitates Florentie vadant sibi ... alacriter videndo et recipiendo."

it persisted in attempting to make the time-honored goal of an orderly and peaceful city a reality. It was responsive to the influence of patricians anxious to escape the rigors of communal law, and yet aware of the pressing need for public order. The inconstancies of the political scene did not escape the attention of such keen observers as Dante who never tired of exposing the fickleness of priors bent upon enacting "such subtle provision that to mid-November reaches not what thou in October spinnest." A generation later Dante's insight had become proverbial in Florence so that whenever Giovanni Villani wanted to declaim against the city's greatest vice—*incostanza*—he would quote this line from the *Divine Comedy*.⁵⁸

While poets and chroniclers emphasized the pendulum-like quality of Florentine government, and were always quick to point out its erratic nature, they were unaware of the cumulative effect of public policy as it inexorably intruded into certain areas of patrician life. Despite remissions of condemnations and annulments of sentences, the direction was towards an ever closer regulation of the lives of the *potentes et magnates*. Special *balie* were established with extra-ordinary powers to compel magnates to underwrite the peace of the city; eminent officials were commissioned to pacify contentious clans, and if reconciliation failed, they were empowered to take swift and severe reprisal.⁵⁹ Feuding Guelf magnates were exhorted to settle their differences, and truces were imposed by the *Signoria* with the proviso that additional security be posted by the more belligerent. Particular magnate families such as the Cavalcanti, with a *consorteria* of eighty-one men and numerous retainers, were repeatedly called upon to exchange the kiss of peace.⁶⁰ The role of government was expanded and new magistracies were created whose techniques were sometimes at odds with the imperatives of earlier chivalric codes of honor. These new officials, concerned with maintaining peace, and issuing numerous public pronouncements proclaiming the need for tranquility, posed a serious threat to traditional mores.⁶¹ Nor should we consider the magnates themselves as being extraneous to this movement. Both

⁵⁸ *Purgatorio*, VI, 142-144.

⁵⁹ Cf. *Delizie degli eruditi toscani*, 10, 92, 117, 281, 289-291, 341. The incidence of such *balie* was much greater through the first half of the Trecento; the possible implications of this fact will be considered in the next part of this study.

⁶⁰ *P.*, 15, f. 24; *balie* 1; *P.*, 13, f. 128r. For the size of certain magnate *consorterie*, see *Capitano del Popolo*, 463. The Adimari totalled forty-three, the Bardi eighty-one, and the Rossi seventy-seven.

⁶¹ Cf. *P.*, 15, fols. 20r-24; *P.*, 16, fols. 66-67; *P.*, 23, f. 87r; *P.*, 25, f. 90.

before and after the passage of the Ordinances of Justice many among this order staunchly supported the resolve of successive regimes to create a pacific environment in the city.⁶² And yet it would be an error to exaggerate the scope of the victory of public law. Attempts to limit the right of vendetta to those who had personally suffered some outrage to their honor or assault upon their person do not imply a wholesale condemnation of this practice, but rather reveal a mentality that recognized the need, even the sacred duty, for avenging certain indignities. The desire of the *Signoria* was to impose bounds upon appeals to arms, for *popolani* were also not immune to the call of honor, and any assessment of a burgher ethic must take this into account.⁶³ The literature, art, the very culture of the *Trecento* and *Quattrocento* will lose much of its dramatic dimension if we do not recognise the durability of deep sentiments of private honor. Few areas of Florentine experience reveal more clearly the interaction between the medieval honorific code and the ethic of the burgher.

Older values, then, were not crushed, but rather were contained, and the reduction of the magnates was a long-term process which never denied the claims of honor. After the middle of the *Trecento*, however, the government was called upon less frequently to pacify obstreperous magnates and restore peace among contentious families. This would seem to indicate that certain volatile strains in the aristocratic temperament had been refined. The way was prepared when the *Signoria* acted to circumscribe vengeance and vendetta by a rule of law: the crime for which revenge was sought had to be "clarus et manifestus," two witnesses were required to attest to the enormity of the offense, and the punishment exacted was to be proportional to the injury suffered. In the 1330's new legislation was passed which seems at first to be at odds with this trend, for it removed certain fundamental limits from the right of vendetta. But a closer examination of these enactments suggests that their purpose was to enlist the support of a larger segment of the citizenry in the suppression of crime. Homicides by magnates were especially rampant at this time and the *Signoria* placed the culprits under what amounted to a ban of outlawry; now they were to be treated like those who had been banished for crimes against the state and to be deprived of the protection of law. The consequences were that any citizen could

⁶² Leading magnates from the houses of Bardi, Bondelmonti, and Tornaquinci served as peace officials (*Paciarri*). *Delizie degli eruditi toscani*, 11, 288.

⁶³ G. Bruckner, *Florentine Politics and Society 1343-1378* (Princeton, 1962), 38-40.

join forces with the *consorteria* of the injured party and strike down the malefactor. Under these conditions the conduct of a vendetta was virtually impossible and private citizens were identified with public law. Soon fines were imposed upon any individual who did not assist communal officials in the apprehension of criminals. Finally, a judicial commission drew up a new criminal code increasing threefold penalties for misdeeds against person. Within a few years, however, these harsh measures were modified; between 1339 and 1343 the practice of judicial dispensation blunted the impact of the law upon the wayward scions of the great houses.⁶⁴

II

The extent to which the *novella* reflected the practices rather than the aspirations of this society is of course conjectural, but the overwhelming acceptance of such works as Boccaccio's *Decameron* indicates that the Florentines had a sympathy with those who could overcome an opponent with wit and cunning, rather than with buckler and sword. No one would have denied the exquisite pleasure that followed revenge, and Sacchetti, in his one hundred and eleventh tale, praises the sensible Venetian law permitting a citizen, upon payment of fifty soldi, to clout a clergyman who has offended the honor of his wife or daughter. The author then laments the impossibility of such a delicious vendetta in the city of Florence. Paolo di Pace da Certaldo's opinion is less intriguing but perhaps it is more representative of popular thinking on the theme of outraged honor: Indeed, "La prima allegrezza del mondo si e fare sua vendetta," but upon sober reflection he offers this caution to his son: Not only is such an act an offense in the sight of God, but it is usually carried out so ineptly that the whole affair wins reproach rather than praise. One's fame is almost always tarnished because either the revenge taken is excessive and therefore you are judged to be cruel, or the vengeance is inadequate and thus you are esteemed a cowardly fool.⁶⁵ If we hold that the persistence of vendetta and the claims of honor were directly proportional to the place one occupied in the Florentine patriciate, and if we agree that the lure of vendetta was felt throughout Florentine society, and yet responded to more frequently by the magnate members

⁶⁴ CC., I bis. Cf. also M. Becker "Gualtieri di Brienne e l'uso delle dispense giudiziarie," *Archivio Storico Italiano*, 11 (1955), 245-251.

⁶⁵ Paolo di Messer Pace da Certaldo, *Il libro di buono costumi*, ed. S. Morpurgo (Florence, 1921), 270; F. Sacchetti, *Il Trecentonovelle*, ed. V. Pernicone (Florence, 1946), nov. 111.

of the enormous *consorterie*, then we might concur in the judgment that when the community exerted an inhibiting influence upon this ancient practice, the effects were most strongly felt among the magnate class. Again the humor of Boccaccio implies that the thing which citizens most feared was appearing ridiculous in the eyes of their neighbors, and a true gentleman was distinguished from a clod by the elegance and subtlety of his reprisals. The difference between the *Decameron* and the earlier collections of vernacular tales, and even between it and later French imitators, is that Boccaccio's world is characterized by its delicate blending of bourgeois craftiness and aristocratic style, while the others are marked by a coarseness of provocation and a crudeness of retaliation displayed against a background of secondary characters almost insensitive to the sufferings of others.

If in the thousand incidents of everyday life there was the possibility of giving offense or suffering an indignity that would diminish one's status, how tender and raw must the feelings of those who suffered some terrible political outrage have been? If the bonds between men gradually strengthened, and the multitude of subtle interrelationships and dependencies accumulated so that in the intricate social world the plane of competition was becoming more intellectual than physical, then what can be said about the mode of conduct of those patricians who were so involved in the bitter political rivalries of the early years of the *Trecento*?

Boccaccio and his audience believed in the durable nature of the social world; how different were the conceptions and commitments of those who theorized on the politics of this era. From the humblest chronicler to the writer of the most original political tract of the period, overwhelming emphasis was placed upon the fragile structure of the state. So delicate was this political mechanism, in the opinion of Marsiglio of Padua, that the main work of those who governed must always be its preservation: "Because among men thus gathered together there arise disputes and quarrels, which if not regulated by the norm of justice would cause battles and the separation of men and thus finally the destruction of the state, there had to be established in this association a standard of things just and a guardian or maker thereof."⁶⁶

⁶⁶ A. Gewirth, *Marsilius of Padua* (New York, 1951), 1, 106. It is worth noting that in Giotto's allegorical figures personifying the "Virtues" in the Scrovegni Chapel at Padua, the one figure to wear a crown—for she is queen of all—is Justice. It was justice that was the protector of all earthly possessions and the guarantor of their equitable distribution.

Politics itself in the hands of men like Marsiglio came to be a theoretical science which sought to establish the necessary conditions for the preservation of the state, and *Signorie* existed "to moderate the excesses of men's transient acts" by reducing them "to equality or due proportion." In terms of Florentine experience, the *maximum inconveniens* of the state was to be achieved by the strict and impartial enforcement of the *divieto*, as well as the rigorous implementation of the Ordinances of Justice. No matter how often these laws were violated in practice, they managed to retain a forceful hold upon the popular imagination, and each time the *Signoria* was democratized, their precepts were reasserted. There was, then, strong support for a political leveling of the magnates, but despite this, and critical for subsequent developments in Florentine cultural history, a deep respect—even a sympathy—for their past accomplishments and their present style of life endured. Seldom were penalties and restraints transposed from the realm of politics to that of society. Notwithstanding the many legal disabilities placed upon the Florentine nobility, magnates and knights alone were exempted from a variety of the republic's sumptuary laws. They and their wives were therefore permitted to adorn themselves with numerous luxury items, ranging from gaudy headdresses to bejeweled gowns and furred mantles.⁶⁷ Such finery was explicitly denied *il popolo* who were expected to be more frugal and less estentatious. The Statutes of the *Capitano* of 1322-1325, decried the fact that many Florentine citizens, especially *artifices*, no longer lived according to the dictates of reason, but rather now sought to imitate magnate style and, as a result, contracted large debts. Such a mode of living, contended the framers of the statutes, was appropriate only to *magnates et milites*.⁶⁸

In 1349 when a strong oligarchical reaction had set in and the *Signoria* was anxious to placate the magnates, the *Esecutore* of the Ordinances of Justice conducted an investigation for the purpose of punishing those *artifices* who habitually violated communal sumptuary

⁶⁷ *Statuti della Repubblica Fiorentina*, 222. D. Compagni (*Cronica*, I, III) observes that knights, "set under bounds," were granted more money than *popolani* who suffered the same fate. Cf. also Paolo di Messer Pace da Certaldo, *op. cit.*, 150 for a statement of the perquisites and prerogatives of the various orders in society.

⁶⁸ G. Salvemini, *op. cit.*, 53; *Statuti della Repubblica Fiorentina*, 226-227. "Quia plerumque florentini cives et artifices non ad rationem sed ad similitudinem magnatum vivere volunt et sic dispendia expensarum incurrunt, statutum et ordinatum est quod nulla persona civitatis Florentie possit vel audeat mictere ultra decem domina cum ea domina vel puella que ad maritum mandat."

laws.⁶⁹ Upper class sympathies stood squarely against these upstarts—the *nouveaux riches* of the city—who arrogated to themselves the hallmarks of noble status, for they were men without lineage or renown. Precedence was given to magnates and knights at most public ceremonies, and only jurists and high government officials could vie with them for this honor. Throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries literary men continued to squabble over which order was entitled to receive this token of esteem. From wedding to funeral a noble was secure in his privileges: he was free to invite more guests to the nuptials, serve a more elegant repast, have more mourners follow his bier from a service ablaze with more candles and conducted by more clergy.

The organic character of the Florentine social world during the early years of the *Trecento*, where each class or order knew well its place, stood as the *paideia* of the patriciate. But this self-same patriciate so socially secure and certain of its values, was divided into contentious political factions. The biological metaphor running through Marsiglio of Padua's political writings emphasizes the inevitability of this strife in the body politic by likening the tenure of the state to the life-cycle of a plant or animal and thus bringing to the fore a realization of instability inherent in the nature of man and his institutional creations. It is to the Fifth Book of Aristotle's *Politics* that Marsiglio turns, for he, like so many of his contemporaries, was concerned with the preservation of the tender body politic, and this of course involved the prevention of revolution.⁷⁰ It is fear of the state's subversion at the hands of the great and powerful clans that pervades the writings of communal political thinkers during this era. Their conception of good government stresses the need for moderating political excesses and dispensing what Aristotle called "rectificatory justice." They are not interested, as later humanists are to be, in educating men to pursue the moral good within the framework of civic life, but rather with promoting the very minimal objective of encouraging the citizenry to shun intense partisanship and despise factionalism.⁷¹

The blight of factionalism was everywhere in evidence in the North Italian communes, and the Florentines and their neighbors regularly saw a variety of contentious cliques struggling for dominion over the

⁶⁹ *Atti Esecutore*, 211 (9 August-27 December 1349). This volume contains "Inquisitiones contra artifices contrafacientes ordinamentis communis Florentie."

⁷⁰ A. Gewirth, *op. cit.*, I, 34-106; *Defensor Pacis*, I, 1, 3.

⁷¹ Cf especially *Defensor Pacis*, I, 1, 7; I, 12, 5-8; I, 13, 5; I, 19, 2.

state. In order to understand this chronic contest, due weight must be given to the fact that neither of these vying groups differed substantially in its social commitments or its economic orientation from its rival. Therefore, in Florence one finds magnates and *popolani* in one party contending with magnates and *popolani* of the other party for control of the *Signoria*. And yet some explanation must be offered for the persistent observations of contemporary chroniclers who blamed the curse of factionalism, as well as most of the other ills that befell the republic, upon the machinations of the seditious and conspiratorial magnates. One of the serious omissions of modern scholarship in assessing the political role of the magnates is its failure to place sufficient stress on *Trecento* explanations of political events. It would not be difficult it is true to show that Giovanni Villani and his fellow chroniclers depicted the magnates in a false light and that this order was certainly innocent of many of the political crimes so laboriously catalogued by contemporaries. And yet if we were to follow this tack then we would be neglecting what is in itself a most crucial piece of historical evidence—the almost unanimous judgment of contemporaries who correctly or incorrectly saw the magnates as the principal agents of rebellion and discord. This reluctance to try to see the magnates as their contemporaries saw them is much in evidence in the writings of present day social and economic historians who have shown that magnate demands for power and preferential treatment were frequently based upon false claims of ancient lineage and manufactured connections with high-born feudal nobles. One could readily establish the fact that many magnate families were indeed nouveaux and that their claims of ancestry were mythical, but by the early years of the fourteenth century they and their neighbors had come truly to believe in these genealogies. Time and human memory were malleable in the *Trecento*; what was ancient and remote might have transpired only a short time before, and men forgot family history when it was to their advantage.⁷² Therefore, when factions fought for dominion, there

⁷² In referring to events that occurred only fifty years before his birth, the chronicler Compagni states that it is not his intention to write about things "long past." Cf. *Cronica*, I, 2. On the general and most relevant theme of "The Folk Memory," see M. Bloch's chapter in *Feudal Society*, trans. L. Manyon (Chicago, 1961), 88-108. The question of whether a clan was considered to be nouveau or ancient is certainly, to some extent, a cultural one. No amount of socio-economic history can establish the parvenu character of a clan without considering the criteria implicit in contemporary historical consciousness and in "the folk memory." E. Fiumi employs only economic criteria to determine the antiquity of Florentine nobles. This would not have been the way in

might be little socio-economic difference between the contending parties, and yet one might come to embody certain qualities and characteristics considered by contemporaries to be aristocratic.

Since the Florentine patriciate was so little differentiated on economic grounds, neither party constituted a threat to guild society. The leadership on both sides was sympathetic to the aspirations of the greater guildsmen and in fundamental accord on communal fiscal policy. Neither proposed startling innovations in any area of public life, and both repeatedly announced their intention of conserving traditional institutions and time-honored political practices. Even when the Donati faction won its substantial victory in 1301, little was done to alter the forms of civic life. The threat to the *libertas* of the city, then, stemmed not from those who would make constitutional innovations, but rather from single families or small cliques who would use the *Signoria* for their own aggrandizement. Coups by such factional chiefs were of course commonplace at this time, and one can be reasonably certain that if they had succeeded in Florence the results would have been the lordship of a single family presiding over a mixed communal constitution. The family that would have ultimately gained dominion would have differed little from its mighty counterparts who led the opposition party.

Since city magnates and high *popolani* were not divided on socio-economic issues, and contending factions also concurred in this area, there was much political mobility. Magnates could and did shift their allegiances in this power struggle. During the early Trecento, vying factions were anxious to gain magnate support since this order could easily tip the political balance. Florence's ancient experiences with the political maneuvers of the Uberti clan were reinforced by the recent machinations of the Donati at a time when despotisms were emerging in so many nearby territories. These were the last days for the communes at Bologna, Milan, Orvieto, and Rimini, and many Florentines attributed the destruction of *libertas* to factionalism promoted by the inordinate ambitions of illustrious clans.⁷³

In Florence the Bordoni faction, so sympathetic to the magnates, led a patrician clique which came to prominence soon after the ouster of

which most Trecento Florentines would have judged themselves nor would their concept of the "antique" be commensurate with that held by a twentieth century man. Cf. "Fioritura e decadenza dell'economia fiorentina," *Archivio Storico Italiano*, 115 (1957), 385-439.

⁷³ M. Becker, "Florentine 'Libertas': Political Independents and 'Novi Cives,' 1372-1378," *Traditio*, 18 (1962), 393-407.

the Donati. Like their magnate predecessors, they, too, were suspected of harboring dictatorial ambitions. *Il popolo* entertained the same opinion of the enemies of the Bordoni—the Serraglini faction.⁷⁴ As early as 1321, disaffection was mounting against these factions and their magnate allies, and soon a reaction set in against the rule of this patrician elite. The few Florentine families who had controlled city politics for almost a generation now found the extra-legal position they had so carefully constructed seriously threatened. The popular reaction of 1322-1325 aimed to reduce special privilege and restrict political individualism; in its stead it sought to institutionalize a broad guild rule. Such a *Signoria* entailed the regular syndication of office holders in general and particularly the judicial review of the political activities of those Bordoni who had used public power for private ends. The *Esecutore* of the Ordinances of Justice found Bernardo di Pagno di Bordini guilty on a charge of peculation of communal funds, and for this he was fined 2,000 lire and excluded from public office. His brother, Chele, was convicted on the same count and sent into exile. Shortly thereafter a cohort, the former prior Zanobi Corsi de' Borghi, was also convicted for abusing his authority when he placed the troops of the commune at the disposal of Chele.⁷⁵

The ouster of the Bordoni was accompanied by a democratization of the *Signoria*; substantial numbers of *novi cives* were brought into the

⁷⁴ This family contracted marriage alliances with the Adimari, Tornaquinci and the Villanuzzi. Moreover, according to Compagni, they had a great rural following and would appear in the city with their "gran seguito" and "pennoni di loro." *Cronica*, III, 1920; G. Villani, *Cronica*, IX, 271. Because the Bordoni were considered to be wholly sympathetic to the magnates, they were deprived of *popolani* status and made magnates. A bit later they were restored to popular status but this did not preclude the use of knightly titles by certain Bordoni after 1330, or perhaps even a bit earlier. *P.*, 15, f. 120r (23 December 1317); *Delizie degli eruditi toscani*, 3, 351; *CC.*, 26, f. 118; *CC.*, 29, 278r. After 1343 at least one of the Bordoni was inscribed among the magnati and condemned for assault. *CC.*, 54, f. 153r.

This family furnished the republic with treasury officials, purchasers of communal gabelles, castellani, and ambassadors. Men from this house were especially prominent as leaders of the republic in her disastrous war with Pisa in 1341, and in the entourage of the despised despot, Brienne, in the following year. Cf. *LF.*, 15, f. 23r; *LF.*, 17, f. 57; *LF.*, 18, f. 5r; *P.*, 12, f. 95; *Capitoli Protocolli*, 12, fols. 116, 119 176, 283; *P.*, 31, f. 7; *LF.*, 21, f. 46; *CC.*, 2 bis, f. 200.

⁷⁵ R. Davidsohn, *Storia di Firenze*, 3, 992; G. Villani, *Cronica*, IX, 294; Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, *op. cit.*, rub. 382. For an attempt to arrive at a pragmatic definition of popular Signorie, see M. Becker, "Some Aspects of Oligarchical, Dictatorial and Popular Signorie in Florence, 1282-1382," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 2 (1960, 421-439.

government. It was at moments such as this that the nebulous term "il popolo" acquired a more definite political meaning, and a concern for the "common good" was more in evidence. This was an interval rather like that of 1293-95 when the Ordinances of Justice were enacted and the *Signoria* stood as the defender of *il popolo*. While a definition of this term did not necessarily exclude the magnates, and the *Signoria* was looked upon as the protector of guilds whose membership included so many from the magnate order, an awareness was developing of what can best be described as a "status popularis." Under this type of popular regime, law-abiding magnate families were to be rewarded with grants of commoner status, while their more obstreperous peers were to suffer the harsh visitations of communal law. Neither of these policies represented an innovation, but not since the tenure of the popular *Signoria* of 1293-95 had they been implemented so enthusiastically. In 1324 a dramatic step was taken: a third of all the magnate families of the republic were declared to be *popolani*. With a single measure the *Signoria* had succeeded in depleting substantially the ranks of the nobility and strengthening the forces of *il popolo*.⁷⁶ By means of this political device, the norm of conformity to communal law was proclaimed on a massive scale, and it was announced that all who obeyed its dictates could now aspire to the highest honors of public life.

This emphasis upon cooperation was to be given impetus by the republic's magistrates who were now urged to enforce the law with vigor against the city's remaining magnate houses. When the judge Piero Landolfi condemned two magnates from the house of Somaia to a heavy fine for assaulting a commoner, *il popolo* were overjoyed, and as soon as Landolfi finished his term of office, they bestowed upon him the title of "cavaliere del popolo." The crowd was especially impressed with this magistrate because he referred to his term in office as "la sua rude Signoria," and thus advertised his willingness to bring the overmighty to justice.⁷⁷ The popular *Signoria* was deeply concerned with enforcement of existing legislation against the magnates and in 1324-25 encouraged the communal courts to convict all *potentes* who had failed to post security for their continued good behavior. Reprisals were also taken against dissident magnates of the *contado* who showed so little regard for communal law.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ G. Capponi, *Storia della repubblica di Firenze* (Florence, 1930), 1, 165; G. Villani, *Cronica*, IX, 287.

⁷⁷ R. Davidsohn, *op. cit.*, 3, 992.

⁷⁸ The Corbizzi were fined on October 8, 1325 for failing to post security as

The chronicler Giovanni Villani, active in government at this time and present during many crucial sessions of the communal councils, was convinced that certain magnates in key military positions, as well as others who advised the *Signoria* on critical foreign policy matters were seeking to discredit this popular government by urging a program that could only culminate in disaster.⁷⁹ Villani believed that these magnates pursued these reprehensible tactics in order to undermine public support and bring the *Signoria* into disfavor; then the regime would have to win the adherence of the magnates by conceding to them what they had so ardently desired since 1293—the abrogation of the Ordinances of Justice. Not only did the *Signoria* remain undaunted, but it even went so far as to strengthen the Ordinances and to call for a general revision of all Florentine statutes.⁸⁰

Perhaps the most noteworthy action of this *Signoria* in the eyes of its contemporaries was the reduction of magnate representation in the captaincy of the *Parte Guelfa*. This organ of communal government played a pivotal role in the conduct of foreign policy, and for years its councils had been dominated by nobles such as Betto de' Brunelleschi, Rosso della Tosa, Geri Spini, Pazzino de' Pazzi, Bernardo de' Rossi and a host of others. Foreign lords and princes were well-advised to treat privately with the Guelf captains for they were judged to be the most influential men of the community.⁸¹ In 1323 when the commune added several eminent commoners to the captaincy, it was displaying a distrust of magnate loyalty and a suspicion of magnate motives.

At precisely the moment when *popolani* were admitted into the sacred captaincy, the city was being threatened by a coalition of exiled nobles and seditious urban magnates. Their vain attempt to overthrow the regime was to provide the patriotic Villani with another opportunity

magnati. On that same day they were condemned for not appearing in court to defend themselves. Cf. *CC.*, 1 bis, f. 78. For comparable charges against other magnates during this interval, see *ibid.*, f. 79r (Pazzi) and *ibid.*, f. 175 (Miglore).

⁷⁹ G. Villani, *Cronica*, IX, 214. In an earlier era (1293-95) when popular discontent was directed against the magnates, a disposition of the Ordinances of Justice was enacted in an effort to eliminate the intrusion of single powerful citizens in the conduct of the republic's foreign affairs. Cf. G. Salvemini, *op. cit.*, 426-427.

⁸⁰ Penalties against criminous magnates were tripled at this time. Cf. *LF.*, 12, II, fols. 88r, 109 (7 November-3 July 1325). A sweeping revision of communal statutes took place between March 16, 1322 and April 6, 1324. This was the first general reformation of Florentine law to occur since the popular *Signoria* of 1293-95 and very few changes were to be made until the outbreak of the next of the republic's great revolutions in October of 1343.

⁸¹ R. Davidsohn, *op. cit.*, 3, 460.

to laud the vigilance of *il popolo* who once again had rescued the republic from the grasp of the tyrannous magnates. Three members of this order, Amerigo Donati, Tegghia Frescobaldi, and Lotteringo Gherardini, great Guelf captains, were seriously implicated in this conspiracy but they inspired such fear among the citizenry that none could be found who would dare accuse them. It was then that the communal councils took the untoward step of indicting them and placing them on public trial. Although they were condemned, their sentences were very light and few criticised this turn of events. Villani even came forward and praised the *Signoria's* moderation and temperateness, for only in this way could amity come to the city. Many other magnates were implicated in this abortive coup, but wisely the *Signoria* chose to overlook their complicity in the interest of peace and tranquility.⁸²

The addition of three great *popolani* to the captaincy of the *Parte Guelfa* did little to alter the overall program of this most aristocratic of all communal institutions; for the newcomers differed very little from their magnate counterparts in social status, and patrimony. Perhaps the subtle difference between these two orders rested in the area of public opinion. In blaming the magnates for the difficulties that befell the republic during these years, Villani oversimplified the causes of the communal dilemma; his approach, however, was similar to that of the popular *Signoria*. The government acted to reduce the influence of the magnates in the councils of the *Parte Guelfa*; this effort suggests a decline of public confidence in the political reliability of this class. Moreover, the influence can be drawn that *il popolo* felt better served by *popolani* in matters of foreign policy. No vital issues were in dispute and very few questioned the almost universally held principles of Guelfism. Florence's ties with the papacy and her loyalty to Naples were secure and her hostility to the Ghibelline lords of Italy was unwavering. What was in doubt was the durability of magnate allegiance to the city of Florence.

Any search for the historical antecedents of this widely held suspicion must take into account the role played by magnates at certain critical moments in communal history. The sympathy of the Della Tosa and Frescobaldi for the despotic intervention of Charles de Valois into communal life in 1301, the persistent alignment of the Pulci with the Tuscan Ghibellines who periodically raided the *contado*, the adherence of the

⁸² G. Villani, *Cronica*, IX, 219.

Circuli to the cause of the tyrannous lords of Pisa and the alacrity with which they betrayed public trust, the many Amadori, Lucardesi, Falconetti, Homodei, Nerli, and Russoli who took up arms in 1312 and raised the banner of the Ghibelline lord, Emperor Henry VII, were not easily forgotten. These and many other magnates stood condemned for their numerous treasons, and in 1323 when these nobles assembled and shouted such battle cries as: "Death, death to the commune and to *il popolo* of Florence and to the Guelfa and long live the Ghibellines," few in the city were reassured.⁸³ Nor was the magnate insurrection in the *contado* or the overthrow of the popular *Signoria* at San Miniato to inspire public confidence in the reliability of this order.⁸⁴

Like virtually all other North Italian communes Florence saw the magnates as the principal threat to *libertas* and to the constitutional stability of the republic. No demonstration of the compatibility of the socio-economic interests of magnate and commoner should obscure this fact. And yet once again only modest inferences can be drawn from this assessment since despite the blatant individualism of defiant magnates, *il popolo* were not eager to stifle the legitimate aspirations of those who were cooperative and civic minded. In part this attitude is explicable in terms of the frailty of communal constitutional structure and the regime's need to obtain the consent and support of those referred to as "*boni et sufficientes homines civitatis*." To the medievals in general and the Florentines in particular, it would have been unthinkable to exclude the prominent and affluent from the decision-making process. This commitment was reinforced by another consideration: prowess at arms was highly regarded, and more than this, was viewed as one of the essential elements of good citizenship. Civic humanism was to make much of the antique heroes whose soldiery and bravery on behalf of the Roman republic gave it its grandeur; this was indeed a quality worthy of emulation. Soon the Florentines were to pay a bounty to those who assumed the onerous burdens of knighthood. While the realities of military practice were eventually to stand at variance with this ideal and the Florentine militia was to be disbanded, the theme of citizen chivalry proved to be durable and reappeared after a brief hiatus in the writings of Leonardo Bruni Aretino.⁸⁵ The profession of arms and the cult of the hero must be

⁸³ R. Davidsohn, *op. cit.*, 3, 323.

⁸⁴ G. Villani, *Cronica*, VIII, 98.

⁸⁵ C. C. Bayley, *War and Society in Renaissance Florence* (Toronto, 1961), "De Militia," 369-387.

studied so that men will desire to gain glory in the name of the state. No regime, until that of 1343, seriously challenged this ideal, and even then the attempt was far from effective.

Even at the height of the popular reaction in 1324 the *Signoria* was willing to open up new offices to the magnates.⁸⁶ To the men of the *Trecento* the term "status popularis" implied that representation must be accorded to the eminent men of the community, no matter what their juridical status might be. Even later when the *Signoria* was further democratized and hostility against the magnates ran high, no one in the council halls objected to sharing certain offices with the magnates. Moreover, proposals were made to augment magnate representation in critical posts. Giovanni Villani, surely no friend of this order, steadfastly upheld their political rights and vigorously contended that by all the canons of *buon governo* they were entitled to a share in the government.⁸⁷ The communal political ideal continued to be that of a civil society in which all the affluent and high-born were to have a voice. In the 1360's and seventies when there was another outburst of anti-magnate feeling, the regime and its advisors were not dissuaded from this commitment. They clung tenaciously to this principle and even upheld it as a remedy for the many political ills that beset neighboring cities. They were unanimous in proposing that constitutional adjustments be made to equalize representation between magnates and *popolani*. For did not this formula for resolving civic quarrels have the weighty authority of Aristotle behind it? His teachings in the *Politics* and the *Ethics* were now widely read in the vernacular and stood at the core of the theory of *buon governo*. Just as popular was Cicero's program envisioning a *concordia ordinum* between the nobility and the *populares* against those *improbi* who would bring the state to ruin.

The entry of *novi cives* into the *Signoria* of the early 1320's did not result in the denial of such fundamental magnate prerogatives as the right to occupy certain public offices; nor was the influence of the magnate order diminished. But what did occur might best be described as the resurgence of a more impartial and impersonal type of regime. Once again the ruling patriciate was confronted with mounting governmental expenses at a time when confidence in the fiscal strength of the republic was dwindling. In February of 1322 the

⁸⁶ R. Davidsohn, *op. cit.*, 3, 991. The facts pertaining to this interval of popular government are presented by Davidsohn, but his interpretation is colored by his strong commitment to the idea of class conflict.

⁸⁷ G. Villani, *Cronica*, XI, 118.

Signoria was unable to make restitution to communal creditors and therefore was forced to declare a moratorium on public debts.⁸⁸ A crisis of this order which was to recur so frequently after 1342 could only be met with radical tributary reforms which would curtail many traditional immunities and deny certain privileges to the older patriciate. For the *Signoria* simply could not afford to permit the continuation of longstanding abuses so costly to the republic. In 1315 the patriciate had succeeded in divesting themselves of a large measure of their tax responsibility; now direct taxation on all real estate in the city and *contado* was reinstated.⁸⁹

The same patriciate had sorely neglected a much needed revision of communal statutes and ordinances. Not since the last interval of popular rule (1293-95) had any regime looked to these perplexing legal matters. Now, three times between March of 1322 and March of 1325, judicial commissions were appointed by the democratized *Signoria* to correct and amend Florentine law so that glaring inconsistencies and ambiguities might be removed. Interest in legal reform, so essential, considering the *ad hoc* character of Trecento government, was always at its height when the *novi cives* entered public life in substantial numbers, and it is worth noting that the next great re-examination of laws and statutes was to take place immediately after the popular revolution of late September, 1343.⁹⁰ Strict syndication of public officials and severe enforcement of the *divieto* was once again an integral part of this movement to exalt public authority at the expense of personal influence.⁹¹ The end product of this trend was to control the extra-legal behavior of the entrenched patriciate—magnates and commoners alike. In no sense can such an effort be judged discriminatory against the nobility since the tendency was to apply the same norms to the other Florentine orders. Once again we witness an attempt to enforce rules which stemmed from collective needs, and this entailed the repression of the political individualism of the great and overmighty. In this context we see that the *Signoria's* reforms of the *Parte Guelfa* represented a purposeful effort to curb the inordinate influence of the dynasts in the captaincy over the formulation of public policy.

⁸⁸ P., 18, f. 65 (25 February 1322).

⁸⁹ B. Barbadoro, *op. cit.*, 148-159.

⁹⁰ R. Palmarocchi, "Contributi allo studio delle fonti statutarie fiorentine," *Archivio Storico Italiano*, 88 (1930), 56-57; P. Santini, "Le più antiche riforme," *Archivio Storico Italiano*, 79 (1921), 224-226. Cf. footnote 81.

⁹¹ G. Masi, *Il sindacato delle magistrature comunali nel secolo XIV* (Rome, 1930). On the complex question of syndication, see M. Becker, *op. cit.*, 427-429.

III

The effects of political experimentation during the years 1322-25 were insubstantial, and despite a renewed flurry of reform in 1328-29, Florence was very soon to reorient her politics around a more personal type of *Signoria*. In the 1330's the commoner aristocracy and the affluent magnates of the greater guilds again came to treat public office as if it were their own private preserve. Among the best represented of all the city's families were the Bardi, Cavalcanti, Frescobaldi, Gherardini, Rossi—magnates all. It was to these nobles that the regime turned for advice in matters of foreign policy and communal finance, and when special *balie* (extraordinary commissions) were founded, their names were among the most prominent. Soon the most pressing public problems were dealt with by these *balie* and the bankers of the house of Frescobaldi and Bardi joined their *popolani* counterparts, the Acciaiuoli and Peruzzi financiers, in directing affairs of state.⁹² During this decade there was a marked tendency to grant concessions to the magnates and to be generally mindful of the claims of the Florentine aristocracy. This regime represented the interests of a handful of the city's most prestigious guilds, and the dominant families matriculated in these corporations were to form a homogeneous patriciate.⁹³ Until 1340 the *Signoria* was secure and self-confident, and except for sporadic instances of seditious activity by such magnate families as the Caponsacchi in 1329 who attempted to open the city gates so that rebels and exiles might enter and bring down the regime, or the treasonous negotiations of a Della Tosa with the chancellor of Mastino della Scala, tyrant of Verona, to convey the lordship of the city to the despot, domestic tranquility prevailed.⁹⁴ In this atmosphere of relative internal accord and burgeoning communal prosperity, the trend was towards a fusion of magnate and

⁹² In the early months of 1336, the war against Martino della Scala was directed by the "Sei sulla guerra." Among their number was Ridolfo de' Bardi, Simone della Tosa, Acciaiuoli Acciaiuoli, Giovenco de' Bastari, Celle Bordonni, and Simone Peruzzi. Bardi, Peruzzi, and Acciaiuoli were also well represented in the Balia authorized to raise revenue. Cf. A. Saponi, *La crisi delle compagnie mercantili dei Bardi e dei Peruzzi* (Florence, 1926), 107-108.

⁹³ For an assessment of certain features of oligarchical *Signorie*, see M. Becker, *op. cit.*, 429-434.

⁹⁴ *Guidice degli Appelli*, 124, I, f. 25r (20 February 1329). Feo della Tosa, one of the many condemned on this count, paid 200 lire on September 20, 1337 for judicial dispensation. Cf. *ibid.*, 124, I, f. 22.

popolano grasso into a social amalgam best described by the term "aristocracy." This tendency had long been in evidence, and upon occasion had almost been realized, but disunity among the Florentine elite, the surge of new men, the intervention of pope or Angevin monarch, humiliating military debacles, and declining public revenues, each in turn, at critical junctures, had prevented the consolidation of an aristocracy after all. The interests of the urban magnates were almost identical with those of the wealthy *popolani*, and except for the persistence of violence, little seemed to stand in the way of this amicable fusion.

Soon this government of the guild patriciate abandoned the strict interpretation of the Ordinances of Justice and decreed that those who held the dignity of knighthood and had not been classified as magnates since 1293, were to be declared eligible for the highest elective offices in the republic. Shortly thereafter, a special commission was established with authority to create new knights and in 1335 the statutes of the *Parte Guelfa* empowered the captains to bestow a bounty of fifty florins upon anyone deemed worthy who would be willing to assume the honors and burdens of knighthood.⁹⁵ Throughout its tenure the *Signoria* was extremely solicitous of the welfare of all sectors of the Florentine nobility. At no time in communal history were more *grandi* to escape the rigors of communal law through grants of judicial dispensation than in those halcyon years immediately preceding the democratization of the Florentine state in 1343.

Clearly the regime was concerned with the problem of staffing the officer cadre of the citizen army, and the benign policies it advocated were intended to encourage the high-born to serve as knights in the elite cavalry. Despite the lure of subsidy and civic honor, this program was fated to fail, and yet we must not be misled by our knowledge of the unfortunate outcome into underestimating the enthusiasm with which the *Signoria* embarked upon this venture. The regime of the 1330's was willing to recall exiled magnates and restore them to full citizenship if they would put their arms at the disposal of the republic. Grave doubts were voiced concerning the efficacy of mercenary troops, and men remembered that Rome had been great when citizen armies commanded by public-spirited generals had taken the field. Her decline ensued with the enlistment of foreign contingents who fought for gold rather than love of *patria*. A few among the city's magnates

⁹⁵ F. Bonaini, "Statuto della parte guelfa di Firenze," *Archivio Storico Italiano*, 5 (1857), p. 41.

were responsive to this type of appeal, and still Brunelleschi, Della Tosa and Ricasoli led the republic's host, but these nobles were the exception rather than the rule.⁹⁶ As in earlier days, public policy was predicated upon a curious duality that did little to encourage the maintenance of a military caste. Knighthood and service to the state were accorded their niche in the pantheon of civic virtues, but those who followed these noble callings still found themselves bound by the harsh restraints of collective life. Judicial dispensation and preferential treatment might be meted out to certain nobles, but the Ordinances of Justice remained in effect. Granted the hyperbole of this magnate complaint: "If a horse is running along and hits a *popolano* in the face with its tail; or if in a crowd one man gives another a blow in the chest without intending harm; or if some children of tender age begin quarelling, an accusation will be made. But ought men to have their houses and property destroyed for such trifles as these?" the emotion from which it stems is real enough.⁹⁷

In his justly famous description of "the greatness and state and magnificence of the commune of Florence," Giovanni Villani laments the fact that in 1336-38 there were only "seventy-five full-dress knights." "To be sure, we find that before the second popular government now in power was formed (before 1293) there were more than 250 knights; but from the time that *il popolo* began to rule, the magnates no longer had the status and authority enjoyed earlier, and hence few persons were knighted." The observation, "*i cavallieri non ebbono stato*," was commonplace at this time.⁹⁸ To the good burgher Villani who only despised the lawless among the magnates, this was a tragic portent of military disasters to come.

The need for law and order, the desire to preserve Florentine *libertas* against the machinations of the powerful clans, and the persistence of certain features of impartial and impersonal government, led to the accumulation of numerous judicial and political restraints upon the magnates. Indeed, these restrictions were lessened during the decade of the thirties, but still no one gained any ostensible civic advantage from magnate status. Therefore nobles continued to petition the

⁹⁶ G. Villani, *Cronica*, I, 134. At this time over 600 affluent Florentines maintained horses and weapons and, while they did not usually serve in person, they did send hired replacements. C. C. Bayley, *op. cit.*, 8.

⁹⁷ D. Compagni, *Cronica*, I, 12.

⁹⁸ *Delizie degli eruditi toscani*, 12, 352 G. Villani, *Cronica*, XI, 94.

government for the privilege of becoming commoners.⁹⁹ No attack was made upon the social prestige of the nobility and yet men were anxious to abandon their magnate status; this type of action demonstrates the incommensurate magnitudes of the *Trecento* social and political universes. The guild aristocracy which so admired the code of the nobility was unwilling to abrogate the dread Ordinances of Justice. Nor were they eager to restore all magnates to their full political rights; they were, however, desirous of imitating the way of life of this order and happy to receive the benefits of noble martial prowess.

Giovanni Villani's so oft-quoted observations pertaining to Florentine magnates and knights are of course relative, based as they are on a comparison of status and authority enjoyed by the nobility in 1336-38 with that of the era before 1293. As informative as this comparison is, it tells us very little about the degree of influence the magnates still exercised during the 1330's. The history of this era suggests that statements by chroniclers that magnates had little status and less authority must be challenged. Granted that there was something of a decline, still we see affluent commoners of the guilds eagerly seeking to marry into magnate families and priding themselves on kinship with the mighty feudatories of the Tuscan *contado*. Nor can we doubt the civic pride taken by these burghers in the most aristocratic of all Florentine organizations—the *Parte Guelfa*. Did not these self-same commoners consistently elect the scions of magnate houses to represent the commune in the most solemn of public ceremonials? When visiting dignitaries arrived in the city, were they not graciously welcomed and entertained by noble patricians? The very forms and amenities of communal life were replete with the ethos of chivalry, and the artisan and merchant guilds were a part of its pageantry, with their costumes, military companies, coats-of-arms, and processions.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ Cf. Requests of magnates from Certaldo and Colle for popular status; identical petitions were submitted by the house of Galigairi, the Counts Alberti, and the Vecchete. *P.*, 32, fols. 1-2 *LF.*, 21, f. 87r (14 May 1342).

¹⁰⁰ State ritual prescribed that *milites* should represent the *comune*. During a later interval, when communal legislation was restrictive, and the nobles lost ancient prerogatives, the *Signoria* still insisted that important embassies be captained by a *miles*: "Atque fiat responsio per unum militem antiquum qui bene sciat totum et res antiquas." Cf. *Consulte et Pratiche*, 19, f. 16 (21 July 1380). This is, of course, not surprising since Florence was not isolated from the chivalric currents of Trecento Europe. Even the working class desired to emulate the bachelorhood of knights; in 1343, Walter of Brienne permitted them to have their own coats-of-arms and to form squads attired in special livery, and to fly banners bearing their insignia.

The one glaring exception was the diminishing interest in the play of knightly arms. Less and less were the Florentines gratified by the medieval tournament and soon this spectacle was to be greeted with apathy, if not scorn.¹⁰¹

It would appear, then, that communal society had made a selection from among the many knightly virtues, retaining only those compatible with the need for public order. Now men were knighted not for their valor of arms, but rather so that they might inspire awe among the inhabitants of the countryside when they went out to serve as communal officials. More and more, high civil servants and bureaucrats bore the honorific title of "knight." This designation seldom failed to elicit the admiration of *il popolo*, and soon it was to be conferred on the many men who responsibly governed the state and bravely directed the many wars of the second half of the *Trecento*.

Earlier in this study it was suggested that the decline of the Florentine knight is not explicable in terms of the communal attitude towards the magnate, but an explanation must be sought rather within the context of startling changes in methods of warfare. The heroic work of the army in the early years of the fourteenth century had been the suppression of insurrection and the defense of the Florentine *contado*. For the most part this had been accomplished by a series of relatively brief campaigns waged within easy distance of the city. The militia of the *contado*, while far from trustworthy, frequently proved to be quite useful, and this force in combination with citizen

Thirty-five years later, all of this was to be revived by the Ciompi revolutionaries. Upon seizing power, these humble woolcarders were to create *milites* of their own. Cf. C. Falletti-Fossati, *Il tumulto dei Ciompi* (Rome, 1882), 172; Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, rub. 566; A. Doren, *Le arti fiorentine* (Florence, 1940), 2, 230-231.

¹⁰¹ The last great tournaments staged in Florence during the Trecento appear to have been those of Easter, 1343. No mention is made of major jousts in the writings of Giovanni Villani which treat the subsequent period of Florentine history (to 1348), nor in the massive chronicle of his kinsmen, Matteo and Filippo, which runs through 1363. Likewise, Marchionne di Coppo Stefani does not note the occurrence of a major tournament, and his chronicle concludes in 1385. Literary men before 1343 referred consistently to the tourney. Among the more prominent literati were Francesco da Barberino (*Documenti d'Amore*), Folgore da San Gimignano (*Le Rime*), and Giovanni Villani (*Cronica*, X, 128). The tourney of 1343 failed to elicit the enthusiasm of the citizenry. Cf. G. Villani, XII, 8.

Much later, in the early Quattrocento, when literary men such as Leonardo Bruni Aretino were trying to revive certain of the military virtues associated with knighthood, they were contemptuous of the ornamented knight of the mock tournament (the *miles gloriosus*). Cf. C. C. Bayley, *op. cit.*, 379. The *dignitas* of knighthood came to be intimately connected with civic virtue.

armies, captained by nobles and great feudatories, achieved a succession of notable victories. Long range campaigns in distant places were beyond the competence of such troops; subsidies and foreign military commanders who led their own contingents seemed an adequate alternative.

During the decade of the thirties the remedy of the citizen militia and the communal knight became obsolete; no longer could they be relied upon to realize the ambitious schemes envisaged by the new Florentine imperialism. Until this moment the *Signoria's* policy had been largely defensive, and only mildly interested in expansion. Most of the republic's military energies over the past thirty years had been expended in fending off dissident exiles, rebellious feudatories, and meddling German emperors. For such purposes foot and mounted militia had been indispensable, but now Florence was promoting a grand design which involved alliance with far-off Venice, the dispatch of troops into Lombardy, and all this was to be done so that Pisa might be defeated and Lucca conquered and annexed. These plans could only be executed by mercenary armies capable of waging protracted warfare in foreign lands. The issue at stake was no longer the reduction of a single castle in rural Tuscany, but rather large-scale warfare throughout North Italy. In the major battles of 1341 fewer than a score of Florentine knights saw action, and while the treasury records do indicate that certain *grandi* did continue to serve as captains, the terms of their employment had altered dramatically.¹⁰²

By 1342 they were being hired under the same type of contract that prevailed for the city's other mercenaries, and thus native *milites* had lost their grandeur and become pensioners of the state. An occasional Bondelmonti, Della Tosa, or Ricasoldi might win the acclaim of the crowd for his daring at arms, but it was to the office of the *condotta* that the *Signoria* looked for victories over the numerous free-booting companies that streamed into Italy during the middle years of the *Trecento*. Soon this office, along with special commissions, was in the business of enlisting the city's would-be enemies under the Florentine

¹⁰² Among the magnates who filled military posts at this time were Adimari, Agli, Bardi, Bordoni, Cavalcanti, Mozzi, Spini, and Tornaquinci. Cf. *CC.*, 1, fols. 2r-36; *CC.*, 11, fols. 13r ff.; *CC.*, 24, f. 48; *CC.*, 28, fols. 628-642. These magnates received a stipend from the commune for recruiting and leading Florentine troops in battle. *Popolani* from high-born families also served in the same capacity. Albizzi, Bastari, Guicciardini, Mazzingi, Raffacani, Rimbaldesi, Rondenelli, and even Medici were included among their number. *CC.*, 1, f. 28r; *CC.*, 4, fols. 68 ff.; *CC.*, 11, fols. 10r-11r; *CC.*, 21, f. 40; *CC.*, 24, fols. 40-41.

banner, and paying marauding companies to evacuate Tuscan territory. The warfare of those years seldom brought honor but frequently resulted in victory. The military virtues associated with knighthood found little expression on the battlefield, and in the closing years of the *Trecento*, they even elicited scorn from such writers as Sacchetti. Fools and knaves, parvenus and the vulgar were awarded the golden spurs, but one must not conclude that all Florentines denigrated the virtues of a militant nobility.¹⁰³

The humanist chancellor Leonardo Bruni Aretino implored the Florentines to restore the republic's militia; to him, the year 1351 had been disastrous for his beloved adopted city, for it was then that the *Signoria* abolished the last vestiges of the citizen army.¹⁰⁴ Machiavelli's well known views were much more extreme: he attributed the decline of civic virtue itself to *il popolo's* repression of the nobility. This oppression had resulted in the death of martial spirit among the citizenry, and he saw the reconstruction of the militia as a means for reviving this antique virtue.¹⁰⁵

The literary tradition that found expression in the writings of the Quattrocento humanists failed to take into account the fundamental changes in military tactics that caused the city to have recourse to mercenaries. The Ordinances of Justice and the other repressive enactments of *il popolo* had done far less to discourage Florentines from assuming the burdens of knighthood than had the new strategies of war itself. The remedies of the thirties which sought to restore the *milites* to full political rights proved ineffectual because citizen knighthood had become militarily obsolete.

IV

Any consideration of the role of the Florentine nobility during the years immediately preceding the establishment of the popular *Signoria* in the autumn of 1343 must treat the degree of political influence exerted by this order during this interlude. Once again we are confronted with Giovanni Villani's assertion that the fifteen hundred "cittadini nobili et potenti" (magnates) who were required to post security for their continued good behavior and the seventy-five knights of the elite cavalry were without "stato ne Signoria" in the

¹⁰³ F. Sacchetti, *op. cit.*, nov. 168, 213.

¹⁰⁴ C. C. Bayley, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

¹⁰⁵ N. Machiavelli, *History of Florence*, trans. F. Gilbert (New York, 1960), 107-111.

years 1336-38.¹⁰⁶ It has already been suggested that this statement can only be interpreted relatively since the chronicler is comparing the degree of status and power enjoyed by the nobility before 1293 with that of his own day. Two questions remain however: first, can we equate the magnates with the knights?, and finally, does not the evidence presented by Villani indicate that the magnates continued to play a crucial role in Florentine politics until at least the 1340's? The leading nobles of the city in those years were not *cavalieri*, and the history of this interval demonstrates that these men could still dominate public life even though they made no appreciable military contribution. That Villani casts these aristocrats in the role of arch villains bent upon subverting the state, and that he holds them responsible for the many political tragedies that befell the city, signifies that magnates from the house of Bardi, Frescobaldi, Neri, and Rossi did indeed wield an inordinate influence over the government. The very argument offered in Villani's chronicle would be unintelligible if this were not taken into account. No single observer of the Florentine political scene attributes more influence to the magnates during those years than does Villani. Nor was this view confined to the pages of a single chronicle: this was the very interpretation subscribed to by the popular *Signoria* established in October 1343.¹⁰⁷

The magnates held one-third of the positions in the special commission formed in 1336 to direct the war against Mastino della Scala, lord of Verona and Padua, and the Bardi took charge of the disbursement of monies to the Florentine troops. They were well represented on every diplomatic mission of consequence and ubiquitous in the communal councils of this time. It would appear then, that Villani's estimate of magnate power cannot be accepted uncritically.¹⁰⁸ One might argue, however, that the power exercised by a Bardi or a Della Tosa stemmed from his position in the guild aristocracy and that he, along with other

¹⁰⁶ G. Villani, *Cronica*, XI, 94.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. M. Becker, "An Essay on the 'Novi Cives' and Florentine Politics, 1343-1382," *Mediaeval Studies*, 24 (1962), 56-58.

¹⁰⁸ Filippo Bardi was elected to the Dieci—a special *balia* authorized to conduct complex diplomatic negotiations with Venice. *Capitoli Protocoli*, 12, f. 242r (26 September 1336); *LF.*, 17, f. 39r (29 July 1338). Ridolfo Bardi was appointed to a committee empowered to raise revenue and handle delicate foreign policy questions. *LF.*, 17, f. 39r (29 July 1338). Andreas Bardi was a member of a special *balia* of eight. *LF.*, 17, 176 (9 December 1339). Cf. also footnote 55. The magnate houses of Adimari, Brunelleschi, Foraboschi, Gherardini, Gianfigliazi, etc. were extremely active in the government during the late 30's and early 40's. *CC.*, 1, f. 206r *LF.*, 141, fols. 141-169r; *Capitoli Protocoli*, 12, fols. 143-238; *LF.*, 19, fols. 104r; *LF.*, 21, fols. 52r ff.

magnates, had become a part of the oligarchy of the *arti* inseparable from the great burghers. If this were the case, then the patriciate would be a collectivity, and single houses would tend to shun acts of political individualism and recourse to violence in the interests of the whole. Moreover, they would abjure the divisive slogans of the past that made so much of the differences between magnates and *popolani grassi*, and be willing to live within the communal constitutional framework. Instead the magnates were repeatedly to attempt to overthrow the popular constitution and annul the despised Ordinances of Justice.

In November of 1340, the Bardi joined with the still powerful feudatories of Tuscany to make armed insurrection. Their fellow conspirators the Ubertini, the Ubaldini, the Counts Guidi, the Tarlati of Arezzo and the Pazzi of the Valdarno, ancient Italian nobles all, had support in the city among those magnates who desired to undo the hated ordinances which discriminated against their class. The conspiracy failed but the discontent that provoked it was soon again to express itself in 1342 and 1343.

Armando Saporì, twentieth century historian of medieval Florence, has studied this insurrection in great detail and concluded that it demonstrates the absence of divisions among the various orders of Florentine society at that time. His researches indeed disclose that economic differences between magnates such as the Bardi and Frescobaldi on the one hand, and the *popolani* Peruzzi and Acciaiuoli on the other, were insignificant.¹⁰⁹ But once again the same dilemma recurs: to what extent does the absence of economic distinctions imply the eradication of other differences? First it should be noted that the Bardi gained their principal military support from those feudal nobles least assimilated into communal economic life, and second that the conspirators were joined by dissident magnates—members of the city patriciate—who still strained under the yoke of the Draconian Ordinances of Justice. Many of this latter group were certainly members of the mercantile oligarchy as Saporì has shown; this does not mean, however, that these men were willing to observe the many onerous provisions of the republic's constitution.

Saporì rejects Villani's account of this uprising, and chooses to assert the homogeneity of the Florentine oligarchy on economic grounds. Surely Villani was well-versed in the economic facts of life

¹⁰⁹ A. Saporì, *op. cit.*, 146 ff. For communal posts held by Frescobaldi at this time, see *LF.*, 17, fols. 155r-186r; *LF.*, 19, fols. 49r-51.

for he was a partner and agent of the most prominent banking establishment of his day. No medieval chronicler was more knowledgeable or more loquacious about business matters than was Villani; and yet he observes crucial distinctions between *popolani* and magnates. His narration of the Bardi conspiracy not only lays stress upon the enthusiasm of magnates for the overthrow of the dreaded ordinances, but also emphasizes the reluctance of particular members of this eminent clan to submit to the dictates of communal justice. There were of course strong economic motives that occasioned the abortive revolt, but in no way do these preclude the play of traditional forces which encouraged the magnates to rebel. When Piero de' Bardi was sentenced to pay a fine of 6,000 lire for an offense committed against one of his vassals of the Castle of Vernio, and Andrea, his brother was obliged to surrender the fortress of Mangona to the republic, the Bardi had ample justification for recourse to arms. Further provocation was added when the *Signoria* enacted severe legislation directed against those Bardi who had acquired other fortified properties in the *contado*.¹¹⁰ Over the next few years magnates were to demonstrate their antipathy towards measures such as these and demand the abrogation of all legislation considered to be discriminatory.

Any analysis of the political role of the magnates in the 1340's must avoid imposing a logic upon events alien to the men of the times. Recent scholarship has reached the conclusion that because certain magnates had interests in common with *popolani*, class distinctions were rendered meaningless.¹¹¹ The presumption here involved is that a rationally organized and highly efficient society existed which in turn produced an integrated culture where men were guided in critical matters by reason rather than emotion. But the facts of *Trecento* experience belie such an over simplified hypothesis: despite the high degree of economic and social cooperation so evident between magnates and *popolani*, the violence and discord were endemic to the former. It was easier for the ruling oligarchs to agree upon matters of economic policy than it was for them to be in accord on such questions as the renunciation of the vendetta by a particular magnate clan, or the desirability of compelling warring *consorterie* to exchange the kiss of peace and post sizable security. Any study of the patrimonies of the elite of Florentine society will not disclose significant differences between those of the magnates and those of the affluent commoners,

¹¹⁰ *Manoscritto varii*, 501, f. 159r; A. Saponi, *op. cit.*, 124.

¹¹¹ For a summary of research on this question, see E. Fiumi, "Fioritura e decadenza dell'economia fiorentina," *Archivio Storico Italiana*, 115 (1957), 385-391.

and yet, this notwithstanding, more subtle distinctions did exist. The Bardi and Frescobaldi were considered magnates because they were required by law to post security for their continued good behavior. The men of the *Trecento* had a juridical mentality which made much of this: status at law was a mode of demarcation and a source of identity. This preoccupation was implicit in their most rudimentary social perceptions. Repeatedly, chroniclers were to insist that Florence was divided into three classes: magnates, *popolani*, and *il popolo minuto*.¹¹² Within this social universe men's identities depended upon membership in certain legally constituted orders; legal personality was bestowed only on guildsmen who were matriculated in a specific corporation juridically accredited by the commune. It is not necessary to mention the legal distinctions between master, apprentice, and journeyman any more than it is required to enumerate the gradations between the orders of clergy. Law was a psychological category, and a scrupulous regard for legality pervaded the political milieu. Later when *il popolo minuto* wished to change their status, they petitioned the *Signoria* for the right to found a new legal order, i.e., to establish artisan corporations.

The city's magnates were not a socio-economic class, but rather a juridical cadre, and this classification had an absolute relevance in the eyes of their contemporaries. The patriciate was then divided juridically and no amount of socio-economic cohesion should cause us to overlook this fact. Modern scholarship which tends to neglect this penchant for legality so deeply imbedded in the Florentine mentality, presents a rational view of social change and human motivation based upon a compatibility of economic interests. Such a description cannot account for the persistence of magnate anti-social behavior and political antagonism. Mutual suspicion and distrust between the magnates and *popolani* were much in evidence in 1340. The Bardi and Frescobaldi appealed to their fellow magnates to avenge insults, real or imagined, and to overthrow that *Signoria* which enforced the ordinances so cruelly. The chroniclers of Florence, *popolani* all, saw the magnates bent upon destroying the political order of the city. They came to believe that these nobles were seized with an inordinate ambition to dominate public life.¹¹³ If these opinions are oversimplifications of

¹¹² This view of society was to persist in the writings of historians and diarists throughout the *Trecento*. Cf. G. Scaramella, *Firenze allo scoppio del tumulto dei Ciompi* (Pisa, 1914), 26-36.

¹¹³ Cf. M. Becker, *op. cit.*, 44-45, 80-82. In order to check the magnates, it was desirable to staff the *Signoria* with a majority of *popolani*. See the prescription of the Dodici for maintaining the peaceful status of Arezzo: "Et quod populares maior pars remittantur in civitatem." *Consulte et Pratiche*, 19, f. 44 (31 August 1380).

complex interaction between the two top echelons of Florentine society, they should nevertheless not be discounted, since these convictions influenced men and their actions.

V

The early 1330's were years of relative harmony between magnate and *popolano*, and the *Signoria's* policies reflected this cordiality. Only the most affluent sat in the communal councils and very few new men were able to win entry into this charmed circle. And yet this accord was as precarious as it was fragile. By 1338 we can observe a hardening of communal policy towards the magnates and a general transformation of the regime's program that was to have serious repercussions for the entire privileged class.¹¹⁴ What was to dissolve might best be described as the easy *laissez-faire* conduct of public life. The world of Florentine business was to undergo its most severe crisis, and the public revenue was to decline until it was no longer adequate for the ambitious imperialistic plans of the republic. Under the impact of these twin pressures, the regime found it necessary to reduce the privileges and immunities of the entrenched classes. Vigorous tax reforms were proposed to revive a declining treasury, but few who sat in the councils were willing to support them.¹¹⁵ Cooperation among the patriciate was pervasive in periods of prosperity, but with the onset of adversity the bonds became strained. The ruling elite were now sharply divided on the issue of the feasibility of maintaining the costly alliance with the papacy. Furthermore they were split on the question of the desirability of pursuing the expensive war against Lucca. Many were reluctant to see direct taxes imposed upon their capital and

¹¹⁴ The basis for this change was the pressing communal need for revenue in order to mount an offensive against neighbouring Pisa. This demand for additional revenue came at a moment when the yield from gabelles (the republic's principal source of income) had declined precipitously. By 1341 the *Signoria* was exerting every effort to recover communal property, and according to a provision enacted in May of that year, much of the *bona et iura communis* had been usurped by "magnates et potentes," and since the citizenry was afraid of these haughty and powerful lords, no effort had been made to wrest the property from them. Now the Officials of the Towers were to have extra-ordinary authority to recover state property and any citizen was to have the right to make secret denunciations (*in tamburo*) against predatory "magnates et potentes." Cf. *Duplicati Provisioni*, 2, fols. 12-12r.

¹¹⁵ *LF.*, 19, fols. 29-187r (8 June 1340 to 20 May 1341).

lands.¹¹⁶ As to the role of the magnates in these troubled years, they ignored so many vital communal needs and continued to press for the repeal of the Ordinances of Justice and the establishment of a *Signoria* that would be solicitous of their private interests.

In September of 1342 the overwhelming majority of affluent *popolani* and magnates championed the desperate remedy of establishing a dictatorship. Walter of Brienne was installed as lord of the city for life, and granted sweeping powers. In one of his first acts he demonstrated his sympathies towards the magnates by absolving the Bardi, Frescobaldi, Nerli, Pazzi, and Rossi from the condemnation they had incurred as a result of their leadership of the abortive revolution of November, 1340. Eminent members of these families were now permitted to return from exile and soon they numbered among Brienne's most trusted counselors. Adimari, Bardi, Donati, Rossi and others undertook far-flung diplomatic missions for the new lord of the city. Adimari, Cavalcanti, Rossi, and Tornaquinci held high administrative posts in the Florentine *contado*.¹¹⁷ Numerous magnates were granted judicial dispensation from convictions on charges of treason; the Falconieri and Guidolotti had been declared enemies of the Holy Roman Church and rebels against the state in 1304. Now these clans, but recently listed among the despicable Ghibelline nobles of the city, had their citizenship and property restored. The Pulci and Circuli who had attacked their native city in the company of the perfidious Ghibellines of Pisa, were likewise granted dispensation from these high crimes. A host of rebel magnates soon were to have condemnations for capital offenses annulled.¹¹⁸

The most vital concern of the Florentine magnates was the abrogation of the Ordinances of Justice and, here too, their desires were given serious consideration. Although Brienne did not acquiesce completely, he did make substantial alterations in one of its most vexatious clauses: the degree of responsibility for crimes of kinsmen was drastically reduced so that now only close blood relations were liable.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶ B. Barbadoro, *op. cit.*, 125 ff.; *LF.*, 17, f. 90.

¹¹⁷ Cf. *CC.*, 1 bis, fols. 130r-249; *Atti Esecutore*, 17, f. 17r. For the despot's decree absolving the Bardi, Frescobaldi, Nerli, Pazzi, and Rossi from condemnations incurred as a result of their participation in the rebellion of November 1, 1340, see C. Paoli, *Delle Signoria di Gualtieri Duca d'Atene* (Florence, 1862), 76. The citation given by Paoli for the document should read, *Balie*, 2, fols. 12-13, instead of, *Provisioni*, 32, f. 12.

¹¹⁸ Other ranking families of magnate status granted dispensation for comparable crimes were the Amadori, Corbizzi, Falconetti, and Visconti.

¹¹⁹ On 10 June 1349, an adviser to the *Signoria* proposed that the Ordinances of

Unfortunately for Brienne, the very magnates so frequently recipients of his largesse, were at best only mildly enthusiastic in their support of his *Signoria*, and as soon as popular rebellion erupted in July of 1343, they joined the surging mobs in the streets and attacked his *palazzo*. Immediately upon regaining its ancient liberties, the government of the republic was taken in hand by a coalition of magnates and *popolani grassi*. The office of Prior was now open to the Florentine magnates. For the first time since the winter of 1292, Adimari, Bardi, Cavalcanti, Foraboschi, Mannelli, Pazzi, and Spini entered the highest magistracy of the republic. For almost two months these scions of the best families met with their commoner peers to treat the great public questions of the day. *Il popolo* was not ungrateful to these aristocrats for their heroism on that glorious St. Anne's Day, the 26th of July, when they came to the fore and provided leadership so that an undisciplined demonstration could become a successful revolution. It was therefore fitting that these aristocrats should be allocated a generous share of high communal offices. Not since the thirteenth century had such an opportunity been presented to the magnates.

This aristocratic coalition had an unparalleled chance to demonstrate its qualifications for political leadership. The prestige of such magnate families as the Adimari, Bardi, Cavalcanti, Donati, Frescobaldi, Pazzi, Rucellai, and others was at its apogee.¹²⁰ Certainly high-born *popolani* and *magnati* had previously proven their ability to cooperate politically. There was even some sympathy with the demands of magnates for the cancellation of the Ordinances of Justice. Based upon the performance of this patriciate, however, one must conclude that few *Signorie* in the annals of the republic showed themselves to be so inept and short-sighted. Granted that the circumstances were hardly propitious, that the city was faced with a staggering public debt, and that confidence in the Florentine business world was at its lowest

Justice be re-established as they had been before Brienne had tampered with them. This counselor suggested that all magnates to the sixth degree had been responsible for their kinsmen before the coming of Brienne. *Consulte et Pratiche*, I, f. 6. „

¹²⁰ It appeared reasonable to Giovanni Villani—no warm friend of the magnates—that they should have a share of political offices since they had been the “*principali*” in the July revolution against Brienne. The chronicler added that the *popolani grassi* “accustomed to governing, supported the “*grandi co' quali aveano molti parentadi.*” Cf. *Cronica*, XII, 18. Seven magnates were chosen to serve in the highest communal magistracy (the *Quattordici*) along with seven *popolani*. The magnates were Ridolfo Bardi, Pino Rossi, Giannozzo Cavalcanti, Giovanni Cianfigliuzzi, Testa Tornaquinci, Bindo della Tosa, and the ubiquitous Talano Adimari.

ebb, that unrest among the many workers of the city's *Lana* industry was widespread, still, the uncreative and pedestrian quality of this regime's policies must remain striking. The legislation enacted during its tenure represented a response to the narrowest of interests and reflected the egoism of the highest echelons of communal society. In their actions the ruling patriciate expressed their desire to return to the easy *laissez-faire* program of earlier days which at best was suitable only for intervals of great general prosperity. At these times the tendency was to minimize the role of government so that few fiscal burdens and restraints would be placed upon the patriciate. The tax structure was adjusted to increase the income from direct levies which fell on the population as a whole, while imposts on capital and property, which struck the patriciate, were cancelled.¹²¹ Such an approach was bound to fail at this time because communal needs far exceeded the ever dwindling tribute collected from direct levies. No longer was it possible to finance the business of government in the traditional and time-honored manner; new and daring techniques were imperative if the *Camera* was to be rescued from the limbo of bankruptcy. In the face of this challenge, the aristocrats of August, 1343 saw fit to increase the retail sales tax and to re-apportion the city so that their own tax assessment would be drastically reduced. This failure to respond to communal needs surely was a factor in demonstrating the unfitness of the magnates to govern.¹²² Their political partners, the great *popolani*, so closely bound to the magnates by kinship and business interests, were faced with a stark and painful alternative. Since November of 1342, the treasury had been unable to amortize or even pay interest on the public debt, and, therefore, the great *popolani* who were the principal creditors of the republic were denied the use of their capital as well as the return from their investment. Fiscal reforms, even if they involved sacrifice, were, then, mandatory at this time; but judging from the policies pursued by those controlling the *Camera*, only the most fatuously sanguine could have believed that they would be initiated by this particular coalition.

¹²¹ CC., 2 (this volume of the treasury records covers the tenure of the *Signoria* of the *Quattordici*).

¹²² For an assessment of the communal fiscal dilemma in August-September 1343, see M. Becker, "Florentine Popular Government (1343-1348)," *op. cit.*, 360-365. This aristocratic regime was unable to pay salaries to communal retainers or honor the republic's commitments to its citizens living in Verona as hostages. *P.*, 32, f. 60 (16 September 1343).

The incapacity of magnates to govern effectively was also evidenced by their judicial policies—or lack of them. Much more significant than the annulment of the Ordinances of Justice was the fact that the high crimes of magnates went virtually unpunished during the summer and early fall of 1343.¹²³ The authority of the Florentine courts was made almost ineffectual and as a consequence, private rights repeatedly triumphed over public law. Communal properties were widely appropriated by the great clans for personal use, and this was symptomatic of what might be described as the beginnings of a systematic dismemberment of the Florentine state. The bonds of community were in the process of being severed, and the tendency was unmistakably towards the dissolution of the commune. The great work of the next regime would involve the successful repression of these centrifugal forces and the containment of the egoism of the powerful clans.

Giovanni Villani contends that at first *il popolo* were satisfied to see the *Signoria* in the hands of those magnates who had been so instrumental in the ouster of Brienne, believing them to be peaceful and law abiding. Soon, however, this fund of good will was dissipated, and the *superbia* of these men became quite evident.¹²⁴ The chronicler Stefani observes that the *popolani grassi* were now thoroughly disenchanted with their magnate confrères and quickly came to the realization that their interests could be better served if they aligned themselves with the masters of the lesser guilds, for these *minori* could be counted upon to be "subservient and reverent" and do the bidding of their social superiors. According to Stefani, the great *popolani* who assumed office after the overthrow of Brienne, 1343, were accustomed to holding the lion's share of public posts, but it was not long before they found themselves relegated to a subordinate role. This seemed unjust since there were 20,000 *popolani* and only 1,000 or so *magnati*.¹²⁵ Their loss of representation appeared to be an inevitable consequence

¹²³ Giovanni Villani's contention that the high crimes of magnates were not prosecuted by this aristocratic regime (*Cronica*, XII, 19), is borne out by the appropriate volume of the *Camera del Comune*. Cf. CC., 2.

¹²⁴ Moreover, suspicion among the populace mounted because of the pervasive fear that the magnates were conspiring with neighboring tyrants to the detriment of the city's liberty. Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, rub. 599; Giovanni Villani, *Cronica*, XII, 21. Very shortly certain Bardi, Frescobaldi and Rossi were exiled because they had been convicted of plotting with Pisa. A Donati was condemned on a similar charge. Stefani, rub. 599, 605; G. Villani, *Cronica*, XII, 32.

¹²⁵ Stefani, rub. 588.

of their unfortunate alliance with magnates who would be satisfied with nothing less than complete hegemony over the *Signoria*. Subsequent communal history was to demonstrate that Stefani's assessment was not far from the truth: the *popolani grassi* did indeed find the lesser guildsmen to be much more cooperative as political partners than the magnates.¹²⁶

Certainly popular feeling against the magnate rulers cannot be an entirely reliable guide in the fixing of responsibility for the misrule of Florence during August and September of 1343. When the rancor of *il popolo* exploded and the mob joined forces with the republic's militia to besiege the palaces of the Bardi, Cavalcanti, Donati, Frescobaldi, and Pazzi, certain of the magnates supported the popular cause. Moreover, many *popolani* had sided with the nobles and as office holders had shown the same incapacity to lead the republic in its desperate hour. The fact remains, however, that the deepest resentments were harbored against the magnate class, and the contempt and disloyalty of leading magnates towards the popular regime of October, 1343-48 did little to repair this opinion. Stefani notes that so intense was the distrust of *il popolo* that "almost all the grandi" fled the city and "retired to the *contado* and remained there."¹²⁷

VI

Florentine experience until October of 1343 had revealed the irrepressible capacity of the magnates to reassert their political virility. Their prestige had fluctuated; but this order had always been an integral part of civil life, and never were they disbarred from certain critical offices. Fundamental to communal life was the principle of according representation to affluent men—be they noble or commoner, and successive regimes availed themselves especially of the valuable services of magnates. For the most part, state tribunals contented themselves with taking reprisals against only the most lawless of the magnate class. Even here the *Signoria* was especially mindful of the prestige and dignity of these aristocrats and frequently mitigated the harsh verdicts of the courts. Few magnate families were not the beneficiaries of cancellations of sentences and dispen-

¹²⁶ Cf. M. Becker, "Florentine *Libertas*: Political Independents and *Novi Cives*, 1372-1378," *Traditio* 18 (1962), 393-407.

¹²⁷ Stefani, rub. 599. The chronicler also notes that many disgruntled magnates entered the service of foreign governments.

sations from verdicts. During periods of prosperity, which usually coincided with times of political calm in Italy, magnates and *popolani grassi* blended their talents to rule the city. It was only when foreign enemies appeared before the walls, or the *Signoria* was confronted with conflicting alternatives in the area of foreign policy that this coalition collapsed. Then the magnates, along with certain *popolani*, would assert their political individuality and embrace causes that threatened the *libertas* and sovereignty of the republic.

At these moments they tended to disregard what a Villani or Stefani or Compagni would have considered the good of the collectivity, in favor of their own egotistical interests. Every time Florence was confronted with a threat to her dominion, there were magnates who would desert the republic and enlist under the banner of a foreign prince or an Italian lord. Their persistent antipathy towards the Ordinances of Justice also indicated that they stood as the greatest single challenge to the constitutional order of the republic.

Social unrest is, after all, a relative concept, and when the magnates are marked as the one order that did most to disturb the equilibrium between classes, it should be borne in mind that neither the workers of the city nor the small guild masters posed any serious threat to the prevailing socio-economic system during the first four decades of the fourteenth century. The lower strata of Florentine society were fairly quiescent during those years and, therefore, discontented segments of the magnate world stood out in bold relief against the background of a social universe bereft of revolutionary ardor. Later in the century *il popolo minuto* were to be the class that demanded radical revisions of the constitution, and they were then to constitute a seditious menace and to stand condemned in the eyes of their guild master contemporaries as the sowers of discord and treason. In the absence of other disaffected strata of society before 1343, the magnates, never as pernicious or despicable as *il popolo minuto*, were an order to be feared, placated, and even emulated. The desire of the *popolani grassi* to work in harmony with the magnates was everywhere in evidence, and the latter suffered no appreciable attrition of political influence between 1295 and 1343. Actually they were presented with an unparalleled opportunity to govern the state as late as the summer of 1343. The conclusion which can be drawn is that this juridical order could retain an identity, not only in its own eyes, but even in those of its contemporaries in an environment where the social and economic forces all favored assimilation. It would appear, then, that the forces in operation were not sufficiently powerful to tame the political individualism of the magnates and cause their

fusion with the burgher class. Occupation, comparable economic interests, and even intermarriage were not enough, and a new ingredient was essential.

Florentine communal society was fragmented and there were numerous pockets of legal authority and a plethora of foci of power. The commoner patricians respected this myriad of entities and generally displayed an over-refined regard for *status ordinum*. In such an atmosphere the rights and privileges of a legal order like the magnates were given every consideration. The subduing of the magnates came only after the Florentine patriciate had failed to provide leadership during the protracted crisis from 1338-1343. It was to be the great work of the regimes after 1343, culminating in the formation of the territorial state of the late *Trecento*, that repressed the obdurate magnates. In the course of this process, traditional forms, intimately associated with the era of the commune dissolved, and successive *Signorie* replaced private immunities with public law. Out of this experience emerged a cohesive aristocracy quite different from the patriciate of the communal age. The issues dividing these *optimates* concerned the procedures of communal finance, the techniques of diplomatic maneuver, and the conduct of the interminable wars of the early *Quattrocento*. Sedition and violence were now more sporadic and the disputes between aristocrats revolved around the management of the funded communal debt or the extent to which the *Signoria* should sponsor mercantilistic programs. The ties of *consorteria* and even of guild slackened, and an intimate nexus developed among the great oligarchs who were now virtually stockholders in a giant corporation called the state. Less and less did the *Signaria* have to play its great medieval role of peacemaker. A canopy of law and bureaucracy was constructed, and the intrusion of public power into the recesses of private life became ever more apparent.

If one comes to accept the Burckhardtian, vitalistic and rationalistic historiographical approach to the Renaissance, and if one entertains his commitment to an interior ideal unity of historical personality as a hall-mark in defining the ethos of this era, then the taming of the Florentine magnate looms as a significant datum. To argue that the Florentine Renaissance is characterized, at least in part, by the citizen's discovery of his persona or ego is to suggest that what came to be unveiled was a new self-consciousness of will and personality. In other words, the individual approached society in a new guise. To capture this self-consciousness, one must attempt to recognize and understand the kind of presuppositions with which the individual approached himself.

In the interval of Florentine experience we have considered, the fused patriciate (half burgher, half magnate) failed to furnish leadership and as a consequence confidence in personal government, with its reliance upon exhortation, admonition, and political magnanimity, ebbed. In its stead we witness the rise of a sterner *paideia* which exalts the power and majesty of communal law. No longer is the *Signoria* to be so responsive to the perquisites and prerogatives of the magnate. This means that the development of the persona or citizen ego as well as the cultivation of citizen perspective will acquire a new creative and resilient adaptability. The *bonus civis* must suppress all proclivities for violence. If he is to compete it must be through shaping his compulsions to the norms of a burgeoning civic humanism rather than to the promptings of a chivalric code. Essentially, then, the period after 1343 marks the triumph of the imperatives of the collectivity over the impulses of the magnate individual. In this latter sense, then, the repressive quality of civic life represents a slightly different emphasis than that accorded to the Italian experience by Jacob Burckhardt in his masterpiece, who may have underestimated the role of public law in tightening the bonds of society.

Finally, there remains the stylistic changes so thoughtfully examined by Milliard Meiss in his *Painting in Florence and Siena after the Black Death* (Princeton, 1951). There he observes the repressive quality of Tuscan painting after the early 1340's. Gone is the spontaneous, the elegant, and the chivalric. Dissipated also is that easy confidence which prompted so much of the proto-humanistic art from Cimabue through Giotto—a faith that the individual could achieve self-mastery and interior reform (*renovatio*) in the easy, casual world of the gentle communal *paideia*. Occasionally, and then only in time of crisis, would it be necessary to apply the enduring external compulsions of the rule of law. After the 1340's, the art and even the literature would become increasingly puritanical, extending as it did the norms of communal law into the most intimate recesses of private life. The new sterner *Signoria* would now become the great engine of compulsion, and the consequence would be a more civic persona. Much later with Machiavelli, the demands of this engine would become self-justifying.*

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* I wish to thank Professor Wallace K. Ferguson for reading this article and making valuable suggestions.

Current Trends in Mediaeval Bibliography

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THE needs of mediaeval bibliography were placed in proper perspective recently when a striking contrast was made between the adequacy of bibliographic coverage in the area of classical studies and that of mediaeval studies. Of course, the oldest and best grounded phase of humanistic studies is the classical tradition. It is not surprising, then, that the bibliographic needs of this area should be so competently met in the combination of Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft* and *L'Année philologique*. Mediaeval studies on the other hand do not at the present time enjoy the same bibliographic excellence. Developments of the past two years, however, do point to a possible parallel in the area of mediaeval studies.

While mediaeval studies has enjoyed a much longer tradition in Europe, the rapid expansion of mediaeval centres in the western hemisphere has made it imperative that the problems of mediaeval bibliography be faced and solutions proposed. With the ever increasing publication of material of interest to the mediaevalist, a vehicle must be introduced to organize and record annually and competently in bibliographic fashion the results of scholarly activity in mediaeval studies.

During the course of informal discussions by scholars in various subject areas at Princeton University in 1963-1964, it was concluded that although many areas of mediaeval bibliography were well covered, other whole areas were either poorly represented or completely neglected. The need for a competent annual bibliography of mediaeval studies, many scholars felt, had long been evident. A request was made by Professors James J. Murphy (Princeton) and Richard J. Schoeck (Toronto) to the American Council of Learned Societies for a grant to make possible a conference to study the problems of mediaeval bibliography and to make recommendations for better bibliographic control of every aspect of mediaeval scholarship. With the support of the American Council of Learned Societies, there was held on April 10-11, 1965, at the close of the annual meeting of the Mediaeval Academy of America at Brown University, a Conference on Medieval Bibliography. Participants in this three session con-

ference included Robert W. Ackerman (Stanford), George L. Anderson (M.L.A.), Gray C. Boyce (Northwestern), Peter H. Brieger (Toronto), Ruth J. Dean (Mount Holyoke), Helena M. Gamer (Chicago), Harold B. Gardner (Toronto), Robert Kaske (Cornell), James J. Murphy (Princeton), Gaines Post (Princeton), Richard H. Rouse (U.C.L.A.), Richard J. Schoeck (Toronto), Laurence K. Shook (Toronto), Samuel Thorne (Harvard), Lynn T. White (U.C.L.A.). Professors Murphy and Schoeck acted as co-chairmen. The discussions of this conference and the far-sighted recommendations which emanated therefrom give every indication that a solution to the bibliographic needs of mediaeval studies can be satisfactorily found.

In preparation for this conference, a questionnaire analysis accompanied by a list of current serially published bibliographic resources was formulated and circulated to mediaevalists in Europe, the United States and Canada. Scholars were requested to comment on the merits and weaknesses of existing bibliographies in given subject areas and to suggest areas of personal interest which are not now properly organized or which are totally neglected. The basis for discussion at the conference came in large part from the responses to the questionnaire which had been submitted in report form to participants for study in advance of the conference.

In the questionnaire returns it was discovered that mediaeval centres were faced with the same problems of bibliographic control as are individual scholars and that they had initiated steps toward solutions. At the University of Chicago, it was precisely the absence of a comprehensive bibliography of mediaeval studies current as well as competent that led to the establishment of an extensive course in bibliography and the compilation of printed bibliographies for each subject area of mediaeval studies. They had envisaged ultimately the publication of an up-to-date bibliography for their several fields of interest.

The Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles, had also begun to seek possible solutions. It was felt that they could contribute to the welfare of the field by supporting some form of bibliographic research. Their initial efforts have resulted in the compilation of an annotated list of serial bibliographies surveying the current scholarship in mediaeval studies. Under consideration is an annotated bibliography of review articles published during the previous decade with a subject index and an annotated bibliography of bibliographies in mediaeval studies.

The annotated bibliography of serial bibliographies, the work of

Dr. Richard Rouse¹ and Mr. Michael Metzger, is obviously only a first step in attempting to bring order to the bibliographic problems of mediaeval studies. It is less a solution, than a means of estimating the problem, of discovering the lacunae and duplication of current bibliography and also of evaluating mediaeval bibliographies. As a result of its publication within the next year, it will point out the need for cooperation and by its comparative evaluation move mediaeval bibliography an essential step toward international collaboration with the hope of establishing an annual bibliography. This U.C.L.A. project is thus an essential step in attacking the much larger problem of building a unified mediaeval bibliography.

The Centre d'Études Supérieures de Civilisation Médiévale at Poitiers is presently giving excellent bibliographic coverage for the period from the tenth to the twelfth centuries and has indicated its wish that other centres might do a similar coverage for the period from the fifth through the ninth and from the thirteenth through the fifteenth centuries. It may well be that such a chronological structure would in itself be an admirable way to overcome the problems of mediaeval bibliography provided, of course, that two other such centres could undertake such a task. In any case, the members of the conference felt that the Centre at Poitiers, and its publication, *Cahiers de civilisation médiévale*, should be represented at the next stage of discussion and study.

The conference expressed its satisfaction with the bibliographic work of the Modern Language Association in the area of mediaeval languages and literatures and welcomed the support of the Association, through its representative, George L. Anderson, in making available their bibliographic resources for any cooperative venture in achieving a comprehensive, annual mediaeval bibliography.

Specific areas which lack adequate bibliographies were noted in the questionnaire returns. These include the history of art, the history of law, economic history, linguistics, mediaeval music, theses in progress and certain aspects of the history of science. In areas where there is better bibliographic control such as literature and ecclesiastical history, scholars showed a marked concern not only for the scattered nature of bibliographies but also for the enormous amount of duplication of efforts. This lack of coordination in specific areas

¹ Acknowledgement is made to Dr. Rouse for his assistance in the compilation of the list of bibliographic resources in mediaeval studies which follow.

of study makes it difficult for scholars to keep abreast of all the significant publications regularly.²

Unanimous concern has been voiced over the failure to have the revision of Paetow's *A Guide to the Study of Medieval History* published. This work is an instrument fundamental for humanistic research covering more than a thousand years of western culture. The highest praise for the work of Professor Gray Boyce has been expressed and mediaevalists everywhere have shared his disappointment in failing to obtain the funds necessary for seeing the revision through to completion. However, a new revision is absolutely indispensable to bridge the gap between past scholarship and the appearance of a new annual mediaeval bibliography, and the first recommendation of the conference was in support of aid for the publication of the Paetow revision.

A major concern in any bibliographic enterprise is the need for uniformity of citation in already existing bibliographies. Obviously, this can be effected on an international basis only. Once effected, collaboration by publishers of existing bibliographies would make a cooperative effort toward a comprehensive mediaeval bibliography possible. It was felt, therefore, that there should be fuller consultation and study among bibliographers and editors of existing bibliographies in order to work toward greater uniformity.

Cooperative efforts would not by that very fact rule out the existence of present specialized bibliographies. On the contrary, they would serve a very useful purpose for specialists especially because they meet the academic world more quickly and with the expertise that their very specialization permits. But even specialists need more than bibliographies limited to their own areas of interest for when a scholar delves into areas apart from his own specialty, the need for a comprehensive mediaeval bibliography becomes all the

² The following comments underscore the need for better bibliographic control: "The bibliographic problem in mediaeval studies is staggering." (Lynn White) "The list of available resources indicates both the abundance and the dispersion of efforts in mediaeval bibliography. It certainly would be a great help to all mediaevalists if bibliographies in the field of mediaeval studies could be coordinated." (Robert S. Lopez) "It is essential to improve the bibliographic control of this important area of study." (David R. Watkins) "I do not find any bibliography or periodical that is complete for my purposes. A comprehensive mediaeval bibliography covering all fields would be useful, and a step towards a mediaeval encyclopedia of which some people have been talking." (Paul O. Kristeller) "There is a need for a general current bibliography published either quarterly or annually to cover all mediaeval fields thoroughly and speedily." (Gaines Post)

more urgent. And of course, all recognize the need of such a bibliography for graduate students in mediaeval studies.

Four recommendations of great significance to the future of mediaeval bibliography were passed at the Conference on Medieval Bibliography :

- 1) Resolved to urge that the Mediaeval Academy of America approach the proposed National Humanities Foundation to solicit financial support for the Boyce revision of Paetow in order to complete the bibliographical work of past mediaeval scholarship;
- 2) Resolved to encourage the University of California Press to publish the Rouse-Metzger, *A Guide to Serial Bibliographies in Medieval Studies*, which would give an overview of the present resources in mediaeval bibliography and provide for a more detailed analysis of the present bibliographic situation;
- 3) Resolved that the American Council of Learned Societies be urged to appoint a committee to discuss the lacunae and duplication in existing bibliographies with the assistance of the Rouse-Metzger bibliography and to try to work out an operative agreement between groups now publishing bibliographies in order to achieve greater uniformity of citation and more complete and more precise coverage in mediaeval bibliography;
- 4) Resolved that an approach be made to the major sources of financial assistance for humanistic studies to support the pooling of bibliographic resources in order to establish a comprehensive and continuing mediaeval bibliography.

The first two resolutions support projects already in progress. The Mediaeval Academy of America has endorsed the Boyce revision of Paetow and the publication of this monumental work will serve as the basis for future bibliographic undertakings. The Rouse-Metzger bibliography is nearing completion and will provide a stepping-stone toward a cooperative effort in mediaeval bibliography. Once the Rouse volume is published, a committee will be able to determine the feasibility of combining existing bibliographies in an effort to inaugurate the publication, on an annual basis, of a comprehensive mediaeval bibliography.

Since there seems to be a well-grounded hope for an *Encyclopaedia medii aevi*, a forty year project subsidized by a Swiss publisher, and now a real possibility of an annual mediaeval bibliography, mediaeval

studies promises to be moving into the level of sophistication long enjoyed by classical studies. In short, mediaeval studies may soon enjoy the bibliographic excellence of that of classical studies.

Bibliographic Resources in Mediaeval Studies

GENERAL :

Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Chartes.
 Bulletin signalétique du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique.
 Cahiers de civilisation médiévale.
 Index translationum.
 International Guide to Medieval Studies.
 Quarterly Check-list of Mediaevalia.
 Quarterly Check-list of Renaissance Studies.
 Répertoire international des médiévistes.
 Repertorium van boeken en tijdschriftartikelen.
 Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique.
 Speculum.
 Studi medievali.

AREA STUDIES :

Abstracta Islamica.
 Al-Andalus.
 Byzantinische Zeitschrift.
 Byzantinoslavica.
 Etudes byzantines d'histoire économique et sociale.
 Index Islamicus.
 Institut Dominicain d'études Orientales du Caire : Mélanges.
 Orientalia.
 Palästina-Literatur.
 Revue des études byzantines.
 Revue des études islamiques.
 Revue des études slaves.
 Sefarad.

ART & ARCHAEOLOGY :

Aegyptus.
 Annuario bibliografico di archeologia.
 Annuario bibliografico di storia dell'arte.
 Antiquaries journal.
 Anzeiger für Altertumswissenschaft.
 Archäologische Bibliographie.
 Art index.
 Arte Veneta.
 Ausgrabungen und Funde.
 Commentari.
 Fasti archaeologi.

Kunstchronik.
 Kunstgeschichtliche Anzeigen.
 Medieval archaeology.
 Répertoire d'art et d'archéologie.
 Revue d'archéologie.
 Rivista di archeologia cristiana.
 Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte.

COLLECTORS & COLLECTING :

Arms and Armour Society, Journal of the.
 Hamburger Beiträge zur Numismatik.
 Numisma.
 Numismatic Literature.

DISSERTATIONS :

Cambridge University : Titles of Dissertations Approved.
 Canadian Theses.
 Catalogue des thèses de doctorat.
 Dissertation Abstracts.
 Historical Research for University Degrees in the United Kingdom :
 Theses Completed.
 Historical Research for University Degrees in the United Kingdom :
 Theses in Progress.
 Index to American Doctoral Dissertations.
 Index to Theses Accepted for higher Degrees in the Universities of
 Great Britain and Ireland.
 Jahresverzeichnis der deutschen Hochschulschriften.
 List of Doctoral Dissertations in progress or completed at Colleges
 and Universities in the United States.

HISTORY :

General :

Acta historica.
 American Historical Review.
 Annual Bulletin of Historical Literature.
 Bibliography of Historical Works issued in the United Kingdom, 1957-1960.
 Bibliothèque d'humanisme et renaissance.
 Catholic Historical Review.
 Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters.
 English Historical Review.
 Historia (Wiesbaden).
 Historisch-politische Buch.
 Historische Zeitschrift.
 Historisk tidskrift.
 International Bibliography of Historical Sciences.
 Jeronimo Zurita.
 Journal of Roman Studies.
 Moyen âge.
 Revue historique.

Scottish Historical Review.
 Storia e economia.
 Studii.
 Tijdschrift voor geschiedenis.
 Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft.

Regional :

Aarbøgger for nordisk oldkyndighed og historie.
 Annales de Bourgogne.
 Annales de l'est.
 Annales de Normandie.
 Annales du midi.
 Arquivo de bibliografia portuguesa.
 Bibliografi til Norges historie.
 Bibliografia historii polskiej.
 Bibliografia storica nazionale.
 Bibliografia romana.
 Bibliographie annuelle de l'histoire de France.
 Bibliographie der Geschichte von Ost- und Westpreussen.
 Bibliographie der Schweizergeschichte.
 Blätter für deutsche Landesgeschichte.
 Bulletin bibliographique d'histoire liégeoise.
 Excerpta historica nordica.
 French Historical Studies.
 Hansische Geschichtsblätter.
 Hessisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte.
 Indice historico español.
 Irish Historical Studies.
 Jahrbuch für Geschichte der UdSSR und der volksdemokratischen Länder Europas.
 Jahresberichte für deutsche Geschichte.
 Pirineos.
 Revista de historia canaria.
 Revue du nord.
 Rivista di studi Liguri.
 Rivista storica italiana.
 Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte.
 Slaski Kwartalnik Historyczny Sobótka.
 Svensk historisk bibliografi.
 Writings on British History.
 Württembergische Geschichtsliteratur.

HISTORY OF MEDICINE :

Current Work in the History of Medicine.

HISTORY OF SCIENCE :

Archives internationales d'histoire des sciences.
 Isis.
 Lychnos.
 Scientiarum historia.

LANGUAGE & LITERATURE :

General :

- Bibliographie générale de littérature comparée.
- Indogermanisches Jahrbuch.
- Literature of the Renaissance.
- Modern Language Association of America: International Bibliography.
- Renaissance News.
- Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire.
- Revue des langues romanes.
- Rinascimento.
- Romania.
- Studier I modern sprakvetenskap.
- Studies in Philology.
- Year's Work in Modern Language Studies.
- Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie.

Arthurian :

- Bibliography of Critical Arthurian Literature.
- Modern Language Quarterly.
- Société Internationale Arthurienne, Bulletin bibliographique de la.

Celtic :

- Bibliotheca celtica.
- Etudes celtiques.

Chansons de gestes :

- Bulletin de la Société «Rencesvals».

Classics :

- Aevum.
- Année philologique.
- Gnomon.
- Latomus.
- Revue des études latines.

English :

- Abstracts of English Studies.
- American Speech.
- Annual Bibliography of English Language and Literature.
- Journal of English and Germanic Philology.
- Old English Bibliography.
- Year's Work in English Studies.

French :

- Bibliographie der französischen Literaturwissenschaft.
- Revue d'histoire littéraire de la France.
- Studi francesi.

German :

- Bibliographie der deutschen Literaturwissenschaft.
- Germanistik.
- Jahresbericht für deutsche Sprache und Literatur.

Jahresbericht über die Erscheinungen auf dem Gebiete der germanischen Philologie.

Gothic :

Bibliographia Gotica (Mediaeval Studies).

Italian :

Giornale storico della letteratura italiana.

Italian Studies.

Rassegna della letteratura italiana.

Portuguese :

Revista portuguesa di filologia.

Scandinavian :

Acta philologica scandinavica.

Arkiv för nordisk filologi.

Bibliography of Old Norse - Icelandic Studies.

Spanish :

Revista de filologia española.

Linguistics :

Bibliographie linguistique.

Revue de linguistique romane.

LAW :

Annali di storia del diritto.

Archiv für katholisches Kirchenrecht.

Canon Law Abstracts.

Current Legal Bibliography.

Index to Foreign Legal Periodicals.

Iura.

Law Quarterly Review.

Österreichisches Archiv für Kirchenrecht.

Revue de droit canonique.

Revue historique de droit français et étranger.

Revue trimestrielle de droit civil.

Tijdschrift voor rechtsgeschiedenis.

Traditio.

Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte: Germanistische abt.;
Kanonistische abt.; Romanistische abt.

MUSIC :

Music Index.

Musica disciplina.

PALAEOGRAPHY, DIPLOMATICS, LIBRARIES :

Archiv für Diplomatik.

Bibliografia dell'archivio vaticano.

Biblos (Vienna).

Cahiers Leopold DeLisle.

Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire des Textes, Bulletin d'information de l'.

Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken.

Scriptorium.

PHILOSOPHY :

Bibliography of Philosophy.

Bulletin thomiste.

Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie.

Giornale critico della filosofia italiana.

New Scholasticism.

Répertoire bibliographique de la philosophie.

Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques.

Revue philosophique de Louvain.

Rivista critica di storia della filosofia.

Société Internationale pour l'étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, Bulletin de la.

RELIGION :

History of Religions :

International Bibliography of the History of Religions.

Revue d'histoire des religions.

Theology :

Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique.

Bulletin de théologie ancienne et médiévale.

Bulletin thomiste.

Ephemerides mariologicae.

Estudios eclesiasticos.

Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie.

Journal of Theological Studies.

Nouvelle revue théologique.

Recherches de science religieuse.

Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale.

Religious and Theological Abstracts.

Répertoire général de sciences religieuses.

Revue d'ascétique et de mystique.

Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques.

Ricerche religiose.

Theological Studies.

Church History :

Journal of Ecclesiastical History.

Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte.

Local :

Revue d'histoire de l'église de France.

Rivista di storia della chiesa in Italia.

Papal :

Archivum historiae pontificiae.

Hagiography :

Analecta bollandiana.

Liturgy :

Archiv für Liturgiewissenschaft.

Ephemerides liturgicae.

Jahrbuch für Liturgik und Hymnologie.

Questions liturgiques et paroissiales.

Rivista liturgica.

Yearbook of Liturgical Studies.

Patristics :

Augustiniana.

Bibliographia patristica.

Bulletin d'ancienne littérature chrétienne latine.

Revue des études augustinienes.

Vigiliae christianae.

Scriptural Studies :

Biblica.

Elenchus bibliographicus biblicus.

Internationale Zeitschriftenschau für Bibelwissenschaft und Grenzgebiete.

New Testament Abstracts.

Religious Orders :

Analecta praemonstratensia.

Analecta sacri ordinis cisterciensis.

Archivum franciscanum historicum.

Archivum fratrum praedicatorum.

Bibliographia franciscana.

Bulletin d'histoire bénédictine.

Carmelus.

Cîteaux.

Collectanea franciscana.

Collectanea ordinis cisterciensium reformatorem.

Miscellanea francescana.

Revue bénédictine.

Revue Mabillon.

Studien und Mitteilungen zur Geschichte des Benediktiner-Ordens und seiner Zweige.

SOCIAL SCIENCES :

Agricultural History.

Agricultural History Review.

Annales; économies, sociétés, civilisations.

Arts et traditions populaires.

Documentation économique.

Economic History Review.

Ergon.

Historia agriculturae.

International Bibliography of Economics.

International Bibliography of Political Science.
International Folklore Bibliography.
Journal of Economic History.
Journal of Transport History.
Middle East Journal.
Roczniki Dziejów Społecznych i Gospodarczych.
Scandinavian Economic History Review.
Southern Folklore Quarterly.

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies

Mediaevalia

"OWLES AND APES"

IN CHAUCER'S *NUN'S PRIEST'S TALE*, 3092

In the second of Chaunticleer's "ensaumples" illustrating the prophetic nature of dreams, a sceptic dismisses dreams as "but vanytees and japes" and adds: "Men dreme alday of owles and of apes." Robinson, after justly observing that owls are commonly regarded as birds of ill-omen, refers to the suggestion that apes may be mentioned simply for the sake of rhyme.¹ C. L. Shaver, remarking that the same two creatures are also yoked together in subsequent works, *The Flyting of Dunbar and Kennedy*, *Campaspe* and *Tyll Owlglass*, thinks that alliteration has something to do with their obtaining literary currency and takes the phrase "owles and apes" to have the figurative meaning of "monstrous" or "absurd."² As far as I know, no one has remarked that Chaucer's phrase is appropriate in that owls and apes have a particular significance in dreams. The *Talmud* records that it is unlucky to dream of either creature,³ and Suetonius describes how Nero, shortly before his death, dreamed that the hindquarters of his favorite horse changed into those of an ape.⁴ Artemidorus Daldianus, soothsayer and interpreter of dreams in the second century A. D., states in his vast compendium on dreams, *Onirocriticon*, that both creatures in dreams signify evil,⁵ and to the dreamer who, like the man in Chaunticleer's *exemplum*, is also a traveller, the owl denotes an impending storm or robbery: *ὁ τι δ' ἂν τόντων τῶν ὀρνέων τις ἴδῃ πλέων ἢ ὁδεύων χειμῶνι μεγάλῳ ἢ λησταῖς περιπεσέεται.*⁶

There is, however, no evidence that Chaucer was familiar with this piece of dream lore, and a more obvious explanation may account for the reference. The owl and the ape were frequently juxtaposed in medieval paintings and carvings, and it seems reasonable to suppose that Chaucer was resorting to an allusion which was basically pejorative in terms of Christian theology.

¹ *The Works of Geoffrey Chaucer*, 2nd ed. (Boston, 1957), p. 753. [All line references are to this edition].

² "Chaucer's 'Owles and Apes'," *MLN*, LVIII (1943), 106, n. 4, 107. Two further instances of its use, not cited by Mr. Shaver, occur in Skelton's *Magnyfycence*, ed. R. L. Ramsay, *EETS*, ES, XCVIII (London, 1906), II, xvii, 1135, and *Lady Caroline Kerrison*, *A Commonplace Book of the Fifteenth Century*, ed. Lucy Toulmin Smith (London, 1886), 12.

³ *Berakoth*, ed. I. Epstein (London, 1948), 57b. L. Lewysohn, *Die Zoologie des Talmuds* (Frankfurt, 1858), 66, 163; see also Ludwig Hopf, *Thierorakel und Orakelthiere* (Stuttgart, 1888), 52.

⁴ *Nero*, ed. C. L. Roth (Leipzig, 1871), IVL, i.

⁵ Ed. Rudolph Hercher (Leipzig, 1864), II, xii, p. 104; IV, lvi, p. 235.

⁶ *Onir.*, III, lxv, p. 194.

One of the most striking representations of the owl and the ape occurs in an early thirteenth century painted panel on the ceiling of the nave of Peterborough Cathedral; a lively ape rides backwards on a goat and carries an owl.⁷ An illustration on the top margin of the *Beatus* page of the late thirteenth century Peterborough Psalter depicts a similar scene except that the owl is perched in the centre of the border and is regarded from the right by the goat and from the left by a fox with a cock in its mouth.⁸ In the early fourteenth century East Anglian Ormesby Psalter the hunting ape rides a hound and swings a lure, while the owl is seated face to tail on a hare.⁹ The ape, both mounted and unmounted, appears with the owl in the Lutterell Psalter: in one marginal illustration it has an owl on its gauntleted hand and rides a goat; at the top left of the *Beatus* page it crouches with the owl on its fist.¹⁰ A sculptured representation of an ape with an owl in its hand riding an ass is referred to in a Latin sermon by an English homilist at the beginning of the fourteenth century.¹¹ A carving on one of the early fourteenth century choir stalls on the north side in Winchester Cathedral depicts an ape which holds out an owl in its paw and appears to be grinning at the bird's blinking in the light.¹² A slightly earlier moulding at Bourges Cathedral has crockets formed entirely of owls and apes.¹³

The reason for the association of these two creatures is not far to seek. In pre-Christian times their ugliness caused them to be associated with all kinds of moral obliquity.¹⁴ In the Christian era they came to represent *turpissima bestia* and *turpissima avis*. The ape in the bestiaries is a participant in the Fall and is likened to the Devil: "Beneque simius, non habens caudam, sine specie enim est; et turpe in simio,^{14a} non habentem caudam; sicut et diabolus, non habet finem bonum."¹⁵ The she-ape of Aesopic fable becomes the devilape who carries sinners off to hell and leaves the good behind with God.¹⁶ The ape symbolizes all enemies of Christ, and in some illustrations of Christ's ill-treatment at the hands of the Jews and Romans, his persecutors have simian features with *caninus* noses showing the entire nostril.¹⁷ That the ape as *figura diaboli* should give

⁷ See C. J. P. Cave and T. Borenus, "The Painted Ceiling in the nave of Peterborough Cathedral," *Archaeologia*, LXXXVII (1937), 297-309.

⁸ See E. G. Millar, *English Illuminated MSS, X-XIII Centuries* (Paris, 1926), pl. 100. (Brussels, Royal Libr. MS 9961-2, f. 14r.).

⁹ Oxford, Bodl. MS Douce 366, f. 147v.

¹⁰ BM. Ad. MS 42130, ff. 13r, 38r.

¹¹ BM. Ad. MS 38818, f. 229v.

¹² Emma Phipson, *Choir Stalls and their Carving* (London, 1896), 25.

¹³ Joan Evans, *Nature in Design* (Oxford, 1933), fig. 63.

¹⁴ Aelian *De Natura Animalium*, ed. F. Jacobs, I (Jena, 1832), x, 37; Pliny *Naturalis Historiae*, ed. C. Mayhoff, II (Leipzig, 1909) x, 16; Plutarch "Quomodo Adolescens Poetas Audire Debeat," *Moralia*, ed. G. N. Bernardakis, VII (Leipzig), 18A. See also further examples cited by W. C. McDermott, *The Ape in Antiquity* (Baltimore, 1938), 141-6; H. W. Janson, *Apes and Ape Lore* (London, 1952), 14-16, 287.

^{14a} Carmody edition has *infimio* with *in simio* as a variant.

¹⁵ *Versio Y*, ed. F. J. Carmody, *University of California Publications in Classical Philology*, XII, No. 7 (1941), 122.

¹⁶ McCulloch, *Mediaeval Latin and French Bestiaries* (North Carolina, 1960), 87.

¹⁷ BM. Ad. MS 42310, f. 124v; BM. Ad. MS 47682, ff. 30v, 31r, 31v, 32r, 32v.

ground to the diversified comic figure of *le monde bestorne* may owe something to familiarity with the antics of the common performing monkey, a popular import in Western Europe from the beginning of the twelfth century. No similar amelioration, however, occurred in the treatment of the indigenous owl, usefully engaged in destroying vermin. It is true that the *Physiologus* ascribed to Epiphanius of Cyprus states: "Augustinus in enarratione Psalmi 101 Christum nycticoraci etiam comparat,"¹⁸ and that according to a thirteenth century *Aviarum* "mistice nycticorax Christum significat qui noctis tenebras amat, quia non vult mortem peccatoris sed ut convertatur et vivat."¹⁹ But the prevalent symbolism is that evinced in the numerous representations of the mobbed owl in medieval art and architecture²⁰ and made explicit in bestiaries and homilies. The owl is the Jew and its preference for darkness signifies the Jews' rejection of Christ: "Vel hic avis figuram tenet Judicorum qui non potuerunt videre Christum verum solem qui illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum."²¹ Filthy habits are ascribed to in and it comes to be regarded as a representative of unclean sensuality.²² Like the ape, it is associated with the Fall and takes its place on the *arbor malorum*.²³

The function in which these two creatures are engaged in medieval art and sculpture shows that they are playing their traditional roles. The ape is the Devil, the well-known fowler or trapper of souls.²⁴ It is also the hunter in its own right, hating small birds—that is, those whose spirits are in harmony with God, and is indefatigable in its pursuit of them.²⁵ As for the owl, although its use reflects a common hunting practise,²⁶ the efficacy of which was attributed by Aelian to the bird's sinister magical powers,²⁷ in the company of the ape it appears to represent once more the enemy of all true believers, seeking to ensnare the soul and separate it from God. The reverse riding positions, on the goat and hare, symbols of lechery,²⁸ are a further reminder of the pejorative significance of the two protagonists. Ornithological evidence to the contrary, the owl, as a symbol of the Jew, was said to fly backwards,²⁹ and riding head to tail was also the typical position accorded in a popular primitive punishment

¹⁸ S. Epiphanius *ad Physiologum librum* (Antwerp, 1588), 85.

¹⁹ London, Sion College, MS L 40.2/L 28, f. 33r.

²⁰ See M. D. Anderson, *The Mediaeval Carver* (Cambridge, 1935), 135; M. D. Anderson, *Misericords* (London, 1954), 15.

²¹ BM. Royal MS 12F XIII, f. 62r.

²² Isidore *Etymologiarum sive Originum*, ed. W. M. Lindsay, II (Oxford, 1911), xii, 7, 39; McCulloch, *Bestiaries*, 147.

²³ BM. Ad. MS 42310, f. 128v. See also instances cited by Janson, *Apes and Ape Lore*, 123, 127, 143, n. 66.

²⁴ See examples cited by B. G. Koonce, "Satan the Fowler," *MS*, XXI (1959), 176-84.

²⁵ Hildegard "De Animalibus," *Patrologiae Latinae*, 197, 1329; Rabanus Maurus "Allegoriae in Universam Sacram Scripturam," *Patrologiae Latinae*, 112, 871. For further illustration of the theme in Gothic marginal art, see Janson, *Apes and Ape Lore*, 180.

²⁶ See *Batman uppon Bartholome, his Booke De Proprietatibus Rerum* (London, 1582), f. 180r.

²⁷ *De Nat. Animal.*, I, i, 29.

²⁸ Isidore, *Etym.* xii, 1, 14; Aelian *De Nat. Animal.*, I, xiii, 12.

²⁹ *Le Bestiaire de Philippe de Thaum*, ed. Emmanuel Walberg (Paris and Lund, 1900), 11, 2789-2802.

whereby criminals, particularly traitors, were thus ignominiously mounted and driven through the streets to torture and death.³⁰

Chaucer's allusion conforms to sound dream psychology in that grimacing figures and beaked flying creatures are indeed characteristic of the nightmare.³¹ But, when it is given the figurative meaning attributable to owls and apes in conjunction, the allusion strikingly foreshadows the fate of the sceptic. The dream consists in a death warning, given in strange circumstances. To one man "fil greet mervaille" (3076). He dreamed that a man stood by his bed and told him he would be drowned if he set sail on the following day. There was no reason to anticipate disaster because the wind "blew right as hem leste" (3073). Yet the scoffer who disregarded the dream was drowned under unusual circumstances:

...Er that he hadde half his cours yseyled,
 Noot I nat why, ne what myschaunce it eyled,
 But casuelly the shippes botme rente,
 And ship and man under the water wente
 In sighte of othere shippes it bisyde...

(3099-3103)

Of the ships which sailed at the same tide, his alone, apparently, met with disaster. It is ironically appropriate that the man who died should think that owls and apes in dreams were of no import, or supernatural evil, the quality with which these creatures are traditionally associated, accounted for his death.

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Beryl ROWLAND.

SIMON OF TOURNAI AND GILBERT OF POITIERS

Simon of Tournai whom J. Warichez¹ describes as "une personnalité marquante dans l'histoire littéraire du Moyen âge" and as a "brillant professeur et subtil théologien" received his early education at the chapter school of his native city, Tournai. About the middle of the 12th century he is found at the chapter school of Notre-Dame in Paris, perhaps still a student under Odo of Soissons whose collaborator, as Warichez holds, he was to become at a later date.² In 1174-78 he is recorded to have assisted Cardinal Peter of Pavia in formulating

³⁰ B. D. H. Miller, "Dame Sirith: Three Notes," *N&Q*, CCVI (1961), 412-14; "A Primitive Punishment: Further Instances," *N&Q*, CCVIII (1963), 366-68.

³¹ Ernest Jones, *On the Nightmare* (New York, 1959), 107-8.

¹ *Les Disputations de Simon de Tournai*, in: *Spicil. Sacr. Lovaniense*, Études et doc. 12 (Louvain, 1932), p. ix.

² *Ibidem*, p. xiii.

a settlement favorable to Sainte-Geneviève.³ The same source reveals that about 1180 Simon signed as a witness together with Master Gerard Pucella.⁴ In a letter, dated 1176-92, the abbot of Sainte-Geneviève (1178-92), Stephen of Tournai, warmly recommends Simon to William, Archbishop of Rheims (1176-1202): *magistro Simoni viro inter scolares egregio... Graciosum et commendabilem faciunt eum hinc auctoritas morum, hinc pericia litterarum.*⁵ The date of Simon's death is uncertain. Matthew Paris records it under the year 1201.⁶

It is generally agreed that Simon favoured Gilbert of Poitiers. Warichez speaks of Simon's "sympathies porrétaïnes"⁷ and states that Simon adopts Boethius's concept of person "vue à travers les commentaires de Gilbert de la Porrée".⁸ These statements are rather vague. They do not reflect the full truth.

In discussing a manuscript containing Simon's *Sentences* B. Hauréau claims that Simon quotes Aristotle's *Physics*, if not his *De Anima*. Hauréau asserts that from Aristotle's *De Anima* Simon derived his definition of the soul as an entelechy,⁹ a definition which, as Hauréau notes, Simon rejects. Hauréau did not realize that Simon's "précision remarquable" concerning the nature of the human soul was by no means due to Simon's learning. The passage quoted by Hauréau is an almost literal transcription from Gilbert's commentary on the *Contra Eutychen* of Boethius.¹⁰ After the definition of person given by Boethius Simon writes:

Secundum¹¹ hanc diffinitionem humana anima videtur esse persona. Non enim, *licet* quidam *hoc* dixerunt, est endilichia¹² i.e. forma sed potius substantia¹³ habens in se formas et diversorum generum accidentia. Est etiam¹⁴ anima substantia naturae rationalis. Intelligit enim atque discernit et separata et in corpore posita usque adeo quod homo qui ex anima constat et corpore sicut distenditur spacio corporis ita animae propria potentia discernit. *Sed quoniam* nulla persona pars personae...

Only the words printed in italics are Simon's. Another excerpt published by Hauréau to show that Simon is "à la fois un théologien très savant et un logicien très subtil"¹⁵ proves to be a text copied by Simon from Gilbert's commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius. The word order in frequently changed but only the words printed here in italics are Simon's own:

³ *Ibidem*, p. xvii.

⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁵ *Ep.* 60; PL 211, 353A.

⁶ *Chronica Maiora* (ad ann. 1201); ed. H. R. Luard, Rolls Series 52, 2 (London, 1874) 476.

⁷ *Les Disputations*, p. xiv.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. xxvii. Cf. M. Schmaus, 'Die Trinitätslehre des Simon von Tournai', in: *RechThéolAncMéd* 3 (1931) 373-396.

⁹ *Notices et extraits* 3 (Paris, 1891) 256.

¹⁰ *Contra Eut. et Nest.* 3, 2; ed. N. Haring, in: *ArchHistDoctLitMA* 21 (1954) 281.

¹¹ *Notices* 3, 256. M. Schmaus, 'Die Texte der Trinitätslehre in den *Sententiae* des Simon v. Tournai', in: *RechThéolAncMéd* 4 (1932) 60.

¹² Gilbert derived this information not from Aristotle's *De Anima* but from Calcidius, *Comm. in Tim. Platonis* 221; ed. J.H. Waszink, in: *Plato Latinus* 4 (London, 1962) 236 f.

¹³ Gilbert: substantia i.e. subsistens habens...

¹⁴ Gilbert: et.

¹⁵ *Notices* 3, 253.

Nam¹⁶ cum dicitur esse in foro, intelligitur quidem circumfusus et determinatus: non¹⁷ tamen hoc est esse vel affici ex aliqua proprietate qua possit designari secundum se, non ad aliud facta collatione sui sicut absque sui comparatione ad alterum per se designatur esse *humanitate* homo,¹⁸ *albedine*¹⁹ albus, *linea* *lineatus*.²⁰ *His enim praedicationibus nulla concipitur unius ad aliud comparatio*. Econtra in eo quod dicitur esse in foro, intelligitur circumfusus et determinatus *nec*²¹ per se dicitur *sine relatione* sed collatione sui ad illa quibus extra se circumdatus continetur et offendens in ea *suis*²² finibus determinatur. Sic ergo per hoc quod homo dicitur esse in foro, nequaquam homini inhaerens proprietas notatur...

Convinced that John Scotus is Simon's "chef d'école"²³ Hauréau ends the transcription of Simon's text with the remark: "Comme on le sait, Jean Scot n'a pas recours à de telles subtilités pour mettre d'accord sa raison et sa foi".²⁴ Here is Simon's text again copied from Gilbert:

De²⁵ Deo non ita i.e. non eo sensu quo dicitur de creaturis. Nam quod dicitur: Deus ubique est, dici videtur ita scilicet²⁶ quod non sit in omni loco i.e. circumfusus aliquibus contineatur aut offendens in aliqua terminetur *circumstantia*. Omnino enim non potest esse in loco ut circumfusus et determinatus sed hoc sensu dicitur esse ubique quod omnis quorumlibet locus ei adsit ad eum capiendum qui intra se sine termino cum ipse tamen non suscipiatur loco tanquam circumfusus aut terminatus *aliquibus* exterioribus atque ideo quia circumfusus non est *aliquibus* circumpositis, nusquam ut in loco esse dicitur quoniam revera est totus ubique sed non est in loco *circumfusus*.

Only the italicized words are Simon's own. The numerous transpositions of words made by him may disguise but do not alter the fact that he copied Gilbert's exposition. However, Simon does more than just plagiarize Gilbert. He uses such passages to lead to his own elucidations, but he never reveals his source.

In addition to Gilbert's commentaries on Boethius, Simon makes use of Gilbert's commentary on St. Paul. The following excerpts from Gilbert's comment on *Rom.* 11:36 as found in MS Paris, B. N. *Lat.* 14441, f. 23rb provide clear evidence:

I Et²⁷ est quidem in Patre auctoritas, in Filio vero nativitas, in Spiritu sancto Patris Filiique communitas...

¹⁶ *Notices* 3, 254. Gilbert, *In Trin.* I, 7, 1-2; ed. N. Haring, in: *Texts and Studies* 1 (Toronto, 1955) 70-71.

¹⁷ Gilbert: nec.

¹⁸ Gilbert: humana forma.

¹⁹ Gilbert: qualitate corporis.

²⁰ Gilbert: quantitate eiusdem corporis, quae vocatur linea, longus.

²¹ Gilbert: non.

²² Gilbert: suorum finibus intervallorum.

²³ *Notices* 3, 253.

²⁴ *Notices* 3, 255.

²⁵ *Notices* 3, 255: Gilbert, *In Trin.* I, 7, 3; ed. Haring 71.

²⁶ Hauréau's reading: scilicet non quod non sit... is not confirmed by MS Paris, B. N. *Lat.* 14886, f. 7 which I was in a position to collate.

²⁷ Gilbert's full comment on *Rom.* 11:36 has been published by two authors: Maurice

2 *Nam* in Patre unitas, in Filio aequalitas, in Spiritu sancto unitatis aequalitatisque concordia: et *tamen* haec tria unum omnia propter Patrem, aequalia omnia propter Filium, conexas omnia propter Spiritum sanctum.²⁸

3 Huius Trinitatis in creatura quomodo dignum est apparet vestigium.²⁹ Nam omnia quae arte divina facta sunt, et unitatem quandum et speciem et ordinem ostendunt. Nam quicquid est, et unum aliquid est—sicut sunt naturae corporum et ingenia animarum—et specie formatur—ut scilicet corpora figuris et qualitatibus et animae artibus—et ordinem petit vel tenet—ut corpora ponderibus et collocationibus et animae delectationibus.

4 *Quorum*³⁰ omnium in Trinitate est summa origo, perfectissima pulcritudo et beatissima delectatio.

5 *Nam* aeternitas in Patre, species in Imagine, usus in Munere.³¹

6 *Unum* Principium ad quod recurrimus, *una* Forma quam sequimur, *una* Gratia qua reconciliamur.³²

7 *Itaque* Creatorem³³ per ea quae facta sunt conspicientes *digne confitemur quod unus*³⁴ Deus Pater EX QUO OMNIA, unus Unigenitus Christus PER QUEM OMNIA, *unum* in omnibus Donum IN QUO OMNIA. IPSI *secundum substantiam* singulariter³⁵ *uni* SIT GLORIA IN SAECULA. AMEN.

To this text one can truly apply what Gilbert wrote after the Consistory of Rheims (1148): What I have written is to educated readers not only solid in doctrine but also so closely in harmony with the approved writings of the past that one may come to think it was stolen rather than original.³⁶

Simon and Vincenzo Miano. See M. Simon, 'La glose de l'épître aux Romains de Gilbert de la Porrée', in: *RevHistEcc* 52 (1957) 75. The transcription is based on MS London, Brit. Mus. Add. 11853, f. 41. V. Miano, 'Il commento alle lettere di s. Paolo di Gilberto Porretano', in: *Bibl. Pontif. Athenaei Antoniani* 7 (Rome 1951) 181 f. I have also collated MS Bruges, Bibl. mun. 78, f. 24. The first ternary is derived from Augustine, *Sermo* 11, 12, 18; PL 38, 454.

²⁸ Augustine, *De Doctr. chr.* I, 5, 5; CCL 32, 9 (15-18). Only the words *nam* and *tamen* are Gilbert's.

²⁹ Augustine, *De Trin.* VI, 10, 12; PL 42, 932: Cuius in creatura quomodo dignum est apparet vestigium. Augustine, *De Vera Rel.* 7, 13; PL 34, 129: Omnis enim res... simul haec tria habet ut *et unum aliquid sit et specie propria discernatur a ceteris et rerum ordinem non excedat*.

³⁰ Augustine, *De Trin.* VI, 10, 12; PL 42, 932: In illa enim Trinitate summa origo est rerum omnium et perfectissima pulcritudo et beatissima delectatio.

³¹ Copied from Augustine, *De Trin.* VI, 10, 11; PL 42, 931. Cf. *De Trin.* XV, 3, 5; PL 42, 1059: Ait Hilarius episcopus: Aeternitas in Patre... St. Hilary, *De Trin.* II, 1; PL 10, 51A: Infinitas in aeterno...

³² Augustine, *De Vera Rel.* 55, 113; CCL 32, 260: Principium ad quod recurrimus et Formam quam sequimur et Gratiam qua reconciliamur.

³³ Augustine, *De Trin.* VI, 10, 12; PL 42, 932: Creatorem per ea quae facta sunt intellectum conspicientes... *Rom.* 1:20.

³⁴ Hilary, *De Trin.* II, 1; PL 10, 50D: Unus enim Deus Pater EX QUO OMNIA et unus Unigenitus Dominus Noster PER QUEM OMNIA et unus Spiritus Donum IN omnibus.

³⁵ Cf. Augustine, *De Trin.* I, 6, 12; PL 42, 827: Singulariter intulit: Ipsi gloria...

³⁶ In *Trin.* (praef.) 7; ed. Haring 34.

It is beyond doubt that Simon used paragraph 3 of our transcribed text when he wrote:

Huius³⁷ autem Trinitatis in creatura quoque modo apparet vestigium. Nam omnia, quae arte divina facta sunt, et unitatem quandam et speciem et ordinem in se ostendunt. Nam quicquid est, et unum aliquid est—sicut sunt corpora³⁸ et spiritus³⁹—et specie formatur⁴⁰—ut corpora figuris et qualitatibus et animae artibus⁴¹—et petit vel tenet⁴² ordinem—ut corpora ponderibus ut quae minus sunt affinia terrae minus sunt gravia et econtra⁴³ et collocationibus ut quanto sunt graviora tanto deprimantur inferius et quanto leviora tanto extollantur altius et animae delectationibus.

The italicized words are Simon's. They reveal how he followed Gilbert's method of interpreting.

Paragraph 4 of Gilbert's text appears in Simon's *Sentences* with the following modification indicated by italics:

Quorum⁴⁴ omnium, scilicet unitatis, speciei et ordinis, in Trinitate est summa origo, perfectissima pulcritudo et beatissima delectatio.

We may now also conclude that Simon copied from Gilbert (paragr. 2) when he wrote:

Est ergo haec distinctio: unitas, aequalitas, concordia. Et tamen haec tria unum propter Patrem, aequalia propter Filium, conexa propter Spiritum sanctum.⁴⁵

Simon does not tell his readers that the *distinctio* dates back to St. Augustine. In fact, he attributes it to Hilary. It seems that contrary to the method generally adopted in the commentary on St. Paul Gilbert did not mark the origin of these passages on the margin. Anxious to supply a patristic source Simon states:

Unde⁴⁶ HILARIUS: In Patre auctoritas, in Filio nativitas, in Spiritu sancto utriusque communitas.

The text is derived from Gilbert (paragr. 1) who copied it from an Augustinian sermon. Needless to say, Gilbert does not attribute it to Hilary. Simon makes a similar error in the following text:

³⁷ M. Schmaus, 'Die Texte' 67. The edition (not intended to be critical) is based on MSS Paris, B. N. Lat. 3141A and 14886. I have been able to collate only the latter to confirm some readings.

³⁸ Gilbert: naturae corporum (Augustine).

³⁹ Gilbert: et ingenia animarum (Augustine).

⁴⁰ Schmaus: formantur. It seems that both MSS used by Schmaus read formantur. Since the subject is *unum*, the verb requires the singular as found in Gilbert and Augustine.

⁴¹ Schmaus: actibus. MS Paris, B. N. Lat. 14886, f. 13 reads artibus.

⁴² Schmaus: petunt vel tenent. See note 40.

⁴³ Cf. Gilbert, *De Hebdomadibus* 16; ed. N. Haring, in: *Traditio* 9 (1953) 195.

⁴⁴ M. Schmaus, 'Die Texte' 67.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*. On p. 66 Simon attributes the text to St. Hilary: In Patre ergo ab Hilario dicitur esse unitas... adiectum est ab Hilario: In Filio vero aequalitas...

⁴⁶ Schmaus, 'Die Texte' 65.

Ecce⁴⁷ rursus distinctiones personarum appropriatione nominum, non rerum, ab HILARIO posita: Summa origo, perfectissima pulcritudo, beatissima delectatio. Item: aeternitas, species, usus. Unde: Aeternitas in Patre, species in Imagine, usus in Munere.

The first of these two trinitarian formulas dates back to St. Augustine and is found in paragraph 4 of Gilbert's text. The second formula agrees with Gilbert's reading. The first member of this second formula (*Aeternitas in Patre*) dates back to St. Augustine who attributes it twice⁴⁸ to St. Hilary. But St. Hilary had written: *Infinitas in aeterno, species in Imagine, usus in Munere*.⁴⁹

In view of the fact that the change was introduced by St. Augustine it is truly amusing to read the following criticism, obviously aimed at Gilbert by an author who belongs to the school of Thierry of Chartres:

Quidam⁵⁰ tamen aut haec verba non intelligens aut nova more suo volens invenire transmutavit *In Aeterno infinitas* sic dicens: *In Patre aeternitas, species in Imagine*, etc. Sed de hoc non curo.

Had Gilbert's critic cared a little more he might not have described this *quidam* as ignorant and a novelty seeker.

Simon's *Sentences* contain other passages derived from Gilbert. The examples offered show how closely he followed Gilbert's text. Did Simon know Gilbert personally? B. Hauréau⁵¹ goes as far as to say that Simon "doit avoir entendu Gilbert de La Porée". Unfortunately, too little is known about Simon's student years to confirm this assumption. Warichez points out that when Simon was teaching at Paris two other Porretans were prominent as teachers: Raoul Ardent at Poitiers and Alan of Lille (d. 1202) at Montpellier.⁵² In addition to these two scholars, Peter of Poitiers (d. 1205) and Master Martin were, as Warichez puts it, "dans l'orbite de Simon"⁵³ and created "un courant plutôt aristotélien et porrétaïn".⁵⁴ We know with certainty that their contemporary Everard of Ypres sat at Gilbert's feet at Chartres, Paris, and Poitiers. Since Gilbert died in 1154 it is quite conceivable that, at one time or another, all these scholars including Hugh of Honau, Peter of Vienna, and Adhemar of Saint-Ruf (Valence) were among Gilbert's students.

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⁴⁷ Schmaus, 'Die Texte' 68.

⁴⁸ *De Trin.* VI, 10, 11 and XV, 3, 5; PL 42, 931 and 1059.

⁴⁹ *De Trin.* II, 1; PL 10, 51A.

⁵⁰ Pseudo-Bede, *In Titulo*; PL 95, 397B.

⁵¹ *Histoire de la philosophie scolastique* II, 1 (Paris, 1880), 59.

⁵² *Les Disputationes*, p. xxxvii.

⁵³ *Ibidem*, p. xxxv.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, p. xxxix.

MERMECOLION — A MEDIAEVAL LATIN WORD FOR 'PEARL OYSTER'

Some illuminated manuscripts of the *Physiologus* contain a miniature illustrating the final chapter of this ancient allegorical treatise on birds and beasts which is almost as puzzling at first sight as the name of the object which it represents.¹ Below a red sun encircled by flames there floats on the surface of blue water a green globe, its two halves open in the direction of the sun. The rubric of this section sheds no light on the scene portrayed; it states: *De lapide mermeclion*. Only a reading of the text—one of the very few pertaining to stones in this collection of fabulous zoological lore—reveals that this globe is the pearl oyster which opens its two valves to the sun's rays in order to conceive a pearl. Allegorically this generation represents the conception of Christ in the Virgin Mary.² It is for the word *mermeclion* (or *mermeclion*) and its context that a partial and admittedly conjectural explanation is here proposed.

The beginning of the long account of the pearl as it appears in manuscripts from the ninth to the fourteenth century reads as follows in a typical text:³

De mermeclion et de naturis eius.

De sancta Maria et filio eius Iesu Christo.

Item lapis est in mari, qui dicitur latine mermeclion, grece conca sabea, quia concavus est et rotundus. Est autem in duas partes divisus, ita ut cum voluerit claudat.⁴ Hic ergo de fundo maris in matutinis horis ascendere dicitur.⁵ Ergo, cum ascenderit de loco suo super mare, aperit os suum et suscipit intra se de rore celi et circumfulget eum radiis solis et sic fit intra eum margarita preciosa et splendida valde, quippe que rore celi concepta est et de radio solis clarificata. Lapis ergo iste qui dicitur conchus, figuram gerit Sancte Maria...

Mermecolion is listed in no Mediaeval Latin dictionary; but should one seek *mirmicoleo*, the spelling which appears in a ninth century manuscript, Bodl.,

¹ For example, Paris, Bibl. Nat., lat. 2495 B, fol. 45, and Cambridge, Sidney Sussex College 100, fol. 40v. For a partial list of manuscripts containing the chapter on the pearl, see the present writer's *Mediaeval Latin and French Bestiaries* (2nd ed., Chapel Hill, 1962), 25-30.

² An unusual and beautiful illustration for this chapter which commonly is limited to the schematically drawn open or closed bowls under the sun, occurs in a late twelfth century manuscript, Oxford, Bodl. 602, fol. 35v, where, beside rather realistically depicted oyster shells, the artist has drawn a graceful Virgin holding her miraculously conceived Son.

³ The entire text of this version of the *Physiologus* as it appears in London Brit. Mus., Royal 2 C. xii, thirteenth century, is printed by Max Friedrich Mann in "Der Bestiaire Divin des Guillaume le Clerc," *Französische Studien*, VI Band, 2 Heft (1888). The *mermeclion* is found in Ch. 37.

⁴ Some manuscripts, such as Oxford, Bodl. 602 and Paris, Bibl. Nat., lat. 2495 B, are more explicit here: "...cum voluerit aperiat se, cum voluerit claudat."

⁵ The two above mentioned manuscripts read: "Hic ergo de profundo maris ascendit, et matutinis horis habet intra se carnem."

Auct. T.2.23, a word of similar appearance would be found in Du Cange's *Glossarium Mediae et Infimae Latinitatis*: "*mirmicoleon* a mirmica et leon, quod est leo componitur... est parvum valde animal formicis adversum. Joan. de Janua. Vide *Formicoleon*." Niermeyer's *Mediae Latinitatis Lexicon minus* likewise includes *myrmicoleon*... "fourmi-lion — ant-lion." In no dictionaries however does the word *mermecolion* or its variant spellings exist in reference to any kind of bivalve shell-fish, and only once has this relationship been noted. In his indispensable but rare work, *The Bestiary*, Montague Rhodes James expressed surprise at finding the name of the ant-lion, the *mirmicoleon* of the Greek *Physiologus* and some Latin versions, attached to the pearl oyster.⁶ Although it is not necessary to dwell on the characteristics of the fantastic ant-lion whose name indicates its double nature — part ant and part lion — its presence in two versions of the *Physiologus* demands some mention in our attempt to establish a plausible connection between the name for this animal and that of the pearl oyster.⁷ Briefly, the word *mirmicoleon* occurs in a relatively unusual version of the *Physiologus* in chapter 33 beginning: "De mirmicoleon: In Job Elefas Temaneorum rex dixit de mirmicoleon: Perit eo quod non habeat escam..."⁸ The passage continues, stating that whereas the father of the ant-lion has the fore-parts of a lion and eats flesh, its mother has the face of an ant and eats plants. The offspring, a *mirmicoleonta*, dies because its hybrid nature prevents its taking nourishment. A more common account, and one which is slightly less fantastic, is found in the version of the *Physiologus* erroneously attributed to Hugh of Saint Victor and printed with his works under the title *De Bestiis et aliis rebus*.⁹ The animal's name, *formicaleon* — a Latin translation of the Greek — is explained as referring to the ant-lion's superiority over other ants. It is described as a small animal which hides in the dust in order to kill the other ants as they pass by carrying grain.¹⁰ It is evident from these few remarks that there is no similarity in the appearance or the actions of the double-natured *mirmicoleon* and the pearl-producing *mermecolion*, and that any explanation based on the transferral of traits later leading to a transferral of name must be eliminated.

Although there exists in some versions of the *Physiologus* a curious and original account of how swimmers use an agate tied to a line which is then cast in the water to find the pearl,¹¹ this legend offers no clue to the name *mermecolion*, nor do references to the gathering of pearls in Arrian's *Indica*

⁶ *The Bestiary* (Edited for the Roxburghe Club. Oxford, 1928), 9.

⁷ The history of this odd animal has been written by George C. Druce, "An Account of the *Μυρμηκολέων* or Ant-Lion," *The Antiquaries Journal*, 3 (1923), 347-364.

⁸ See Francis J. Carmody, "Physiologus Latinus Versio Y," *University of California Publications in Classical Philology*, XII (1933-44), 127.

⁹ See Migne, PL 177, 75.

¹⁰ Pseudo-Hugo also includes in this chapter an account of the gold-digging ants.

¹¹ For example, in the Greek version (Ch. 44) edited by Francesco Sbordone, *Physiologus* (Milan, 1936), and in Carmody, *op. cit.*, 102. In the latter work, Versio Y, the agate is treated in Ch. 22, while the following chapter, entitled *De lapide sotoros et margarita*, records the pearl's birth in this manner: "...est lapis (two manuscripts add here: vel piscis) in mari qui vocatur sotoros; et venit a mari matutino ante lucanum; et aperit

(VIII.8) or the lengthy description in Pliny (*Nat. Hist.*, IX.35.107).¹² It is only by consulting the prolific compiler of etymologies, the seventh century Isidore of Seville, and the later scholar, Rabanus Maurus, that we find the first elements of a possible reconstruction of the text. In Isidore's chapter on fish. (*Etymologiae*, XII.6.49), various types of shell fish are thus described:

Concharum multa genera sunt; inter quas et margaritiferae, quae † ocello † dicuntur in quarum carne pretiosus calculus solidatur. De quibus tradunt hi qui in animantium scripsere naturis eo quod nocturno tempore litore appetant, et ex caelesti rore margaritum concipiunt; et † ocello † nominantur.

The word *oceloe* obviously presented difficulties to several scribes since the editor gives five variant readings: *oecaeloe*, *caeloe*, *aceloe*, *oecoloe*, *eceloe*.¹³ In an almost identical passage Rabanus Maurus presents an etymology more immediately comprehensible than Isidore's: "... et ex coelesti rore margaritum. Unde et coeloe nominantur."¹⁴

Here we shall have to imagine what might have occurred in the mind of a scribe at some unknown date when he was faced with a word which he did not recognize. It is apparent that there was already uncertainty connected with the name given to pearls which were conceived from celestial dew, those *coeloe*, to use Rabanus' spelling. To the ordinary scribe who was unversed in natural history there was a certain resemblance in form and meaning among the words *coclea* (or *cochlea*), 'a snail' or 'a snail shell', *cochloe*, 'a kind of shell fish with spiral shells', *concha*, 'a bivalve shell fish, a mussel', and the pearl that was called *coeleo*. We should therefore propose that the original reading of the first sentence on the pearl in the *Physiologus* was: "Item lapis est in mari qui dicitur latine marina coclea..."¹⁵ Were *coclea* misconstrued as *coelea* (an understandable mistake in a manuscript) and the two words written together as

conchas (id est os summ) et deglutit celestem rorem, et radium solis et lune et que sursum siderum; et sic nascitur margarita de superioribus astris." A similar description in Pseudo-Hugo (*op. cit.*, col. 115) begins: "Est lapis vel piscis qui vocatur conchus."

¹² Other readings concerning the pearl are equally unrewarding. Among these is the Glossarius Ansileubus (published by Angelo Mai, *Classici Auctores*, Rome, 1835 VII, 589) which omits the essential word. This very omission is significant since it probably indicates that the "Greek word" was not understood by the scribe. The beginning of the text reads: "Conchus lapis est in mari, graeco vocabulo appellatur hoc quia convexus est et rotundus..." Another formula occurs in the manuscript used by Migne for Book II of Pseudo-Hugo's *De bestiis* (*op. cit.*, col. 80). This contains an unusually elaborate introductory sentence on the various words for pearl: "De concha seu concha margaritifera. Est inter conchas margaritiferas, id est conchas et margaritas quae Latine uniones, et vulgo perlae vocantur ferentes, species quaedam, quae aliis marmatholion, ab Latinis concha Sabaea dicitur, quia concava est et rotunda..."

¹³ *Etymologiarum sive originum libri XX*, ed. W. M. Lindsay (Oxford, 1911). Still another variant, *cocaeloe*, occurs in Pseudo-Hugo's chapter on shell fish (*op. cit.*, coll. 110).

¹⁴ Migne, PL 111, 238.

¹⁵ Marcellus medicus (fifth century) mentions *cocleae marinae* (30, 45), and Rufinus in his church history speaks of "marinas cochleas, quae conchylia vocant" (IV.14.4). See *Die lateinische übersetzung des Rufinus*, ed. Theodor Mommsen (Leipzig, 1903).

marinacoelea, we have the basis for the strange word *mermecoleon* which is not unlike *mirmicoleon*, already familiar in the Latin version containing the chapter on the ant-lion. The same number of strokes is needed for writing *-ina-* as for *-ma-*, and the phonological change of *a* to *e* is possible. Given man's propensity to clarify by means of superficial resemblances what to him is obscure, the proposed conjecture seems far from preposterous.

Much more uncertain is the origin of the alleged Greek name of the pearl oyster, *conca sabea* (written usually as two words), and only the most tentative hypothesis can be presented. All efforts to relate these two words to any form of the Greek *κόγχη* followed by a descriptive adjective have proved as vain as the attempt to make *sabea* into the Arabian region of Sabaea known in antiquity for its spices. Apparently the words *conca* and *sabea* were thought to be derived from the shape of the objects they designated — *conca sabea*, quia concavus est et rotundus. A twelfth century *Liber Glossarum* (Bibl. Nat., lat. 7647 A, fol. 77) explicitly states: "Conca dicta quia concava." The resemblance is clear. But for *sabea*, the explanation is less evident. The word might be a deformation of *sphaera*, though for numerous reasons this seems improbable. More likely there is an ambiguous connection between *conca sabea* and the *conchea baca* which Virgil used to refer to the pearl in his *Culex* (67): "...nec Indi/ conchea baca maris pretio est." *Bacca* or *baca*, literally 'berry', was figuratively used by Horace and Ovid to designate the pearl.¹⁶ How the transformation took place, if indeed there was one, and when the words were qualified as Greek, will probably remain the secret of the scribe responsible for these changes.

Palaeographical, phonological, and particularly psychological reasons, however, lead us to think that the origin of the word *mermecoleon* referring to the pearl oyster can be traced to one of the words used by Isidore and Rabanus to designate the pearl born in the sea from celestial dew. As this word suffered changes in spelling and was deformed beyond recognition, a new word appeared that was eventually made to conform to the already known word for ant-lion, the *mirmicoleon*. Thus the names of these two totally disparate objects came with time to resemble each other.

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THE CASTLE OF VNITE IN *PIERS PLOWMAN*

G. R. Owst in *Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England*, revealing the extent of Langland's debt to the vast sermon and homily tradition, brilliantly summarizes the history of the castle images and relates the "Toure" of Truth, the "Castel of Care," and the "Castel of Kynde" in *Piers Plowman* to homiletic

¹⁶ Under *bacae*, whose second meaning is *uniones*, Du Cange cites both Prudentius and the ninth century monk from Saint Gall, Magister Iso, who wrote: "Bacas, gemmas rotundas, qui uniones vocantur,..."

prototypes.¹ He does not, however, mention the image of the castle of *Vnite*² which occurs late in the *Vita*.³

The work which may provide the direct source of Langland's Castle of Unity is the *Ancrene Riwe*. A comparison of the corresponding passages in *Piers Plowman* and in the *Ancrene Riwe*, as well as an examination of their contexts, suggests that Langland was working with not only the image of the castle in the *Ancrene Riwe* but also the idea of Christian unity as a protection against the onslaught of the devil and the seven deadly sins which occurs in the adjoining passage of the *Riwe*.

Recall the scene in the *Vita*: Pride has gathered "a grete oest" to destroy "Conscience and al Crystene · and cardinale vertues..." (B-text XIX, ll. 331 ff.; C-text XXII, ll. 337 ff.). Conscience advises all Christians "...to wende / Hastiliche in-to Vnyte · and holde we vs there ... For witterly I wote wel · we beth nougte of strengthe / To gone agayne Pryde · but Grace were with vs." Then Kynde Witte suggests to Conscience that the Christians "...deluen a dyche · depe a-boute Vnite as it a pyle were. / Conscience comaunded tho · al Crystene to delue, / And make a muche mote · that myzte ben a strengthe, / To helpe holycherche · and hem that it kepeth." At this point, without any exhortation from their leaders, the Christians begin suddenly to repent and to refuse sin. "...and then welled water · for wikked werkes, / Egerlich ernynge · out of mennes eyen. / Clennesse of the comune · and clerkes clene lyvyng / Made Vnite holicherche · in holynesse to stonde."

Compare this with the similar image in the *Ancrene Riwe*:

...hwon hit so biualleð ðet me asaileð buruhwes oðer castles. þeo ðet beoð wiðinnen heldeð schaldin-de water ut.⁷ & werieð so ðe walles. & 3e don also. ase ofte ase þe ueond asaileð ouwer castel.⁸ & te soule buruh. mid inwarde bonen worpeð ut uppon him schaldirde teares. þet dauī sigge biðe. contribulasti ca'pita draconum in aquis. þu hauest forschalded he seið þe drake heaued mid wallinde watere. þet is mid hôte teares. þer ase þis water is.⁹ sikerliche ðe ueond flihð.⁹ leste he beo uorschalded. eft on oþer uorbisne. kastel þet haueð deope dich a buten & water beo iðe dich.⁹ þe kastel is wel kareleas aȝean his unwines. kastel. þet is euerihc god mon. þet te ueo-nd weorreð. auh habbe ȝe dope dich of deope edmodnesse. & wete teares þer to.⁹ ȝe beoð strong kastel. þe weorreur of helle mei longe asailen ou.⁹ forleosen al his hwule. eft me seið & soð hit is...⁴

Although the tears filling the moat of the castle of *Vnite* are not "hote teares," the rest of the image in the *Riwe* is strikingly similar to that in the *Vita*: the tears of the repentant sinners fill the moat and the Christian stands safe from the devil. Even the alliterations in the two passages suggest a connection. In the passage from the *Riwe*, we find "...deope dich..." and later "...dope dich of deope edmodnesse..."; in the B-text of *Piers Plowman*, we find

¹ New York, 1933, 76-85.

² Surely Owst was aware of W. W. Skeat's note on the castle of *Vnite* (*Piers The Plowman. Together with Richard The Redeless*. 2 Vols. Oxford, 1886. For Skeat's comment on the *Vnite* image, see II, p. 272, note 366. He offers no sources for the image.). Owst states (p. 80) that the castle image "is suggested here and there in the *Ancrene Riwe*," but he does not relate any of these images to the castle of *Vnite*.

³ B-text, XIX, ll. 352-378; C-text, XXII, ll. 358-382.

⁴ London, Br. Mus., Cotton Nero A. XIV. ed. Mabel Day, E.E.T.S. o.s. 225, 109-110. Similar in other MSS.

"...deluen a dyche · depe about Vnite..." (the C-text has "...deop diche..."). It is unlikely that *deop diche* was a formulaic phrase of the alliterative revival before *Piers Plowman*.⁵ It is also possible that Langland's "...welled water..." was suggested by the *Riwele*'s "...wallinde watere...."⁶

More convincing evidence of the link between these images is in that passage of the *Riwele* which follows the passage providing the castle image:

Herdi bileaue bringeð þene deuuel a vlihte anon-rihtes. & tet widneð seint iame. & seið. Resistite di abolo et fugiet auobis. etstondeð one aþean þe euonde. & he deð him o fluhte. etstond. & þuruh hwat strenče? Seinte peter techeð. cui resistite fortes in fide. stond one aþean him. & mid stronge bileaue. beoð herdi of godes helpe. & wuteð hu he is woc ðet none strenče nauēð on us. & buten ðuruh us suluen. ne mei he buten scheawe ðe uorð sumhwat of his apeware. & oluhnen oðer þreaten ðet me bugge þerof. and hwe-ðer so he deð. & hokereð & schorneð & lauhweð ðe olde ape. & lude to bisemare. & ðuruh treowe bileaue. & he halt him ischend. & deð him o fluhte swuðe. Sancti per fidem uicerunt. ðet is. alle ðe holie haluwen ouercomen þuruh bileaue þes deofles rixlunge. & ðet nis bute sunne. vor ne rixleð he ine none. & bute þuruh sunne one. nimeð nu gode þeme hu alle ðe seouen deaðliche sunnen muwen beon a bleied. & þuruh treowe bileaue. on crest nu of prude....⁷

The general similarity of this passage to that in *Piers Plowman* is obvious. The *Riwele* states that the strength of man in his attempt to resist the devil and the seven deadly sins lies in the unity of true belief — faith. This theme is, of course, identical to that which pervades our passage from *Piers Plowman*. While the seven deadly sins are not named in the passage from *Piers Plowman*, there is little doubt they are the "grete oest" of which Pride is the leader. The fortress to which the Christians flee is *holicherche* or *Unite*; this movement of the Christians into *holicherche*, the symbol of unified belief, is a dramatic echo of the *Riwele*'s injunction.

Note the marked likeness of some of the terms in the two passages: the author of the *Riwele* asks "...þuruh hwat strenče...?" and later states "...none strenče nauēð on us..." In our passage from *Piers Plowman*, Conscience is made to say "...we beth nouzte of strengthe..."; he also commands the Christians to dig a moat "...that myzte ben a strengthe..." In addition to the term *strength* which we find twice in each passage, there is a corresponding occurrence of the term *stond* (*stand*); the *Riwele* has "...etstondeð one aþean þe ueonde...", "...etstond. & þuruh hwat strenče?...," "...stond one aþean him...." In Langland's passage we find "...Vnite holicherche · in holynesse to stonde...."

Langland may have found the material for his castle of *Unite* and, indeed, for a small portion of his poem in these adjoining passages from the *Ancrene Riwele*.

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⁵ See Merle Jane Fifield, *Alliteration In the Middle English Lyrics*. Dissertation for Ph. d. University of Illinois. 1960. Unpublished. Appendixes II-VI, pp. 132-498. She catalogues formulaics not only from the lyrics but also from some works of the alliterative revival. For occurrence of the *depe dich* alliteration in secular literature after *Piers Plowman*, see the various listings of *deluen depe* in Appendix VI.

⁶ While Fifield lists nothing similar to *welled water* or *wallinde watere*, she often lists *wikked werkes*, the other alliteration found in Langland's line. The ingenuity of the poet may be solely responsible for "welled water."

⁷ Day, pp. 110-111. Similar in other MSS.

WALTER BURLEY'S TEXT, DE DIFFINITIONE

Burley's *De Diffinitione* has never been printed. The following edition of this little tract is based upon the only copy of the work known to be extant: Cad. Vat. lat. 2146, ff. 244^{va}-245^{ra}. There seems no reason to doubt its authenticity. The manuscript in which it appears¹ fairly bristles with unquestionably authentic works by the English Master. Besides, for what this kind of evidence is worth, there is a clear sytlistic correspondence between this tract and other writings of Burley known to be genuine.

The division of the text into sentences and paragraphs is wholly the work of the present editors. All contractions have been expanded, and we have supplied punctuation throughout with the purpose of rendering the text as readable as possible. We have set off with single quotation marks, terms and phrases used in the text with what the mediaeval logician would call 'material supposition'—i.e., used not to denote what they mean, but for themselves as terms or verbal expressions. We would like here to express our gratitude to Professor E.A. Moody of the University of California at Los Angeles for his help in clarifying some of the text's more baffling passages.

The text itself is quite interesting. It treats of an aspect of Burley's theory of logic not touched on in his *De Puritate Artis Logicae*.² In *De Diffinitione*, Burley gives a very clear statement of the process of defining by division and composition. He acutely, and perhaps originally, observes that division and composition are really not two ways of defining, but two operations of one way. Objections to the requirement that there be at least two species under a genus are serious, and are solved by the neat distinction of not accidental but the habitual (virtual) inclusion of species in a genus. Aristotle's opinion on what the completeness of a definition consists in, is defended by two carefully drawn distinctions. When Aristotle claims that the quiddity, or definition of all the specifically distinct parts must be expressed, the parts must be considered (1) as essential parts, and hence not like the part 'flesh and bones' when, e.g., the substance 'man' is being defined; (2) as parts *in recto* and not *in obliquo*. Burley's text follows.

Sciendum quod duplex est modus diffiniendi: scilicet, compositionis et divisionis. Qui est primus modus seu prima via diffiniendi est talis: primo capiendum est aliquod diffinibile cuius diffinito queritur, ut 'homo.' Primo igitur inquirendum est in quo predicamento contineatur species diffinienda et inveniatur quod continetur in predicamento substantie. Tunc capiendum est genus generalissimum predicamenti substantie quod gratia exempli ponatur esse substantia et dividatur per duas differentias contrarias et sibi essentielles et immediatas, ut substantia alia corporea alia incorporea, et inqueratur

¹ For a full description of the MS, see *Codices Vaticani latini: codices 2118-2192*, recensuit Anneliese Maier (Vatican City, 1961).

² Edited by P. Boehner (New York, 1955).

sub qua differentia contineatur species diffinienda, et invenietur quod continetur sub hac differentia corporea, ponatur ergo ista differentia cum genere generalissimo sic dicendo substantia corporea. Sed quia istud congregatum non est convertibile cum homine et per consequens non est sua diffinitio, capiatur proximum genus sub genere generalissimo et dividatur ut predictum est de genere generalissimo et differentia competens speciei diffiniende componatur ordinatim cum priori congregato. Verbi gratia: ponatur gratia exempli proximum genus generi generalissimo et dividatur ut premititur per has differentias, animatum et inanimatum, et quia hec differentia animatum competit homini componatur cum priori congregato ordine suo sic dicendo substantia corporea animata et quia istud congregatum adhuc non est convertibile cum homine et per consequens non sua diffinitio, capiatur proximum genus et fiant omnia sicut prius. Verbi gratia: capiatur hoc proximum corpus animatum et dividatur per illas differentias sensibile et insensibile et quia ista differentia sensibile competit homini, coniugatur cum priori proximo congregato ordine suo, sic dicendo: substantia, corporea, animata, sensibilis et quia istud adhuc non est convertibile cum [fol. 244Vb] diffinito et per consequens non est sua diffinitio, capiatur hoc proximum genus animal et dividatur per has differentias rationale et irrationale, et hec differentia rationale quia competit homini coniugatur cum priori aggregato sic dicendo: substantia, corporea, animata, sensibilis, rationalis, et quia istud, secundum opinionem Porphyrii³ et aliorum ponentium corpora supraccelestia animata anima rationali: scilicet, intelligentia, non est convertibile cum homine, ideo oportet capere istud proximum genus animal rationale et dividere ipsum per has differentias mortale et immortale. Et quia ista differentia mortale competit homini, coniungatur cum priori aggregato sic dicendo: substantia, corporea, animata, sensibilis, rationalis, mortalis et hec est vera et completa diffinitio hominis, quia quilibet pars illius aggregati est in plus et totum inaequale.

Ex hoc notandum quod via compositionis et divisionis non est due vie diffiniendi sed tantam una. Una continens duas operationes: scilicet, divisionem generis vel generum si fuerent multa genera rei diffiniende et compositionem differentie vel differentiarum cum genere generalissimo. Et quia in ista via diffiniendi prior est divisio generis quam compositio differentie vel differentiarum cum genere generalissimo, melius vocatur via divisionis et compositionis quam econverso, sicut communiter appellatur.

Et sciendum quod aliquod diffinitum habet tantum unum genus supra se, sicut hec diffinitio corpus tantum habet supra se hoc generalissimum substantia et tantum habet unam differentiam constitutivam: scilicet, corpoream. Ideo sua diffinitio componitur ex genere generalissimo et ista univoca differentia: scilicet, substantia corporea et universaliter ita est de omni specie immediate contenta in quocumque predicamento.

Circa Illud quod dictum est in principio, sciendum quod omne genus ad minus habet duas species sibi suppositas et ideo ad minus dividitur per duas differentias contrarias constitutivas istarum specierum.

Sed contra, ponitur quod omne animal preter hominem esset corruptum. Tunc animal esset genus et non haberet unam speciem. Similiter, sit A genus immediatum fenicis et B altera species que cum fenice immediate contineatur sub A; tunc corrupta fenice, A habet tantum B speciem.

Item, quantitas discreta non habet nisi istas duas species: numerum et orationem cum voce prolatam, ut patet in *Predicamentis*.⁴ Sed possibile est quod nulla sit oratio

³ Porphyrii *Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium*, A. Busse, editor (Berlin, 1887), page 11, line 24. It would be only a poor guess to suggest who the "others" are.

⁴ *Categories*, 4b 32-36.

in voce, quia possibile est quod quilibet homo sileat a loquela. Ponatur ergo in esse et remanebit tantum una species: scilicet, numerus sub isto genere.

Ad ista dicendum est quod genus habere duas species vel das differentias possit intelligi dupliciter: scilicet, accidentaliter vel habitualiter sive aptitudinaliter. Primo modo non oportet sed tantum secundo modo. Et per hoc solvuntur argumenta.

Et sciendum quod oportet quod differentie dividentes aliquod genus esse essentielles illi generi et speciebus constitutivis illis, quia diffinitio est oratio indicans quid est esse rei sive quidditatem rei. Esse autem rei et quidditas et forma eius eius (!) essentialis ratio. Si quis dividit sic animal, aliud masculinum aliud feminam, vel, aliud volatile et aliud gressibile, male dividit, quia ille sunt differentie accidentales et non essentielles. Et etiam oportet quod differentie sint immediate, quia aliter vel erunt diminute vel superflue generi dividendo. Diminute erunt, si genus dividatur per differentias inferiores, ut substantia divideretur per rationale et irrationale, quia ille differentie sunt diminute, quia disiunctum ex illis non convertitur cum genere diviso. Si sint superiores, erunt superflue et de genere diviso, ut si animal dividatur sic, aliud sensibile et aliud insensibile. Ideo⁶ sunt superflue, quia continent plus quam genus divisum sicut superius in suo inferiori alio modo sicut pars integralis in suo toto. [fol. 245 ra]

Auctoritas autem Aristotelis que dicit quod in diffinitione perfecta exprimitur quidditas cuiuslibet existentis in diffinito de quo contingit querere per quid.

Intelligendum de illis que sunt in diffinito sicut pars in suo toto et sic patet ad rationem predictam. Aliter posset dici quod in diffinitione completissima hominis debet poni divisio carnis et ossis et cuiuslibet partis specificè distincte ab aliis, ut patet 1^o *Physicorum*⁷ ubi Aristoteles dicit contra Anaxagoram quod nihil cognoscitur nisi cognoscatur ex quibus compositum et ex quot.

Idem potest sic ostendi per rationem: diffinitio est oratio indicans quidditatem rei; ergo ista diffinitio que completissime indicat quidditatem rei completissima diffinitio. Sed illa diffinitio que indicat quidditatem diffiniti per genus supremum et omnes differentias medias et cum hoc exprimit quidditates omnium partium diffiniti specificè distinctarum completissime indicat quidditatem totius diffiniti; ergo talis est completissima diffinitio.

Sed contra illud obicitur sic: si talis esset completissima diffinitio et Aristoteles 2^o *Posteriorum*⁸ tradit artem diffiniendi et docet diffinire rem per genus ens supremum et differentias medias et non per diffinitiones nec quidditatem partium, ergo non dat artem completissime diffiniendi et per consequens est diminutus.

Dicendum quod est duplex diffinitio. Quedam que componitur tantum ex partibus in recto que per se predicantur in recto de diffinito et talem artem docet Philosophus 2^o *Posteriorum*. Alia est diffinitio habens partes in obliquo, ut si homo diffineretur isto modo, 'homo est compositus ex carne et osse'. Talem artem diffiniendi non tradit Aristoteles ibi.

Sciendum quod hec est differentia inter diffinitiones substantiarum et accidentium, quod in diffinitione substantiarum ponuntur genus et differentia, et differentia vel

⁵ There follows here a word which cannot be clearly deciphered. It appears to be 'fe'. We can only suggest *figure*, *fallacie* and *false*.

⁶ The Ms at the beginning of a column has a capital 'I' with a superscript 'd' and should read *illud*. A scribal error suggests *ideo* as the correct reading.

⁷ *Physics*, 187b 11-13.

⁸ *Posterior Analytics*, 96a 20-97b 27.

differentie in recto. In diffinitione accidentium ponuntur genus accidentis in recto et differentia in obliquo, quia differentia accidentis est suum subiectum, ut si simitas debeat diffiniri per suum genus quod est concavitas et hoc in recto et per suum subiectum quod est nasus et hoc in obliquo, sic dicendo simitas est concavitas nasi vel in naso.

Item, alia est differentia quod in diffinitione substantie non cadit aliquod extrinsecum a predicamento substantie, quia substantia non diffinitur per aliquod accidens sed in diffinitione cuiuslibet accidentis cadit aliquod extrinsecum a predicamento illius accidentis: scilicet, suum subiectum quod est in predicamento substantie.

Notandum tamen quod in diffinitione completissima accidentis non ponitur suum subiectum sed loco illius ponitur eius diffinitio.

EXPLICIT

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NINETEEN LESS PROBABLE OPINIONS OF PETER LOMBARD

I

Both the corporate character of the theological enterprise in the middle ages, and the freedom with which mediaeval masters entered the fray against the most formidable "authorities," are visible in the resistance by theologians to certain theses upheld in the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. Successive editions of the *Sentences*, and of commentaries on that durable work, are not uncommonly garnished with lists of opinions, proposed by the Master of the *Sentences* to be sure, but collected under the rubric that they are "generally," *communiter*, or "today," not defended, above all, not defended by the masters of Paris. Often enough, this detail in the tradition of university theology has been given at least cursory notice, and F. Stegmüller has counted the formulation of these lists a noteworthy stage in the development of theology grounded on the *Sentences*. In particular, he has remarked that the lists burgeoned from the symmetrically distributed eight opinions, two from each of the four Books, that even Bonaventure declined to accept, until it reached a maximum of twenty nine.¹ No doubt the list tended to lengthen with the passage of time, but it would be excessively simple to give this tendency an absolute value. Bonaventure's eight can be reckoned as nine, and even he qualified the errors he could not help mentioning as those "especially," *praecipue*, unpalatable to the theologians of his generation,² thus inviting us to suppose that he might well have mentioned more.

¹ F. Stegmüller, *Repertorium Commentariorum In Sententias Petri Lombardi* (Würzburg, 1947) I, x.

² Bonaventure put together as one the two theses on angelic merit from II *Sent.*, dist. 5 and dist. 11, here listed as number 6 and number 7; his qualification of the

Despite repeated advertence to the rejected opinions, historians refer their readers to an extremely limited number of published lists. That of Bonaventure occurs, not only in his *Commentaria in IO Libros Sententiarum* where it makes two appearances,³ but also in the *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*;⁴ finally, the Quaracchi editors have included both the list of Bonaventure and another, dated by Du Plessis d'Argentré at 1300, and composed of twenty six erroneous opinions, in their edition of the *Sentences*.⁵ The list first printed by Du Plessis d'Argentré in 1728 has had much success: reprinted by J. de Ghellinck in his article on Pierre Lombard in the *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*,⁶ it had long since been taken up by Jean Aleaume for his 1757 Antwerp edition of the *Sentences*;⁷ it then entered Migne's *Patrologia* when the Aleaume text of the *Sentences* was chosen for that collection.⁸ Since each master had his reasons for accepting or rejecting positions of the Master, every list that circulated offers the historian of mediaeval theology a point of departure for a whole series of theological, canonical, and even philosophical evaluations.

II

The budget of commonly rejected opinions edited here was written by an English scribe who had found barely enough blank parchment for this purpose on folio 88^v of the British Museum's Harleian MS 3243; the whole left column and one third of the right column on that page had been used by another scribe to copy a series of theological aphorisms by Master Richard of Campsall.⁹ Using a bold, upright hand, the second of the two scribes managed to crowd on to his page the statement of nineteen "less probable opinions from

Master's departure from the more common and more probable opinions as occurring *præcipue in octo locis* is to be found in his comments on II *Sent.*, dist. 44, dubium 3; both points have been noted by J. de Ghellinck, "Pierre Lombard," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* t. 12, 2 partie, col. 2014.

³ In addition to II *Sent.*, dist. 44, dubium 3, the *Praelocutio* that opens the received text of Bonaventure's commentary on II *Sent.* contains his list; although the Quaracchi editors expressed some misgivings on the *Praelocutio*, since it is transmitted in a single codex, when they adduced Bonaventure's list in their *prolegomena* to the 1916 edition of the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, it still appears in their 1938 manual edition of Bonaventure's *Commentaria in IV Libros Sententiarum* 2, 2.

⁴ Ed. H. Denifle et A. Chatelain (Paris, 1889) 1, 220-221, no. 194.

⁵ *Petri Lombardi Libri IV Sententiarum* (Quaracchi, 1916) 1, lxxviii, n. 1.

⁶ Du Plessis d'Argentré, *Collectio judiciorum* (Paris, 1728) 118 sqq., has not been available to me; see de Ghellinck, *art. cit.* cols. 2014-2015.

⁷ *Petri Lombardi Novariensis, Episcopi Parisiensis, Sententiarum Libri Quatuor...* Per Joannem Aleaume, Parisiensem Theologiae Professore... restituti... (Antwerpe, 1757) 630-632.

⁸ PL 192, 519 B sqq. for the text of the *Sentences*; the rejected opinions are listed 961-964.

⁹ "Sixteen Sayings by Richard of Campsall on Contingency and Foreknowledge," *Mediaeval Studies* 24 (1962) 250-262.

the Books of the *Sentences*, those which the doctors do not sustain" at the price of filling out the remainder of the right column and then by writing clear across the bottom margin to the very edge of the parchment. As an item written in to make use of space left over when the more considerable elements of the codex had been completed, this list of erroneous opinions must postdate the only component that carries a date. This is the text of a discussion of "insolubles" by Roger Nottingham O.F.M., carried on near the end of June, 1343.¹⁰ Although considerably longer than the list of Bonaventure, who had read the *Sentences* at Paris between 1250 and 1254, this enumeration is only slightly shorter than the list of theses that was to occupy the Inquisitor, Nicolaus Eymericus O.P., during October and November 1397, when he composed his *Declaratio articulorum xxii magistri sententiarum*.¹¹ From the point of view of its length, the present list of nineteen opinions is plausible enough for the second half of the fourteenth century.

Spelling and punctuation have been normalized, essential references supplied, and the opinions have been numbered, in sequence for easy reference, by Arabic numerals in pointed brackets.

III

Haec sunt opiniones minus probabiles librorum sententiarum, quas non sustinent doctores:

IN PRIMO LIBRO SUNT ISTAE:

<1>

Prima est quod caritas, qua diligimus deum et proximum, est spiritus sanctus; distinctione 17, capitulo primo.¹

<2>

Secunda est quod nomina numeralia dicta de deo, ut *unus*, *trinitas*, respectu dicuntur solomodo privative; distinctione 24, capitulo primo.²

<3>

Tertia est quod nomina relativa, ut *simile*, *aequale*, etc., solum dicuntur privative; distinctione 31, capitulo primo.³

<4>

Quarta est quod deus scit omne enunciabile quod aliquando scivit; distinctione 4, <capitulo> ultimo.⁴

¹⁰ The 'Insolubilia' of Roger Nottingham O.F.M., *Mediaeval Studies* 26 (1964) 257-270; the date is given in the colophon of this text, p. 270.

¹¹ *Scriptores ordinis praedicatorum...* J. Quétif et J. Echard (Paris, 1719 sqq.) 1, 713, s. v. Nicolaus Eymerici, no. 34.

¹ References are by volume and page to the 1916 Quaracchi edition of the *Sentences*, see above, note 5; 1, 106.

² *ed. cit.* 1, 154.

³ *ed. cit.* 1, 191-192.

⁴ *ed. cit.* 1, 258, chapter 3.

< 5 >

Quinta est quod deus potest quidquid aliquando potuit; distinctione 44, capitulo ultimo.⁵

IN SECUNDO LIBRO SUNT HAEC:

< 6 >

Prima est quod angelis praemium praecessit meritum; distinctione 5, capitulo ultimo.⁶

< 7 >

Secunda est quod in merito, respectu essentialis praemii, angeli proficiunt usque ad iudicium; distinctione 11, capitulo quarto.⁷

< 8 >

Tertia est quod in veritate humanae naturae, nihil transit extrinsecum, sed ab Adam descendit tota veritas corporum humanorum; distinctione 30, capitulo *Quibus responderi*.⁸

IN TERTIO LIBRO SUNT HAEC:

< 9 >

Prima est quod anima separata a corpore sit persona; distinctione 5, capitulo ultimo.⁹

< 10 >

Secunda est quod Christus in triduo, anima separata a corpore, fuerit homo; distinctione 22, capitulo primo.¹⁰

IN QUARTO LIBRO SUNT ISTAE:

< 11 >

Prima quod sacramenta legalia non justificabant, etiam si in fide et devotione fierent; distinctione 1, capitulo secundo.¹¹

< 12 >

Secunda est quod baptizati baptismo Johannis, non ponentes spem in illo, et habentes fidem trinitatis, non erant baptizandi baptismo Christi; distinctione 2, capitulo ultimo,¹² quasi diceret baptismus Johannis, cum impositione manus, aequipollebat baptismus Christi.

< 13 >

Tertia est quod, sicut deus potuit dare alicui homini potestatem baptizandi et abluendi ab intra, sic potuerit ei communicare, vel alteri creaturae, potestatem consecrandi, ita quod potuerit creare per ministrum; distinctione 5, capitulo ultimo.¹³

⁵ *ed. cit.* 1, 270-271, chapter 2.

⁶ *ed. cit.* 1, 328-329, chapter 6.

⁷ *ed. cit.* 1, 355; in the edition, the text occurs in chapter 2, which is also the last chapter—just such variations in the internal divisions of the work justify our locating texts by volume and page.

⁸ *ed. cit.* 1, 467, chapter 14.

⁹ *ed. cit.* 2, 571-572, chapter 3.

¹⁰ *ed. cit.* 2, 650-651.

¹¹ *ed. cit.* 2, 746-747, chapter 4.

¹² *ed. cit.* 2, 754, chapter 6.

¹³ *ed. cit.* 2, 776, chapter 3.

< 14 >

Quarta est quod haeretici, ab ecclesia praecisi vel excommunicati, non habent potestatem consecrandi; distinctione 13, capitulo *Illi vero*.¹⁴

< 15 >

Quinta est quod episcopi simoniaci degradati non habent potestatem ordinandi; distinctione 25, capitulo *De simoniacis*.¹⁵

< 16 >

Sexta est quod scientia discernendi, prout nominat habitum sciendi, sit clavis; distinctione 19, capitulo primo.¹⁶

< 17 >

Septima est quod maritus sponsae alicujus per consensum de praesenti, quam ille non cognovit, ex illa copula bigamus judicatur, et ad sacras ordines accedere prohibetur; distinctione 27, capitulo ultimo.¹⁷

< 18 >

Octava est quod cognoscens sororem uxoris legitimae non potest postea uxori debitum reddere; distinctione 34, capitulo *De hiis*,¹⁸ cujus habetur contrarium express Extra: *De eo qui cognovit consanguineam uxoris suae*, capitulo *Jordanae*¹⁹ et capitulo *Discretionem*. 20

< 19 >

Nona est quod ille qui, vivente uxore legitima, contr<axer> it cum alia, volens tamen ab ea recedere, et cogitur ab ecclesia in reddendo debito, incipit excusari per obedientiam et timorem; distinctione 38, capitulo secundo,²¹ cujus habetur contrarium expresse Extra: *De sententia excommunicationis*, capitulo *Inquisitioni*.²²

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THE "DE HOMINE" OF ULRICH OF STRASBOURG

The chief work of Ulrich of Strasbourg (c. 1228 - c. 1278) is his *Summa de Bono*. The part of this work dealing with the philosophy of man (Book IV, tractates 4-6) has been found in only one manuscript.¹ This fact is striking, since the *Summa de Bono* has been discovered in twenty-two manuscripts,

¹⁴ *ed. cit.* 2, 816, chapter 1.

¹⁵ *ed. cit.* 2, 909, chapter 2.

¹⁶ *ed. cit.* 2, 867.

¹⁷ *ed. cit.* 2, 922-924, chapters 8-10.

¹⁸ *ed. cit.* 2, 956, chapter 5.

¹⁹ Decretals of Gregory IX, lib. 4, tit. 13, c. 11 (Friedberg ed. *Corpus Iuris Canonici*, vol. 2, col. 700). Cfr. legislation on the point by the Third Lateran Council, 1179 (Mansi, ed. Florence, 1759-1798, 22, col. 428, no. 4 and 5.)

²⁰ Decretals of Gregory IX, 4, 13, 6 (col. 698).

²¹ *Sentences*, ed. cit. 2, 972, chapter 3.

²² Decretals of Gregory IX, lib. 5, tit. 39, c. 44 (*ed. cit.*, 2, col. 908).

¹ Louvain, Bibliothèque de l'Université, Ms. D 320. The section in question is contained in ff. 293^v-320^r. It has never been edited.

many of which contain the other tractates of Book IV.² A simple explanation of this fact is that a later writer composed the section dealing with man in order to fill in a part of the *Summa* which Ulrich never wrote, or which was lost. This explanation would seem the only possible one in view of the note at the beginning of the section in question. In this note the scribe, Henry Weert, who copied the manuscript in 1470, says that the author of the section is John of Mechlin, doctor of theology at Cologne, who composed it in the name of Ulrich, using Ulrich's style. The scribe even records that he was given this information by a person who helped John in his task, Henry Horst.³

Yet the scholars who have considered the matter refuse to accept John of Mechlin as the author. Daguillon leaves the question open,⁴ and Dom Lottin⁵ and Fries⁶ think that Ulrich is the author. Daguillon is unconvinced of John's authorship because one manuscript lists the title of the fourth tractate of the fourth book, followed by empty pages, and because two additional manuscripts possibly allude to the existence of the tractates concerned.⁷ If these allusions were established there would be evidence of more widespread knowledge of the *De Homine* in the fifteenth century, which would argue for its having been composed earlier than 1470, and therefore being the work of Ulrich.

Dom Lottin thinks that Ulrich is the author for two additional reasons. First, the *De Homine* is heavily dependent on the *Summa de Creaturis* of St. Albert the Great, whom Ulrich usually followed faithfully. Secondly, it refers to other parts of the *Summa de Bono*, thus showing its close relationship with them.⁸

Fries adds a further argument for Ulrich's authorship, namely, that parts of the *Summa de Bono* preceding and following the *De Homine* make reference to the latter. This shows even more convincingly that the *De Homine* is an integral part of the *Summa*.⁹

It is true that these arguments, though far from being demonstrative, have some weight. However, new evidence uncovered by the present writer is so strong that it would be rash to deny the authorship of John of Mechlin. John of Mechlin and Henry Horst were both doctors of theology at Cologne.

² A list of twenty-one of these, with descriptions, is given in J. Daguillon, *Ulrich de Strasbourg, O.P. La "Summa de Bono." Livre I* (Paris, 1930) 32*-108*. A later discovery is described in H. Weisweiler, "Eine neue Überlieferung aus der Summa de bono Ulrichs von Strassburg und andere Handschriften in Innsbruck," *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie*, 59 (1935) 442-443.

³ "Hoc complementum ab hinc usque in finem hujus quarti non posuit Ulricus, sed universalis magister Johannes de Mechellinia, doctor eximius sacre theologie Coloniensis. Illud complevit sub nomine tamen et typo Ulrici predicti. Hec ex M. Henrico Horst, qui ad hoc, ut michi retulit, aliquando compilatori in adiutorium fuit." Daguillon, *Ulrich*..., 89*. For the date of the manuscript, see *ibid.*, 90*.

⁴ *Ulrich*..., 90*.

⁵ O. Lottin, *Bulletin de Théologie ancienne et médiévale*, I (1929-32) n° 411.

⁶ A. Fries, "Die Abhandlung *De Anima* des Ulrich Engelberti O.P.," *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale*, XVII (1950) 328-331.

⁷ *Ulrich*..., 91*.

⁸ *Bulletin*..., n° 411.

⁹ Fries, "Die Abhandlung..." 328-331.

Johannes Hulshoet de Mechlinia entered the University of Cologne in 1423. He received his licentiate in 1438, became professor of theology in 1451, was vice-chancellor of the University, and was still teaching in 1467.¹⁰ Henricus der Boese de Horst entered the University of Cologne in 1443, became a doctor of theology in 1480, and was still teaching in 1484.¹¹ Both men were Albertists.¹² There would seem, then, to be no extrinsic reason why Henry Weert's statement could not be true.

But there is also intrinsic evidence for his claim. John of Mechlin's commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima* was published in Cologne in 1491. It professes to follow the tradition of St. Albert the Great. Its relationship to the *De Homine* of the *Summa de Bono* is proven by a passage in the commentary which is almost the same as one in the *De Homine*:

*Summa de Bono*¹³

Sed quia non est passibilis per motum
et passione proprie dicta, propter hoc
potius a philosopho

3° de anima dicitur

possibilis quam passibilis,
et est subiectum et locus specierum
intelligibilium lumine intellectus agentis
productarum.

Patet etiam quod non solum rationalis
anima est sic divisa potestative in intel-
lectum agentem et possibilem,
ut probatur 3° de anima,

sed etiam reperiuntur hec differentie in
intelligentiis, cum sint composite ex quo
est, sed not est ibi intellectus

possibilis possibiliter, cum semper sit
reductus ad actum. Sed in anima ratio-
nali propter longe distare a primo est
possibiliter, et ergo videtur sibi hoc esse
proprium, quod sit possibilis vocatus, qui
per studium et doctrinam promovetur
continue ad adispiscendum perfectionem
luminis intelligentie agentis, quod sem-
per est receptum in intellectu possibili
intelligentiarum separatarum.

Unde anima rationalis est discursiva...

*Commentary*¹⁴

Sed quia non est passibilis per motum
et passione proprie dicta, ideo potius
vocatur a philosopho

in textu

possibilis quam passibilis.

Ex isto etiam patet quod non solum
rationalis anima est sic divisa potestative
in agentem et possibilem,

sed etiam reperiuntur hec differentie in
intelligentiis, cum sint predicto modo
composite, sed non est in eis intellectus
possibilis possibiliter, cum semper sit
reductus ad actum. Sed in anima ratio-
nali propter longe distare a primo est
possibiliter, et ergo videtur sibi hoc esse
proprium, quod sit possibilis vocatur, qui
per studium et doctrinam promovetur
continue ad adispiscendum perfectionem
luminis intelligentie, quod semper est
receptum in intellectu possibili intelligen-
tiarum separatarum.

Unde anima rationalis est discursiva...

¹⁰ G. Löhr, *Die theologischen Disputationen und Promotionen an der Universität Köln im ausgehenden 15. Jahrhundert* (Leipzig, 1926), 26, 32. Also Daguillon, *Ulrich*.... 92*. Also see n. 14.

¹¹ Löhr, *Die theologischen Disputationen*...., 25, 32.

¹² *Ibid.*, 25-26.

¹³ Lib. IV, tract. 5, cap. 2 f. 310^r2.

¹⁴ *Commentaria... de anima secundum Alberti magni... traditionem... edita... per... magistrum Johannem de Mechilinea, artium liberalium et theologie doctorem, inlyteque universitatis Colonensis vicecancellarium* (Cologne, 1491), lib. II, tract. 2; f. xl^r.

Though this text is Albertinian in both language and doctrine, a search for it in the works of St. Albert has failed to reveal it there. The best supposition, then, is that John of Mechlin wrote the *De Homine* as well as his commentary, and copied this passage from one into the other. The possibility that John copied from Ulrich's authentic *De Homine* seems unlikely, in view of the scribe's statement.¹⁵

John of Mechlin's authorship of the *De Homine* can be further defended by answering the objections against it which were presented earlier. In regard to the problem raised by Daguiillon, it can be pointed out that the only manuscript¹⁶ other than Henry Weert's which gives certain evidence of the existence of part of the *De Homine* is a manuscript of the fifteenth century whose date cannot be made more precise. It is therefore possible that it is later than the one containing the *De Homine* (1470 A.D.). Besides, it may be that Ulrich composed a treatise on man and that it was lost.

The fact that the *De Homine* is heavily dependent on St. Albert's *Summa de Creaturis* is no proof of Ulrich's authorship, as John of Mechlin was an Albertist also. The other argument of Dom Lottin, based on the fact that the *De Homine* refers to other sections of the *Summa de Bono*, can be answered by bringing attention to the witness of the scribe, who says that John wrote in Ulrich's name, using Ulrich's style.¹⁷ If John did this, he could certainly have referred to other parts of the *Summa*.

The final objection, that of Fries, is the strongest. Since other sections of the *Summa de Bono* refer to the *De Homine*, especially sections following it, it is quite likely that the *De Homine* existed. Yet this does not demonstrate that the extant *De Homine* was written by Ulrich. It is quite possible that, even if Ulrich did write a philosophy of man, it was lost.

In view of all the evidence it would seem that John of Mechlin is most likely the author of the *De Homine* in the Louvain manuscript of Ulrich's *Summa de Bono*.

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¹⁵ The work of John of Mechlin on Albert the Great which is mentioned by Daguiillon (*Ulrich*..., 92*) is *Dicta Alberti Magni super III-IV libris sententiarum per Joannem de Mechlinia*, and is in the Philadelphia Free Library (Ms. Lewis 141). However, its subject matter is such as to be of no help in establishing the authenticity of the *De Homine* we have been discussing.

¹⁶ Saint-Omer, n° 152.

¹⁷ See n. 3.

REPORT OF A THESIS DEFENDED AT THE PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES

Excommunication and The Secular Arm in Mediaeval England: A Study in Legal Procedure from the Thirteenth to the Sixteenth Century

F. DONALD LOGAN

In England by the early thirteenth century records begin to appear which reveal a procedure of punishment of obdurate excommunicates by the secular power. Similar procedure existed in other parts of western Christendom, but nowhere else was the procedure so highly formalized and institutionalized as it was in England. The present thesis describes in detail this English procedure from the time of its appearance in the records of the thirteenth century until the time of the reforming statutes of Henry VIII in the 1530's. Happily, a substantial body of records illustrative of this procedure survives: in fact, among the public records are kept approximately 7,600 significations of excommunications (i.e., episcopal requests for secular aid) for this period.

The use of secular constraint against excommunicates in England was not an invention of the thirteenth century. It owes its origin, rather, to the provisions made by William the Conqueror when he withdrew ecclesiastical matters from the secular courts. The ecclesiastical courts in order to enforce their decrees were to use the censure of excommunication and, if that failed, they could have recourse to the king or sheriff. It is not clear when imprisonment began to be used as the form of secular punishment, but it was in this form that it appears in the records of the early thirteenth century.

The possession of the power to excommunicate did not imply possession of the right to request the king to capture excommunicated persons. Bishops, archdeacons, abbots, and judges acting by their commissions could excommunicate, but only the residential bishops of England and Wales could by right signify excommunicates to the royal chancery; at various times the king granted to other prelates, (e.g., abbots of certain exempt monasteries) the power to signify. Papal judges-delegate were consistently denied this privilege, yet in 1499 without explanation they began to exercise it. The bishops and these other prelates could signify only those persons over whom they had ecclesiastical jurisdiction.

Not every excommunicated person was subject to this procedure. A great many excommunicates — perhaps the majority — fell outside the provisions of this procedure, since their excommunications had been incurred *ipso facto*. The excommunicates against whom the secular arm was used were those who had been censured because of contumacy, and in the overwhelming majority of cases the contumacy had been committed against the ecclesiastical courts. Failure of a person to obey decrees of the court either by not coming when cited or by leaving before termination of the case or by not carrying out the decisions of the court constituted the contumacious behaviour. In addition, the procedure was used against excommunicates whose contumacies had been contracted by failure to pay the clerical subsidy, especially between 1371 and 1406.

The types of cases in the ecclesiastical courts which gave rise to the contumacies were representative of the cases, criminal and civil, with which the courts were concerned: tithes, marriages, benefices, testaments, etc. Heresy cases played no significant part in the history of the signification procedure. Likewise, an analysis

of the persons against whom the secular arm was invoked reveals a representative cross-section of medieval society. To the attention of the judges of the ecclesiastical courts there came contumacious persons who were lay and clerical, men and women, of high and lowly condition. Some were titled, some even mitred; some were scholars. Yet most belonged to the endless army of those who appear only once in the records of history. They all had it in common that their contumacies had led to their excommunications.

After such an excommunicate remained forty days under sentence, the secular arm could be invoked. The court could decree the invoking of the secular arm and send the decree to the bishop or, alternatively, the court could cite the excommunicate peremptorily to show cause why the secular arm ought not to be invoked. His failure to answer the latter question adequately would lead to the decree.

The bishop normally assented to the court's request and sent the signification to the royal chancery. This signification was in the form of a letter patent sent in the bishop's name and under his seal; it informed the king of at least the name of the excommunicate and the fact that he had remained more than forty days excommunicated.

Upon receipt of the bishop's signification chancery issued as a matter of course and without unusual delay the writ *de excommunicato capiendo*. The writ was addressed to the sheriff of the place where the excommunicate was known or believed to be and directed him to seize the person of the excommunicate and detain him until he was absolved from his censure. The sheriff depended on his bailiffs for the execution of the writ. When the excommunicate was seized, he was taken to the royal prison in the local county. This writ was probably as effective as any other royal writ for capture.

By appealing his excommunication a person who had been signified for arrest could, at least temporarily, evade secular imprisonment. The judge of appeal would absolve him *ad cautelam* so that he could proceed with his appeal without hindrance. Once absolved, such a person was no longer an excommunicate and, hence, no longer subject to secular coercion on that title. During the second half of the thirteenth century the usual procedure was for the bishop of the jurisdiction *ad quem* to notify chancery of the absolution, and the writ for capture was thereupon superseded. By the early fourteenth century another procedure became dominant. By it the appellant proved in chancery the fact of his appeal and its actual prosecution and requested a writ superseding the writ for his capture; chancery responded by giving his opponents a day in King's Bench to show reason why his capture should not be superseded and, pending that day, chancery allowed the appellant his freedom in mainprise. In most cases the hearing in King's Bench resulted in the acquittal of the appellant *sine die*.

The bishop invoked the secular arm against obdurate excommunicates for the same reason for which he had excommunicated them: to cure them of their contumacy. The successful use of the secular arm would have led to the repentance of the excommunicate and his absolution from his excommunication. The manifest nature of the contumacy required that the excommunicate first give suitable caution to repair the injury which his contumacy had caused before he could be absolved. Once suitable caution had been offered and absolution had been given, there was no further reason for the person's detention in jail, and the bishop sent a request for his release either to chancery or directly to the sheriff. Chancery in response to such a request issued the writ *de excommunicato deliberando* to the sheriff, and release followed forthwith.

The procedure which this thesis describes survived the Reformation with only slight modifications and lasted into the early seventeenth century, when it fell into desuetude.

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